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Introduction

On 15 December 2011, at the Sandwell Christian Centre, in Oldbury, in the West Midlands, Prime Minister David Cameron gave a speech in which he wanted to talk about ‘troubled families’. Whether they were called ‘families with multiple disadvantages’ or ‘neighbours from hell’, he said, ‘we’ve known for years that a relatively small number of families are the source of a large proportion of the problems in society’.1 It was estimated that the state had spent £9 billion on just 120,000 families the previous year, or £75,000 per family. The Prime Minister had appointed Louise Casey as Head of a Troubled Families Unit in the Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG). She was to lead the nationwide task of ‘getting to grips’ with the number of troubled families, and working out where they were. There were estimated, for instance, to be 4,500 of these families in Birmingham, 2,500 in Manchester, and 1,115 in Sandwell. By February 2012, local authorities were to have identified who the troubled families were, where they lived, and what services they used. The Government was committing £448m to turn around the lives of these families by the end of the Parliament, funding 40 per cent of the total cost. Thus Cameron ended by proclaiming that ‘we must get out there, help them turn their lives around and heal the scars of the broken society’.2

Immediate press reaction to the speech focused on the perceived inadequacy of the offered funding. What is perhaps more striking, if unsurprising, is that writers and commentators seemed unaware of the historical resonance of the phrase ‘troubled family’. The example of troubled families indicates that what is missing from this debate is a sense of its historical dimension. Very little is known about the extent to which the agenda on troubled families marks a radical departure from previous efforts by Government in this field, or whether it is simply the latest in a series of similar labels. This book is concerned with the history of the concept of the ‘underclass’, and aims to fill that gap. It is arguable, of course, that the idea of the deserving and undeserving poor is much older, and it can certainly be identified in the early modern era. However, while we briefly review the earlier history of these ideas in the next chapter, this book really covers the period from the 1880s to the present day. Its main focus is Britain, though two chapters, on the culture of poverty and the underclass, also look in detail at the experience of the United States (US). What is perhaps most important to get across is that the book is not a history of poverty per se, but of a particular
interpretation of the causes of poverty that has reappeared periodically under slightly different labels. It seeks to understand why these ideas have been so persistent, and also how they have been moulded by the particular political, economic, and demographic concerns of specific historical periods. One issue is who has been inventing these labels, and which professional groups have been defined as ‘experts’. It has been pointed out, for instance, that whereas the main writers on poverty in the 1960s were sociologists, this area of research is now dominated by economists, and by the manipulation of large data sets. A further theme is the influence of American poverty models on British social policy, notably in the 1960s, and of what the sociologist A. H. Halsey has described as ‘ideas drifting casually across the Atlantic, soggy on arrival, and of dubious utility’. The book also looks in detail at those periods when ideas underwent a process of transition, to emerge in slightly different form, and at the periods when no underclass notion appeared to be in existence. It is thus concerned with both continuities and discontinuities. However its main concern is to explore the idea that an underclass has been successively re-invented over the past 132 years in Britain and the US.

This Introduction seeks to set the scene for the later chapters: these are arranged chronologically and examine successive re-inventions of the underclass idea over the past 132 years. But it is important to pause for a moment to look at the background to this issue. First, the introduction examines some of the difficulties that defining the underclass has posed for researchers. Second, it briefly reviews earlier writing on the history of the concept of the underclass, in both the US and Britain. Third, it makes a case for the book, arguing that earlier writing, while important, has failed to provide a systematic analysis of the history of the concept in either the US or Britain. Fourth, it outlines how the book is organized, and identifies two main questions. The first is whether the similarities between these ideas are greater than the differences. The second is whether there is sufficient linearity between these ideas to support the argument that the underclass has been periodically re-invented over the past 132 years.

Norman Fairclough has explored the language of New Labour. This has been paralleled by greater interest in the vocabulary of poverty. One international glossary, for example, includes the phrases ‘Charity Organisation Society’; ‘culture of poverty’; ‘cycle of deprivation’; ‘deserving poor’; ‘exclusion’; ‘genetic explanations’; ‘intergenerational continuity’; ‘problem families’; and ‘underclass’. It notes that the term ‘underclass’ has been used both to describe the long-term marginalized or unemployable, and as a labelling phenomenon. Certainly the difficulties of defining the underclass and the ambiguities of the term have been both an obstacle for researchers and part of its attraction for users. The Oxford English Dictionary notes the Swedish term underklass, and defines the underclass as ‘a subordinate social class, the lowest social stratum in a country or community, consisting of the poor and unemployed’. The earliest usage given in the OED is that by the Scottish poet Hugh Macdiarmid, in a biography of the Red Clydesider,
John Maclean. At his trial in 1918, Maclean stated that ‘the whole history of society, has proved that society moves forward as a consequence of an under-class overcoming the resistance of a class on top of them’. The next reference given by the OED, however, is by the Swedish economist Gunnar Myrdal in 1963, when he stated ‘less often observed . . . is the tendency of the changes under way to trap an “underclass” of unemployed and, gradually, unemployable persons and families at the bottom of a society’. The usages given in this edition of the OED, for the period 1964–85, show how Myrdal’s structural explanation has become one based increasingly on behaviour.

However, it is also important to note that defining the underclass has posed problems for researchers. Although it does not appear in Raymond Williams’s famous book *Keywords*, the term ‘underclass’ can be considered in that way, as a phrase that has its own particular history, but which plays a significant role in putting across different meanings. One of the interesting questions about the underclass is whether it is technically a class in the Marxist sense. As John Macnicol has written, many proponents of the underclass have seen it as ‘distinct from the working class – in effect, a rootless mass divorced from the means of production – definable only in terms of social inefficiency, and hence not strictly a class in a neo-Marxist sense’. For Marx and Engels the ‘dangerous class’ was the *lumpenproletariat*. The other important Marxist concept was that of the ‘reserve army of labour’. In *Das Capital*, Marx had written that a surplus working-class population tended to form an ‘available industrial reserve army’, and it was on its formation and re-formation that the cycles of modern industry depended. General movements of wages, argued Marx, were similarly regulated by the expansion and contraction of the ‘reserve army of labour’. Other writers have suggested that the social security system reproduces a ‘reserve army of labour’, and functions only secondarily to mitigate poverty or provide income maintenance. The ‘reserve army of labour’ increases competition among workers, and acts as a downward force on wages. Norman Ginsburg has written, for example, that ‘in the inter-war years the permanent existence of an inflated labour reserve army, now closely supervised by the state, performed the classic function of holding down wages and dividing the working class’. What Marx meant by the ‘reserve army of labour’ was of course the unemployed. However, it is less clear that the ‘reserve army of labour’ and the underclass are synonymous. That is one question that this book seeks to answer.

These debates about how to define the underclass became particularly heated in the 1980s, as we shall see in Chapters 7 and 8. The main contrast was then between those who used alternative structural and behavioural definitions. Thus William Julius Wilson defined the underclass as:

Individuals who lack training and skills and either experience long-term unemployment or are not a part of the labour force, individuals who engage in street criminal activity and other aberrant behaviour, and families who experience long-term spells of poverty and/or welfare dependency.
Erol R. Ricketts and Isabel V. Sawhill defined the underclass as a ‘subgroup of the American population that engages in behaviours at variance with those of mainstream populations’. Specifically, they argued that an underclass area was one with a high proportion of high school dropouts; adult males not regularly attached to the labour force; welfare recipients; and female heads of households. They estimated that 2.5m people, or 1 per cent of the American population, lived in these areas, mainly in the older industrial cities. But Robert Aponte countered in 1990, writing of the US, that the term underclass had never been properly defined, despite three decades of sporadic use.

British underclass researchers have faced similar problems, with definitions that have stressed either structural or behavioural elements. David Smith defined the underclass as ‘those who fall outside this [Marxist] class schema, because they belong to family units having no stable relationship at all with the “mode of production” – with legitimate gainful employment’. Thus for Smith, the underclass lay outside the conventional class hierarchy, and below the bottom class. David Willetts viewed the underclass as the same as ‘long-term or frequent claimants of income support’. But British commentators have been critical of attempts to define the underclass. Writing in 1987, John Macnicol outlined three problems of defining the underclass. First, that a popular version of the concept had been internalized by ordinary working-class people as the converse of ‘respectable’. Second, there was the difficulty of separating the underclass concept from wider assumptions about the inheritance of intelligence and ability that were common before IQ testing was discredited. Third, a further complication was the fact that the idea of an underclass had also been used by those on the Left to describe the casualties of capitalism, and those suffering from acute economic deprivation. Hartley Dean and Peter Taylor-Gooby have argued that it is a concept which ‘empirically speaking, is hopelessly imprecise and, as a theoretical device, has repeatedly conflated structural and cultural definitions of not only poverty, but of crime as well’. They concluded that underclass was ‘a symbolic term with no single meaning, but a great many applications ... it represents, not a useful concept, but a potent symbol’.

These debates about how to define and measure the underclass were perhaps most marked in the 1980s. In this book we will not attempt to define the underclass since our concern is with the history of a discourse rather than an empirical reality. Equally, however, we do not regard the underclass as simply a synonym for the poor. Its use over time has generally been more precise than that – generally to define a much smaller group whose poverty is attributed in part to wider structural factors, but also with respect to the behavioural inadequacies of individual members. We are concerned with how the underclass has been defined at different times, and what these definitions illustrate about the individuals and organizations doing the defining. There are continuities in these debates, notably in the relative weighting given to behavioural factors on the one hand, and
structural causes on the other. Nevertheless there are also differences in the way in which the underclass has been defined at different times, reflecting the distinctive economic, political, and social contexts of particular periods. Moreover, two of the ideas that we will look at – the culture of poverty and the cycle of deprivation – were more about outlining a process by which people became or remained poor, than about setting out parameters with which a particular social group could be circumscribed. One of the aims of the book, then, is to map these continuities and changes in debates about defining and measuring the underclass.

It is important to recognize that although the history of the concept of the underclass has never been systematically explored, there has nevertheless been important earlier work that provides a set of hypotheses and arguments that can be tested against the evidence. The theme of the deserving and undeserving poor in the early modern period is one example of this timeless discourse. But there has also been writing on the underclass in both the US and Britain.

In the modern period, academics have explored how ideas about stigma and deviance have become incorporated in labelling. David Matza, for example, argued as early as 1966 that the ‘disreputable poor’ were being continually rediscovered, and that words were being constantly substituted, mainly in an attempt to reduce stigma. Matza, a sociologist based at the University of California at Berkeley, noted that terms that referred to essentially the same thing shifted rapidly, and that perhaps because of this, both researchers and practitioners remained unaware of historical continuities. The latest example, at that time, was the expression ‘hard to reach’. Other examples identified by Matza included the lumpenproletariat; Thorstein Veblen’s idea of a leisure class; and the term ‘pauper’. He argued that those he deemed the ‘disreputable poor’ were ‘the people who remain unemployed, or casually and irregularly employed, even during periods approaching full employment and prosperity; for that reason, and others, they live in disrepute’. Matza claimed that the ‘disreputable poor’ comprised several smaller groups – the ‘dregs’ who tended to be migrants; ‘newcomers’ who were recently arrived; ‘skidders’, or those who had fallen from higher social standing; and the ‘infirm’. In terms of the process of ‘pauperisation’, Matza identified a process of ‘massive generation’, by which this population was continually replenished, and one of ‘fractional selection’, by which newcomers passed into its ranks. Matza concluded the ‘disreputable poor’ were ‘an immobilised segment of society located at a point in the social structure where poverty intersects with illicit pursuits’.

Matza published a slightly different version of this chapter that was subsequently revised and elaborated in light of the culture of poverty debates of the 1960s. He argued that poverty might most usefully be seen as a series of concentric circles – the poor; the welfare poor; and the disreputable poor who were ‘poor, sporadically or permanently on welfare, and, additionally, suffer the especially demoralising effects of the stigma of immorality’.
Matza provided more statistical detail on the poor and the welfare poor, included the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) programme. He added a further group to those that comprised the disreputable poor – the ‘functionaries’ who oversaw the conduct of those who required assistance. What was interesting about Matza’s work was that it was an early recognition that the ‘poor’ were socially constructed. In addition, his work was notable for the way it recognized similarities with the British experience. In particular, he noted that the ‘problem family’ concept was defined in terms of the alleged disorder of family life. The concept of the problem family will be addressed in Chapter 4.

Matza recognized that, in part, the labelling process was motivated by attempts to reduce stigma, and for this reason was likely to fail. Conversely, some terms were deliberately offensive, originating outside social work circles. Writings on the role of stigma amplified some of these ideas. Chaim Waxman, for example, observed that social work had been dominated by a social casework approach that was based on a cultural perspective. These commentators saw the poor as manifesting patterns of behaviour and values – to escape from their poverty they had to change their behaviour and values – but as these had been internalized, it was a slow and difficult process. Waxman suggested that Matza’s example of the disreputable poor showed how, for some people in society, receipt of certain types of assistance was sufficient evidence of moral defectiveness, and could lead to labelling and stigma. He suggested rather that the patterns and attitudes of the poor were adjustments to the stigma of poverty; these were transmitted intergenerationally, through socialization. To break the stigma of poverty, the poor should be ‘integrated, rather than isolated’.23

Some of those critical of early underclass concepts located them in a longer-term historical process. In his important critique of the culture of poverty, published in 1968, Charles Valentine noted that this idea had much deeper roots in the history of American social investigation – there had long been a belief that the lower classes had a different social outlook to the middle class.24 There was then a lull in this writing, extending from the late 1960s to the late 1980s. It was only with the emergence of the underclass in the 1980s that some commentators returned to the question of how one term replaced another. The psychologist Michael Morris, for instance, asked why the concept of the underclass had replaced the culture of poverty. He concluded they were similar but not identical – the traits identified by Oscar Lewis as being part of the culture of poverty were almost identical to those allegedly observed in the underclass. However, there were also important differences. The conservative argument that welfare programmes helped develop and maintain the underclass had not been evident in the culture of poverty; the culture of poverty was less single-minded in its treatment of race; and the underclass was seen as a growing problem, whereas the culture of poverty was more static. Morris suggested that the term ‘underclass’ gained popularity because it appeared to be more neutral; it helped to define a
subgroup; it could be fitted more easily into sociological frameworks; it was supported by black scholars such as William Julius Wilson; and it was more in line with the prevailing conservative ideology. Morris suggested that the evidence indicated that ‘another chapter in the history of word substitution concerning the disreputable poor is currently being written’.25

Observers have thus commented both on the idea of the disreputable poor as a labelling phenomenon and on the processes by which one term has tended to replace another. Others have directed attention to the functions of these terms, and viewed them through a historical lens. Writing of the history of the underclass in the United States, historian Michael Katz has suggested that despite the anxiety it created, the emergence of the underclass in the late 1970s was a comforting discovery. It was small and concentrated enough to be helped or contained, and its prominence refocused attention on culture and behaviour, and away from income inequality and the class structure. The concept served to focus attention on a subset of the poor, and it encouraged targeted approaches through reviving discredited notions of the culture of poverty. Katz concluded that:

by diffusing an image of poor people as split into two sharply divided groups, underclass helps perpetuate their political powerlessness by strengthening the barriers that for so long have divided them against each other.26

More relevant for our purposes is that Katz has also suggested that the underclass is a ‘metaphor for social transformation’ and evokes perceptions of novelty, complexity, and danger.27 Like Matza, Katz points out that there have always been attempts to distinguish between the able-bodied and impotent poor. In the 1920s, ‘scientific racism’ culminated in eugenics and immigration restrictions. Similarly in the 1960s, the work of Oscar Lewis, in propagating the notion of a culture of poverty, along with developments in social psychology, emphasized the helplessness and passivity of dependent people. At the same time, Katz is critical of the phrase ‘underclass’. For Katz, the term ‘muddies debate and inhibits the formulation of constructive policy’, lacks a consistent theoretical basis, and has ‘little intellectual substance’.28

Nevertheless some of the work of Katz and his colleagues, certainly in the edited collection The “Underclass” Debate, is arguably more about urban poverty than about the history of the concept of the underclass itself. More relevant to the concerns of this book has been the work of the American sociologist Herbert Gans. Writing in the journal of the American Planning Association in 1990, for example, Gans, at that time Robert S. Lynd Professor of Sociology at Columbia University, observed that whereas the term ‘underclass’ as used by Gunnar Myrdal in the 1960s had been concerned with unemployment, by the late 1970s social scientists were identifying the underclass with persistent poverty, rather than joblessness. In the same period, the term became more mixed up with race, and with behavioural factors. Gans
argued the term should be dropped, as it had become ‘hopelessly polluted in meaning, ideological overtone and implications’. Gans argued the term had numerous dangers for planners. These included its power as a buzzword; its use as a racial codeword; its flexibility; and its synthesizing function. It covered a number of different groups of people, and had become a stereotype. Furthermore, the term interfered with anti-poverty planning; was extremely persuasive; was associated with particular neighbourhoods; and was linked to the ‘concentration and isolation’ hypothesis put forward by William Julius Wilson. Finally, Gans argued that the term side-stepped issues of poverty, and was unpredictable in how it might be used. Gans suggested the phrase might signal that society was preparing for an unemployed ‘caste’, whose members were blamed for their joblessness, and regarded as undeserving.

Gans noted that the term can be analysed in terms of its functions, as well as its causes. He wrote of the functions of the concept of the ‘undeserving poor’, both positive and negative, adaptive and destructive. Among these functions Gans listed risk reduction; scapegoating and displacement; norm reinforcement; spatial purification; the reproduction of stigma and the stigmatized; and the extermination of the surplus. The idea of the undeserving poor and the stigmas with which people are labelled persist, he argued, because they are useful to the people who are not poor. In arguably his most substantial contribution to this field, Gans outlined what he called the ‘label formation’ process. He argued that this includes a number of interested parties. First are the ‘label-makers’ who invent and reinvent the labels. They need to be ‘alarmists’, able to persuade an audience that the new word identifies a population that is responsible for alarming problems. The ‘alarmists’ also need to have access to the ‘counters’, who are able to supply the numbers on the labelled population. Labels need to refer to failings rather than processes or concepts, and also should be credible. At the same time, there may be times when no label for the undeserving poor is needed. Gans referred to a ‘sorting’ or ‘replacement’ process when a new label becomes popular after an old one has lost favour. But even the most popular labels undergo ‘broadening’, when they develop subsidiary meanings, or are attached to other populations. A crucial role is played by the ‘label users’, in being willing to listen to a new word, and also by the ‘legitimators’, whether academics or journalists, whose arguments justify the use of the new label. Also involved in this process are the ‘labelled’, the poor who are the subject of these changing terms. Gans argued that it is ‘contextual conditions’, embracing forces, agencies, and individuals that ultimately account for the success of a label. Last are the ‘romanticisers’, who revive ‘dead’ labels decades after they have passed out of use.

The hypothesis suggested by Gans provides a useful frame of reference against which to map the processes of change and empirical evidence explored in this book. Given that the underclass debate has been more influential in the US than in Britain in the recent period, it is not surprising that there has been more serious historical work on the US. But in Britain
too, there has been work on the history of the undeserving poor; on images of the poor; and on the cyclical nature of particular terms. Bill Jordan, for example, was inspired by the ‘cycle of deprivation’ thesis advanced by Sir Keith Joseph in the early 1970s to trace the earlier history of the recurring idea of the undeserving poor, from the seventeenth century onwards. Peter Golding and Sue Middleton have looked at images of the poor in the period 1890–1939, noting the role of the ‘primary definers’ and the popular media, and concluding that blaming the victim remains a cornerstone for conceptions of poverty. The cyclical nature of ideas underlies Geoffrey Pearson’s book on the history of ‘hooliganism’. Pearson criticized the view that street crime and ‘hooliganism’ are evidence of a permissive revolution, and further evidence of a rapid moral decline from the stable traditions of the past. In fact, successive generations have voiced identical fears of social breakdown and moral degeneration, whether the ‘Hooligan’ gangs of the late Victorian period, or the ‘muggers’ of the contemporary urban streets. Pearson argued that his history of ‘respectable fears’ showed that street violence and disorder were a solidly entrenched aspect of the social landscape. There was thus a strong cyclical element in these anxieties.

But in Britain it has been John Macnicol who has done most to point out continuities in the history of the underclass concept. Influenced by the emergence of the idea of the underclass in the US. Macnicol argued in 1987 that those involved in the debate were only half aware of the conceptual flaws of the concept, and were ignorant of its ‘long and undistinguished pedigree’. He outlined problems in defining the underclass. These problems of definition notwithstanding, also significant were the continuities that could be observed over the previous hundred years. Macnicol claimed that there had been at least six reconstructions:

- The social residuum notion of the 1880s
- The social problem group idea of the 1930s
- The concept of the problem family in the 1950s
- The culture of poverty thesis of the 1960s
- The cycle of deprivation theory of the 1970s
- The underclass debates of the 1980s

This schematic framework really provides the backbone for this book, although we look in more detail at the idea of the unemployable in the early 1900s, at the idea of social exclusion from the 1990s, and at the troubled families agenda of the Coalition Government from May 2010. Macnicol’s main aim was to chart, in some detail, debates about the social problem group in the 1930s, and to demonstrate links between them and both the cycle of deprivation in the 1970s, and the underclass in the 1980s. In the interwar period, there were investigations of a hereditary social problem group, as part of a wider conservative social reformist strategy. Macnicol concluded that:
The concept of an inter-generational underclass displaying a high concentration of social problems – remaining outwith the boundaries of citizenship, alienated from cultural norms and stubbornly impervious to the normal incentives of the market, social work intervention or state welfare – has been reconstructed periodically over at least the past one hundred years, and while there have been important shifts of emphasis between each of these reconstructions, there have also been striking continuities. Underclass stereotypes have always been a part of the discourse on poverty in advanced industrial societies.36

While acknowledging that the ambiguity of the underclass concept had been one of the main reasons for its on-going popularity, Macnicol also identified five important underlying strands. First, he claimed it was an artificial ‘administrative’ definition relating to contacts with organizations and individuals of the state, such as social workers. In this respect, it was a statistical artefact in that its size would be affected by such factors as eligibility, take-up of benefits, and changing levels of unemployment. Second, it tended to get muddled with the separate issue of inter-generational transmission, typically of social inefficiency. Third, certain behavioural traits were identified as antisocial while others were ignored – a wide variety of human conditions were lumped together and attributed to a single cause. Fourth, for him the underclass issue was mainly a resource allocation problem. Fifth, Macnicol claimed that it was supported by people who wished to constrain state welfare, and was thus part of a conservative analysis of the causes of social problems and their solutions.37

The key question of linearity was also addressed by Macnicol, in relation to continuities between the problem family concept of the 1950s and the underclass notion of the 1980s. Macnicol suggested that the debate over the problem family provided a kind of rehearsal for the underclass debates of the 1980s, particularly in respect of the methodological difficulties faced by researchers. Three groups were interested – the Eugenics Society, Family Service Units, and local Medical Officers of Health (MOsH) – but all experienced problems in proving the existence of problem families. Most of the definitions of problem families were really descriptions of household squalor. Macnicol concluded that the emergence of the culture of poverty in the 1960s and the cycle of deprivation in the 1970s suggested a linear development between 1945 and 1995. Moreover there were similarities in the process of social distancing; the involvement of pressure groups; and a combination of administrative definitions with behavioural ones. However, he also noted that by the 1990s much had changed, most obviously in relation to the labour market, demography, and family formation.38

By the 1990s, Macnicol was inclined to treat the underclass less as a discursive phenomenon, and more as an empirical possibility – though he remained sceptical. The question of how and when these ideas emerge is a key theme for this book. Macnicol suggested that underclass stereotypes will
emerge most strongly at times of economic restructuring, when there are high levels of poverty, unemployment, and general social dislocation. At these times, a large ‘reserve army of labour’ will exist, and its ‘dysfunctional’ behaviour will cause concern. But he conceded that during the 1950s the concept of the problem family emerged at a time of full employment, economic optimism, a strong belief in the nuclear family, and low illegitimacy ratios. Macnicol made the point that the term ‘underclass’ became a metaphor for real problems that post-industrial societies faced, such as widening social polarization and income inequality, residential segregation, and segmented labour markets. Nonetheless he observed that as soon as one entered the debate, one entered a world of enormous empirical and conceptual complexity. The former included such issues as unemployment, family formation and demographic trends, shifts in the social ecology of cities, and welfare spells, while debates about the meaning of social exclusion provided a good example of the latter. In the 1980s, a conservative model of underclass formation, which stressed over-generous welfare payments and a decline in moral responsibility, was countered by a structural model that emphasized changes in the labour market, the social ecology of cities, and family formation. Overall, Macnicol concluded that the term was most useful as a metaphor for widening social polarization and economic inequality – it might be applied to an underclass of retired people.39

Given the impetus provided by Macnicol, it has often been acknowledged that the underclass concept has been periodically re-invented over the past hundred years. Hartley Dean and Peter Taylor-Gooby, for example, argued the concept had been most interesting for what it had revealed about preoccupations with delinquency and dependency. The underclass had always been negatively defined, by the criteria of productive work and family life from which the underclass was excluded. They wrote that the effect of the concept was ‘not to define the marginalised, but to marginalise those it defines’, and was more a potent symbol than a useful concept. It would be helpful, they suggested, to see the residuum and underclass as discursive phenomena that provided a commentary on broader social relations.40 Pete Alcock, writing of poverty, argued that a pathological approach had been a recurring feature of debates about the problem of poverty in an industrial society.41 Tony Novak underlined the importance of the word ‘underclass’, despite its lack of precision, in evoking threats that the poor posed to the family, law and order, and to the labour market.42 And researchers have begun to explore contending philosophical perspectives on the causation and resolution of the underclass.43

However despite this recognition of the successive invention and reinvention of different labels, academic research has not gone beyond this to provide a systematic analysis of how this process has occurred and what lessons it offers to contemporary policy makers. In part this reflects the distaste that many academics on the Left have felt for terms such as ‘underclass’. It has been argued that one of the distinctive features of social
policy in the postwar period was an almost total focus on structural rather
than behavioural factors in the causation of poverty and deprivation. This derived in part from the approach of its dominant figure – Richard Titmuss – and can be seen in the work of one of its most distinguished practitioners – Peter Townsend. But their disapproval for what is perceived as a focus on the behavioural inadequacies of the poor has also led to a failure to explore the meaning of underclass and associated labels as discursive phenomena.

While there has been important writing on the history of the underclass in the US, much of the writing by British-based academics has been superficial and unsatisfactory – with the important exception of Macnicol. Several of the books that have been produced have been by sociologists and social policy analysts who have been interested in the history of the underclass only as a preliminary to recent policy developments. The book by Kirk Mann, for example, The Making of an English ‘Underclass’, is really a history of the social divisions of welfare and labour, and is not, despite its title, a history of the concept of the underclass. He asked why the poorest members of society were so often segregated from the rest of the working class. Mann touched on the disappearance of the social residuum and the unemployables during World Wars I and II, and he was concerned to tackle the ideas of Charles Murray. However, because of unease over the term ‘underclass’, the book focused on intra-class divisions.

Lydia Morris’s book Dangerous Classes does examine the historical background to the development of an underclass. She noted that a welfare system that had appeared to offer a guarantee of social citizenship in the 1940s had become transformed into a system that was associated with the underclass and social disenfranchisement. Discussions of the underclass tended to be cast in terms of a nuclear family, argued Morris, where the father is the breadwinner and the mother socializes the children. Morris saw social citizenship and the underclass as linked concepts: one representing inclusion, the other exclusion and moral failure. The term ‘underclass’ was useful in capturing this sense of status exclusion, though it was less convincing in explanatory terms. Morris suggested the debate should be changed, from a focus on the underclass to a reconsideration of how sociologists think about social structures. Nonetheless, while she related the term ‘underclass’ to the history of ideas about citizenship, and of the creation of the welfare state, her book was not an exploration of the different forms that the underclass concept had taken across time.

There is therefore, despite this earlier work, no full-length study of the history of the concept of the underclass in either Britain or the US over the past 133 years. Several of the reconstructions are known only in terms of their broad outlines, such as the cycle of deprivation debates of the 1970s, in part because of an emphasis on easily available published sources. In contrast, archival materials remain under-exploited. There has been perhaps an inevitable focus on the underclass debates of the 1980s. Much
less is known about other underclass reconstructions, such as the debates about the unemployable in the 1900s, which arguably form an additional conceptual stepping stone. The links by which concepts in Britain and the US served to cross-fertilize each other, and the extent to which this occurred, remains unknown, although there is increasing interest in processes of policy transfer. Arguably the most glaring gap in research is the process by which one term replaces another. The preliminary hypotheses provided by Gans and Macnicol form a useful starting point. But otherwise very little is known about the process by which a term comes into existence, gains popularity, falls out of favour, and then is replaced by a different, but similar, alternative. In fact as this brief survey of the secondary literature shows, there is no comprehensive history of this story, either in Britain or in the US.

The aim of this book, then, is to explore the history of the concept of the underclass in Britain between 1880 and the present. The first chapter examines the longer-term history of such ideas as the undeserving poor, the ‘dangerous class’, and the *lumpenproletariat*. It then turns to the theory of the social residuum in the 1880s, and the way it was used by social investigators such as Charles Booth and Helen Bosanquet, exploring its rise and fall in the period up to World War I. Chapter 2 charts the history of the related concept of the unemployable, starting with the role of Sidney and Beatrice Webb and William Beveridge in promoting it in parallel to the social residuum, but also tracing its influence in the interwar period. It also examines how the notion of the social residuum came to be absent from the social surveys of the early 1900s – such as those by Seebohm Rowntree and Arthur Bowley. The notion of the social problem group, espoused by the Eugenics Society in the 1920s and 1930s, is taken up in Chapter 3. This was succeeded by the theory of the problem family, which surfaced during the evacuation of schoolchildren at the outbreak of World War II, and which remained an influential concept in public health up to the early 1970s. As we have noted, one of the most important aspects of this story is not only to understand why and how these concepts came into existence, but also to examine periods of transition, such as wartime. The problem family, then, is the subject of Chapter 4.

The focus of this part of the book is essentially on Britain. In the case of the culture of poverty, however, explored in Chapter 5, it is the experience of the United States that is most relevant. The phrase was popularized by the social anthropologist Oscar Lewis, and had an important influence on debates about America’s ‘War on Poverty’ in the 1960s. In Britain, the concept of the problem family re-emerged in a slightly different form, as espoused by Sir Keith Joseph. His thinking and the research programme on the cycle of deprivation in the 1970s are the subjects of Chapter 6. The underclass debates of the 1980s were much more wide-ranging, generating a huge literature, particularly in America. Here we look at the experience of the US in Chapter 7, before turning to related debates about the underclass in Britain in Chapter 8. In Chapter 9 we look at social exclusion, exploring
how the cycle of deprivation was revived by New Labour in the context of initiatives designed to tackle child poverty, but also at the more punitive approach to problem families inspired by Tony Blair. Chapter 10 then brings the story up to date with the Coalition Government’s ambitions to ‘turn around’ the lives of Britain’s alleged 120,000 troubled families. In the Conclusion, we examine how this is a story of both continuity and change; empirical detail and conceptual complexity; the expert and the non-expert; and structural constraints and alleged behavioural inadequacies. We argue, nonetheless, that despite the many differences between these concepts, there is also much evidence of a linear process at work. The social residuum of the 1880s is the troubled family of the present day.
Regulating the residuum

The period 1880–1914 was an age of classic social investigation, with such well-known figures as Charles Booth and Benjamin Seebohm Rowntree. Less commented on, perhaps, is the existence of a parallel concern with an underclass or social residuum. This is partly because early historians tended to concentrate on those elements of policy, such as old age pensions, free school meals, and unemployment insurance, that appeared to prefigure the welfare state of the 1940s.1 They assumed that the approach to social policy before 1914 was overwhelmingly empirical, and neglected its wider ideological context. With some important exceptions, it is only more recently that historians have begun to look closely at the moral assumptions that often lay behind policy. The focus has shifted towards those other, more illiberal, elements. They include such issues as proposals for labour colonies, policy in the field of mental deficiency, eugenics, and plans for the sterilization and segregation of ‘defectives’. In part, this reflects the decline of the classic welfare state, and wider changes in attitudes towards the relative roles of the statutory, private, and voluntary sectors.

David Ward’s work indicates that, in the United States in this period, there was a similar preoccupation with the size and situation of the lowest stratum of urban society. Many housing reformers believed that there was a stratum of the poor, a ‘submerged residuum’, that would not respond to improved housing. For this reason, they recommended municipal lodging houses. This debate was refined following the publication of Booth’s work on London. Ward claims that by 1900, reformers had modified their view of the slum to incorporate the social isolation and environmental deprivation of the poor. Thus there was then a more sustained attempt to improve the social environment, and to ensure social justice.2 Interestingly, in the United States, Booth’s structural interpretation was more influential than his behavioural analysis. The American case was different to the British context, in that the situation of the immigrant poor was more prominent. Nevertheless the experience of the United States would in turn have an important influence on British debates – especially with regard to the culture of poverty in the 1960s, and the underclass of the 1980s.
Here, we look again at the phenomenon of the social residuum in the period 1880–1914 in the light of various arguments that have been put forward by historians. The impact of his social surveys meant that Charles Booth was arguably the most influential writer on the social residuum in the 1880s. But it was a theme that also appeared in other contemporary writing, including that by H. M. Hyndman, secretary of the Social Democratic Federation; Samuel A. Barnett, Warden of the East London settlement of Toynbee Hall; the founder of the Salvation Army, William Booth; and by Helen Bosanquet. More generally, the term ‘residuum’ can be found in a wide range of Parliamentary papers. These include the reports and evidence of the Royal Commission on Housing (1885); the Select Committees on Distress from Want of Employment (1894–96); the Interdepartmental Committee on Physical Deterioration (1904); the Royal Commission on the Care and Control of the Feeble Minded (1904–08); and the Royal Commission on the Poor Laws (1905–09).

In this chapter, we look first at the way that historians have interpreted the sudden interest in the residuum in the 1880s. Second, we explore the longer term history of the theme of the undeserving poor, as expressed by writers as diverse as Thomas More and Thomas Malthus, and also at related ideas such as the Marxist concept of the *lumpenproletariat*, and the contemporary concern with the dangerous classes. We then turn to look in more detail at how the concept of the social residuum was used in the 1880s, by Charles Booth, Helen Bosanquet, and a wide range of other writers. In subsequent chapters we will seek to examine how the social residuum remained an important influence on later concepts, most obviously in the case of the unemployable in the early 1900s, and the social problem group in the 1930s. Overall, we are concerned with how the notion of the social residuum has influenced successive re-inventions of the underclass since the 1880s.

Although the theme of the undeserving poor has a long history, it appears nevertheless that in the 1880s the idea re-emerged with particular force, through the concept of the social residuum. Gareth Stedman Jones represents an important exception to the general rule that historians have tended to focus on liberal rather than illiberal social policies. In *Outcast London* (1971), Stedman Jones provided a powerful analysis of perceptions of the residuum in the 1880s and 1890s. Whereas contemporary observers drew comforting pictures of London in the 1870s, by the following decade it was thought that the residuum formed a significant proportion of the working class. Stedman Jones has argued that the concept of the residuum was central to the crisis of the 1880s, and was present in the thinking of every group, from the Charity Organisation Society (COS) to the Social Democratic Federation. It was dangerous, not only ‘because of its degenerate nature, but also because its very existence served to contaminate the classes immediately above it’. The fear was that if this situation continued, the residuum would in time contaminate and subsume the respectable working class. Although
the New Liberals wooed the respectable working class, they also advocated a more coercive and interventionist policy towards the residuum, which was too great a threat to be left to natural forces and to the Poor Law. Thus both Samuel Barnett and Alfred Marshall advocated labour colonies – Marshall in response to the housing crisis, and Barnett as a solution to unemployment. Stedman Jones argued that the subjective psychological defects of individuals featured larger than before. The problem was not structural, but moral, and the evil to be combated was not poverty but pauperism. Stedman Jones has argued that new theories of ‘degeneration’ influenced the debate and served to switch the focus from the moral inadequacies of the individual, to the effects of the urban environment. This let middle-class people see poverty as the endemic condition of large masses of the population, rather than the product of exceptional improvidence or misfortune on the part of individuals. Even so, the distinction between the deserving and undeserving poor remained, and was simply recast in new language borrowed from Charles Darwin.

Stedman Jones suggested that the dock strike of 1889 marked a crucial turning point, since its effect was to establish, in the eyes of the middle class, a clear distinction between the respectable working class and the residuum. After the strike, the residuum was regarded as a much less serious problem – a ‘nuisance to administrators rather than a threat to civilisation’. Stedman Jones suggested that this new distinction was amplified by the writings of Charles Booth, since Booth divided the residuum into two classes. He claimed that there was a consensus among experts that it was desirable to segregate and eliminate the residuum, but also conceded that none of these proposals passed into legislation. Moreover, Stedman Jones argued that the advent of full employment during World War I showed that the residuum had been a social rather than a biological creation. Their lifestyle had not been the effect of some hereditary taint, but the results of poor housing, inadequate wages, and irregular work. Once employment opportunities became more widely available, those previously deemed unemployable could not be found. In fact, concluded Stedman Jones, ‘they had never existed, except as a phantom army called up by late Victorian and Edwardian social science to legitimise its practice’.

In an analysis of Booth’s contribution to social theory, Peter Hennock has argued that the Stedman Jones interpretation needs to be modified. In particular, he has claimed that there are important elements of continuity with the 1860s that make it difficult to regard the 1880s as a period of significant theoretical innovation. Whereas Stedman Jones stressed that writers in the 1880s took a new line in separating the residuum and the respectable working class, Hennock pointed out that these issues had been debated before, in the Reform Bills of 1866–67. He suggested that the connections between the ideas of the 1860s and 1880s are too close to be ignored.

Jose Harris noted that the residuum has been identified as a key concept in Victorian social science, and a component in the shift from the
rationalistic hedonism of the New Poor Law to the ‘Social Darwinism’ of the age of imperialism. Its emergence has been located in the 1880s. However, Harris argued that the term was used in many different ways, and a demarcation between the respectable and degenerate poor long pre-dated the 1880s. The debates of the 1880s showed continuity with this earlier era in that they were partly fuelled by fears that the residuum would be given the vote. She characterized the 1880s as an era both of economic crisis and of popular democracy. Moreover, theories of the residuum had other sources in political and social thought, apart from the application of Darwinism. They were fuelled as much by issues to do with extending the suffrage to the working class, as with biological degeneracy. Finally Harris argued that in Britain at least, there is little evidence that those who used the term ‘residuum’ necessarily had any wider commitment to a framework of ‘natural selection’ or ‘hereditary degeneration’. Harris concluded therefore that the residuum issue of the 1880s and 1890s was as much a political as a sociological phenomenon, and ‘at least as much an expression of certain ancient moral and constitutional ideas as of new-fangled notions of science and social evolution’. The debate about social reform in the 1880s and 1890s was influenced by evolutionary language, but this should be seen as ‘emblematic verbiage rather than precise social science’. It was invoked by many different commentators, and did not preclude support for draconian social policies. In fact, the only area of policy where a ‘Darwinian’ model took hold was in the treatment of mental deficiency.

This secondary literature has been illuminating on the debate about the residuum in the 1880s. However, it has weaknesses in two respects. First, it tends to concentrate on Booth and neglect the many other commentators who wrote on the residuum in this period. Second, while good on the 1880s, it is much weaker on the period after 1900, and on continuities between the concerns about the residuum and related debates about the unemployable. Marc Brodie’s study of the political and social attitudes of the poor of Victorian and Edwardian London underlined the importance of assessment of individual, personal, and moral character in working-class political judgements. Nevertheless while questioning the extent of poverty in the East End, Brodie does not deal directly with the concept of the residuum.

It is important to recognize that underclass stereotypes have always been part of discussions of poverty, and certainly pre-dated the upsurge of interest in the social residuum of the 1880s. In Britain, the broad idea of an underclass dates back at least as far as the seventeenth-century Poor Law, with its concerns about vagrancy, and desire to distinguish between deserving and undeserving claimants. The 1598 Poor Law Act stated that parents and children should maintain poor people, that children should be set to work, and also reflected concerns about public order. Similar anxieties were expressed by contemporary writers. Thomas More’s *Utopia*, for example, published in 1516, reveals a contemporary concern with the ‘lusty beggar’ that echoes much more recent debates about single parents.
Similar concerns were evident in the late eighteenth century, when moral judgements were based on the labour-market relevance of different claimants. The period 1790–1834 saw important changes in poor relief, and it was argued that these had led to the ‘demoralisation’ of the poor. One such writer was Thomas Malthus (1766–1834). In his ‘Essay on the Principle of Population’, published in 1798, Malthus argued that the Poor Laws had not helped deal with distress even with an expenditure of £3m. In his view, it had increased the population without increasing the amount of food available for its support. Moreover the provisions consumed in the workhouse reduced the amount for the ‘more industrious and more worthy members’. Parish laws had increased the price of provisions and lowered the real price of labour. Malthus wrote:

It is also difficult to suppose that they have not powerfully contributed to generate that carelessness and want of frugality observable among the poor, so contrary to the disposition frequently to be remarked among petty tradesmen and small farmers. The labouring poor, to use a vulgar expression, seem always to live from hand to mouth. Their present wants employ their whole attention, and they seldom think of the future. Even when they have an opportunity of saving they seldom exercise it, but all that is beyond their present necessities, goes, generally speaking, to the ale-house.16

Malthus argued therefore, that the Poor Laws diminished the will to save, and weakened incentives to sobriety, industry, and happiness. As we shall see, many aspects of his interpretation – the effects of welfare on behaviour; the alleged focus of the poor on the present; their failure to make adequate preparation for the future; and their tendency to spend money on enjoyment rather than saving – were to be echoed by much more recent commentators.

It was a theme that was picked up by other writers. In 1798, for example, Jeremy Bentham, in his Outline of a Work Entitled Pauper Management Improvement, emphasized the defective ‘moral sanity’ of the dependent poor, their economic unproductiveness, and the gulf between them and the ordinary working class.17 Similar anxieties underlay the 1834 Poor Law Amendment Act, which removed subsidies on low wages and created workhouses. The principle of ‘less eligibility’ was adopted, and it was believed that the bulk of social evils were to be found among the poor. As Bill Jordan has written:

The real enemy was still seen as the moral depravity of the poorest class, and the real solution as a system of relief which dealt with this depravity and confined it as narrowly as possible to this near-incorrigible group, thus saving the much larger poor but industrious class from contamination.18
Although the Poor Law Amendment Act of 1834 appeared to make no
distinction between different grades of the able-bodied poor, this lack of
discrimination was never completely acceptable to popular opinion.

There were signs of similar anxieties in the 1860s. Henry Mayhew
had drawn on related ideas, although he did not actually use the phrase
‘residuum’. Jennifer Davis has suggested that the garrotting panic of 1862
in London led to a moral panic – one of those periods when public anxieties,
especially as expressed by newspapers and the government, served to ‘amplify
deviance’ and promote new measures for its control. Following the Habitual
Criminals Act of 1869, a particular group of law-breakers were defined as
distinct from the rest of the population – a ‘criminal class’ – which was useful
in justifying the creation of a police force and its extension into working-
class areas. A further influence came across the Channel, from France. Here
the writings of Balzac and Victor Hugo, along with bourgeois opinion, had
helped to create the notion of the dangerous class. Bourgeois opinion was
concerned about where the dangerous class was recruited from, whether it
had similar characteristics to the labouring classes, and whether both groups
were governed by similar imperatives. Ideas about a dangerous class drew
support from contemporary beliefs about the physionomy of criminals and
the poor. It was seen as a residuum of paupers and criminals recruited from
the unskilled urban poor left behind by the march of progress. Jennifer Davis
has explored how image and reality interacted, illuminating the process by
which the residuum was identified and given concrete existence, by studying
the relationship between a Kensington slum and the wider community. She
has argued that Jennings’ Buildings became a focus for local anxieties about
the dangerous classes. Yet Davis has noted it was also part of the wider
economy of Kensington, and many individuals profited from its existence. It
was only in 1873 that it was finally demolished.

Some writers have argued that the underclass is not a class in the Marxist
sense. In the Communist Manifesto, published in German in London in
February 1848, Marx and Engels argued that the proletariat was the really
revolutionary class. But of the dangerous class they wrote:

the social scum, that passively rotting mass thrown off by the lowest
layers of old society, may here and there, be swept into the movement
by a proletarian revolution, its conditions of life, however, prepare it far
more for the part of a bribed tool of reactionary intrigue.

Writing of France in 1851, Marx noted:

the lumpenproletariat . . . in all towns forms a mass quite distinct from the
industrial proletariat. It is a recruiting ground for thieves and criminals
of all sorts, living off the garbage of society. . . . vagabonds, gens sans feu
et sans aveu, varying according to the cultural level of their particular
nation.
Engels expressed similar ideas in his preface to the second edition of his *Peasant War in Germany*, published in October 1870. Engels wrote ‘the *lumpenproletariat*, this scum of depraved elements from all social classes, with headquarters in the big cities, is the worst of all the possible allies’.25 Every leader of the workers who relied on them as guards or allies, wrote Engels, had proved he was a traitor to the movement.

This was amplified in later Marxist writing on historical materialism. Nikolai Bukharin, for example, was to write in 1925 of a social system that included a fifth class made up of déclassé groups – categories of people outside the labour market, such as the *lumpenproletariat*, beggars, and vagrants. For Bukharin, the psychology and ideology of classes was determined by the conditions of material existence. In the case of the *lumpenproletariat* this led to ‘shiftlessness, lack of discipline, hatred of the old, but impotence to construct or organize anything new, an individualistic declassed “personality”, whose actions are based only on foolish caprices’.26 He argued that in each of the classes, an ideology corresponded to its psychology – revolutionary communism in the proletariat; a property ideology in the peasantry; and in the *lumpenproletariat* ‘a vacillating and hysterical anarchism’. For Bukharin, certain traits needed to be present in a class in order for it to be able to transform society. It should be a class that was economically exploited and politically oppressed; poor; one that was involved in production; was not bound by private property; and was welded together by the conditions of its existence and common labour. In the case of the *lumpenproletariat*, economic exploitation, political oppression, and a sense of a common interest were all absent. Bukharin concluded that it was ‘barred chiefly by the circumstances that it performs no productive work; it can tear down, but has no habit of building up’.27

The modern concept of the underclass, therefore, has to be set within the context of these earlier ideas in both Britain and continental Europe. Moreover as Jose Harris has pointed out, in the particular case of the residuum, many recent writers have ignored the fact that debates long pre-dated the better-known anxieties of the 1880s, and had been originally associated with the campaign to widen Parliamentary and local suffrage. The term ‘social residuum’ seems to have been first used in a British context by John Bright, radical MP for Birmingham, in the debate on the Second Reform Act of 1867. Bright used it to define those who (in his opinion) should in no circumstances be given the vote. He argued there was a small class which should not be enfranchised, ‘because they have no independence whatsoever . . . I call this class the residuum, which there is in almost every constituency, of almost helpless poverty and dependence’.28

Bright’s case against the residuum was not in terms of poverty, but in the language of property. Compared to the independent working class, the residuum were:

all of them in a condition of dependence, such as to give no reasonable expectation that they would be able to resist the many temptations which
rich and unscrupulous men would offer them at periods of election to give their vote in a manner not only not consistent with their own opinions and consciences, if they have any, but not consistent with the representation of the town or city in which they live.\textsuperscript{29}

Thus it was feared that, unlike the respectable working class, the members of the residuum would sell their votes to the highest bidder. The household suffrage provisions of the 1867 Act were deliberately designed to create a direct ratepayers’ franchise in which respectable working men who paid their own rates were admitted to the constitution. Contemporaries were confused about who should be let in, but were agreed that the residuum should be left out – by definition, the residuum did not include household ratepayers.

Another early example of the use of the term ‘residuum’ is provided by the social reformer Alsager Hay Hill (1839–1906). Trained as a barrister, Hay Hill had become interested in Poor Law and labour questions, and worked as an almoner for the Society for the Relief of Distress in East London. He later was prominent in the work of the Charity Organisation Society in the 1870s and 1880s. His paper on unemployment had originally been an entry to a competition organized by the National Association for the Promotion of Social Science, for the best essay on a ‘Feasible Plan for the Temporary Employment of Operatives and Workmen in Casual Distress’. Published in 1868 as \emph{Our Unemployed}, Hay Hill’s pamphlet argued that the unemployed fell into three groups – casual labourers; representatives of the ‘decaying and underpaid’ trades; and an ‘incompetent class’. At the same time, there was also a separate residuum of ‘honest, thrifty, and industrious men’ who became unemployed and destitute through the normal workings of the trade cycle. Hay Hill’s solutions were a national system of registration of labour, more rigorous classification by the Poor Law authorities, and the creation of public works by Local Improvement Committees.\textsuperscript{30}

The ambiguity of the term residuum, and indeed much of its appeal, is immediately apparent. For John Bright, it was a small dependent class which could not be trusted to use the vote responsibly. For Alsager Hay Hill, on the other hand, the residuum were the ‘industrious unemployed’, men who found themselves out of work through no fault of their own, though his ‘incompetent class’ may be closer to an underclass stereotype. The concept of the residuum can be seen to have had political, economic, social, and moral implications. Increasingly common was the line taken by the Charity Organisation Society, which was founded in 1869 specifically to distinguish between the deserving and undeserving poor.

Peter Hennock has shown that the 1880s were a period of particular upheaval. So much attention was focused on the existence of poverty that beliefs in social progress came to be questioned. These distinctive features included the publication of the pamphlet \emph{The Bitter Cry of Outcast London} (1883–84), leading to the appointment of the Royal Commission on the
Housing of the Working Classes; demonstrations and riots during the winter of distress and unemployment in 1885–86; an influx of Jewish migrants from Eastern Europe; strikes by the London matchgirls and dockers in 1888 and 1889; and the launching of the Salvation Army with William Booth’s *In Darkest England: And the Way Out* (1890). One recurring theme was anxiety about the residuum on the part of various individuals and organizations.

Peter Keating has written of the history of social investigation in England, noting the constant references to ‘wandering tribes’, ‘pygmies’, and ‘rain forests’ in the period 1866–1913, and arguing that the use of the word ‘abyss’ in the 1890s marked an intensification of the class fear that had always been present in this writing. He argued that by the time of Rowntree’s survey of York, ‘rain forests’ had been replaced by ‘poverty cycles’; vignettes by statistical tables; the individual by the mass; and the study of the poor by the investigation of poverty. Even so, the tradition of social investigation continued in the twentieth century with increasing power. The famous book *In Darkest England* (1890), by William Booth (1829–1912) provides a good example of this literature. Best known today for founding the Salvation Army, Booth’s book was largely written by the journalist W. T. Stead, but it nevertheless caused a sensation. Booth argued that perhaps the most striking aspect of Stanley’s African explorations had been his account of the equatorial forest – ‘where the rays of the sun never penetrate, where in the dark, dank air, filled with the steam of the heated morass, human beings dwarfed into pygmies and brutalised into cannibals lurk and live and die’. The obvious parallel was between a ‘darkest Africa’ and a ‘darkest England’ – for England too had its ivory raiders (publicans), its tribes of savages, and its explorers (social reformers).

An examination of some of this literature suggests that the story is more complex than earlier writers have implied. In an article in the journal *Contemporary Review* (1884), for example, the economist Alfred Marshall argued that in order to solve the pressing problem of housing, the ‘London poor’ should be forcibly moved to rural areas. Marshall (1842–1924) served on the Royal Commission on Labour (1891–94), and spent much time on the preparation of evidence for the Royal Commission on the Aged Poor (1893). Many people went to London in the first place, Marshall alleged, because they were ‘impatient and reckless, or miserable and purposeless; and because they hope to prey on the charities, the follies, and the vices that are nowhere so richly gilded as there’. The effect of living in London was to reduce their physical constitution, and in any case ‘the descendents of the dissolute are naturally weak, and especially those of the dissolute in large towns’. The solution was a network of labour colonies, for, as he concluded, ‘till this is done our treatment of the poor cannot cease to be tender where tenderness is the parent of crime, and hard where hardness involves needless and bitter degradation and woe’. Marshall used the phrase ‘submerged social stratum’, he was concerned about physical deterioration, and he did
advocate the setting up of labour colonies. Yet his concern was with the poor and the unemployed, and he did not use the phrase ‘the residuum’.

Arnold White, writing in the same journal a year later, was concerned with the condition of the class he deemed the ‘nomad poor’. A popular journalist who was involved in the ‘national efficiency’ movement, and who is perhaps best known for *Efficiency and Empire* (1901), White estimated that 20 per cent of this group were able to work, 40 per cent were capable of part-time work, and the remaining 40 per cent were ‘men from whom the grace of humanity has almost disappeared’. Although White had found more ‘temperate and would-be industrious folk’ among London vagrants, he conceded they were a minority, arguing of the group as a whole that:

physically, mentally, and morally unfit, there is nothing that the nation can do for these men, except to let them die out by leaving them alone.

To enable them by unwise compassion to propagate their kind, is to hand on to posterity a legacy of pure and unmixed evil.37

White estimated from the 1881 census that some 200,000 men, women, and children formed a ‘submerged social stratum’ in London, and he claimed that ‘physical unfitness’ was increasing. He proposed to reorganize charities so that the provision of poor relief was more efficient, and to ‘sterilise the vicious’ by refusing charity to those whose poverty and unemployment was due to their own shortcomings. But again White did not use the term ‘residuum’, and his concerns were more with the ‘nomad poor’, claiming there had been an improvement in the ‘moral texture’ of the population.

Examining the case of the working class in 1887, the socialist leader H. M. Hyndman (1842–1921) argued that overcrowding had led to physical degeneration; age discrimination was a further problem; and technological change meant that men were increasingly being ‘worn out’ by work. A further problem was the existence of a ‘certain percentage who are almost beyond hope of being reached at all’. He wrote that this group was ‘crushed down into the gutter, physically and mentally, by their social surroundings, they can but die out, leaving, it is to be hoped, no progeny as a burden on a better state of things’.38 While Hyndman was concerned with physical degeneration, and he noted the existence of some who were beyond hope, his main interest lay in how improvements to housing might be reflected in better health, and again he did not use the phrase ‘residuum’. In fact evolutionary language was strikingly absent from his article.

In the journal *Nineteenth Century* in 1888, Samuel A. Barnett, later Warden of Toynbee Hall, noted the existence of large numbers of unemployed, writing that ‘the existence of such a class numbering in London its tens of thousands is a national disgrace and a national danger’. If one part of society was content with a poor standard of living, and the rest of society was indifferent to their situation, class conflict was not far away. For:
there are tens of thousands, with the thoughts and feelings of men, living
the life of beasts, greedy for what they can get, careless of the means of
getting, rejoicing in low pleasures, moved by a blind sense of injustice
ready to take shape in foolish demands and wild acts.39

Like Booth, Barnett thought one solution might be a system of labour
colonies which would deter ‘loafers’ and reduce pauperism. Nevertheless
Barnett conceded that the unemployed were not all loafers and idlers – many
were steady and honest, and did want to work. Moreover, while Barnett
considered labour colonies as a solution, he also emphasized the importance
of ‘character’, concluding that it was for the London Poor Law Guardians to
seek ‘the means of settling the problem of the unemployed, of hushing that
cry which is so much more bitter because it rises from men who, for want of
knowledge, are in poverty, in misery, and in sin’.40

The evidence of reports from public bodies was as similarly complex
as the writings of individuals. In the case of the Royal Commission on
the Housing of the Working Classes (1884–85), it is unclear whether the
concept of the social residuum really was very influential. On the one hand,
the report noted that if a ‘certain class’ of the poor was put into decent
houses, it would wreck them. Struggling industrial workers and the ‘semi-
criminal class’ lived side by side, and it was this latter group that was the
really destructive class.41 On the other hand, the report acknowledged that
although it was said homes were dirty because of the habits of people,
there was a reason why individuals appeared to be indifferent to their
surroundings. Many were ignorant about sanitation, blocked up sources
of ventilation, and kept corpses for many days before burial. Given this
analysis, what was needed above all was education.42 But the question
really was whether the habits of the very poor who lived in overcrowded
conditions, such as drinking, were the cause or consequence of their
condition. As a contemporary pamphlet put it, ‘is it the pig that makes the
stye or the stye that makes the pig?’ The Royal Commission concluded that
drink and poverty acted and reacted upon one another, and the main cause
was low wages:

discomfort of the most abject kind is caused by drink, but indulgence in
drink is caused by overcrowding and its cognate evils, and the poor who
live under the conditions described here have the greatest difficulty in
leading decent lives and of maintaining decent habitations.43

Despite the writing of others, arguably the key figure in the propagation of
the concept of the social residuum was the social investigator Charles Booth
(1840–1916). Born in Liverpool in 1840, and after some training in the
Lamport and Holt Steamship Company, Booth began a long and successful
career as a shipowner. He was a partner in the firm of Alfred Booth & Co
from the age of 22, and later the Booth Steamship Company was formed,
with Charles Booth as chairman until 1912. However, from the 1880s Booth’s main energies were directed principally towards social investigation rather than business affairs. As is well known, his major achievement was the *Life and Labour of the People of London* (1891–1903), extending to 17 volumes in three series. Many of his other publications were concerned with old age pensions, including *Pauperism and the Endowment of Old Age* (1892), and Booth was appointed a member of the Royal Commission on the Poor Law in 1905.

The work of Booth has been of key importance in debates about the social residuum in the 1880s. Stedman Jones suggested that the new distinction between the residuum and the respectable working class was amplified by the writings of Booth, since he divided the residuum into two classes. Once separated from the respectable working class, the residuum was no longer a political threat – more of a social problem. However, other writing on Booth has been more cautious. John Brown has explored how Booth considered the potential of the labour colonies that he called ‘industrial communities’. But Brown pointed out that Booth always put forward the labour colony solution very tentatively, not least because it would have involved evacuating around 345,000 people out of London. As a policy option, it was both impractical and authoritarian, and was generally ignored by contemporaries. But it is true that Booth’s ideas remained influential. William Beveridge, for example, refined Booth’s analysis through the concept of underemployment, even though the solution that he proposed was a national system of labour exchanges rather than labour colonies. Brown argued there was little reason to suppose that Booth regarded his proposals for labour colonies as a serious solution to the problem of the residuum.

Similarly Jose Harris argued that while Booth’s survey is imbued with residualist and evolutionary language and conceptions, he used Darwinist language loosely and metaphorically rather than in an exact and scientific way. He did not suggest that progress and degeneracy were the products of irreversible biological mutation. Instead, men and women were the products of experience and circumstance. Booth thought the ‘residuum mentality’ was found at all levels of society, and he did not believe degeneracy was hereditary in a physiological sense. Harris argued therefore that Booth’s residuum was a cultural phenomenon susceptible to pressure and manipulation, rather than the product of a natural law. Booth certainly exploited fashionable rhetoric, but more important in his analysis was the role of personal character and rational choice. His solution to poverty was not forcible segregation, but greater efforts to develop moral character and citizenship. Jane Lewis argued that Booth shared the conviction of Octavia Hill and Helen Bosanquet that individual habits and character had to be modified for change to be lasting. Therefore she tended to support Harris’s point that it was the role of character and personal choice that was most important to Booth. Peter Hennock too has argued that the emphasis of Booth’s work was in separating out the classes, particularly between the
respective working class, and the residuum of demoralized labour. Booth’s
genius was not in analytical or conceptual originality, but in his perseverance
and inquisitiveness. Thus Hennock concluded that ‘there is therefore a strong
case to be made for regarding Charles Booth as a systematiser, working
within a familiar set of assumptions about the composition of society and
the nature of social progress’.48

Booth is recognized as an extremely important figure in the development
of social investigation.49 However, with some notable exceptions his interest
in the social residuum has been neglected in favour of his empirical research
into poverty. This is surprising, since this thread in his thinking was evident
from his first publications. The results of the early research that were later
to form part of the Life and Labour of the People of London were given
in papers to the Royal Statistical Society, in May 1887 and May 1888. In
the first of these papers, Booth described the ‘condition of the inhabitants’
of Tower Hamlets, an area that comprised the five registration districts of
Whitechapel, St George’s in the East, Stepney, Mile End Old Town, and
Poplar.50 Booth divided the people who lived in Tower Hamlets into eight
classes, ranging from ‘A’, the ‘lowest class’, to ‘H’, the ‘upper middle class’.
Class ‘A’ was thought to comprise some 6,882 people, or 1.5 per cent of
the total population. Included in it were ‘so-called labourers, loafers, semi-
criminals, a proportion of the street sellers, street performers, and others’,
along with the homeless and criminals who were also working.51 Class ‘B’,
that dependent on casual earnings, comprised some 51,860 people, or over
11 per cent of the total. Of the members of class ‘B’, Booth wrote that ‘these
people, as a class, are shiftless, hand-to-mouth, pleasure loving, and always
poor; to work when they like and play when they like is their ideal’.52 While
there was much unemployment, there was also an element of a ‘leisure
class’. Booth argued that ‘they cannot stand the regularity and dulness [sic]
of civilised existence, and find the excitement they need in the life of the
streets, or at home as spectators of, or participants in, some highly coloured
domestic scene’.53

Nevertheless, when Booth attempted to classify the population in the five
districts of Tower Hamlets by employment, or ‘sections’, he was forced to
concede that the divisions between these classes were not fixed, but constantly
fluctuating. The sections ‘not only melt into each other by insensible degrees,
but the only divisions which can be made are rather divisions of sentiment
than of positive fact’.54 In all, there were some 39 employment groups, or
‘sections’. The first section did correspond to class ‘A’. These were ‘casual
labourers of low character, together with those who pick up a living without
labour, and include the criminal or semi-criminal classes’.55 Their food was
poor, and alcohol their only luxury. Booth wrote:

these are the battered figures who slouch through the streets, and play the
beggar or the bully, or help to foul the record of the unemployed; these
are the worst class of corner men who hang round the doors of public
houses, the young men who spring forward on any chance to earn a copper, the ready materials for disorder when occasion serves.\textsuperscript{56}

Booth had no doubt that the situation of these people was in part hereditary – the children of this class were the ‘street arabs’, and were separated from their parents in pauper or industrial schools. More numerous were the ‘young persons’ who belonged to this group – ‘young men who take naturally to loafing; girls who take almost as naturally to the streets; some drift back from the pauper and industrial schools, and others drift down from the classes of casual and irregular labour’.\textsuperscript{57} At the same time, the group was not homogeneous and there were some respectable individuals. Employing the metaphor of the prospector, Booth claimed that ‘those who are able to wash the mud may find some gems in it’.\textsuperscript{58}

What is most interesting for our purposes are Booth’s overall conclusions. For while Booth admitted that the state of affairs revealed in his investigations was serious, it was ‘not visibly fraught with imminent social danger, or leading straight to revolution’.\textsuperscript{59} Overall, he calculated that 65 per cent of the population were above the poverty line, 22 per cent on the line, and 13 per cent in distress and falling below it. His findings were therefore reassuring, in that although profound poverty was apparent, social revolution was not an immediate danger. Booth concluded:

\begin{quote}
that there should be so much savagery as there is, and so much abject poverty, and so many who can never raise their heads much above the level of actual want is grave enough; but we can afford to be calm, and give to attempts at improvement the time and patience which are absolutely needed if we are to do any good at all.\textsuperscript{60}
\end{quote}

In his second paper to the Royal Statistical Society, given in May 1888, Booth reported on his attempts to extend his investigations into the Hackney School Board Division. This comprised the registration districts of Shoreditch, Bethnal Green, and Hackney, or a further 440,000 inhabitants, making a total of some 908,958 people when combined with the earlier work on Tower Hamlets.\textsuperscript{61} Again much of the information was collected by School Board Visitors. Booth retained his eight classes, ranging from ‘A’ to ‘H’. He estimated that in the Hackney School Board Division, class ‘A’ comprised some 11,000 people, or 1.25 per cent of the total, while class ‘B’ numbered some 100,000 people, or 11.25 per cent of the entire population. However, Booth now argued that classes ‘B’, ‘C’, and ‘D’ constituted the real problem of poverty, disregarding ‘A’, which he regarded more as an issue of ‘disorder’.

In an attempt to uncover the causes of poverty, Booth analysed 4,000 cases known to the School Board visitors as the ‘poor’ and ‘very poor’ in each district. With regard to the 1,610 heads of families in classes ‘A’ and ‘B’, 4 per cent were classified by him as ‘loafers’, while 55 per cent were in casual or irregular employment or had low pay. A further 14 per cent
were thought to be in poverty because of ‘drink or obvious want of thrift’, while the predicament of a further 27 per cent was owing to ‘questions of circumstance’, ranging through large families, illness, and irregular work. In contrast, a similar analysis of 2,466 heads of families in classes ‘C’ and ‘D’ suggested that 68 per cent were in poverty due to conditions of ‘employment’, and that fewer cases were due to questions of ‘habit’ or ‘circumstance’.

For Booth, the main problem was posed by class ‘B’; if it could be ‘swept out of existence’ the work it did could be taken on by classes ‘C’ and ‘D’, which would then be much better off. He wrote:

to the rich the very poor are a sentimental interest: to the poor they are a crushing load. The poverty of the poor is mainly the result of the competition of the very poor. The entire removal of this class out of the daily struggle for existence I believe to be the only solution of the problem of poverty.\(^62\)

Class ‘A’, on the other hand, represented a very small group – both in relation to the rest of the population and with regard to class ‘B’. Echoing his paper of the previous year, Booth maintained that the situation was not out of control. His purpose was to reassure on the basis of his extensive social investigation, and to play down the more dramatic pronouncements of some of his contemporaries. Booth concluded, ‘the hordes of barbarians of whom we have heard, who, coming forth from their slums, will one day overwhelm modern civilisation, do not exist. The barbarians are a handful, a very small and decreasing percentage’.\(^63\)

The ways in which Booth viewed the residuum are further illustrated in the collected volumes of the *Life and Labour of the People of London*, published from 1902. These included examples of what might be termed evolutionary language. Booth wrote that ‘the unemployed are, as a class, a selection of the unfit, and, on the whole, those most in want are the most unfit’.\(^64\) Similarly he argued that periods of economic slump sorted out those men who were better managers or who had other advantages, writing that ‘there result a constant seeking after improvement, a weeding-out of the incapable, and a survival of the fittest’.\(^65\) Nevertheless, while he advocated that class ‘A’ should be dispersed, and that labour colonies might be used for class ‘B’, there was no sense that the latter was in any sense fixed, and it is not clear how seriously he viewed this as a solution. Though he termed it a ‘sort of quagmire underlying the social structure’, class ‘B’ were not paupers but ‘the material from which paupers are made’.\(^66\) Moreover, while he argued that class ‘A’ was hereditary, he hoped that it might become less so, partly through improved provision for children.\(^67\) Finally, his overall message was again hopeful, since he amended his earlier warning slightly to read ‘there are barbarians, but they are a handful, a small and decreasing percentage: a disgrace but not a danger’.\(^68\) As Peter Hennock has suggested, ‘the percentages that he presented, far from being grounds for pessimism, were in his opinion ones for optimism’.\(^69\)
But what is most striking on looking again at the Booth survey is that – like Alfred Marshall, Arnold White, H. M. Hyndman, and Samuel Barnett writing before him – he made little serious attempt to define the residuum accurately, and in fact the term itself was almost entirely absent from his writings. As Jose Harris has suggested, Booth used evolutionary language opportunistically and rather loosely. He did not suggest that progress or degeneracy were caused by irreversible biological mutation – rather men and women were mainly the products of experience and circumstance – and if there was deterioration it was caused by the effects of the London environment. He aimed to make the transmission of bad characteristics less hereditary. And the solutions that he advocated most seriously were not dispersal and labour colonies, but the exercise of character and rational choice.70

What was the impact of the Booth survey? Gareth Stedman Jones has suggested that Booth’s conclusions were not immediately accepted, but with the dock strike and the publication of the first two volumes of *Life and Labour*, his analysis merged with that of middle-class opinion. Once social investigation and the actions of the strikers themselves had established a clear distinction between the ‘residuum’ and the working class, fears of revolution subsided.71 In his book *In Darkest England* (1890), General William Booth attempted to use Charles Booth’s figures to estimate the numbers of the destitute. Adding together the poorest class, prison inmates, ‘indoor paupers and lunatics’, and those dependent on them, Booth estimated that this group constituted some three million of the total population of thirty-one million in Great Britain. Thus from these ‘ghastly figures’, Booth argued the problem was one of the ‘submerged tenth’.72

Appointed to the chair of political economy at Cambridge in 1885, Alfred Marshall published his *Principles of Economics* in 1890. It rapidly came to be seen as the greatest economic treatise of his generation. In it, Marshall made a more direct reference to the residuum. He wrote that:

> those who have been called the Residuum of our large towns have little opportunity for friendship; they know nothing of the decencies and the quiet, and very little even of the unity of family life; and religion often fails to reach them. No doubt their physical, mental, and moral ill-health is partly due to other causes than poverty: but this is the chief cause.73

Thus Marshall provided an explanation that located the residuum in a structural rather than behavioural context. The residuum was less to be feared than to be pitied. Ninety years later, his points would be repeated almost exactly in debates about the underclass.

Nevertheless, the Report of the Select Committee on Distress from Want of Employment (1896) suggests that the older distinction between the ‘deserving’ and ‘undeserving’ survived despite the Booth survey. Based partly on evidence from Charles Booth, the Report of the Select Committee
argued that the respectable unemployed did not deserve Poor Law relief, and the Report objected to the stigma associated with it. Significantly, the Report also embodied the fear that if the ‘better class of unemployed’ was brought into contact with poor relief, its independence would be gradually undermined and it would rely permanently on receiving assistance. Basically, a distinction was made between the ordinary applicants for parish relief and the deserving unemployed. The needs of the former could be met in the usual way, while there were other ways to help the deserving poor. With regard to the stone-breaking test, for example, the Committee argued that this should be ended since ‘the casual and deserving poor suffer by being brought into contact with the loafing class in the stoneyard’. Similarly it objected to state grants on the basis that they would lead to the ‘demoralisation’ of the recipients, and to farm colonies which became ‘the resort of the idle and vicious, to the exclusion of the efficient and deserving’.

The writers and commentators featured so far had one thing in common – they were all men. Ross McKibbin, on the other hand, has claimed that the work of early female social investigators was marked by an interest in the behaviour of the poor that anticipated Oscar Lewis’s culture of poverty in the 1960s. He has written of Helen Bosanquet, Margaret Loane, and Florence, Lady Bell, that ‘they were all three probably the most accomplished Edwardian practitioners of a cultural sociology; but they were also all three hostile to structural explanations of poverty and collective solutions to it’. These writers were concerned with familiar aspects of the life of the poor. Why, for example, were the poor so improvident in their management of money? Why was working-class behaviour marked by a sense of time that seemed confined? And why, compared to the middle class, did the urge for excitement seem so strong, and lapses of concentration sudden and frequent? McKibbin points out the striking similarities between the approaches taken by Bosanquet, Loane, and Bell, and by cultural sociology in the United States in the 1950s and 1960s. He claims that the techniques adopted by Oscar Lewis were almost identical to those of these early female investigators.

Helen Bosanquet (1860–1925) was born into the well-known Manchester Utilitarian family of the Dendys – her sister Mary, for example, was active in social work with the mentally defective. After graduating from Cambridge, Helen worked as a paid secretary for the Shoreditch District Committee of the Charity Organisation Society, from 1890 until her marriage to the philosopher Bernard Bosanquet in 1894. Helen remained committed to the world of social work within the COS, and she also edited the Charity Organisation Review until 1912. Helen Bosanquet was one of the most powerful intellectual and political influences on the COS before World War I, if an increasingly isolated one. Angus McBriar has suggested that the attitude of the Bosanquets towards the residuum showed that they believed that the condition of the poor was due to their lack of will power or strong character, and absence of self-help and independence. McBriar claims that in the 1890s the Bosanquets led the COS away from the dichotomy between
deserving and undeserving, towards a more refined distinction between the ‘helpable’ and the ‘unhelpable’.77

In a paper read at the Economic Club in January 1893, and subsequently published in the *Economic Journal*, the then Helen Dendy analysed the social residuum within the framework provided by neo-classical economics. She made a clear distinction between the residuum and the class of ‘genuinely self-supporting wage-earners’, though she also argued that members of the residuum could be found in all classes of society.78 The difference between the two groups, according to Bosanquet, was one of ‘character and disposition’. What distinguished members of the residuum was their attitude to pleasure, pain, labour, and reward. But the residuum itself consisted of two groups – those who were in ‘superfluous’ jobs, and unskilled labourers who supported regular wage earners in the main industries. Together, the residuum also possessed a number of other notable characteristics. Its members lacked foresight and self-control, they lived entirely in the present, and had little sense of the past. According to Bosanquet, they were unable to remember street names and house numbers, they had a poor sense of direction, and they had trouble in distinguishing left and right. Family ties were loose, so that neither different generations nor siblings had much sense of mutual responsibility. As a result, the life of a member of the residuum was:

one incoherent jumble from beginning to end; it would be impossible to make even a connected story out of it, for every day merely repeats the mistakes, the follies and mishaps of yesterday; there is no development in it; all is aimless and drifting.79

Most important for Bosanquet was that these variations of ‘character’ had economic results, in that members of the residuum had a different attitude towards labour and reward from that of ‘normal’ people. In the opinion of Bosanquet, it was the ‘inferior’ man who was most vulnerable to the ups and downs of the trade cycle – it was these workers who were ‘the first to be turned off as work slackens, and the last to be taken on as it improves’. The residuum cost as much to produce as the self-supporting wage earner, but generated little of real value – they had the economic worth of cracked bells. Bosanquet thought that it was almost impossible to eradicate these ‘defects of character’ – the best that could be hoped for was that the residuum would fade away through natural processes. It might ‘gradually wear itself away, or in the coming generation be reabsorbed into the industrial life on which it is at present a mere parasite’.80

Some of the same ideas were repeated in *The Strength of the People* (1902). It is interesting that here Bosanquet tended to use the phrase ‘very poor’ in place of the residuum. In suggesting the term ‘residuum’ was no longer fashionable, this may provide a comment on wider changes in intellectual thought. Nonetheless Bosanquet maintained that the first step towards solving contemporary social problems was in the area of the ‘individual
mind and character’. Indeed any alternative approach was likely to make the situation worse rather than better. In a section that provides clear resonances with later writing on social capital, Bosanquet argued that the less obvious, but ultimately more successful, strategy would be to ‘approach the problem by striking at its roots in the minds of the people themselves; to stimulate their energies, to insist upon their responsibilities, to train their faculties. In short, to make them efficient’.81

Jane Lewis has suggested that Helen and Bernard Bosanquet believed in ideas as much as social action. Only through a thorough understanding of human behaviour could social problems be solved, and it was social work that was the key to achieving social change. And it was because they placed so much emphasis on developing and reforming individual character that they favoured social work as the means of achieving change. Thus state intervention posed a danger to the exercise of individual will and effort. Lewis argued that Helen Bosanquet provided perceptive and sympathetic descriptions of working-class life. At best, the emphasis on ‘character’ could lead to a desire to work with and empower individuals. She was, for instance, more sympathetic to the residuum than her contemporary Beatrice Webb, and her ideas were better worked out than those of Charles Booth. At the same time, the interpretation was heavily influenced by the prevailing moral and social philosophical framework.82 To change character would achieve more fundamental improvement than changing economic conditions. Jose Harris pointed out that for Helen Bosanquet the residuum could be reclaimed, by a mixture of tough social policies, visiting, and training in citizenship and good housekeeping.83 As with Booth, therefore, Bosanquet saw the residuum as amenable to change rather than the product of an inexorable natural law; its members could be found in all social classes; and it was character that held the key.

There was therefore much discussion about the existence of a social residuum among social investigators in England in the 1880s, and this has to be placed in the context of older ideas about the deserving and undeserving poor, the Marxist insistence on the existence of the *lumpenproletariat*, and wider fears of criminal classes and dangerous classes. Influenced in part by fears of physical degeneracy, there was much concern about the poor and the unemployed in London in the 1880s, and draconian social policies were advocated that sought to segregate these social groups, including through the establishment of labour colonies. Much of Booth’s analysis was concerned to separate out his ‘social quagmire’ from the respectable working class, and some of this was couched loosely in evolutionary language. Moreover, as the writing of Helen Bosanquet indicates, this analysis, and the use of the term ‘residuum’ itself, persisted into the 1890s.

However, it is also clear that a concern with a residuum existed long before the 1880s, in the debates about enfranchising the working class through the Second Reform Act, in 1867. Moreover much of the writing of the 1880s, by Alfred Marshall, Arnold White, H. M. Hyndman, and
Samuel Barnett, among others, was concerned more generally with poverty and unemployment; their anxiety about a ‘submerged social stratum’ or the ‘nomad poor’ was only one of the issues that they explored; and while they may have subscribed to the idea, they did not in fact use the term ‘residuum’. While these writers were concerned with the effects of physical degeneracy allegedly caused by the urban environment, they were also concerned with improvements to housing, and in fact the language of Social Darwinism was strikingly absent from their analysis. In the arguments of both Booth and Bosanquet, the main thrust of their writing was to emphasize the importance of character, and there was evidence from the Report of the Select Committee on Distress from Want of Employment (1896) that the older distinction between the deserving and undeserving survived despite the evidence of the Booth survey. As others have noted, arguments for sterilizing the ‘unfit’ or for establishing labour colonies did not pass into legislation.

While earlier writers on the residuum have tended to see World War I as a further turning point, and have made some connections between the social residuum and the ideas that came after, they have failed to do this systematically. Social investigators had begun to write about the unemployable in the 1890s. It is to that notion that we now turn.
In order to look more closely at the transition from the notion of the social residuum to the concept of the ‘social problem group’, we examine in this chapter the related idea of the unemployable. This phrase was used by a range of writers in the 1890s and early 1900s, including Sidney and Beatrice Webb, and William Beveridge. There were both similarities and differences between the notions of the social residuum and the unemployable. On the other hand, social surveys conducted by, among others, Benjamin Seebohm Rowntree and Arthur Bowley, and published after 1900, suggest these terms fell out of favour in the years before World War I. Nevertheless debates in the 1920s and 1930s about unemployment, which generated a search for the scrounger, and when contemporaries claimed to have detected a social psychology of unemployment, entailed re-visiting those debates on the unemployable that had been such a feature of the 1890s and early 1900s. We argue that concern with the residuum did not ebb away, as Stedman Jones has suggested. Rather it remained a latent, but still potent, stream in intellectual thought, embodied in the Trojan Horse concept of the unemployable. In this way it served to sustain a particular interpretation of poverty that provided a fertile soil for the concept of the social problem group in the 1920s.

It was Charles Booth’s eight-class taxonomy of the population of London, and particularly the case of Class ‘B’ within it, that provided the focal point for much of the discussion of the concept of unemployables in the late-Victorian and Edwardian periods. Beatrice Potter (1858–1943) joined the COS in 1883 as an unpaid Visitor, and also worked as a rent collector in one of Octavia Hill’s housing schemes. Later, she became disillusioned with social work, and moved more towards social investigation, initially by working on Booth’s survey of London. After she married Sidney Webb (1859–1947) in 1892, the Webbs worked more on histories of institutions than social surveys. Working in tandem as ‘the firm’, their publications...
included histories of trade unionism, Fabian tracts on education, a history of local government, and the drafting of the Minority Report of the Royal Commission on the Poor Law.

Jane Lewis has made the point that whereas women’s roles in nineteenth-century philanthropy have been acknowledged, the part women played as social investigators has often been overlooked. Even so, this secondary work on Beatrice Webb has not gone as far as it might to explore the ways in which she used the related concept of the unemployable. The new absence of the term ‘residuum’ and the frequency of the phrase ‘unemployable’ are made clear in some of the earliest writings of Sidney and Beatrice Webb. In their book *Industrial Democracy* (1897), for example, the Webbs made the – to them – important distinction between the unemployable and the temporarily unemployed. While unemployment was ‘an inevitable incident in the life of even the most competent and the best conducted workman’, they argued that, like the poor, the unemployable ‘we have always with us’.¹ The Webbs divided the unemployable into three groups. In the first category were children, older people, and women of child-bearing age. The second group was composed of the sick and crippled, ‘idiots and lunatics’, the epileptic, the blind, deaf, and dumb, criminals and the ‘incorrigibly idle’, and all who were ‘morally deficient’. In the third group were men and women who:

> without suffering from apparent disease of body or mind, are incapable of steady or continuous application, or who are so deficient in strength, speed, or skill that they are incapable, in the industrial order in which they find themselves, of producing their maintenance at any occupation whatsoever.²

It is immediately clear that the boundaries between these groupings were blurred – older people might fit into the first and third. Nevertheless, the solution put forward by the Webbs was a dual one, influenced by current public health policy, of prevention on the one hand and treatment on the other. Like Booth, the Webbs realized that one solution was offered by labour colonies which would remove the unemployable from the labour market, and avoid the danger of ‘parasitic competition with those who are whole’.³ However, the Webbs also argued that, if a policy of a national minimum of education, sanitation, leisure, and wages was adopted, it would reduce the costs of the unemployable to the state, and also begin to reduce its size. This fiscal accounting argument was typical of much thought at the time. Taxpayers, it was alleged, were concerned at having to maintain in public institutions ‘an enlarged residuum of the unemployable’, and a national minimum would instead ‘increase the efficiency of the community as a whole’.⁴ Thus the Webbs managed to combine a belief in the unemployable with solutions that emphasized the role of state action. In this, their remedies were almost the direct opposite of those of Helen Bosanquet outlined in the previous chapter.
As we have noted, the Webbs played a key role in the drafting of the Minority Report of the Royal Commission on the Poor Law (1909). The Report argued that in the end, ‘character’ was irrelevant in discussions of unemployment. It concluded that ‘whether the men are good or bad, drunken or sober, immoral or virtuous, it is a terrible misfortune to the community, as well as to themselves, that they should be unemployed’. Even so, the Minority Report did support the concept of the unemployable. The Minority Report again argued that the unemployable were not all the same – some members of the group did not actively look for work, while others did look but were unsuccessful. Another simile was to compare the unemployable to wreckage from an ocean liner, since it was composed of ‘material of the most heterogeneous and sharply differentiated kinds, bright and clean and in active use, but now so battered and sodden as to appear, in bulk, almost homogeneous in its worthlessness’. The Report argued that some members of the unemployable could be rehabilitated. Again employing the metaphor of the prospector, the Webbs wrote that, if properly sorted, there was much that could be useful, and some ‘gems’ of real value. Jane Lewis has compared Beatrice Webb and Helen Bosanquet, noting that they differed in the way they viewed the relationship between social facts and social theory. She has argued that Bosanquet was more sympathetic towards the residuum than either Booth or Webb, noting that the Minority Report, in its attitude to ‘recalcitrant labour’, and in recommending draconian proposals for dealing with it, and forcing it into a useful life, showed the old distrust of, and contempt for, the residuum.

*Industrial Democracy* and the Minority Report support the argument of Lewis that Beatrice Webb was less sympathetic towards the ‘residuum’ than Helen Bosanquet. But it was the expression ‘unemployable’ that Beatrice Webb used, more than the term ‘residuum’. Certainly the work of the Webbs demonstrated how the concept of the unemployable persisted in social thought well after World War I. In their history of the Poor Law (1929), for example, the Webbs argued that the unemployed could be classified into six groups, with the residuum constituting a final group, who might be called the unemployable. This group included:

- those who, by reason of physical, mental or moral deficiencies, have great difficulty in discovering any employer willing to engage them at any price; and also those who, finding other ways of picking up a meagre subsistence, are not, with any reality, seeking employment at all.

For the Webbs, the terms ‘residuum’ and ‘unemployable’ seemed interchangeable. But they also claimed that World War I had demonstrated two things. First, there was no surplus population for which occupation or wages could not be found. Second, the category of the unemployable had no definite boundary since a large proportion of those thought to be physically, mentally, or morally incapable of employment did find work in wartime. Thus they continued to believe the unemployable existed, while
conceding there was no definite distinction between the unemployable and the unemployed. It is debatable which strand in their thinking was the most significant. It is certainly interesting that the point made by Stedman Jones in *Outcast London* about the residuum and World War I was made originally by the Webbs in relation to wartime and the unemployable. But as we shall see when we come to the problem family, it is also the case that underclass concepts can be invented in wartime, raising important questions about how and when the transition between these concepts occurs.

The Webbs’ interest in the unemployable was echoed by other contemporary writing on unemployment. Geoffrey Drage, Secretary to the Labour Commission, and writing in 1894, had argued that casual labourers could fall into the lower class of the unemployable, which consisted of those ‘who are permanently unemployed because through some physical or moral defect they are economically worthless’. At the same time, Drage conceded that there were many temporarily without work because of economic conditions rather than their ‘comparative fitness’, and it was the ‘least capable’ or the ‘least steady’ who were the first to be ‘turned off’. When it came to the causes of unemployment, temporary unemployment was usually due to conditions independent of the men involved, and over which they had no control. Drage did argue that unemployment could be due to ‘low physical and moral condition’, old age, or a physical disability. But more often it was ‘faults of character – habits of intemperance, idleness or dishonesty – which constitute their inferiority’. Drage was heavily influenced by the earlier work of Booth, and he attached great importance to classifying the unemployed. He also accepted that labour colonies offered the prospect of a temporary solution.

Percy Alden’s study of unemployment, published in 1905, was also heavily embued with the concept of the unemployable. Alden had previously been Warden of the Mansfield House Settlement in East London, a member of the Mansion House Unemployed Committee, and secretary to a conference on unemployment held at London’s Guildhall in 1903. For Alden, the unemployable was composed of two groups. First, there were the ‘criminals, semi-criminals, vicious vagabonds and the incorrigibly lazy’ – the able-bodied who refused to work, or were refused work because of some ‘defect’ in their character. Second, there were the physically and mentally deficient. The second group could be subdivided into a further four groups – the aged; the physically weak and maimed; epileptics; and ‘weak-willed inebriates and the mentally deficient’. Given this, the solutions were different for each group, though there was some overlap. For the former, the remedies were the abolition of casual wards; the introduction of identification papers; the provision of relief stations; and the setting up of labour colonies. For the latter, they included residential homes for old people, the provision of old age pensions, and the creation of farm colonies.

Like the Webbs, Alden regarded the unemployable as a heterogeneous group, comprising both those unwilling and those unable to work. And, like
them, his solutions were a mix of the progressive and the reactionary. Alden had just returned from a visit to labour colonies in Holland, Belgium, and Germany, and the key theme of his book was segregation. He emphasized the separation ‘of the criminal and vicious vagabond from all who may be called in any real sense irresponsible’. It was also important to distinguish between ‘the genuine unemployed man who is in search of work, and the vicious vagrant who is in search of opportunities for plunder and who has not the slightest intention of working’. From his observations on the Continent, Alden knew that Denmark, Belgium, Germany, and Holland had set up labour colonies and workshops. His preference was for farm colonies rather than casual wards, because men were detained in the former, and the work was ‘useful and humanising’. Nevertheless many of these were not hopeless cases, they were ‘men of weak character, easily swayed and led by the baser kind’ – they need not be permanently unemployable, but could be rehabilitated. Overall the aim, as he saw it, was ‘to check the wholesale demoralisation of large sections of the working classes, and restore to the people the assurance so long denied that honest work will carry with it a just and certain reward’.

The concept of the unemployable can also be seen to have permeated debates about vagrancy. The Departmental Committee on Vagrancy was appointed in July 1904. Its 1906 Report argued that ‘it [the casual ward population] is mainly composed of those who deliberately avoid any work and depend for their existence on almsgiving and the casual wards; and also for their benefit the industrious portions of the community is heavily taxed’. Numbers for 1905, for example, for the casual ward population for London, had decreased slightly, but remained unacceptably high. Overall, the Departmental Committee argued that the current system made no attempt to reform the vagrant. It stressed the potential role of labour colonies and police control, and proposed that the real cause of vagrancy was ‘indiscriminate charity’.

Interestingly, the Report was shot through by a distinction between the ‘habitual vagrant’ and the ‘bona fide wayfarer’. The habitual vagrant was regarded as one of four identified types of the homeless, and while numbers fluctuated, it was thought there was an irreducible minimum of some 20,000–30,000 people. The Committee claimed, for example, that ‘the habitual vagrant much prefers bad accommodation with laxity of control to a well-appointed cell and strict discipline’. One suggestion was that vagrants should be the responsibility of the police, rather than the Poor Law authorities. Nevertheless attempts should also be made to improve provision for the man genuinely in search of work. One idea was to give him bread and cheese on leaving the workhouse, while forcing the ‘other class’ of vagrant to report to the police. Furthermore, the Committee recommended compulsory labour colonies for habitual vagrants, to clear them from the streets, force them to lead a more useful life during detention, and to act as a deterrent. These labour colonies were to be organized by local authorities or
charities, with deterrent features such as unpleasant food, distinctive dress, and high walls to prevent escape. They should be self-financing through the work of the inmates – free food and cheap shelters were a ‘serious evil’.21

Writing in the preface to Edmond Kelly’s *The Unemployables* (1907), Sir William Chance echoed the recommendations of the Departmental Committee, noting the importance of abolishing the casual wards, and establishing labour colonies for the unemployed and habitual vagrants. Previously a Lecturer in Municipal Government at Columbia University, in New York, Kelly’s book provided a more sustained analysis of the concept of the unemployable, or what John Burns had called the ‘loafers, thieves and ne’er-do-wells’. Kelly attempted to classify the unemployed according to physical strength, blamelessness, and the causes of unemployment. For him, it was important to distinguish between the able-bodied and the non-able-bodied; between the blameless and the not blameless; and between the temporary and the permanent. Much of Kelly’s book was taken up with the issue of to what extent the continental system of labour colonies could be applied in England. He argued that ultimately this might solve the problem of vagrancy and ‘greatly diminish the expense of the criminal class and restore to the community all such persons of the vagrant and criminal classes as are capable of reformation’.22 Kelly noted, for example, that colonies could ultimately become self-supporting, but could also prevent the current generation of vagrants from reproducing. Overall Kelly’s work demonstrated how, in this period, discussions of vagrancy were inseparable from those around unemployability.

Changing views on the causes of unemployment were reflected in, and informed by, work by William Beveridge (1879–1963). Educated at Charterhouse and Balliol College, Oxford, Beveridge is best known for his *Report on Social Insurance and Allied Services*. Published in December 1942 at the height of World War II, it was an immediate, if unlikely, bestseller. It remains a key document in the history of the welfare state. Jose Harris’s biography argued that Beveridge concluded that unemployment should be seen not as a problem of social distress or personal character, but as a problem of industrial organization. He thought there were three types – redundancy; occasional unemployment; and chronic underemployment – and these were more important than traditional explanations based on lack of skill or thrift, and moral character. Thus Beveridge cut across debates about ‘character’ and ‘environment’ by arguing that it was industrial conditions that created the character of the unemployed, and that industrial reorganization, not just moral improvement, was essential.23 Yet Harris’s biography also makes clear that, as with many of his contemporaries, Beveridge took an interest in debates about the relative influences of heredity and environment, and there were signs that he was attracted to eugenics. His views were complex, and while at times he subscribed to an environmental interpretation, at others he was swayed by eugenics, especially with regard to mental subnormality. Harris has written:
The development of Beveridge’s views on unemployment between 1903 and 1906 was therefore in many respects ambivalent. On the one hand he was intellectually committed to a purely inductive approach to social problems; yet many of his conclusions about unemployment were clearly derived not merely from facts but from contemporary social theory.24

In 1904, Beveridge reflected in the *Contemporary Review* on the lessons of the Mansion House Fund for tackling unemployment. The main feature of the proposals of the Mansion House Committee, supported by the Lord Mayor’s Fund, had been the offer of continuous work, in colonies outside London, to male heads of families. Between December 1903 and March 1904, 467 families received relief. Labour tests and the local knowledge of the selectors had been relied upon to eliminate those deemed ‘undesirable’. Beveridge argued the colony test had been effective, and ‘the mass of idlers and dependents who usually expect to reap an easy harvest from the opening of relief funds ceased to apply as soon as they found that work was demanded’.25 He suggested the main lessons from the work of the Committee had been the importance of classification, but also the persistence of the distress. Beveridge argued that the ‘material’ comprised three groups – the unemployable; casual labourers; and men normally in regular work. The unemployable had to be isolated, and periods of regular work and discipline in compulsory labour colonies were essential.

The inconsistencies in Beveridge’s thought that Harris points to are also evident in the summary of the earlier writing in the *Morning Post* that appeared as the book *Unemployment: A Problem of Industry* (1909). Beveridge on the one hand maintained an interest in the ‘personal factor’ in unemployment. He asked to what extent strengths of personality could prevent unemployment, and how far weaknesses of personality should be regarded as its causes. For Beveridge, there were some men who clearly did not want to work. He wrote that:

they are the social parasites most prominently represented by the habitual criminal and the habitual vagrant. Each of these is in truth as definitely diseased as are the inmates of hospitals, asylums and infirmaries, and should be classed with them.26

Beveridge believed that there were various ‘defects of character’ that increased the likelihood of a person being unemployed. First, there were the ‘purely parasitic types’ who constituted a permanent vagrant class. Second, there were men willing to work now and again, but not continuously. Third, among all men, there were ‘common faults and occasional self-indulgences’ whose net effect was to increase economic waste and unemployment.27

However, although some were unemployable, Beveridge acknowledged that this term had no real meaning – the best carpenter in the world was ‘unemployable’ as a printer – and that the dividing line between ‘this class’
and the rest of the community was hard to define. Beveridge argued that the ‘problem’ of unemployment could only to a limited extent be solved by improvements in human character. First, the class of the unemployable was small in number. Second, human character could best be improved by eliminating the social or industrial conditions that tended to perpetuate ‘idleness and irresponsibility’. Third, no likely improvement in character would eliminate the main economic factors in unemployment. Beveridge observed that one of the main problems was that many people were living on a quicksand of casual and irregular work. Therefore he concluded that:

while this quicksand and its movements are part of industry, society cannot escape some responsibility for those who live there; cannot treat as criminals those whose industrial services are there required; cannot end the evil by rescuing individuals.28

Thus Jose Harris claimed that Beveridge’s views on unemployment were in many ways based on traditional economic and evolutionary assumptions, especially in relation to the issue of casual labour. She pointed out the contradictions in the position that he, and others, adopted. The distress that resulted from unemployment was viewed as the product of a disorganized labour market, but it was also thought that casual and irregular workmen were inferior social specimens. It was important to maintain the principle of deterrence, but at the same time it was thought the labour market should be regulated and unemployment reduced. The lowest class was not seen just as inefficient or improvident, but as a degenerate class. This distinction was increasingly called into question by the leaders of the working class. However, personal criticism of the unemployed was not incompatible with a structural explanation. The solutions that Beveridge put forward embraced labour exchanges; unemployment insurance; short-time agreements and adjustments in standard wage-rates at times of depression; and the reform of the Poor Law. He believed, therefore, that social and economic activities were capable of rational administrative control.29

Overall, there are some respects in which it would clearly be wrong to regard the terms ‘residuum’ and ‘unemployable’ as synonymous. Unlike the residuum, which was regarded as a separate class, the unemployable was seen as a subset of the ‘unemployed’. And unlike the former, the latter was regarded as a heterogeneous group, comprising both those unable, and those unwilling, to work. Nevertheless the comment of the Webbs that there was a ‘residuum of the unemployable’ also hinted at continuities between the two ideas that were more than semantic. As in the case of the residuum, there were commentators whose preferred solution was a system of labour colonies. As with the social residuum, it is suggested that the concept of the unemployable evaporated with the advent of full employment during wartime. Again, like the social residuum, the concept of the unemployable was not seen as inconsistent with a structural analysis of the causes of
poverty. In terms of timing, it seems that the concept of the unemployable was most obvious in the period 1880–1914 – Beveridge’s classic *Unemployment: A Problem of Industry*, was published in 1909. With the Webbs, however, there was evidence that they discussed the unemployable as early as 1897, and as late as 1929. It seems likely that the term ‘residuum’ was succeeded by that of the ‘unemployable’ as less pejorative, less redolent of evolutionary language and Social Darwinism. But it also appears that terms such as ‘social residuum’, ‘unemployable’, and ‘social problem group’ could all be in use in the same period.

Further evidence on the appearance and disappearance of these terms after 1900 is provided by social surveys on both poverty and unemployment. The pioneering research by Charles Booth on poverty in East London was quickly followed by similar studies by other social investigators. Among the best known are those by Benjamin Seebohm Rowntree in York, published in 1901, and a social survey of working-class households in four English towns that was published by Arthur Bowley in 1915. Both are deservedly seen as landmarks in the history of social investigation – Rowntree for the distinction he drew between primary and secondary poverty; and Bowley for his innovative use of sampling methods. But the surveys have less frequently been examined for what they reveal about the ideas and assumptions of the researchers that planned and conducted them. Here we examine the work of Rowntree and Bowley to see the extent to which their surveys reflected a continuing interest in the concepts of the residuum and the unemployable, or whether they arguably marked a transition in the social theories that lay behind social investigation.

The third child of Joseph Rowntree, Benjamin Seebohm Rowntree (1871–1954) was born in York. He joined the family firm in 1889, becoming a member of the Board of Directors in 1897, and Chairman in 1923–41. He was closely associated with the charitable, social service, and village trusts that his father created, and subsequently the Rowntree firm became a leader in the field of scientific management and industrial welfare. Impressed by the work of Booth, Rowntree was determined to find out if the state of the poor in York was as bad as Booth had found in London, and *Poverty, A Study of Town Life* was published in 1901. Jonathan Bradshaw suggests that three important claims can be made for this survey – it had an important impact on public understanding of poverty; it had an immediate impact on policy; and it established the British tradition of empirical social science research.30

Recent writing on Rowntree has clarified the circumstances in which his first survey came to be written, showing, for example, how his background as an industrialist led him to have an interest in the physical efficiency of his workers.31 It has also been claimed that, rather than the Booth survey, the inspiration for *Poverty* was a work by Rowntree’s father and Arthur Sherwell, *The Temperance Problem and Social Reform* (1899).32 At the outset, Rowntree outlined his aim as being to ‘throw some light upon the conditions which
govern the life of the wage-earning classes in provincial towns, and especially upon the problem of poverty.\textsuperscript{33} The method chosen was a house-to-house survey of York carried out in 1899, of 11,560 families living in 388 streets. The families comprised a total of 46,754 people, or two-thirds of the overall population of the city. Rowntree included an enquiry into food, rent, and other expenditure, along with a study of social conditions, budgets, and diet. Arguably the most important conclusion drawn was the distinction between primary and secondary poverty. Primary poverty was defined as ‘families whose total earnings are insufficient to obtain the minimum necessaries for the maintenance of merely physical efficiency’. Secondary poverty, on the other hand, was defined as ‘families whose total earnings would be sufficient for the maintenance of merely physical efficiency were it not that some portion of it is absorbed by other expenditure, either useful or wasteful’.\textsuperscript{34}

There was no doubt that serious poverty existed in York. Rowntree wrote of the Hungate area of the city, for example, that:

\begin{quote}
though not large in extent, it is still large enough to exhibit the chief characteristics of slum life – the reckless expenditure of money as soon as obtained, with the aggravated want at other times; the rowdy Saturday night, the Monday morning pilgrimage to the pawn-shop, and especially that love for the district, and disinclination to move to better surroundings, which, combined with an indifference to the higher aims of life, are the despair of so many social workers.\textsuperscript{35}
\end{quote}

His conclusion was that 7,230 people were in primary poverty in York (9.91 per cent of the total population) and that 13,072 people were in secondary poverty (17.93 per cent). Therefore overall, 20,302 people (27.84 per cent) were in poverty. This was comparable to the findings of Booth, who as we have seen estimated that 30.7 per cent of the population of London were in poverty. Rowntree concluded that more attention should be given to living standards, ‘for no civilisation can be sound or stable which has at its base this mass of stunted human life’.\textsuperscript{36}

With regard to the residuum, there are two important methodological differences between the surveys of Booth and Rowntree. First, Rowntree employed special investigators to undertake house-to-house visits, and surveyed the entire working-class population. Second, Rowntree classified his households by income and household composition rather than by ‘conditions of poverty’.\textsuperscript{37} It had not been possible to find out about income through direct questioning of households, but income on occupation and workplace was available, and Rowntree used this to estimate earnings. Thus Rowntree adopted a four-fold classification of the working-class family (A–D), accordingly to the weekly income for a moderate family of two adults and from 2 to 4 children. The ranges were less than 18 shillings; 18–21 shillings; 21–30 shillings; and more than 30 shillings. The distribution of the population of York within Rowntree’s four classes is given in Table 2.1.
Rowntree divided his class ‘A’ (the lowest) into those earning money and those earning no money. He estimated that in the case of 1,295 people (66 per cent of the total), the immediate cause of poverty was the fact that the main wage earner had died or deserted the family, or was unable to work because of ill health or old age. Economic causes, through lack of work or low wages, accounted for the poverty of 418 people (21 per cent). He concluded that ‘after full allowance has been made for public and private charity, the people in Class A are chronically ill-housed, ill-clothed, and underfed’.38

Rowntree’s moralism is well known – his later surveys of York contained maps indicating the location of all the pubs in the city. There were occasional examples in the text when the language of national efficiency, and concepts of ‘fitness’, were apparent. Rowntree noted, for instance, of ‘unfit’ workmen that unfitness meant low wages, low wages meant insufficient food, and insufficient food led to unfitness for labour. The result was a vicious circle which was perpetuated in the next generation. Rowntree wrote that ‘the children of such parents have to share their privations, and even if healthy when born, the lack of sufficient food soon tells upon them. Thus they often grow up weak and diseased, and so tend to perpetuate the race of the “unfit”’.39 At other points, Rowntree employed eugenic language. He argued, for example, that the high rate of infant mortality in certain wards in York had its advantages, in that sickly children were ‘weeded out’. Even so, many of those who survived did so with ‘seriously enfeebled constitutions’.40 Like many other contemporary commentators, Rowntree referred to the ways that medical examinations of recruits had provided a commentary on the health of the population, and he compared the position of Britain to that of Germany, Belgium, Russia, and the United States, thereby equating health with concepts of national fitness.

Nonetheless, while Rowntree at times drew on the language of national fitness and eugenics, he also was aware of what today would be called poverty dynamics. He argued that people moved in and out of poverty, and also stressed that structural factors were the key causes. Rowntree argued,

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**Table 2.1 Rowntree’s four-fold classification of working class incomes**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>Weekly Income</th>
<th>Number of Households</th>
<th>Numbers of Persons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>less than 18 shillings</td>
<td>656</td>
<td>1957</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>18–21 shillings</td>
<td>983</td>
<td>4492</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>21–30 shillings</td>
<td>3822</td>
<td>15710</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>more than 30 shillings</td>
<td>6099</td>
<td>24595</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Sources: Rowntree, Poverty: A Study of Town Life, p. 31; Hennock, ‘Concepts of Poverty’, p. 193, Table 7.1.*
for example, that few people were likely to remain in class ‘A’. At any time the poor might sink into it, through lack of work or the death or illness of the main wage earner, but equally they would rise out of it when work was found, or when children began to earn money. Only older people would remain in class ‘A’, until they died or went into the workhouse. In general, claimed Rowntree, the main causes of primary poverty were the death of the main wage earner; his incapacity through accident, illness, or old age; the fact that he was out of work; chronic irregularity of work; large families; and low wages. Thus Rowntree recognized that most people moved in and out of poverty. The main determinants of these movements were structural factors such as death, illness, unemployment, and low incomes.

The closest that Rowntree came to a behavioural explanation was in his discussion of what he termed secondary poverty. Rowntree estimated secondary poverty by calculating the amount of poverty in York, and then subtracting primary poverty from the total. He conceded that ‘the point at which “primary” passes into “secondary” poverty is largely a matter of opinion, depending upon the standard of well-being which is considered necessary’. Rowntree argued that the causes of secondary poverty were in part in the control of individuals. They included ‘drink, betting, and gambling. Ignorant or careless housekeeping, and other improvident expenditure, the latter often induced by irregularity of income’. Nevertheless, Rowntree argued that the causes of secondary poverty were again primarily structural, in that they reflected the wider environmental circumstances within which much of the working class lived. He wrote:

housed for the most part in sordid streets, frequently under overcrowded and unhealthy conditions, compelled very often to earn their bread by monotonous and laborious work, and unable, partly through limited education and partly through overtime and other causes of physical exhaustion, to enjoy intellectual recreation, what wonder that many of these people fall a ready prey to the publican and the bookmaker?

Subsequent writing was revealing about Rowntree’s viewpoint. Helen Bosanquet was critical of Rowntree’s survey in her review of Poverty in the Charity Organisation Review in May 1902. She was doubtful that the proportion of the population in poverty in York and London was virtually the same. Bosanquet argued that debates about the percentage of people in poverty served to distract attention from the need for improvements in housing and sanitation. She also argued that like Booth, Rowntree had relied on ‘appearances’ to identify the poor. Moreover in The Times in September 1902 Bosanquet wrote that:

it can do no good, and may do much harm, to be constantly reiterating to people whose lives are difficult that their difficulties are insuperable. Hundreds of thousands of families throughout the country are daily
proving that they are not insuperable, and proving also to those who care to look that the ‘poverty line’ is comparatively seldom a question of money income primarily.45

She argued that Rowntree had in fact ‘emphasised the wonderful capacity of even the poorest to make a good life for themselves’.46 In reply, Rowntree defended the relatively high nutritional standard he had adopted, and the reliability of his estimates of family incomes. He suggested the main difference between Bosanquet and himself was a different view of human nature, and her attachment to:

the extreme wing of the Individualist school [which] unduly magnifies what may be done for the amelioration of social conditions through the personal effort and self-reliance of the individual, and correspondingly minimises the sphere of State intervention.47

Most secondary writing has centred on Rowntree’s distinction between primary and secondary poverty. John Veit-Wilson has argued that Rowntree’s work was of fundamental importance in the history of social investigation, in facilitating a shift from an absolutist to a relativistic model of poverty. Rowntree’s model was therefore quite comparable to the concept of relative deprivation later adopted by Peter Townsend. Unlike Booth, he acknowledged that class ‘A’ was not a static residuum – people might fall into it through unemployment or the ill health of the main wage earner, but equally could rise out of it when their circumstances improved, as when their children began to work. Although secondary poverty was caused in part by drinking, betting, and ‘improvident’ expenditure, Rowntree viewed these as an inevitable response to a social environment dominated by low wages. Veit-Wilson suggested that it appears Rowntree used the distinction between primary and secondary poverty as a heuristic device to convince those who favoured a behavioural interpretation that the lifestyle of the poor was in part caused by low income.48 Nevertheless Bernard Harris argues that although Rowntree used an impressionistic method to identify poverty in 1899, he defined poverty in terms of physical and economic inefficiency. Although Rowntree moved further towards a definition of relative poverty than his contemporaries, there was still an important gap between this and the idea of relative poverty that Townsend pioneered in the 1960s. Rowntree took cultural factors into account when estimating minimum diets, included an allowance for personal and recreational expenditure, and he did not argue that the poverty line should move upwards with the general standard of living.49

Jonathan Bradshaw argued that Rowntree’s distinction between secondary and primary poverty was a critical element in convincing the public that poverty was a structural rather than merely a behavioural problem. Rowntree ‘established for the first time that poverty was the result of structural not
behavioural factors’, and his facts finally ‘put the nail in the coffin’ of the
distinction between the ‘deserving’ and ‘undeserving’ poor put forward by
the COS. Bradshaw writes that if poverty in Britain has been understood, in
the main, as a structural problem rather than a behavioural one, this is in part
due to the legacy of Rowntree.50 It is certainly true that while the language
of national fitness and eugenics made occasional appearances, the concept
of the residuum was absent from Rowntree’s survey. Nevertheless Bradshaw
underestimates the extent to which concepts of the underclass have been
successively re-invented in twentieth- and twenty-first-century Britain. If the
concepts and vocabulary of the residuum and the unemployable were absent
from Rowntree’s survey, it was to prove a temporary respite.
The fact that the terms ‘residuum’ and ‘unemployable’ were now
noticeable by their absence was also true of social surveys of poverty
published during World War I. Rowntree’s contribution to the development
of the social survey was taken further by Arthur Bowley. Whereas Rowntree
was a businessman and philanthropist, Arthur Bowley (1869–1957) was
a career academic. Educated at Trinity College, Cambridge, Bowley’s
earliest academic appointments were at the London School of Economics
and University College, Reading. It was only in 1919 that Bowley became
Professor of Statistics at the London School of Economics. Much of his work
was in the measurement and definition of national income, and during World
War II Bowley was director of the Oxford University Institute of Statistics.
As Peter Hennock has noted, Bowley’s most important contribution to the
social survey was in the use of random sampling methods.51
Together with A. R. Burnett-Hurst, a former Research Assistant at the
London School of Economics, Bowley published in 1915 a social survey of
working-class households in four English towns. Their survey was based
on enquiries made in 1913 into economic conditions in Northampton and
Warrington, and in Stanley, County Durham. A similar enquiry had been
made in Reading in 1912. The most important innovation in this survey
was the adoption of a random sample. This comprised one house in 23 in
Northampton; one in 17 in Stanley; one in 19 in Warrington; and one in 21
in Reading. Bowley and Burnett-Hurst calculated the weekly wage rates
for adult males, ranging from under 8 shillings to over 40 shillings, and
compared these to Rowntree’s figures for York in 1899. A further innovation
was the use of a new poverty line. Bowley and Burnett-Hurst estimated the
number of families above and below: firstly, the minimum standard adopted
by Rowntree, and second, a new standard. For example, they found that
in Reading, 128 of 622 families were below Rowntree’s poverty line, and
127 families were below the new standard. This meant that 20.6 per cent of
working-class households, or 15.3 per cent of all households, were below
the Rowntree poverty line. With regard to the new poverty standard, the
equivalent figures were 20.4 per cent and 15.1 per cent.52
*Livelihood and Poverty* was far ahead of its time in explaining the methods
used, and in the precision of the results. Unlike Rowntree, Bowley showed
no interest in mere impressions of poverty. It is not particularly surprising, therefore, that – as was the case with the Rowntree survey – the phrases ‘residuum’ and ‘unemployable’ were entirely absent. Bowley and Burnett-Hurst argued that what their survey illustrated was that much poverty ‘is not intermittent but permanent, not accidental or due to exceptional misfortune, but a regular feature of the industries of the towns concerned’. Overall, as shown in Table 2.2, it was estimated that the main reasons why a household was in poverty were: because the income was inadequate for a large family; the main wage earner had died; he was ill or old; because of unemployment; and due to irregular work. Low wages were the most important of the causes of primary poverty.

Thus Bowley and Burnett-Hurst, through the adoption of sampling procedures and refinement of a poverty line, further advanced the move towards the modern social survey. The approach taken was precise and statistical, and one in which the moral condemnation of the unemployable had no place. The authors of the survey summarized their conclusions in the following way:

> It is often implied that the causes which bring men into poverty are within their own control, that they are the masters of their own fate and the creators of their misfortunes. In many cases this may be so; yet the extent to which it is true is exaggerated.54

Livelihood and Poverty was published during World War I, and attracted little interest. In fact, it was the sequel to the study, published in 1925 with the title Has Poverty Diminished?, that made Arthur Bowley more widely known as a social investigator. In this book, Bowley compared the very different worlds of before and after World War I, by investigating the same towns with as nearly as possible the same methods. The main developments were seen as being the fall in the birth rate; the loss of life during World War I; the rise in prices; rise in wages for unskilled labour; and unemployment.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2.2 Households in poverty by cause (per cent)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Bowley and Burnett-Hurst, Livelihood and Poverty, p. 47.
But again the causes of poverty were seen as falling into two groups – first, the broken families in which the father or husband was dead or not able to earn; and second, those in which he was normally at work but at insufficient wages. The relative numbers of these families had changed little. Thus this second study again confirmed the objective, statistical tone of the earlier one, a tone in which the language of ‘social residuum’ and ‘unemployable’ would have seemed an anachronism.

It appears from the evidence of the Rowntree and Bowley surveys that the language of ‘social residuum’, so apparent in the earlier investigations of Booth, was absent from later reports on poverty. The term ‘unemployable’ was also noticeable by its absence. The Bowley and Burnett-Hurst survey was published by the Ratan Tata Foundation, an organization that had been funded by an Indian philanthropist and set up at the London School of Economics ‘in order to promote the study and further the knowledge of methods of preventing and relieving poverty and destitution’. Further insights into changing views on the residuum were provided by the inaugural lecture of its Director, R. H. Tawney, given at the School in October 1913. Entitled ‘Poverty as an Industrial Problem’, Tawney argued that economic history had led to a change:

- to approach problems of poverty, as, in the first place at any rate, problems of industry, to emphasise the fundamental economic contrasts common to numbers of men, rather than the individual peculiarities of earning and spending, to take the trade, the town, the school as the unit of enquiry rather than the isolated individual or family.

Tawney argued that modern poverty was associated, not with ‘personal misfortunes peculiar to individuals, but with the economic status of particular classes and occupations’, and poverty should be studied, therefore, ‘first at its sources, and only secondly in its manifestations’. He proposed that low wages, casual employment, and juvenile labour were the most pressing areas to be studied.

Nevertheless, while the work of Rowntree and Bowley marked an important shift in the analysis of social problems, it is important not to underestimate the continuities with earlier analyses. Tawney did not regard the personal factor as unimportant. He argued that what was also needed was to increase the ‘economic resisting power’ of individuals and their families. Furthermore in Rowntree’s examination of unemployment in York (1913), he devoted a chapter to the ‘work-shy’. This investigation was based on 7 June 1910, when 60 investigators called on every working-class house in York, and asked whether anyone living there was out of work, keen to find work, male or female, and in which occupation they were interested. These cases were examined by a small number of investigators – reasons given for leaving work were checked with employers. In the survey, 105 men were found to be ‘work-shy’, defined as ‘men whose inefficiency, or unwillingness to work, is not due to age, illness, or any other physical disqualification, but
primarily to infirmity of character’.62 One example was a publican who had left his job in 1906 owing to illness. He was suffering from indigestion, and was classified as ‘drinker and lazy’.63

However, the line separating these men from the casual worker was acknowledged to be a fine one, and the state of mind of the work-shy was ‘often the result of external conditions beyond their control’. Rowntree wrote that ‘it is of much greater importance that we should cease to manufacture shirkers than that we should learn how best to deal with them after they have been manufactured’.64 Of the 105, for example, 50 had been previously engaged in regular work, and were ‘inferior workmen’ who, once unemployed, found it difficult to compete for work against ‘better men’. Among those who had lost their jobs for ‘unsatisfactory reasons’ were drinkers. Even here Rowntree wrote:

Born often of a poor stock, and growing up amid a degrading environment, with a slum street for an unguarded playground, receiving the legal minimum of education with no encouragement from their parents, sent into the world at 13 or 14 to drift into whatever occupation comes their way, then, whether single or married, living in a poor house and dingy street, and returning to it night by night after nine or ten hours of unskilled work, which rouses neither interest nor ambition, with minds untrained to serious thought, and a horizon on which the marvels of art and science and literature have never dawned – what wonder if, in their effort to introduce some colour into the drab monotony of their lives, they fall victims to the allurements of the bookmaker or publican, or lose heart and join the ranks of those who have ceased to strive?65

Overall, Rowntree concluded that about 30 per cent of the 105 once worked regularly and left their jobs for ‘satisfactory’ reasons; 30 per cent also worked regularly but left for ‘unsatisfactory’ reasons; and 40 per cent had never done any regular work.66 Various solutions were put forward, including Care Committees and industrial training, although it was acknowledged that even if the number of unemployables was reduced, ‘a residuum of unemployed men’ would still exist. For them, some form of labour colony was necessary. Nevertheless the main thing was to ‘cease to manufacture an unemployable class’.67

In 1914, Victor Branford, Honorary Secretary of the Sociological Society, wrote of the Booth survey that:

while the Booth type of survey is admirable in giving a picture of the economic and material condition of the family, it remains deficient . . . in the more difficult task of describing and estimating the family’s life of leisure, its spiritual condition – what might be called its cultural status . . . Here the difficult problem is to discover some method for observing and recording what the French call the etat-d’ame, i.e., the thoughts
and emotions, the habit of mind and life, of persons in their interior and intimate relations with one another and with surroundings. The sort of question this more intensive survey has to put before itself, is – How can we decipher and record peoples’ ideals, their characteristic ideas and culture, and the images and symbols which habitually occupy their minds?68

It was this concern with the culture of poverty that was to become so pervasive 50 years later, in the 1960s.69

Both in the 1930s and more recently, there have been heated debates about the alleged impact of unemployment on health. In many respects it has been hard to prove that the experience of being out of work has affected health, not least because of the difficulty of separating the effects of unemployment from those of poverty and poor housing. It is equally difficult to make a valid distinction between the experiences of health and illness of the unemployed, and those who are in work, but employed on low pay. In fact, it is arguable that ill health has not so much been caused by unemployment, as revealed by it.70 As unemployment worsened in the late 1920s and early 1930s there was a concern with benefit fraud, and with those ‘genuinely seeking work’, that again has parallels in the early twenty-first century. In the words of one writer, those who administered unemployment insurance in the interwar years were ‘in search of the scrounger’.71 Moreover with regard to health, it is also possible to trace at this time a discourse that was more concerned with the mental than the physical effects of becoming unemployed. It was pointed out, for instance, that the campaigns of the National Unemployed Workers Movement were surprisingly peaceful, and it has been argued that this was because of the pervading sense of fatalism and powerlessness.

More specifically, some observers began to talk about the ‘social psychology’ of unemployment. The best known of these studies was based on the Austrian town of Marienthal. This small industrial community, on the Fischa-Dagnitz River in the Steinfeld district, suffered almost total economic breakdown in the summer of 1929. By February 1930, when the looms and turbines stopped and only a few men had been kept on to dismantle the plant, 367 of the 478 families (77 per cent) were thought to be unemployed. These families were studied intensively, through family files, life histories, time sheets, a school essay project, and other statistical data.72 The study was conducted by Marie Jahoda, Paul Lazarsfeld, and Hans Zeisl of the Psychological Institute at the University of Vienna, and it was published in German in 1933. The responses of 100 families to the experience of unemployment were classified. It was claimed that 16 remained ‘unbroken’; 48 were ‘resigned’; 11 were ‘in despair’; and 25 were ‘apathetic’. The authors concluded of the latter two ‘deteriorated forms’ that:

it now appears that they are probably but two different stages of a process of psychological deterioration that runs parallel to the narrowing of economic resources and the wear and tear on personal belongings. At the end of this process lies ruin and despair.73
By the late 1930s, Paul Lazarsfeld, one of the authors of the study, had moved to the United States, to the University of Newark. With Philip Eisenberg, of the University of Columbia, Lazarsfeld refined the earlier analysis into what became the classic account of the psychological effects of unemployment. In their article, published in 1938, Lazarsfeld and Eisenberg argued that unemployment made people emotionally unstable, since it disrupted time patterns. There was a loss of the sense of the passage of time, and some people indulged in irrational spending. More importantly, Lazarsfeld and Eisenberg claimed individuals went through a process of stages of psychological adjustment to the experience of becoming unemployed. First came shock, followed by an active search for a job during which the individual remained optimistic; second, when efforts failed, the individual became more pessimistic; and third, the individual was broken and became fatalistic. Thus it was claimed that the unemployed progressed from optimism through pessimism to fatalism, reflected in an increasing sense of inferiority, the destruction of family relationships, and a weakening of interest in politics and organizations.

The theory of the social psychology of unemployment was paralleled in some studies conducted in Britain in the 1930s. A report on 1,000 medical examinations for sickness benefit in Glasgow was conducted by the Department of Health for Scotland. This claimed that in 335 cases (33.5 per cent) the cause of incapacity was ‘psychoneurotic’. The Regional Medical Officer concluded that in the event of unemployment, male workers were more likely to ‘break down’ than female. Psychoneurotic disability was lowest (compared to the employed) in those unemployed for less than 3 months, highest in those who had been unemployed for 6 months to 2 years, and it declined thereafter to a level similar to the employed. The author concluded that:

after falling out of work there is a short period of a sense of release (a holiday freedom); gradually anxiety and depression set in with loss of mental equilibrium; finally, after several years, adaptation takes place to a new and debased level of life, lacking hope as well as fear of the future . . . we may conclude that unemployment primarily influences the mind rather than the body.

Other interwar surveys, that focused more directly on the experience of the unemployed, provided evidence that cast doubt on the social psychology theory. A study by E. Wight Bakke, an American academic from Yale, for example, was based mainly on interviews, diaries, and participant observation. Bakke found that the unemployed were not a group of social misfits, but workers subject to the normal fluctuations of industry. Unemployment had affected their nutrition and family budgets, enforcing economies, for instance, in the purchase of new clothes. Nevertheless Bakke maintained that their morale was high, and only a small proportion (7.6 per cent) could be described as ‘loafers’. If they were tired, it was
because of the exhausting business of looking for a job – diaries indicated that on average they spent 23 hours a week searching for work. They were keen on the cinema and gambling, but spent little time in pubs. Overall, Bakke concluded that unemployment insurance had alleviated the worst effects of unemployment – the extra income kept peoples’ diets from deteriorating, it was not necessary to sell furniture, and they were able to remain involved in organizations and associations.78

Apart from the material provided by Bakke, there is evidence that the authors of the Marienthal study themselves had serious reservations about their work. Although well known through the original, the book was only available in German until 1972. One of the authors, Paul Lazarsfeld, admitted that he refused an English translation of the Marienthal study for a long time because he was aware of its weaknesses. Lazarsfeld conceded that the sampling procedures had never been stated, the typologies were developed intuitively, attitude scales were not used, and the approach was naïve. He admitted that ‘I can excuse this all by remembering the adventurous pioneering spirit that propelled us; but it made me uncomfortable enough that for a while I refused an offer to publish a translation’.79

It is very likely unemployment had an important effect on the psychological health of unemployed workers. However, as Ross McKibbin has argued, it seems clear that the social psychology theory of unemployment is less convincing. Lazarsfeld and his colleagues had argued that ‘demoralisation’ showed itself in four ways – in the disintegration of daily routines; in an inability to devise alternative work; through the collapse of intellectual interests; and in the abandoning of political activity. But there is little evidence, from contemporary surveys, that any of these things happened. In the 1930s, the unemployed did not disintegrate, they did not lose interest in work, and they did not become apolitical. What is more surprising is how little these things happened. The extent to which people who were unemployed remained interested in reading, went to the cinema, were politically active or joined clubs seemed to depend to a large degree on how much they had done these things when they were employed. McKibbin concludes that many unemployed people remained tied to aspects of working-class life. Indeed the reason why the unemployed were so resilient may very well be because they were not wrenched from their communities, and because family life remained intact.80

Nevertheless the theory of the social psychology of unemployment has had an important influence on research in this field. One of the original authors of the Marienthal study, Marie Jahoda, continued to argue in favour of this analysis as high unemployment returned in the 1970s and 1980s. Jahoda maintained that the onset of unemployment was marked by shock and a period of constructive adaptation, and was then followed by successive feelings of deterioration, boredom, and lack of self-respect, ending in fatalistic apathy. She argued that physical deprivation undermined psychological resistance, while the absence of the sense of organization that
accompanied work led to a sense of uselessness. In other writing, Jahoda returned to the four-fold classification of the earlier Marienthal study – that which had sorted the unemployed into the categories of the ‘unbroken’, the ‘resigned’, those ‘in despair’ and the ‘apathetic’. Writing in 1981, on the return of mass unemployment, Adrian Sinfield argued the social psychology theory was receiving increasing support. At the same time, he noted that the hypothesis had been illustrated and supported rather than tested. Writers had tended to look for social psychology patterns in the unemployed workers that they interviewed, and ignored evidence to the contrary.

There were important differences between the social psychology of unemployment, and the concept of the unemployable in the early 1900s. Whereas the social psychology theory was mainly about the effects of the experience of unemployment on the mental well-being of workers, debates about the unemployable were more about the character of individual workers, which, it was claimed, meant they had a predisposition to becoming unemployed. Moreover those deemed unemployable were perceived as being a heterogeneous group, comprising both those who were unwilling to work, and those unable to take paid employment. Even so, there were marked continuities.

There were important changes in social thought in this period, which permeated debates about the causes of unemployment. Even though the concept of the unemployable remained popular among commentators that included the Webbs and William Beveridge, there were signs that unemployment was recognized much more as having structural causes, so that the solutions included a national system of labour exchanges, and attempts to mediate the effects of the casualization of labour. With regard to unemployment, both Beveridge and the Webbs believed that the move from moral and personal to industrial and environmental explanations of unemployment was one of the main characteristics of a new analysis of the subject at the end of the nineteenth century. Perhaps most importantly, being unemployable was not, in general, seen as a hereditary condition that was intergenerational in effect. Rather it was a reflection of economic forces allied to personal inadequacies. The effect of these changes can be seen after 1900, when the language of the ‘residuum’ was almost entirely absent from the social surveys of Rowntree and Bowley. As the Webbs pointed out, the advent of full employment during World War I seemed to destroy the concept of the unemployable.

After 1900, many of the ideas that had sustained the concept of the residuum in the 1880s were absent. The language of Social Darwinism had waned in its influence, and the emphasis on ‘character’ seemed less apparent in discussions of unemployment. The draconian proposals for the setting up of labour colonies were less in evidence. If, as has been argued, fears of the residuum were more about constitutional issues than a belief in degeneracy, the nation was adjusting to an enlarged working-class franchise. Perhaps most importantly, full employment during World War I meant there was
less of a focus on the idea of being unemployable. Finally, in the hands of social investigators such as Rowntree and Bowley, a more scientific style of research was evident, stressing structural rather than moral factors. The work of Bowley marked a decisive shift towards apparently neutral techniques, and in the 1930s it was the search for the scrounger that was more apparent than the focus on the unemployable.

Nevertheless what is perhaps more striking is the resilience of these ideas. It is arguable that the concept of the unemployable was simply the social residuum reborn, shorn of its evolutionary language and connotations, and reshaped so that it could co-exist with a more structural interpretation of unemployment. The Webbs believed in the existence of the unemployable; it shaped the Minority Report of the Royal Commission on the Poor Law; and as late as 1929 the Webbs were still including the unemployable in their discussions of unemployment. Beveridge too, argued that there were people who did not want to work, and ‘defects of character’ meant that unemployment was more likely for some, his points about unemployment as a problem of industry, and recommended solution of a system of labour exchanges notwithstanding. The alternative solution of labour colonies continued to lurk in the background. Rowntree continued to explore the condition of the work-shy, even Tawney believed that the ‘personal factor’ in unemployment was not unimportant, and Victor Branford, at least, thought that the culture of the poor deserved greater emphasis in the work of social investigators. Perhaps the era of Bowley, and the absence of residuum and unemployable, is best seen as a hiatus in the history of the underclass. If so, it was short-lived. For it was in the 1920s that, inspired chiefly by the Eugenics Society, the search began again for an underclass, now called not the social residuum, but the social problem group. It is to that later period, and to the social problem group that we now turn.
As we have seen, there was considerable interest in the concept of the social residuum in the late nineteenth century on the part of a large number of individuals and organizations. Among these Charles Booth was arguably the best known. Slightly different, but related, ideas were embodied in the idea of the unemployable, by the Webbs and William Beveridge among others. It is clear that this behavioural emphasis was less clear-cut after 1900, and that a more structural interpretation was reflected in the work of Rowntree in York and the Bowley social survey. At the time of World War I, full employment suggested that there did not exist a group termed the ‘unemployable’. However, various factors including the economic depression of the 1920s, along with the assumption that mental deficiency was increasing, meant that the earlier concerns about the social residuum and the unemployable reappeared in the interwar years, albeit in slightly different form.

One obvious source of support for the concept of a social residuum lay in the work of the Eugenics Education Society, founded in 1907. Following on from the work of Sir Francis Galton, its interest lay in improving ‘national efficiency’ through selective breeding, with the information for this being assembled by eugenists. Established initially in London, it gradually set up a network of provincial branches. While the group was a heterogeneous one, most members would have agreed that human characteristics were determined by inheritance according to laws that were knowable; that they could identify desirable and undesirable human characteristics; and that policies should be devised to increase the fertility of those with desirable characteristics (positive eugenics) and to limit that of those with undesirable characteristics (negative eugenics).¹ Historians have pointed out that eugenics appealed particularly to the professional middle class, especially those who were involved in social policy, though there were some notable exceptions, such as Medical Officers of Health (MOsH), the nature of whose work inclined them more to an environmental or structural interpretation.² There has also been debate over
the extent to which eugenics appealed to ‘progressive thinkers’. Historians have shown how, reflecting anxiety about the future of the race, a eugenic influence can be detected in contemporary debates about education, birth control, slum clearance, and mental deficiency. However, John Macnicol has pointed to various interpretative problems – many prominent political figures used eugenic ideas tactically and opportunistically; it is difficult to rank in significance and influence the range of eugenic ideas; and measuring the impact of any elitist group is always difficult. Moreover, the explicit policy outcomes of eugenics were few. Macnicol has concluded therefore that ‘the eugenics movement is undoubtedly interesting – indeed, perhaps more interesting at the periphery of its influence than at the centre – but one must be cautious of overstressing its importance’.

The new underclass concept of the 1920s and 1930s was that of the social problem group, and the relative merits of a policy of sterilization was one of the key areas of debate. Historians interested in eugenics have explored how the Society used the concept of the social problem group in the 1920s and 1930s. Pauline Mazumdar, for example, has argued that the eugenics movement was part of a larger trend – an attempt by the upper middle class to understand and control the urban poor. The COS (1869); the Moral Education League (1898); the National Association for the Care and Protection of the Feeble-Minded (1896); and the Fabian Society each had its own solutions, but the Eugenics Society believed its explanation undercut all of them. Greta Jones has argued that the social problem group notion illustrated the marriage of two concepts – that there was a stratum of society of low intellectual endowment deemed the ‘feeble-minded’, and that most social problems were a product of this stratum. Thus the social problem group represented a medicalization of the residuum. R. A. Soloway located the interest in the social problem group in the context of evidence that differences in the birth rates of social classes were moderating – eugenists therefore turned to smaller sectors of society, such as unskilled manual workers and casual workers, and chronic paupers. New reform-minded eugenists were not sure what constituted hereditary fitness and where it was found in society. But most eugenists were still able to recognize racial fitness even if it was not precisely defined – in the skilled working class, and the middle and upper ranks of society. Similarly there was more of a consensus about unfitness, and that defects were heavily clustered in the new social problem group. Desmond King has agreed that it was in attempting to define the target of sterilization that commentators turned to the social problem group.

John Macnicol has argued that, at a time of recession and unemployment, when mass democracy and the newly established Labour Party appeared to threaten the existing order, and when the emerging medical, psychiatric, and social work professions were on the rise, the social problem group provided a theory of social reform for newly-professionalized groups. This coincided with concern over the increase in mental deficiency as highlighted in the Wood Report on Mental Deficiency (1929). Macnicol argued that
the concept was sustained by a small group of eugenists, but their concerns reflected wider insecurities within conservative professional middle-class opinion, and was constructed in relation to the solution of sterilization. However, proving the existence of the social problem group led to serious methodological difficulties. By the late 1930s, the credibility of both eugenics and sterilization was being weakened. Nevertheless, Macnicol argued that in the 1940s, the idea of the social problem group was to re-emerge as the notion of the problem family.10

The social problem group has thus been the subject of some work by historians interested in the history of eugenics, mental deficiency, and birth control. Despite the research by Macnicol, this work has not yet been integrated into the longer-term history of the underclass in either Britain or the United States. This chapter looks at how the Eugenics Society embraced the concept of the social problem group, particularly in relation to debates about sterilization. It begins by exploring how eugenics was drawn into debates about vagrancy in both Britain and the United States. It traces studies on individual families published in the United States in the 1890s, and explores the work of individual researchers, such as E. J. Lidbetter in London, and David Caradog Jones in Liverpool. A final section of the chapter looks at the problems that the Eugenics Society faced in trying to prove the existence of a social problem group in the 1930s, but also, conversely, at how this concept was transformed into that of the problem family in the early 1940s. The chapter argues that the theory of the social problem group served as a conceptual stepping stone, effectively linking the ideas of the social residuum and the unemployable, current in the 1880s and 1900s, to the theme of the problem family that was to emerge in the 1940s.

One way in which eugenics pervaded discussions of social issues in the interwar period was in relation to the perceived ‘problem’ of homelessness. Tim Cresswell has argued that in the United States, the family histories of vagrants were examined for characteristics such as headaches, drinking, and crooked feet, that might make it possible to diagnose or predict those who would subsequently become tramps. Through these diagnoses, and other observations that linked tramps to the spread of syphilis, Cresswell claimed it is possible to map the ways in which normality was being defined in relation to the pathological mobility of the tramp. He argues that ‘observers sought to encode the bodies of tramps as pathological, as diseased and genetically unsound . . . tramps were metaphorically a pathology in the wider social body’.11 In the minds of investigators, the causes of mobility were not linked to wider structural factors, but were located in the tramps’ own minds and bodies – the solution was to prevent tramps from reproducing. Methods of dealing with tramps were justified through the alleged threat of disease, and the need to restore health and normality. Thus Cresswell concluded that:

In the process of pathologisation, social reform, medicine and eugenics were all implicated in the construction of American society as a body
threatened by the pathology of tramphood, just as the body of the tramp – one with suspect heredity and racked with disease – was made up as an embodied sign of danger and deviance.\textsuperscript{12}

Discourses similar to those identified by Cresswell were evident in Britain. The Departmental Committee on the Relief of the Casual Poor, which was appointed in September 1929 and reported in 1930, provides evidence both on the way that the homeless were treated, and on attitudes towards them.\textsuperscript{13} The Report on the Relief of the Casual Poor was similar to the 1906 Report on Vagrancy in that it continued to distinguish between those seeking work and those who were habitual vagrants. It was calculated, for example, from a census conducted on one night in February 1928, that casual wards in London had a population of some 2,582 people. But more interesting was the way in which this group was subdivided. The Report estimated that 12.5 per cent of this group were seeking work; 31.5 per cent were probably seeking work; 33 per cent were habitual vagrants; and 23 per cent were probably habitual vagrants.\textsuperscript{14} The Departmental Committee argued that there was a marked overlap between the ‘casual poor’ and mental deficiency. One of the Board of Control’s inspectors, Dr E. O. Lewis, had examined 592 ‘casuals’. It was claimed that of these, 93 (15.7 per cent) were ‘feeble-minded’; 32 (5.4 per cent) were ‘insane’; and 34 (5.7 per cent) were in a ‘psychoneurotic’ condition.\textsuperscript{15}

While the Report of the Departmental Committee continued to distinguish between types of vagrants, it also tempered this with a more liberal policy. For one thing, it admitted that casual wards fell short of the ideal standards – conditions in many were ‘infamous and intolerable’. Tasks were trivial, while the attitude of the officers was harsh – they had lost hope and all interest in the men that they were responsible for. The Committee argued that the effect of improving standards of treatment and accommodation would not be to attract men to a life of vagrancy, but would improve the self-respect of the casual population, and make it easier for them to be reintegrated into society. Recommendations were made for proper arrangements for bathing, sleeping, cleaning, feeding, and work; properly qualified staff; regular medical inspection; and better co-ordination and administration.\textsuperscript{16} The Report noted further that the population of the casual wards was a heterogeneous one. The men who passed through the ward of a large provincial workhouse, for example, included labourers, bootmakers, carpenters, cooks, clerks, grooms, porters, firemen, painters, sailors, and tailors. Echoing Beveridge’s report on unemployment (1909), the Report argued that the habit of tramping in search of work served no useful purpose that could not be provided through labour exchanges.\textsuperscript{17}

This conclusion was supported by the third volume of the New London Survey, published in 1932, which showed that many of the inmates of common lodging houses were in more or less regular work. By then, there were 155 licensed common lodging houses in London, with about 16,900
beds. Common lodging houses provided a bed, washing accommodation, and the use of a common kitchen, with a charge that varied from 5 pence to 1 shilling. The New London Survey found that the occupation of the homeless depended very much on location – in the riverside boroughs of Stepney, Poplar, Deptford, Greenwich, Woolwich, and Southwark one might find dock-labourers, seamen, and ships’ firemen; in the boroughs of St Pancras, Paddington, and Islington coal porters near the railway terminals; and in the boroughs near the markets, porters for fish and other goods. It was the same for women. In Paddington and Kensington they tended to be laundry hands; and in inner boroughs such as Holborn waitresses, washers-up, servants, office cleaners, and charwomen. The survey claimed that hawkers and older women in receipt of old-age pensions could be found in all common lodging houses, flower and match sellers more occasionally, and prostitutes in those that were privately managed.

Despite the evidence that the inhabitants of common lodging houses were in regular work, when it came to vagrancy the New London Survey continued to use a behavioural interpretation of homelessness, with eugenic overtones. Its author, Hubert Llewellyn Smith, wrote that only a few vagrants could be rehabilitated, with the remainder continuing to live ‘aimless, hopeless and useless lives’. In fact there were very few vagrants in the common lodging houses, and the habitual tramps were found more in the casual wards. He wrote of the homeless that:

They include a large element of the vagrant, criminal, mentally deficient and physically subnormal, and their ranks are continuously recruited by the deposit of the moral, physical and economic dregs which filter down from all the grades above them. Most of them have little will power and no hope.

Llewellyn Smith rejected Booth’s classification of vagrants as degraded and semi-criminal – rather they were economically ‘subnormal’ and living below the poverty line. At the same time, there was evidence that vagrancy and mental deficiency continued to be seen as linked together. Because of the ‘low-grade character of the human material dealt with’, solutions would only affect one in ten of the homeless.

In the United States, one early example of writing on vagrancy was the study of ‘the hobo’ by Nels Anderson (1921) under the auspices of the Chicago School. Anderson reported that many tramps were physically or mentally defective, and he concluded that ‘disease, physical disability, and insanitary living conditions seem to be, as things are, the natural and inevitable consequences of the migratory risk-taking and irregular life of the homeless man’. Similar ideas, though less punitive, pervaded Frank Gray’s popular book The Tramp (1931). This was more in the tradition of picaresque writing that viewed the tramp as a ‘gentleman of the road’. Here the tramp was viewed as a kind of Pinteresque noble savage, superior
in knowledge and conversation to the average person. His life was one of freedom, he was an expert on geography and also on famous criminal trials, he was a fund of knowledge on the countryside, on ‘the habits of the police and of the birds and hares’.24 The needs of the tramp were few, and his outlook meant he was ‘at war with the community from whom he receives and takes’.25 Nevertheless Gray also claimed that a high proportion of tramps were criminals, mentally deficient, feeble-minded, or mentally ‘peculiar’. While he argued that poverty was not one of the key causes of vagrancy, the physique of tramps was so poor they were ‘physical degenerates’.26

Overall then, there is evidence in Britain, in the early decades of the twentieth century, of similar concerns to those that Cresswell has identified for the United States. Several reports made recommendations to improve the state of casual wards, the principle of deterrence notwithstanding. Those who used the casual wards were casual labourers, and it was recognized that labour exchanges might be a more effective system than tramping in search of work. In London, it was known that many of those who inhabited common lodging houses were in regular work. Nevertheless the desire to distinguish between the habitual tramp and the wayfarer genuinely in search of work was also remarkably persistent. The tramp was pathologized, and labour colonies were again put forward as a solution. As we shall see in the following section, similar views pervaded debates about the social problem group.

The way that the issue of vagrancy was pathologized provides the background to the narrower search for the social problem group in the interwar years. It was this group that allegedly produced the phenomenon of tramps, among other social undesirables. It has been suggested that there was renewed interest in the residuum or social problem group in the 1920s because post-war recession and unemployment convinced many eugenists that the effects of differential fertility were manifesting themselves in poor economic performance and an expanding army of unemployables. Second, the rise of the Labour Party created a situation in which existing class privileges appeared to be threatened. Third, the rise of the medical, psychiatric, and social work professions highlighted the possibility of therapeutic intervention; a conservative aspect of this was the application of Mendelian laws of inheritance and remedies such as sterilization. Eugenics offered newly-professionalized groups a strategy of conservative reform. Fourth, there was the concern in the 1920s over an apparent increase in the incidence of mental deficiency.27

The background to this later interest in the social problem group was earlier interest in the effects of heredity and the environment in individual families, particularly in the United States. Charles Rosenberg located an increase in hereditary explanations of individual disease and anti-social behaviour from the 1840s, especially in explaining the origin and intractability of the incarcerated and stigmatized. He claimed American populizers of hereditarian ideas in the 1870s reflected various influences
that of French degeneration theorists; a need to elaborate mechanisms in scientific terms; an emphasis on environmental reform; and a diffuse evangelicalism. In 1877, the social reformer Robert Dugdale published an exhaustive examination of the notorious Jukes family – a family whose members were allegedly marked by a high incidence of ‘antisocial’ habits. Dugdale had studied the family while working as the Secretary of the New York Prison Association. He argued that fornication was the key feature of the behaviour of the Jukes family, while secondary features included prostitution, exhaustion, and disease. On the Jukes themselves, Dugdale estimated that successive generations of the family – 709 members in all – had over 75 years cost the state some $1.3m, in expenditure associated with pauperism, outdoor relief, prison, prostitution, illegitimacy, begging, and charity.

But Dugdale argued not for sterilization, but for environmental reform and control. In the Introduction, Franklin H. Giddings argued that:

the factor of ‘heredity’ whatever it may be, and whether great or small, always has the coefficient, ‘environment’, and if bad personal antecedents are reinforced by neglect, indecent domestic arrangements, isolation from the disturbing and stimulating influences of a vigorous civilisation, and, above all, if evil example is forced upon the child from his earliest infancy, the product will inevitably be an extraordinary high percentage of pauperism, vice, and crime.  

Dugdale referred to two earlier enquiries, one conducted into county jails in 1874, and one on state prisons in 1875. Elisha Harris, of the Prison Association of New York, had observed from these that although in theory any young person could become trapped in a downward spiral, in practice the number of ‘well-born’ and ‘well-trained’ children who descended from virtue to vice was very small. He wrote that ‘habitual criminals spring almost exclusively from degenerating stocks; their youth is spent amid the degrading surroundings of physical and social defilement, with only a flickering of the redeeming influence of virtuous aspiration’. Criminals, vagrants and paupers – the ‘ignorant, vicious and incapable’ – arose out of the ‘same social soil’. Thus it was the corrupting environment that was emphasized.

It is interesting to contrast Dugdale’s study of the Jukes with those of later social investigators, who were concerned more with heredity and with mental deficiency. The best known is that of the Kallikak family (1912) conducted by Henry Herbert Goddard, of the Training School for Feeble-Minded Boys and Girls at Vineland, New Jersey. Among the pupils at the School was Deborah, a girl aged 22 who had been classified as feeble-minded. Goddard began to research her family history, and claimed to have found evidence of feeble-mindedness in earlier generations. He argued that this provided a natural experiment in heredity. A young man of a good
family had become through two different women the ancestor of two lines of descendants – one good and the other allegedly characterized by mental defect in every generation. One side of the family comprised 496 people, prominent in nearly every walk of life. In this family and its branches there was nothing but ‘good representative citizenship’ – there were doctors, lawyers, judges, teachers, traders, landholders, and men and women prominent in every area of social life. On the other side of the family (480 descendants including Deborah) were found ‘paupers, criminals, prostitutes, drunkards, and examples of all forms of social pest with which modern society is burdened’. It was estimated that 143 of the 480 were feeble-minded, 46 ‘normal’, and the rest ‘unknown’ or ‘doubtful’. A further 36 were illegitimate, 33 sexually immoral (mainly prostitutes), 24 confirmed alcoholics, 3 epileptics, 82 died in infancy, 3 were criminals, and 8 kept houses of ‘ill fame’. An additional total of 1,146 – that included those who had married into other families, allegedly included 262 who were feeble-minded, 197 ‘normal’, and 581 ‘undetermined’. Goddard wrote that:

> the conclusion is inevitable that all this degeneracy has come as the result of the defective mentality and bad blood having been brought into the normal family of good blood, first from the nameless feeble-minded girl and later by additional contaminations from other sources.

The solution advocated by Goddard, as by many other writers on the feeble-minded, was that of segregation. However, he acknowledged that there were two problems. One was how to identify the feeble-minded. The other was how best to deal with them even when they had been found. Colonies offered one solution, sterilization another. In the case of the latter, there were a further two problems. First, there was public opposition to the operation. Second, there was the difficulty of knowing who were the right people to operate on, owing to persisting uncertainty about the exact laws of inheritance. Nevertheless Goddard concluded that ‘for practical purposes it is, of course, pretty clear that it is safe to assume that two feeble-minded parents will never have anything but feeble-minded children’.

Thus earlier discussions that had emphasized the influence of the environment were increasingly replaced by studies that had a biological reductionism and emphasis on authoritarian solutions, such as segregation and sterilization. The earlier study of the Jukes had attempted to balance the effects of heredity and environment, but in 1911 Dugdale’s original notes were found, and a eugenics field worker, Arthur H. Estabrook, began to trace the contemporary descendants of the family. Estabrook traced a further 2,111 Jukes, arguing that half of the Jukes were feeble-minded, and all the criminals were feeble-minded. After 1910, the Jukes and the Kallikaks were joined by numerous other families – the Pineys, the family of Sam Sixty, the Happy Hickory family in Ohio, the Nam family, the Hill Folk, and the Dack family – all accepted as proof of the idea that from heredity flowed feeble-
mindedness and social failure. From 1907, the Eugenics Society in Britain began to produce reports on the family histories of paupers. This echoed the studies in the United States of the Jukes and the Kallikaks. Family record forms were produced for Society members, and these included the category ‘presence of any special tastes, defect, gift or peculiarity of mind or body’. Advice on preparing family pedigrees was also circulated by the Eugenics Society at this time.

Aside from its research on family histories, the most focused research of this kind was the support that the Eugenics Society gave to the work of E. J. Lidbetter, a Poor Law official in the East End of London. Lidbetter (1877–1962) is now largely a forgotten figure in the history of social investigation. Nevertheless his early work, and the support that the Eugenics Society gave to it, is an important example of early research into the existence of an intergenerational underclass. Working as a Relieving Officer in Bethnal Green, Lidbetter had in his spare time begun to look more closely at the family histories of the people that he was dealing with. At the National Conference on the Prevention of Destitution in 1911, for example, Lidbetter summarized the eugenist point of view rather neatly, arguing, ‘it is the view of the Society that destitution, so far as it is represented by pauperism (and where there is no other standard) is to a large extent confined to a special and degenerate class’. The solution to the problem, as Lidbetter saw it, was detention and segregation. The Society had formed a committee on pauperism in 1910. In 1911 and 1917, he published articles in the Society’s journal, the *Eugenics Review*, the first of which was about what he termed the ‘defective community’. From 1913, Lidbetter had begun an investigation into pauperism and heredity, but this was abandoned during World War I.

In 1920, at the Second International Eugenics Congress, Lidbetter argued that pauperism was not hereditary, but that it was ‘a consequence of inherent and transmissible defects of character’ and dependant on mental, moral, and physical defects. What had been neglected, in his view, was the ‘essentially personal element’. From some 400–500 pedigrees of paupers that he had compiled, Lidbetter suggested that there were three groups – those characterized by the inheritance of mental defect; a low grade type of ‘mildly incompetent persons’; and a group that was ‘distinctly non-moral’. The two main questions were whether the existence of a certain type of pauper family could be proven, and whether the cause of pauperism was of ‘definitely transmissible character’. Lidbetter argued that there existed ‘a definite race of chronic pauper stocks, intermingled with the general community, not recruited to an large extent from the normal population, and not sensibly decreased by the agencies for the promotion of human efficiency’. In his view the laws of heredity meant that this class could be reduced.

Lidbetter remains an elusive figure, especially in this early period when the archival sources make only occasional references to him. But by the early 1920s he was in fairly close contact with the Eugenics Society, as well
as writing articles for newspapers like the *Daily News* on such topics as the ‘marriage of the unfit’. Lidbetter became more closely involved with the Eugenics Society from May 1923 when a small research committee was formed. This included some of the key figures in the Society – Dr Cyril Burt, Professor A. M. Carr-Saunders, Professor Julian Huxley, and Sir Frederick Mott. The exact status of this new committee remains something of a mystery. It noted that the earlier investigations of 1913–15 had not been completed, and one of the committee’s aims was to assist Lidbetter in his on-going work into the family histories of paupers. More specifically, it agreed to pay for a research assistant, so that his survey could become more sophisticated – for instance by including a random sample and control group. Correspondence indicates that Lidbetter was highly thought-of at this time. In January 1928, for example, an MP asked the Society for a speaker who could address the Conservative Health and Housing Committee on the theme of ‘Eugenics and the Cost of the Unfit’. Its Secretary recommended Lidbetter, writing ‘I have in mind someone who has studied this problem at firsthand very thoroughly and he has really data of greater practical value than any man in England or America’.42

The Eugenics Society contributed to the costs of a book that Lidbetter was writing. Nevertheless there were signs that the Society’s new Secretary, Carlos Blacker, was concerned about Lidbetter’s methodology. In June 1931, for instance, Blacker reported on a recent meeting he had had with Professor Lancelot Hogben, then Head of the Department of Social Biology at the London School of Economics. One of the things they had discussed was the possibility of securing additional funding through the Rockefeller Foundation. Blacker was anxious to increase the academic credibility of the Society’s research by improving links with the School. However, Blacker warned Lidbetter that Hogben’s willingness to approach Rockefeller ‘depends to a great extent, upon your ability to discriminate between different kinds of pauperism, in particular between that which implies social inadequacy and that which implies misfortune without social inadequacy’.43

Lidbetter himself provided further insights into his work in an article published in the *Eugenics Review* in 1932. He argued that concern about a social problem group, expressed in the Wood Report on Mental Deficiency of 1929, was nothing new. Similar concerns had been expressed in articles in the *Eugenics Review* in 1910, and publicized in newspapers including *The Times*. His aim was to examine the personal, family, and wider relationships of paupers in the East End, and to collect pedigrees in selected cases. Lidbetter argued that these revealed ‘that there is in existence a definite race of sub-normal people, closely related by marriage or parenthood, not to any extent recruited from the normal population, nor sensibly diminished by the agencies for social or individual improvement’.44 The pedigrees provided insights as to how this group had been created: the main reason was inbreeding, and the recurring intermarriage of defective people. The greatest danger, in fact, was the case of the ‘high-grade defective and the
mildly incompetent, but apparently normal, person’. Lidbetter conceded that the more he studied this problem, the less certain he was about what should be done about it. What was needed most was intensive research, carried out by responsible academics, and properly funded. Despite this proviso, the first volume of Lidbetter’s research was published in 1933. The book could only summarize a fraction of the research that Lidbetter had carried out in the East End of London between 1910 and 1928. In fact, this first volume contained only 26 pedigrees. Nonetheless, as in his article of the previous year, Lidbetter argued that the pedigrees provided evidence for the existence of a social problem group. He wrote that ‘there is some evidence that the persons included in the pedigrees have a sufficiency of common characteristics such as to constitute a class by themselves’.

Some observers were quite impressed with the results of Lidbetter’s labours. The Secretary of the COS, J. C. Pringle, for instance, congratulated Blacker that the book had finally been published. He wrote that he and his colleagues had long been convinced it was going to be ‘one of the most important contributions to the elucidation of difficult problems of our lifetime’. Others were less happy. When Carr-Saunders reviewed the book for the Society, he admitted to Blacker that ‘all that I say in praise of it is really meant. What I do not say is that his introduction rather alarms me. He finds difficulty in telling a plain story. One can hardly make out from it what he has been doing. Also bias is evident’. Blacker replied to Carr-Saunders that ‘I quite agree with you about the dangers of Lidbetter making questionable deductions from his material, and I much hope that the contents of the later volumes will be adequately supervised’.

Only the first volume of the proposed survey was published, and John Macnicol has suggested that what is most apparent from the book is how vague Lidbetter’s evidence actually was. On the one hand Lidbetter argued that many ‘degenerate tendencies’ could take a variety of forms, and were due to biological weakness transmitted through heredity. On the other, he argued that the group were sufficiently similar to constitute a separate class. The social problem group had to be presented as being sufficiently large to represent a serious problem, but also needed to be shown to be an identifiable unit with a single cause. While Lidbetter made no reference to social conditions in the East End of London, he did concede that military call-up and improved employment opportunities during World War I had reduced the pauper population. Furthermore, the Boards of Guardians had relaxed the administration of outdoor relief to the able-bodied, so that the numbers of ‘persons chargeable’ rose rapidly. This illustrated how the social problem group was ultimately a statistical artefact. A final weakness was that little information was given on individual family members. As Macnicol has noted, a recurring feature of the history of the underclass has been the repeated insistence that more research is necessary.

As this discussion of Lidbetter’s role has indicated, the wider context to his work was provided by the way the Eugenics Society propagated the
concept of the social problem group in the 1920s and 1930s. Lidbetter had noted that the key event in spreading the concept of the social problem group was the Report of the Committee on Mental Deficiency (1929). This had been appointed in June 1924 by Sir George Newman, Chief Medical Officer of the Board of Education, to consider problems posed by the mentally defective child. In 1925 its remit was widened to include adult defectives. It became a Joint Committee of the Board of Education and the Board of Control. Chaired by Arthur Wood, a civil servant in the Board of Education, the members included the prominent eugenists Sir Cyril Burt and Dr Alfred Tredgold, respectively Professor of Education and Lecturer in Mental Deficiency at London University, and Evelyn Fox of the Central Association for Mental Welfare. The Wood Committee met 42 times, and its report was completed in January 1929. Overall, the Committee estimated that there were around 105,000 mentally defective children, or about three times the number then known to Local Education Committees. There were about 30,000 lower grade defectives under 16. And it was thought there were around 150,000 adult defectives, or twice as many as had been certified by the Board of Control. Thus the Wood Committee claimed that some 300,000 children and adults in England and Wales were mentally defective. Eugenics clearly was an important influence on the work of the Committee. The report commented that ‘the science of eugenics is doing invaluable service in focusing scientific thought and public opinion upon the racial, social and economic problems that the subnormal group presents to every civilised nation’.

The most important aspect of the report was the alleged increase in the incidence of mental deficiency. Dr E. O. Lewis, the Committee’s Medical Investigator, attempted to assess the number of mental defectives by investigating six areas with a population of 100,000. The Wood Committee argued, for example, that feeble-mindedness was more likely to occur among populations of a low mental or physical level, in slum districts or poor rural areas, and was more likely to be prevalent in a ‘sub-normal’ group. It was suggested that ‘primary amentia’ was both a family and a group problem. Mental defectives could be found in all social classes. However, the report argued that if families containing mental defectives were segregated, this group would contain a higher proportion of paupers, criminals, the unemployed, ‘habitual slum dwellers’, and prostitutes than an equivalent group. Most of these families would belong to a ‘social problem’ or ‘subnormal’ group, comprising the bottom 10 per cent of the population. In terms of prevention, the options were segregation and sterilization. The key problem was that the families of the ‘subnormal’ group remained large, while families of the ‘better’ social groups were becoming smaller.

Following the publication of the Wood Report, some members of the Eugenics Society were cautious about the concept of the social problem group, suggesting it would offer a target to the Society’s enemies. Others argued that it should be brought to the attention of the general public, and
linked to the Society’s policy on voluntary sterilization. Bernard Mallet, the Society’s then Secretary, wrote:

surely few more challenging statements than this have ever been uttered by a Departmental Committee. Four million persons in England and Wales who are the great purveyors of social inefficiency, prostitution, feeble-mindedness and petty crime, the chief architects of slumdom, the most fertile strain in the community! Four million persons in a socially well-defined group forming the dregs of the community and thriving upon it as a parasite thrives upon a healthy and vigorous host. It is difficult to conceive of a more sweeping or socially significant generalisation.

Mallet proposed to form a Social Problem Investigation Committee to look in detail at such areas of study as epileptics, slum dwellers, unemployment, and prostitution. He suggested that inquiries might be carried out at the local level, and a short book published by the Society. It is clear that the impact of the Wood Report permeated provincial intellectual life. Some members were interested in the alleged links between feeble-mindedness and the social problem group, and it was featured in radio broadcasts by some of the Eugenics Society’s members.

Successive Secretaries of the Eugenics Society promoted this issue. Bernard Mallet called for an investigation of the social problem group in his article in the *Eugenics Review*, and in May 1932, Carlos Blacker asked for collaborators, hoping that there might be ten separate studies, each investigating 50 families. The aim was to select families that exhibited ‘multiple social problem’ characteristics and to see if the incidence of mental defectiveness was higher in these families than in the population as a whole. This reversed the procedure of the investigation carried out by Lewis for the Wood Committee. By November 1932, Blacker was claiming that local studies were being carried out in London, Hull, Southampton, Liverpool, Newcastle, and Reading. As a result, the Social Problem Group Investigation Committee, that had been set up in 1923 and supported the early Lidbetter work, was effectively reconstituted in June 1933. Chaired by Sir Allan Powell, it included David Caradog Jones and E. J. Lidbetter.

With segregation, sterilization had long been recommended as a solution to the problems posed by the underclass in its different forms. The social problem group became the focus because it provided the means of defining the target for sterilization policies. Following the publication of the Wood Report, the Eugenics Society intensified its efforts in support of a policy of sterilization, and it sought to build a coalition of support among the social work, mental health, and public health professions. A Committee for Legalising Eugenic Sterilisation was organized by Carlos Blacker of the Eugenics Society, and a Private Member’s Bill was introduced by the Labour MP, Major A. G. Church, in July 1931. However, this was unsuccessful, and the Eugenics Society turned instead to lobbying civil servants and bodies
such as the Central Association for Mental Welfare. Public meetings in support of sterilization were held up to the outbreak of World War II.60

The Departmental Committee on Voluntary Sterilisation, set up by the Ministry of Health in June 1932, was largely in response to the fears triggered off by the Wood Report. But it also represented a coup for the Eugenics Society in influencing the policy-making elite, and the Departmental Committee would also in turn further support the concept of a social problem group. Its terms of reference were to:

examine and report on the information already available regarding the hereditary transmission and other causes of mental disorder and deficiency; to consider the value of sterilisation as a preventive measure having regard to its physical, psychological, and social effects and to the experience of legislation in other countries permitting it; and to suggest what further inquiries might usefully be undertaken in this connection.61

Chaired by Sir Laurence Brock, a senior civil servant in the Ministry of Health and Board of Control, its members included a mixture of civil servants, experts in mental deficiency, and others sympathetic to the Eugenics Society. The Report produced by the Departmental Committee argued that mental defectiveness was more common in the ‘lowest social stratum’ than in the rest of the population. Here one could find ‘an unduly high incidence of mental defect, insanity, intellectual dullness, epilepsy, as well as tuberculosis and other physical defects’.62 The Committee attached particular importance to the social problem group, and argued that the solution of voluntary sterilization was especially relevant. Mental defectives were unable to support themselves, drifted to the slums, and married others like them. Thus the social problem group increased the number of mental defectives, and children of low intelligence. The Committee rejected compulsory sterilization, but overall, recommended that voluntary sterilization should be legalized for mental defectives and other ‘transmissible’ mental disorders and physical disabilities.

Despite the recommendations of the Departmental Committee, the campaign for the voluntary sterilization of mental defectives was not successful. This illustrates the dangers of exaggerating the impact of eugenics on policy. There was confusion between the voluntary and compulsory options of sterilization. Historians John Macnicol and Desmond King have together suggested there were four main reasons that account for the failure of the campaign. First, the Minister for Health, Sir Hilton Young, had reservations about sterilization and was not co-operative; second, the labour movement was joined in its opposition by the Catholic Church; third, there was never a strong scientific case for sterilization, and the British Medical Association refused to endorse it; and fourth, the proposed sterilization programme was damaged from January 1934 by revelations of the Nazi campaign of compulsory sterilization and euthanasia. Overall, the campaign
for the voluntary sterilization of mental defectives revealed both the wide appeal of eugenics, but also the obstacles that the Society faced.63

Although the campaign for voluntary sterilization was ultimately unsuccessful, the report of the Departmental Committee had also provided support for the concept of the social problem group. By the early 1930s, the Eugenics Society was beginning to realize that eugenics was becoming discredited through attacks on it by legitimate scientists. Evidence was emerging from Nazi Germany about the compulsory sterilization of the feeble-minded, following the 1933 Eugenic Sterilisation Law. The Society was starting to turn to positive eugenics and to wider population questions. Nevertheless Blacker remained determined to find clear proof of the existence of the social problem group.64 Embarrassed by the obvious weaknesses in Lidbetter’s methods, the Eugenics Society placed more hope in the work of other investigators. David Caradog Jones (1883–1975) was educated at King’s School, Chester, and later won an open mathematics scholarship to Pembroke College, Cambridge. After World War I, Caradog Jones was first Lecturer in Mathematics at Manchester, and later Lecturer in Sociology at Liverpool.65 In this latter post he planned and directed the Merseyside Social Survey.

It has been suggested that Caradog Jones was a typical member of the Eugenics Society at this time. In his autobiography, he recorded that his parents were born ‘of good Welsh farming stock’. During World War I he was a conscientious objector, spending time in the detention room at Newcastle Barracks, sewing mailbags. The interest of Caradog Jones into aspects of personality was apparent at an early stage. In 1913, for example, he published in the Journal of the Royal Statistical Society a study of the extent of ‘economic moral failure’ among regular workers. This listed such traits as drink, dishonesty, misconduct, negligence or irregularity, and incompetence.66 As John Macnicol comments:

by background and temperament, therefore, Caradog Jones was in many respects the archetypal inter-war eugenist; newly professionalized, he had worked his way up by considerable effort; to a strong religious faith was added an interest in social policy and a non-socialist reformism.67

Caradog Jones was able to find an outlet for these interests in the Merseyside Social Survey. Funded through the Rockefeller Foundation, the Merseyside Survey was intended to complement the New London Survey. Chapter 14 of the third volume dealt with ‘sub-normal types’, defined as being the mentally deficient and epileptic. Here Caradog Jones wrote that one of the most important questions was ‘how to identify those persons who outwardly are normal but who inwardly carry defective “genes”, seeds which if transmitted produce defective stock some time in the future’.68 Using data based on children attending Special Schools, and adults supervised by the West Lancashire Association for Mental Welfare, Caradog Jones explored
the relationship between defectiveness, sex, and age; families; social class; and home conditions. He suggested that where families had two or more mentally defective children, it was likely that the defect was hereditary – marriages of defectives should be closely monitored. He referred to the work of Lewis on the Wood Report, claiming that Lewis had shown how feeble-mindedness was more common in the social problem group. Overall, Caradog Jones concluded that in any large urban area there was a social problem group which was ‘the source from which the majority of criminals and paupers, unemployables and defectives of all kinds are recruited’.  

In general, Caradog Jones maintained that structural measures were not sufficient for social reform, writing that it was not enough to improve the framework of society. Instead, attention should also be directed to ‘the quality of the people from whom that society is increasingly recruited’.  

The fact that these concerns were evident in the Merseyside Social Survey is generally well known. Caradog Jones provided the Brock Committee on Voluntary Sterilisation with a summary of the material he had collected. What is much less appreciated is the extent to which it was this aspect of the Survey that was noted by reviewers, in newspapers and other periodicals. The social problem group was mentioned, for example, in a review in the *Liverpool Post* in June 1934, while the *Daily Dispatch* commented ‘amazing revelations of the intimate lives of thousands of sub-normal people and mental defectives in Merseyside are made in the University’s three-volume social survey’. Other newspapers echoed the concern that the birth rate was higher among these ‘undesirable groups’, and questioned whether the ‘unfit’ should marry. There were some doubts expressed about the methodology employed in the survey. In the *Political Quarterly*, for instance, its reviewer argued that the main criticisms of the chapters on subnormal types were that they ‘were not always presented with the scientific integrity and detachment that one would expect in a publication of this kind’. There was evidence, he suggested, of a preconception in favour of a hereditary social problem group. On the other hand, the *New Statesman* thought the detailed survey of subnormal types one of the most original aspects of the survey. Its reviewer noted: ‘it goes beyond an analysis of their economic condition and attempts to trace the incidence and hereditary nature of both physical and mental defects’.  

In fact Caradog Jones’s work on the social problem group was bedevilled by many of the same problems with which Lidbetter had struggled. In September 1929, Caradog Jones had told the Secretary of the Eugenics Society that:

among other investigations I have initiated one concerning certain types of abnormal people: those who are born blind, the very deaf, the epileptic, the mentally deficient, those who are persistently addicted to drink, crime or vice, and those who are constantly coming upon the Guardians or some charitable institution for assistance.
This illustrated how weak his definition of abnormality actually was. It included three main groups: those with some form of disability; others with moral failings; and a third group that was defined through its dependence on welfare. The cards that were prepared for the survey included for those born blind or partially blind; for the very deaf; the epileptic; those mentally retarded and deficient; those persistently addicted to immorality, crime and alcohol; the chronically destitute; and those ‘in any other way abnormal’, such as being tuberculous or deformed. Caradog Jones wrote that in all these cases there was ‘some lack of physical, mental, or moral balance, or some failure of social and economic adjustment which makes them a burden upon the community’.

Caradog Jones hoped that, in the survey, Lewis’s concept of the social problem group might be broken down into its different components. These methods were borne out in the published Survey, where different chapters dealt with the blind, the deaf, physical defectives, alcoholics, criminals, the ‘immoral’, and the unemployed. He defined the group as being a section of the population that is ‘largely dependent upon others for support’. In addition to it being a heterogeneous group, Caradog Jones faced difficulties in proving that mental defectiveness was hereditary. In the chapter on mental deficiency, he was forced to admit that out of 912 children attending schools for mental defectives, only 11 had a parent recorded as ex-Special School or suffering from a more serious grade of defect. He argued, unconvincingly, that the figures were misleading, since there had been no special school in Liverpool before 1900, and the West Lancashire Association for Mental Welfare had been in existence only since 1915. He was forced to fall back on the work of the eugenist A. F. Tredgold to argue that the ‘neuropathic diathesis’ could be transmitted, but that it might be several generations before it resulted in mental defect.

By the late 1930s, various factors were combining to weaken the legitimacy of eugenics and sterilization. The mood of crisis that had characterized the early 1930s had evaporated by the latter half of the decade, as the economy began to recover, and the social and political fabric had shown itself to be strong enough to withstand the strains to which it had been subjected. Demographic investigations were destroying the foundations of many eugenic theories, such as the phenomenon of the differential birth rate. Eugenics was increasingly under attack from scientists such as Lancelot Hogben, and research, such as that of John Boyd Orr on nutrition, directed attention more to environmental than hereditarian factors. In particular, an emerging Keynesian middle-way consensus was holding out an optimistic and convincing strategy for non-socialist reformism. In this context, many began to argue that environmental reform was a complementary component of eugenics.

Research on the social problem group therefore took place within a changed intellectual climate, where the emphasis was on what has been called ‘reform eugenics’. E. J. Lidbetter, for example, was aware that by the late
1930s the intellectual climate had changed dramatically. Writing in January 1936, he warned that an attempt to link housing to eugenics or to the social problem group would lead to a torrent of (arguably justifiable) criticism being directed at the Society. Moreover, the Eugenics Society still faced the problem of proving that the social problem group actually existed. In 1937, a book was published from the work sponsored by the Social Problem Group Investigation Committee. C. P. Blacker argued that, from the point of view of ‘negative eugenics’, no question was more important than that of whether a ‘social problem group composed of persons of inferior hereditary condition’ actually existed. If it did exist, and had recognizable biological characteristics, it was important that the fertility of the members should be restricted. However, the composition of the group remained extremely heterogeneous. Different chapters dealt with the mentally retarded child; mental disorder; epilepsy; drunkenness; prostitution; recidivism; paupers; neurasthenia, and unemployment. Moreover the tentative title, *A Social Problem Group?,* showed that the findings remained inconclusive. Despite his belief that research was essential, Blacker was forced to concede that ‘the social problem group constitutes a very difficult subject for accurate and impartial investigation.*

Some investigators continued to believe in the group. Raymond Cattell, for example, wrote in 1937 that ‘such sub-average types are often only fitfully employed, cannot co-operate in hygienic measures and in enlightened methods of bringing up children, and cannot comprehend political issues’. Similarly David Caradog Jones maintained in the foreword to *A Social Problem Group?* that:

> our acquaintance with the detail of human inheritance of various defects and disabilities and of the effect of the environment upon them is still astonishingly meagre, but enough is known in a broad sense to provide us with guiding principles in our attitude towards social conditions.*

Others drew on the concept for opportunistic or tactical reasons. In his study of regional variations in infant mortality, for example, the young Richard Titmuss repeated the mantra that the social problem group was ‘the source from which all too many of our criminals, paupers, degenerates, unemployables and defectives are recruited’. Despite the doubts expressed in *A Social Problem Group?*, Blacker remained persistent into the 1940s, encouraged by the formation of the Royal Commission on Population. In April 1944, he wrote to Lidbetter of the social problem group that ‘the line that I have in mind is that such a group exists and that it may well seek to abuse the measures of social security which are designed to secure freedom from anxiety, want and fear’. In June 1944, he told Lidbetter that copies of *Heredity and the Social Problem Group* should be given to members of the Royal Commission, writing that ‘the fact that social security schemes will break down if unemployment and
other forms of dependency exceed a certain minimum should make people conscious of the parasitic character of the social problem group’. However, many of the leading members of the Eugenics Society remained embarrassed about Lidbetter and his work. In June 1944, Carr-Saunders recommended that copies of Lidbetter’s volume should not be presented to the Royal Commission, warning that its members would argue most of the ‘defects and ill-behaviour’ had social and environmental causes. Blacker admitted to Carr-Saunders that on re-reading the book he was disappointed by the Introduction. He continued ‘indeed, I felt that I had rarely come across such a clear instance of the reader’s mind being muddled or even prejudiced against a piece of careful work by a bad general presentation’.

By World War II, even Caradog Jones appeared to be more cautious. While he argued that Lidbetter’s pedigrees confirmed that the social problem group existed, he conceded that the Brock Committee were probably right in saying there was less agreement about its size. He maintained that people of subnormal intelligence who were not certified defectives could be the carriers of certain genes that were defective in one way or another. What was crucial was where to draw the line defining ‘subnormal’ intelligence – a bit like the poverty line. The reactions of Leon Radzinowicz and Lord Horder to this piece were revealing. Radzinowicz observed that although the work of Booth, Rowntree, and Bowley had revealed much about the economic and social facts of the social problem group, less was known about its ‘physical and mental peculiarities’. Little was known about the relationship between poverty and mental defect, and it was not established that the social problem group was the source of criminality. Radzinowicz suggested, perceptively, that these ideas were more of a discursive phenomenon. Whereas the concept of the dangerous class belonged to the period of the Industrial Revolution, that of the social problem group was linked to plans for a system of universal social security. Lord Horder observed that Caradog Jones said little about the relationship between economic and mental poverty, and he too, remained undecided about whether the social problem group really existed.

In a textbook on social surveys, published in 1949, Caradog Jones asked:

is the so-called ‘social problem group’ a class radically different from the rest of the population, or is the term one which conveniently, but perhaps rather confusingly, covers a heterogeneous mass of persons suffering from defects and disabilities which have no more than a superficial relationship to one another?

At the same time, he was enthusiastic about the new theme of the problem family. He wrote that ‘in my experience the majority of such families seem, in fact, to be incapable of economic thought, or at least of forethought’. The fundamental cause was subnormal intelligence, and the only useful approach was that of the Family Service Units – which persisted with ‘utterly useless
human material”. Thus, as the following chapter will illustrate, many of those attracted to the concept of the social problem group in the 1930s were able to transfer their interests to the new theme of the problem family in the 1940s.

There was thus much evidence that the earlier concepts of the social residuum and unemployable persisted into the interwar period. One illustration of this is provided by the attempts to pathologize the tramp. But the main sense in which these ideas were propagated was in the new concept of the social problem group. This was a key element in the work of the Eugenics Society. Early attempts to study mental defectiveness and heredity in families and paupers were given further support in the way that the social problem group was identified in the Wood Report, supported by the Brock Committee. Compared to the social residuum, ideas about mental deficiency were crucial in sustaining the concept of the social problem group – there was more concern about methodology, and a desire for academic respectability. Nevertheless, other key aspects of earlier concepts were evident – a sense that the group constituted around 10 per cent of the population; an emphasis on intergenerational continuities; a stress on the potential importance of sterilization and segregation; and a continuing belief in the role of the expert. Against the background of the depression, and in the context of anxieties about the rise of the Labour Party, the social problem group provided middle-class professional groups with a single-cause explanation of social problems. Moreover in the 1930s, the social problem group was constructed in relation to the advocated solution of sterilization. The social problem group thus entered the lexicon of fashionable eugenic language, to be exploited by opportunists who were on the margins of the Eugenics Society.

Despite this symbolic importance, the efforts of the Eugenics Society were weakened by the fact that the existence of the social problem group could not be proven. E. J. Lidbetter argued that it was characterized by biological weakness and was also a separate class, and while the group had to be large enough to create concern, it was also an identifiable unit with a single cause. Lidbetter made little reference to social conditions, and his admission that pauperism declined during World War I and in the recession showed that it was a statistical artefact. In his work on the Merseyside Social Survey, David Caradog Jones argued that the group was made up of three factions – those who had some form of disability; those marked by moral failings; and a third group that was dependent on welfare. But like Lidbetter, Caradog Jones struggled to demonstrate convincingly that mental defectiveness was hereditary, arguing that while it could be transmitted, it might be several decades before mental defect showed itself. Both therefore linked vague ideas of social inefficiency to pseudo-scientific ideas about heredity. Both were forced to fall back on the argument that, while the existence of the group was self-evident, more research was necessary.

The Wood Report and Lidbetter research would surface periodically in the later researches of both supporters and opponents of related ideas, such
as the cycle of deprivation in the 1970s. But while the concept of the social problem group remained popular in the late 1930s, wider factors such as the emerging Keynesian ‘middle-way’ consensus had also begun to weaken both the credibility of eugenics and the attractions of a policy of sterilization. The position of the Society was further weakened following the publication of the Beveridge Report of 1942. By the mid-1940s, the concept of the social problem group had already begun its transformation into the notion of the problem family. This was first apparent in accounts of the schoolchildren evacuated from the cities to the countryside in September 1939. One account in particular, the survey *Our Towns*, by the Women’s Group on Public Welfare (1943), was particularly important in this respect. Perceiving that the mounting evidence of Nazi experiments and the wider climate of social reconstruction made its ideas appear out of date, the Eugenics Society sought to take on board this shift and use it for its own ends. It was not surprising, therefore, that in the late 1940s the Society was in the forefront of proposals to investigate the new phenomenon. It is the new concept of the problem family that the next chapter seeks to explore.
In an article published in September 1944, Dr R. C. Wofinden, the Deputy Medical Officer of Health (MOH) for Rotherham, described the typical problem family in the following way:

Almost invariably it is a large family, some of the children being dull or feeble-minded. From their appearance they are strangers to soap and water, toothbrush and comb; the clothing is dirty and torn and the footwear absent or totally inadequate. Often they are verminous and have scabies and impetigo. Their nutrition is surprisingly average – doubtless partly due to extra-familial feeding in schools. The mother is frequently sub-standard mentally. The home, if indeed it can be described as such, has usually the most striking characteristics. Nauseating odours assail one’s nostrils on entry, and the source is usually located in some urine-sodden faecal-stained mattress in an upstairs room. There are no floor coverings, no decorations on the walls except perhaps the scribblings of the children and bizarre patterns formed by absent plaster. Furniture is of the most primitive, cooking utensils absent, facilities for sleeping hopeless – iron bedsteads furnished with fouled mattresses and no coverings. Upstairs there is flock everywhere, which the mother assures us has come out of a mattress which she has unpacked for cleansing. But the flock seems to stay there for weeks and the cleansed and repacked mattress never appears. The bathroom is obviously the least frequented room of the building. There are sometimes faecal accumulations on the floors upstairs, and tin baths containing several days’ accumulation of faeces and urine are not unknown.¹

It was a description that was to remain powerful, if misleading, for much of the early post-war period.
Although there was much interest in the concept of the social problem group during the interwar period, at the end of the 1930s social investigators were still unable to prove that it actually existed. By the early 1940s, the theme of the social problem group had been superseded by that of the problem family. It was this concept that represented a further step in the evolution of the concept of the underclass. The problem family has attracted limited interest from historians. Some studies have sought to explore the problem family in terms of the concept’s usefulness to professional groups including public health doctors and social workers, relating this to wider processes and organizational changes culminating in the Seebohm Report (1968). Pat Starkey has argued that it was the Children and Young Persons Act (1963) that transferred responsibility for these families to Children’s Departments. Drawing in part on a case study of Bristol, Starkey maintains that the continuing use of the term masked changes in the type of family it was used to describe. Elsewhere, Starkey has related the issue of the problem family to the wider stigmatization of the feckless mother, pointing out that problem family really meant ‘problem mother’, and that the physical conditions of the home and children were given more importance than any other aspect of their welfare. Starkey writes that the problem mother was ‘at the intersection of eugenic, class and social anxieties, all concerned with the quality of post-war British life and represented by groups of professionals who had an interest in reforming her’. Historians have traced the history of problem families in the context of the early history of the voluntary Family Service Units, showing how the metaphor changed from a biologically deterministic one to a medical one, from corrective to therapeutic work.

Perhaps most interestingly, John Macnicol has explored the shift from the problem family debates of the 1950s to the underclass anxieties of the 1980s. Macnicol argued that discussions about problem families provided a rehearsal for underclass debates, indicating continuities in the discourse, but also showing how much had changed in British society over the 50 years. Macnicol noted how the Eugenics Society, the Family Service Units, and public health doctors had become interested in the problem family in the 1940s, and also explored in some detail methodological problems that bedevilled this early research. Most definitions of problem families, for example, were essentially definitions of household squalor, and the Eugenics Society faced big problems in attempting to carry out a survey. Macnicol also charted the growing criticisms of the problem family concept in the 1950s. Acknowledging the related ideas of the culture of poverty and the cycle of deprivation, Macnicol asked to what extent there was a linear development from problem family to underclass in the period 1945–95. On the one hand, there were continuities in the process of social distancing based on class, gender, and age; in the way the idea was pushed by a small but active pressure group; in the combination of administrative and behavioural definitions; and in the agreement that a problem existed but disagreement
over its causes. But on the other hand, there were significant changes in the labour market; and in demographic and family formation behaviour. Given very real concerns about widening social polarization in the 1990s, Macnicol concluded that in contrast ‘the 1950s do appear to be years of optimism and hope’.  

This chapter examines these earlier interpretations against the empirical evidence. It explores the concept of the problem family through the eyes of four different interest groups, whose members and ideas overlapped, but which can nonetheless be considered as having separate identities. These comprise the Eugenics Society and other individuals interested in eugenics; the voluntary Family Service Units; medical personnel including public health doctors; and a broad coalition of academics and practitioners in the emerging social work profession. The chapter argues that the problem family can be seen as a kind of conceptual stepping stone between the social problem group idea of the 1930s, and the cycle of deprivation notion of the 1970s. The problem family provides important evidence on how these ideas emerge, and also how they acquire a pejorative connotation and fade away. However, the links between the problem family idea and the American culture of poverty theory are much less easy to trace, with important differences, most notably in the treatment of race.

It is well known that the evacuation of schoolchildren from the cities to the countryside in September 1939 led to an important debate about the effectiveness of health and welfare services, and contributed to the favourable reception given to the Beveridge Report. It was in the course of these discussions that the transition from the notion of the social problem group to the concept of the problem family occurred. One of the most influential reports on the evacuation experience was the survey Our Towns, published by the Women’s Group on Public Welfare in 1943. This was a group of middle-class women, who had previously been active in a range of voluntary organizations. In many respects, the report made incisive criticisms of the performance of organizations such as the School Medical Service in the 1930s. On the other hand, the report also reflected a pathological or behavioural interpretation of poverty. Most obviously, the introduction to the report argued that one effect of the evacuation had been to ‘flood the dark places with light’ and show that the ‘submerged tenth’ described by Charles Booth still existed in cities. In language that was later echoed by Oscar Lewis, the authors of the survey argued that its members seldom joined trade unions, friendly societies, classes, or clubs, and rarely attended church. And Our Towns claimed that within this group were the problem families who were:

on the edge of pauperism and crime, riddled with mental and physical defects, in and out of the Courts for child neglect, a menace to the community, of which the gravity is out of all proportion to their numbers.
Next to the problem families were others who were ‘grey rather than black’, who were dirty, but were nevertheless capable of improvement through better education and higher living standards. The authors of the *Our Towns* report suggested that a social survey of ‘this class of the population’ was seriously needed.

The *Our Towns* report was a beguiling mixture of reactionary and progressive views, emphasizing the role of education on the one hand, and the importance of improved living conditions on the other. While it advocated nursery classes and clubs for mothers, it also recommended family allowances and minimum wages. Part of the reason why it became an unlikely bestseller was because it caught the mood for social reconstruction. But it was the comment on problem families that caught the eye of other social commentators. David Caradog Jones, for example, used a piece on the *Our Towns* report in the *Eugenics Review* to press for a new survey. The *Our Towns* survey inspired several public health doctors to write articles about problem families, and also generated other social surveys. In Luton, for example, a study on post-war reconstruction included a report on problem families that was funded by a small grant awarded by the Eugenics Society and written by an administrator in the local public health department. He claimed that problem families were those which:

> For their own well-being or the well-being of others, for reasons primarily unconnected with old age, accident, misfortune, illness or pregnancy, require a substantially greater degree of supervision and help over longer periods than is usually provided by existing social services.

Health visitors, district nurses, and sanitary inspectors were asked to submit details of families that fitted this definition, and the 167 families reported were investigated further by a health visitor. The report suggested that the causes of the problem family phenomenon were numerous – subnormal mental capacity, broken families, frequent pregnancies, ill health, absent husbands, and alcoholism. What was really needed were education and rehabilitation, intervention by central government, and a national survey. Luton’s MOH agreed that ‘an aspect of the rekindled interest in the social problems of our times has been an increased attention to the problem family’.

Prominent among these observers was the Eugenics Society. By the end of World War II, the association between Nazism and eugenics, the election of a Labour government, and declining anxieties about the birth rate all seemed unfavourable for the objectives that the Society had espoused in the 1930s. David Caradog Jones observed of the Luton report that it was unclear what was cause and what was effect, and that the author might have been ‘too drastic in his pruning’. More significant was an attempt by the General Secretary of the Society, C. P. Blacker, to summarize the findings of the growing number of reports on problem families, and to outline methods for a national survey. Blacker argued that what seemed important
was ‘temperamental instability’ in the mother or father, along with large families. He accepted that defining the problem family still posed problems, especially for borderline cases, but he claimed the families were well known at the local level and thought that, through several small-scale surveys, it would be possible to estimate the size of the social problem group. Thus Blacker aimed to shore up support for the Eugenics Society by updating the concept of the social problem group, and by cashing in on the vogue for the problem family.

Following meetings between Blacker and the MOH for Luton, and the awarding of a small grant, the Eugenics Society now formed a Problem Families Committee. Its first meeting in July 1947 was attended by prominent members of the Society such as David Caradog Jones, Lord Horder, and Richard Titmuss, and a number of interested MOsH. It was recommended that a survey needed to be undertaken of the size of the social problem group, and the MOsH present agreed to undertake pilot enquiries in their areas, in Bristol, Warwickshire, Luton, Rotherham, the West Riding of Yorkshire, and the London borough of Kensington. Problem families would be defined in terms of the multiple problems they presented to statutory and voluntary organizations. Further changes to the definition were necessary. Problem families were not just families with children, and older people were excluded. It was thought that the four main features were ‘intractable ineducability’; ‘instability or infirmity of character’; ‘the presentation by the family of multiple social problems’; and a ‘squalid home’.

The idea was to use local authorities to collect lists of families that presented various problems. In fact, organizations were asked to submit details of any family which over at least 6 months ‘has confronted you with a chronic and relatively intractable problem for which our present social services provide no lasting remedy’. These were to be returned to the MOH who would prepare a complete list. Following a conference, a list of ‘possible problem families’ would be agreed. It was suggested that in a large area, such as the West Riding of Yorkshire, a sample of 100 should be selected for more intensive study and visiting. Those deemed ‘biological or social casualties’ in the Luton survey should be removed, and so the list of ‘possible problem families’ would be ‘pruned’ and reduced to a smaller list of ‘authentic problem families’. Details of these families were to be sent to Blacker, at the Eugenics Society. Nevertheless it was recognized that however carefully the final list was prepared, there were likely to be different standards of assessment by the MOsH in the different areas. It was suggested, therefore, that there should be close co-operation between all concerned with the fieldwork, and between the study sites and the centre, with C. G. Tomlinson, author of the Luton survey, co-ordinating the pilot studies.

These doubts about the methodology were reflected in the cautious claims made in support of the project. In January 1948, it was said that the purpose of the pilot enquiries was simply to devise a workable method of
counting problem families, and to standardize a method of investigation that might be adopted on a larger scale.\textsuperscript{18} It was hoped that each area would produce reports on 50–100 ‘authentic problem families’. But it was also admitted that the six areas were not representative, and were simply those where the local MOsH were sympathetic to the problem, and linked to the Eugenics Society.\textsuperscript{19} In March 1948, an observer from the Ministry of Health reported that the Committee was focusing on two characteristics, ‘intractable ineducability’ and ‘instability or infirmity of character’, declaring that:

these together express themselves in the persistent neglect of children (if there are any), in fecklessness, irresponsibility, improvidence in the conduct of life, and indiscipline in the home wherein dirt, poverty and squalor are often conspicuous.\textsuperscript{20}

Despite the attempts at ensuring some consistency in the fieldwork, doubts about the methodology persisted. In April 1949, for example, it was suggested that each investigator should send to Blacker a detailed account of three problem families regarded as typical in their area.\textsuperscript{21} These concerns were highlighted by evidence of dissension within the team. In Bristol, it became clear on reading case histories that notorious problem families had not been included on the lists. The procedure was changed, so that a list of names and addresses was circulated to the organizations, who were asked to give more information about them. Dr R. C. Wofinden, the then MOH for Bristol, revealed that his list of ‘problem families’ had been whittled down from 212 to 155, and he admitted of the attempt to establish a procedure for a national survey that ‘the method tried out has not been a complete success’.\textsuperscript{22} The MOH for Rotherham argued that the term ‘problem family’ was unfortunate, suggesting that ‘there is, of course, no clear-cut division between respectable citizens and those whose habits make them a nuisance and a burden to the rest of the community’.\textsuperscript{23} And criticisms were voiced by Dr E. O. Lewis. In February 1952, Lewis wrote that the results were disappointing since variations in the number of notifications indicated they were far from thorough, and suggested that MOsH knew little about social problems in their areas.\textsuperscript{24}

The role of Richard Titmuss in the problem family debate was particularly interesting. As we have seen, Titmuss was one of the original members of the Committee, but he thought that rehabilitation deserved more emphasis, and quietly stopped attending the meetings. Titmuss used this as an excuse to distance himself from the final report when it was published in 1952, and he asked that his name be removed from the list of contributors.\textsuperscript{25} The reasons for Titmuss’s embarrassment were not difficult to see. C. P. Blacker admitted that ‘none of us is unaware of the defects in these inquiries or of the pitfalls involved in comparing them’, and the pilot surveys were best thought of as ‘experiments in method’.\textsuperscript{26} Nevertheless the final report claimed that the five pilot surveys (Warwickshire had been dropped) had
found 379 problem families. In terms of incidence, there were 2.6 problem families per 1,000 families in North Kensington; 1.4 in Bristol; 1.2 in the West Riding of Yorkshire; 3.5 in Rotherham; and 6.2 in Luton. Blacker acknowledged that some tables, such as those on the physical appearance of housewives, where impressions had simply been recorded by health visitors, were rather subjective. He attributed the ‘ineducability’ of parents to mental subnormality and to their ‘weak and vacillating characters’, and he argued that the families were characterized by their inability to benefit from education, by the dirt and chaos of their homes, and the high number of children. Heartened by a recent Government circular on child neglect, Blacker suggested that MOsH should co-ordinate future surveys of the problem family.

The Eugenics Society now turned its attention from problem families to the theme of promising families. More generally, other aspects of post-war Britain, including the creation of the welfare state, changing attitudes towards mental health, and the baby boom, contributed to a decisive turning point in intellectual life, after which eugenics had less influence on public policy. The mentally defective, for example, had proved that they could work, and it was no longer possible to argue that labour market failure was caused by genetics. Even so, there remained a eugenic interest in problem families into the 1960s, particularly in connection with birth control. In 1965, for example, it was reported that a domiciliary birth control service had been started for problem families in Southampton, funded in part through the Marie Stopes Foundation. The author wrote that ‘eleven families have left the area – the nomadic instinct is noticeable in these families; they move about, believing that the distant fields are greener, and to keep track of them is often impossible’. C. P. Blacker remained involved in a sterilization project for the Simon Population Trust. As late as 1966, he wrote that ‘for problem families sterilisation is especially appropriate. Here socio-economic indications commonly overlap therapeutic ones, especially when the mental health of the mother is in question’. This then provides the link between the problem family debate and the notion of the cycle of deprivation. As we will see subsequently, it was the problem family concept rather than the American culture of poverty notion that was the main influence on Sir Keith Joseph and his cycle of deprivation theory.

Although it is commonplace that World War II witnessed the evolution of universal health services and the creation of the welfare state, less is known about the fortunes of voluntary organizations in this period. These included existing charities like the Red Cross, and semi-official bodies such as the Women’s Voluntary Service. To these we can add the Pacifist Service Units that were formed by small groups of conscientious objectors in a few large cities. The most prominent Pacifist Service Unit was the Liverpool branch formed in October 1940. It began work in the air raid shelter in the crypt of Holy Trinity Church, in St Anne Street. Here the workers tried to find billets for homeless people, and, by 1941, were helping individuals and
families through emergency hostels. Many of the Unit’s volunteers were members of the Society of Friends, and the approach was essentially pacifist and religious, with the workers identifying closely with their clients. As the chairman of the Liverpool Unit later wrote of his colleagues, ‘they were cut off from, and, in some measure, ostracised by society, and they found in the men, women and children in the hostels a like group of people’.33

Although the Pacifist Service Units prided themselves on their independence from professional organizations, their growing interest in casework was an important step in the evolution of social work. The Liverpool Unit, for example, took on casework at the end of 1941, by providing more personal help to families and individuals in need. By May 1942, it had begun to classify the stages that ‘rehabilitation families’ passed through. Its approach to social work was one that was innovative and relied on the personal relationship between workers and clients, but which nonetheless stressed the value of practical help of a physical nature and was essentially amateur. The Unit noted that what it termed ‘rehabilitation families’ posed particularly difficult challenges; by 1944 it was diagnosis, and the problems of those families deemed ‘baffling cases’, that were receiving more attention. The Units were generally small, consisting of a fieldwork leader, a secretary, and a team of caseworkers. Caseworkers usually handled about 15 cases, and casework meetings were held weekly. Training was provided, and some workers were graduates in social science. The emphasis on casework was taken up by the Manchester and London Units, and a new National Casework Committee was formed.34 Thus, the Pacifist Service Units had their own distinctive agenda, but also adopted an approach that was to become an important stepping stone for the emerging social work profession.

The rehabilitation families were the forerunners of the problem families, and by the end of World War II, the Pacifist Service Units had become closely identified with the latter concept. In 1944, Tom Stephens of the London Unit wrote that problem families were characterized by a combination of irregular income, but also by mismanagement. He argued that aspects of their condition, such as their disordered lives, the fact that the children were often late for school, and the inefficiency of the mothers and fathers showed that the main cause was one of ‘character’. However, outside factors, such as poverty, illness, and large families were also important. The problem, then, was both a failure of character and the pressure of circumstances. Stephens wrote that the solution was the restoration of normal family life. He wrote that:

the problem family are left untouched by much of the help they need: they stay behind when their neighbours are rehoused, their children are not taken to the clinics, and the most undernourished child never gets his free milk and vitamins.35

Despite close links with the Eugenics Society, both in terms of personnel and with regard to how they conceptualized the families, the approach of the
Family Service Units was one in which ideas of biological determinism were mitigated by humane values, which saw worth in every person.36

Further insights into the way that the Pacifist Service Units viewed problem families were provided in a book edited by Stephens and published in November 1945. It followed on from a conference on casework held in Liverpool in 1944. The book set out the nature of the problem, provided a series of descriptions of families considered typical, reviewed the work of the Pacifist Service Units, and appealed for additional funds. Stephens echoed the Eugenics Society in arguing that, while the problem family could not be defined, it was easy to recognize. Thus the problem family lived in a filthy home and possessed little furniture, the mother could not manage the home or the children, and the father was in irregular employment such as casual labouring. At the same time, his prognosis was more hopeful, with the solution consisting of ‘personal treatment for the individual families’.37 In the estimation of Stephens, problem families were essentially ‘the misfits who fail to benefit from the provisions which suffice for average people’.38 Stephens argued that the strength of the Pacifist Service Unit approach derived from its combination of professional competence and warmth and sincerity, but he admitted that it was founded on practical help, so that ‘cleaning, decorating, removing, repairing and disinfesting were the first forms of service, and on this basis the rest was built’. Thus the hope was that, through practical example and training, the problem families could be educated into ‘the highest possible standards of social and domestic life’.39

The book sold well and both publicized the work of the Pacifist Service Units and propagated the concept of the problem family more widely. Some reviewers interpreted its findings as being further evidence of the existence of a residuum or ‘a kind of social sediment of persons and families’.40 Others were less interested in the number of families and thought that practical work was the correct approach, arguing that to treat the family members and ignore the home would be ‘to treat the symptoms and leave the focus of disease untouched’.41 The Pacifist Service Units had always intended to continue their work in peacetime and, in January 1947, a new national organization named Family Service Units was formed. Discussions held at this time indicated that the Our Towns report had provided important support for this work. New Units were formed in 1948 in several London boroughs and gradually spread to provincial cities so that, by 1954, there were ten, with two in London and others in Liverpool, Manchester, Sheffield, Leicester, Birmingham, York, Bristol, and Bradford. From 1954, the Ministry of Health allowed local authorities to provide grants towards the work of the Family Service Units. Even so, while a skeleton national organization had been created, the influence of the Liverpool Unit remained significant.

Some of the Family Service Units made attempts to adopt a more innovative approach, by experimenting with groups for adolescent girls and camps, extending their work to cover new housing estates, and by appointing full-time workers who possessed academic qualifications in social work. Yet,
in many ways, the approach seemed little different to that of the Pacifist Service Units in the early 1940s. While the new National Secretary argued that phrases such as ‘derelict families’ and ‘unsatisfactory households’ were not interchangeable, and the terms ‘social problem group’ and ‘problem families’ not synonymous, his language remained eugenic in tone. Moreover, his emphasis on the defining characteristics of the families echoed that of Stephens, so that eating habits, for example, continued to be used as a benchmark for social norms. This approach was replicated at the local level. Workers in the Liverpool Unit rejected a more professional approach, arguing they were successful only in ‘a warm sympathetic relationship of friendship and involvement’, while their Chairman admitted in 1963 that the work was continuing as it had begun, ‘with an offer of practical help made in a spirit of friendship’. The Family Service Units appointed a research worker in the late 1950s, but his findings lacked originality and essentially drew on the ideas of others. One article, for example, concluded that workers should act as parents, claiming that extreme immaturity was a common characteristic among problem families.

The approach of the Family Service Units remained embedded in the experiences of the early 1940s, and belated attempts to assess the effectiveness of casework were unconvincing. Yet this is to miss much of the importance of the Units, which lay more in their contact with more influential organizations and individuals. Many of those who sought to professionalize social work looked to the Units for a viable alternative to the approach of local health departments. One survey of social work in London, for example, wrote that the local Unit was ‘both unique and extremely effective in its methods’. Similarly, the Younghusband Report on the role of social workers claimed the Units had shown that problem families were not a homogeneous group, and had influenced the work of local authorities. Particularly significant were the close links forged with academics in university departments, illustrated in the involvement of Unit members in the rediscovery of poverty and in the formation of the Child Poverty Action Group. In these ways, the Units played a key role in the development of the emerging social work profession. However, most significant in this context was their role in the concept of the problem family, with which the Family Service Units remained most closely identified.

Some members of the medical establishment were sceptical of the value of the Family Service Units. One review concluded that ‘the cure of this social disease is often impossible, and until the causes of family failure are better understood prevention cannot begin to operate’. In part, this attitude reflected a desire to prevent the Units from encroaching on the empire of local MOsH. These doctors had originally been appointed by local authorities in the late nineteenth century, to monitor public health and to tackle the rise in infectious disease that had accompanied the growth of large cities. In the interwar period, MOsH had begun to treat tuberculosis and venereal disease, to manage personal health services for mothers and infants, and supervise
municipal hospitals. Under the National Health Service Act (1946), the MOsH lost their hospitals and clinics, and the role of public health was to become increasingly problematic in the post-war period. In many ways, the involvement of the MOsH with problem families, and the subsequent policy of the Ministry of Health on family welfare, represented an attempt to come to terms with the impact of these wider changes.

The *Our Towns* report on the evacuation of schoolchildren, published in 1943, was the key source for the concept of the problem family. But towards the end of World War II, half a dozen or so MOsH began to publish articles in their professional journals on problem families in their respective areas. It was these MOsH who subsequently were linked with the Eugenics Society’s Problem Families Committee. One was Dr R. C. Wofinden, Deputy MOH for Rotherham and subsequently MOH for Bristol. He argued that ‘derelict families’ were those with ‘social defectiveness of such a degree that they require care, supervision and control for their own well-being or for the well-being of others’. Wofinden thought that the ascertainment and disposal of mental defectives might be improved through sterilization and segregation, but also advocated training centres and further research.

Though the doctors may have had similar motives for becoming interested in problem families, they came up with radically different solutions, illustrating that, while some had a lingering affection for eugenics, others were more in tune with the Pacifist Service Units.

Another was Dr C. O. Stallybrass, Deputy MOH for Liverpool. She wrote that *Our Towns* had revealed that ‘the norm of many areas is horribly low’, and defined problem families as those ‘presenting an abnormal amount of subnormal behaviour over prolonged periods with a marked tendency to backsliding’. Stallybrass recommended both prevention and treatment, including marriage guidance, bodies similar to the Pacifist Service Units, and hostels and training homes for mothers and children. Like Wofinden, Stallybrass placed a heavy emphasis on characteristics. She wrote that:

> If one makes a list of their unpleasant aspects of social life, one will invariably find that these families offend in several of them, e.g., squalor; vermin and dirt; truantism – the whole family may be discovered in bed at an hour when the children should be in school; delinquency; indecent overcrowding; failure to pay the rent; irregular and uncertain mealtimes; an almost complete absence of furniture especially inadequacy of cooking utensils, and of beds and bedding; for these latter they are frequent applicants to charitable agencies, largely on account of the insanitary habits of the children, or even of the adults; these insanitary habits, in turn, give a characteristic odour to the house.

The language employed by Stallybrass was remarkable. She wrote that problem families were ‘like animals in a cave, or a cage – often a cage of their own making’, and were ‘like rudderless barques with flapping sails
drifting on the social tide, driven hither and thither by any momentary gust of emotion’.55

Another of the MOsH involved with the Eugenics Society was Dr S. W. Savage, MOH for Hertfordshire. He stated that problem mothers did not give their children a minimum level of care, refused to co-operate with health visitors, and did not use the advice given to them.56 Dr J. L. Burn, MOH for Salford, suggested that the problem family was one where ‘the conditions of the home are dirty and disordered, and where the care of the children is bad’.57 Burn organized the making of a short film strip on the issue of the problem family. Dr Fraser Brockington, MOH for the West Riding of Yorkshire, was also closely associated with the Eugenics Society. He advocated registers, changes in the law, and a new approach to delinquency, but also thought local authorities should appoint social workers, arguing that ‘what is required is someone who will take off his coat and get down to restitution of civilised conditions’.58 In many respects, the authors of these articles, and their emphasis on characteristics, had an important influence on the approach subsequently adopted by the Eugenics Society. More generally, these doctors seized on the issue of the problem family to claim that they were at the cutting edge of social welfare, and to prevent further erosion of their medical specialism.

In the 1950s, further articles appeared in public health journals on problem families in a range of rural and urban areas, including Herefordshire, Sheffield, Worcestershire, London, and Southampton.59 The concept continued to be propagated in textbooks for MOsH and other health professionals. Uncertain attempts were made to incorporate the notion of the problem family into the new discipline of social medicine. One Professor of Social Medicine argued that the families were characterized by dirty homes, primitive cooking arrangements, verminous children, and erratic time-keeping. Indeed, he wrote that the characteristics of the problem family were so distinctive ‘that they may fairly be deemed pathological, in the sense that the family as a group is diseased’.60 Some of these textbooks were written by former MOsH who, by the mid-1950s, had become academics in the new discipline. At Manchester, Professor Fraser Brockington acknowledged that there was no precise definition and that each family was unique, but still argued, nonetheless, that ‘the problem family is one of the great social diseases of modern times’.61 The concept was also promoted within particular groups of health professionals. A textbook for health visitors, for example, included the problem family in a chapter on the ‘abnormal family’. The suggested characteristics were a lack of order; the weekly income was wrongly spent; bad feeding; the furniture and other equipment were poor; the sleeping arrangements were unsuitable; and the clothing was inadequate.62

This writing was matched by some limited activity at the local level. Some local authorities had taken action in the early 1940s. Norwich, for instance, had appointed a home advisor who scrubbed floors, cleaned children, and taught mothers the basics of mending, cooking, and household
management. However, while the Ministry of Health monitored the wave of interest in problem families, it did not take action, perhaps because it was preoccupied with other changes in the structure of health services. It was only in the early 1950s, and following the publication of the survey sponsored by the Eugenics Society, that the term ‘problem family’ cropped up in new Ministry of Health circulars on child neglect and family break-ups. First, in July 1950, a Joint Circular by the Home Office, Ministry of Health, and Ministry of Education sought to tackle child neglect, and avoid the need to remove children from their homes. This was to be achieved mainly through improved co-operation by statutory and voluntary agencies. Second, in a further circular issued in 1954 it was suggested that local authorities should use health visitors and home helps to tackle problem families. Henceforth, this area of social welfare began to be included in the work of many local health departments.

Official reports suddenly began to mention problem families. In 1951, for example, the Chief Medical Officer wrote that, with improvements in child health, more time could be devoted to the problem families that comprised 2–3 per cent of families in most areas. In particular, the Ministry of Health encouraged local authorities to draw on the recently-created home help service, arguing that these women could often make families more resourceful and independent. In the same period, these families began to appear in reports on the School Health Service. One report commented that children with head lice tended to be the offspring of problem families, and that treatment was particularly difficult owing to the ignorance, neglect and indifference of the parents. Other surveys used the phrase in passing. The report of a government working party on the future of health visiting commented that problem families were ‘merely the most obvious sign of the social ill-health that many think is endemic in a modern industrial society’. While the issue was a minor feature of health provision as a whole, the Ministry of Health clearly regarded the families in clinical terms, as having a disease with recognizable causes and symptoms and which could be cured through practical help.

Certainly these ideas were translated into practical reality since many local health departments, in both urban and rural areas, began to make provision for the problem family. Herefordshire, for example, appointed a welfare worker for this purpose in 1949, arguing that with the ‘rough dirty woman of independent spirit’ it was best to concentrate on the children. In Bristol, where the MOH remained uneasy about the problem of definitions, the local authority made sure health visitors had small caseloads, drew on the resources of the Family Service Unit, and also sent families to recuperation centres. Other local authorities, including Leicester and Kent, preferred to rely on their large pool of home helps. The approach taken usually depended on the age of the MOH, the relative strengths of the health visitor and home help services, and the degree to which voluntary organizations could be relied upon. Whatever method was employed, it can be seen with
hindsight to have been characterized by a degree of self-confidence and complacency. One medical journal claimed in 1957 that ‘most medical officers of health know personally or through their health visitors, the great majority of problem families in their areas’.\textsuperscript{73}

In the 1960s, the concept remained alive at the local level in many local authorities. Although formal responsibility for this issue had been transferred to Children’s Departments through the 1963 Children and Young Persons Act, the health dimension continued to be important.\textsuperscript{74} In Sheffield, for example, the Health Department carried out follow-up surveys on the problem families they had supposedly identified in the 1950s. This chapter concluded that, overall, housing and living standards had improved, as part of the general rise in living standards, but employment and child care continued to pose problems.\textsuperscript{75} There was much evidence that a judgemental approach continued to prevail. It was reported, for instance, that families were irresponsible in their attitude to money, with the authors writing that:

articles commonly found in households where the family income does not cover bare necessities because of heavy debts, include tape recorders, radiograms, cocktail cabinets, and quite often one or more large pedigree dogs.\textsuperscript{76}

The Sheffield studies underlined the need for contraception for large families, and it was in this respect that the concept of the problem family, and eugenic language in general, was most prominent at the national level. Many local health departments targeted family planning services at their problem families, and this was a policy advocated by central government departments.\textsuperscript{77} In 1968, for example, the Chief Medical Officer wrote that family planning was particularly important for families characterized by ‘squalor, ill-health, an inability to cope and limited intelligence’.\textsuperscript{78} Public health was usually the outlet for these ideas, but the term ‘problem family’ remained attractive to other medical specialisms, like psychiatry, into the 1970s.\textsuperscript{79} What was particularly striking was that the concept displayed remarkable resilience and longevity, at least in medical circles, long after it had been discredited among the emerging social work profession.

Noel Timms has argued that social workers have shown little interest in the history of their profession, and that the story of social work remains ‘largely untold’.\textsuperscript{80} Although the Our Towns survey of evacuation did much to promote the concept of the problem family, other reports published in the 1940s were more critical, suggesting, for example, that the answer lay with trained social workers.\textsuperscript{81} Moreover, as we have seen, the Pacifist Service Units, with their emphasis on rehabilitation through social casework, had also provided an important counter to the claims of the Eugenics Society. Although the British Federation of Social Workers had been established in 1936, social work remained in its infancy and the first course was only
established at the London School of Economics in 1954. The numbers of social workers on the ground remained small into the late 1960s. As social workers grew in confidence, however, many became increasingly critical of the concept of the problem family, and of the work of local health departments. In this sense, the issue became bound up in the 1960s with the wider struggle between the public health and social work professions for control of the personal social services.82

When the Eugenics Society published its report on problem families in 1952, many of the medical journals carried favourable reviews, claiming that these families displayed consistent symptoms.83 However, many of the social work journals were more critical, questioning whether the problem family label was useful and proposing that rehabilitation deserved more emphasis.84 Other practitioners in new specialisms such as psychiatric social work were also sceptical. Elizabeth Irvine, for example, thought that casework by psychiatric social workers was the most useful approach and was critical of the Eugenics Society’s survey, noting that ‘problem families are easy to recognise and describe, but surprisingly hard to define’.85 Workers employed by organizations such as the Family Welfare Association agreed on the symptoms and definitions, but concurred that more study was required. Furthermore, other surveys on related subjects suggested that local authorities should increase the scale of casework. In his study of health visiting in Manchester and Salford, for example, David Donnison argued of problem families that ‘some of the complaints made against such people by those in the social services sound like the grumbles of respectable citizens against neighbours with a more Bohemian way of life’.86

These reservations and doubts were strengthened by academic research which, from the mid-1950s, began to examine the term ‘problem family’ with a greater degree of intellectual rigour. Some of these theorists had previously worked in Family Service Units, and many were keen to establish the distinctiveness of social work as an emerging professional group. Noel Timms, for example, noted in 1954 that casework was being taken up by social workers, arguing that ‘the so-called “problem family” is becoming respectable’.87 In a similar vein, he argued the following year that the term covered an extremely heterogeneous group, and suggested earlier studies were essentially descriptive and lacked theoretical sophistication. He doubted whether the social problem group and problem family were synonymous, and thought sociological factors had been ignored. Drawing on theories about deviance, he examined the attitudes of problem families towards goals and standards, concluding that some displayed the retreatism previously described by Robert Merton.88 It is interesting that Merton himself acknowledged this work, writing that examples of retreatism had recently been identified among problem families in England.89 Indeed, these links between Britain and the United States are worthy of further examination.

Supported by the Family Service Units and encouraged by academics such as Richard Titmuss, by then Professor of Social Administration at the London
School of Economics, Timms elaborated these ideas in other publications. In 1956, for example, he argued that ‘previous research into the problem family suffers from deficiencies in theory and in research method; it has proceeded largely on unexamined biological assumptions and has relied on the techniques of the social survey’.

This work culminated in the book *The Problem of the ‘Problem Family’*, which was co-written by Timms and Fred Philp and published in 1957. In the foreword, Titmuss argued that the debate about the problem family had been conducted ‘in a singularly uncritical manner’ so that ‘what knowledge has been gained from all these inquiries has not accumulated on any theoretical foundations’. Philp and Timms noted that no satisfactory definition had emerged and that previous writers had usually avoided the issue by stating that the problem family was ‘hard to define, but easy to recognise’. Of the emphasis on cleanliness and dirt, they commented that social workers often used middle-class, rather than working-class standards. They noted that the deployment of health visitors by local authorities rested on an assumption that the problem was largely one of faulty domestic and child-care standards, and were sceptical about the value of co-ordinating committees. Overall, they concluded that previous studies had failed to show how behavioural and structural factors related to each other, and suggested that ideas about heredity had obscured the value of sociological and psychological theory.

The book was a significant turning point, both in the history of the problem family and in the context of the wider struggle to establish the professional identity of social work. Not surprisingly, the social work journals reviewed it favourably. David Donnison, for example, now suggested that the term ‘problem family’ should be abandoned, arguing that earlier work on the subject was ‘a shocking indictment of the intellectual level of much that is written about social work and social policy’. Similarly, others were increasingly critical of the co-ordinating committees that many local authorities had established in 1950. One study doubted whether the MOH was ‘sufficiently cognisant of social work needs to be able to use the committee effectively’; argued that trained caseworkers were needed; and began to consider the idea of a family department. Others summed up the approach of this group when they wrote of the problem family that ‘it is the complexity and depth of its individual problems which need to be understood and dealt with, not the presenting symptoms which are offensive to society’.

These articles reflected the growing professionalism of social work, and a more general trend away from ideas of biological determinism towards social science. As we have seen, the Younghusband report looked more favourably on the work of Family Service Units than the Eugenics Society, and suggested that problem families were only an entity in that ‘they represent a problem to society’. The Younghusband report had argued that psychology, psychiatry, and sociology were more influential than ideas about genetics, but it was an attack on social casework that was the
central concern of Barbara Wootton’s *Social Pathology and Social Science*, also published in 1959. Wootton noted that the earlier surveys had been motivated by ideas about social pathology and were marked by techniques and findings of poor quality. In particular, Wootton argued that previous work on the social problem group had failed to distinguish between personal inadequacy and economic misfortune, and suggested that it had not ‘advanced beyond the descriptive stage, establishing the recurrences of recognisable syndromes of problem behaviour’.98

Although Wootton’s work hinted at an important sea change in thinking, it is important to appreciate that the approach of this lobby was not one of simple consensus. There were differences of interpretation between the various interest groups that were subsumed, for convenience, under the social work umbrella. Psychiatric social workers, for example, had their own agenda, with the concept of immaturity being one area of disagreement.99 Moreover, some studies were able to combine a more sophisticated attitude to other aspects of social welfare with a continuing belief in the problem family. A study of unmarried mothers, for example, adopted a sympathetic approach that diverged sharply from the earlier pathological emphasis, but also claimed that the 10 per cent of children in problem families were ‘more trouble to the authorities than all the rest put together’.100 Nevertheless, there was evidence of an uneasy coalition that was broadly critical of the Eugenics Society and of the approach subsequently adopted by local health departments. In 1962, Noel Timms wrote that ‘we are still faced with a variety of “symptoms” but no one is quite sure what they are symptoms of’.101 Similarly, a local case study of delinquency suggested that failure was not on the part of problem families, but in the inadequacies of social services.102 Other studies specifically excluded the problem families known to the local authority, and argued that co-ordinating committees simply provided a forum for the outlet of underlying medical and social work tensions.103

The changing climate of opinion was particularly evident in successive editions of Penelope Hall’s guide to social services. Although she had devoted a whole chapter to problem families in the first edition published in 1952, by 1965 she emphasized integration into the community rather than separate treatment and hoped that the term would disappear.104 These changes both reflected the earlier Ingleby report on juvenile delinquency, and anticipated many of the recommendations of the Seebohm Committee on social services departments.105 In this sense, the issue of the problem family became bound up with the wider struggle between the public health and social work professions for control of the personal social services. The Ingleby Committee distinguished between the problem family and the ‘family with a problem’, and it was more critical of co-ordinating committees than of Family Service Units.106 Following the 1963 Children and Young Persons Act, in many areas it was the Children’s rather than the Health Departments that had the responsibility for problem families.
In many ways, the Seebohm Committee represented the culmination of this particular debate on the respective roles of the public health and social work professions. On the specific issue of the problem family, the report hinted that work of this kind should not be undertaken by local health departments, argued that co-ordinating committees had not been effective, and thought that health visitors could not operate as social workers. The creation of Social Services Departments in 1970 represented a crushing defeat to the Health Departments, which subsequently disappeared in the 1974 health service reorganization. It was an intriguing irony that Richard Titmuss, an original member of the Eugenics Society’s Problem Families Committee, was also one of the main forces behind the Seebohm Report. In this respect the Seebohm Committee accelerated the process already begun through the 1963 Children and Young Persons Act, in taking these areas of social work away from local MOsH.

The case of the problem family therefore represents a further step in the evolution of the concept of the underclass, effectively linking the notion of the social problem group of the 1930s with the theory of the cycle of deprivation that was to become prevalent in the 1970s. In this chapter, we have tried to explore the history of the problem family in terms of its usefulness to a range of interest groups. It is easy to exaggerate the differences between these interest groups, and arguable that the overlaps in ideas and membership are equally important. Nevertheless four broad approaches can be distinguished. The Eugenics Society, which had taken up the social problem group in the 1930s, sought to use the concept of the problem family at a time when wider political and demographic trends were unfavourable to its objectives. The Pacifist Service Units, on the other hand, began as a group of conscientious objectors who invented an essentially amateur and self-styled branch of social work, and whose identity remained bound up with the concept of the problem family. The medical establishment, and MOsH especially, became interested in the problem family at a time when the decline of infectious disease raised questions about the need for public health. In the 1950s, efforts to tackle problem families became part of the work of local public health departments, often working in tandem with Family Service Units. However, the concept of the problem family itself was also coming under increasing criticism from a broad coalition of practitioners and theorists in the emerging field of social work, who were opposed to the approach favoured by the Eugenics Society and others, and who used this aspect of social welfare as a means of establishing the identity of their own profession.

In many respects, the problem family was a more hopeful concept than that of the social problem group since, apart from the Eugenics Society, the emphasis was on rehabilitation rather than sterilization and segregation. Several strands of the notion reflected the wider economic, political, and social climate of the 1950s. In the first place, the focus was very much on women, reflecting the strength of contemporary views on the traditional
nuclear family and attitudes towards the place of the wife and mother in the home. By contrast, the father was a shadowy figure. Second, what was most striking was the stress on behavioural rather than structural factors, with childcare rather than poverty being emphasized. In this, the concept of the problem family illustrated the perception that most people were enjoying a period of full employment, along with new universal health and welfare services. Third, the concept relied to an extent on the failure to develop effective and robust methodologies for social science research, and it was only belatedly that the Eugenics Society survey came in for sustained criticism.

What is perhaps most interesting is whether there is a linear trend in the history of the concept of the underclass. How exactly did the social problem group mutate into the problem family, and then change again into the cycle of deprivation formulation? There are some important differences. While the history of the problem family was very interesting in the 1950s it was nonetheless a debate that was contained within professional circles, and did not have the popular or media dimensions associated with similar debates in the 1980s. Interestingly too, it was a concept that evolved in wartime, while we have previously argued that in the case of the social residuum the idea evaporated with the advent of full employment during World War I. These are important questions, to which we will return in the Conclusion. For the moment we turn to the 1960s, and to events on the other side of the Atlantic, where the notion of the culture of poverty was to play a significant role in similar debates in the United States.
Chasing the culture of poverty

In Britain, as we have seen, developments in public health and social policy were influenced by the theme of the problem family well into the 1960s. On the other side of the Atlantic, in the United States, the 1960s saw the emergence of the ‘War on Poverty’. Given the belief in the ‘American Dream’, the discovery of poverty was arguably more disturbing to Americans than to their British counterparts. Introduced by the Kennedy administration, and continued in the Johnson administration, a wide-ranging new programme that came to be called the ‘War on Poverty’ sought to eradicate poverty once and for all. Amendments to the Social Security Act, in 1962 and 1967, aimed to provide training schemes, day nurseries, and family planning advice to make mothers self-supporting. Another strand was provided by community action, embracing techniques that had originally been employed in developing countries. New structures and initiatives that were set up at this time included the Office of Economic Opportunity, and within it, the Community Action Programme. By 1969, there were 972 Community Action Areas in the United States.1

Those involved in these programmes later admitted that it remained unclear whether the target was really the individual or the community.2 It was argued by some, for example, that community action was emphasized too heavily, and that greater attention should have been paid to creating jobs and raising income levels. These critics suggested that little thought was given to the difference between poverty (a lack of money) and a culture of poverty (essentially a lifestyle).3 In part this was because the ‘War on Poverty’ was influenced so heavily by concepts like lower-class culture and the culture of poverty. In 1964, for example, when presenting the Economic Opportunity Act to Congress, Sargent Shriver, director of the Peace Corps and a special assistant to the president for the poverty programme, said:

being poor . . . is a rigid way of life. It is handed down from generation to generation in a cycle of inadequate education, inadequate homes, inadequate jobs and stunted ambitions. It is a peculiar axiom of poverty
that the poor are poor because they earn little and they also earn little because they are poor.4

As this quotation indicates, for some the fundamental question remained unresolved – are people poor because they behave differently, or do they behave differently because they are poor? This chapter examines the way that the theory of the culture of poverty influenced these debates in the United States, and to a lesser extent in Britain. It explores the emergence of the culture of poverty as put forward by Oscar Lewis, and the earlier history of writing about lower-class culture, and the influence of both on the Moynihan Report (1965). We also look at the critical reception the concept received in the late 1960s; the extent to which it was imported into Britain; and how it influenced initiatives such as the Educational Priority Areas (EPAs). The culture of poverty provides a further step in the history of the underclass, successfully linking the theme of the problem family in the 1950s, to the concept of the cycle of deprivation in the 1970s. One final point on language is that we retain the use of the term ‘negro’ as it was commonplace at the time, even though now rightly regarded as a stigmatizing device.

Alice O’Connor locates the emergence and influence of the culture of poverty in terms of wider post-war changes that affected social scientific thinking about the poor. First, the political economy of affluence that created the idea that America was becoming a classless society. Second, the post-war institutionalization of the behavioural sciences, which encouraged a psychological emphasis on class and race. Third, the resurgence of middle-class domesticity in Cold War ideology and culture, which reinforced the patriarchal family as a psychological and social norm. Fourth, the rise of poverty as a global political issue. She argues that all of these converged in the idea of the culture of poverty, and more broadly in the paradox of poverty in the affluent United States. O’Connor writes that although the culture of poverty was rooted in an earlier era, it can be understood ‘as an expression of the broader trends in postwar political economy, politics, and culture that reshaped liberalism as an ideology as well as its approach to social knowledge and to the poor’.5

The culture of poverty hypothesis can be located in the context of earlier writing on blacks and migrant groups. However, in other respects its source was outside the United States, since it was generated by anthropological fieldwork. What is clear is that it was the creation of one individual – Oscar Lewis, Professor of Anthropology at the University of Illinois from 1948. Lewis had previously carried out fieldwork in Tepoztlan in Mexico, but from the mid-1950s his work took a new course and he worked increasingly with tape recorders. He was never again to do as much historical work, or as thorough an ethnography, as he had carried out in Tepoztlan. Susan Rigdon, Lewis’s biographer, argues that he now committed himself to areas
of investigation in which he was ill-equipped to carry out research. One of
these was his involvement with the culture of poverty thesis.6

From 1956, Lewis began to look at lower-class culture patterns in Mexico
City, reported in his book *Five Families: Mexican Case Studies in the Culture
of Poverty* (1959). In this work, Lewis sought to present a picture of daily
life in five Mexican families, four of which were in a lower income group.
Yet at this point he had not provided a description of the culture of poverty.
He wrote that his purpose had been to ‘contribute to our understanding
of the culture of poverty in contemporary Mexico and, insofar as the poor
throughout the world have something in common, to lower-class life in
general’.7 But at this stage it was just a means of linking two things he was
interested in – culture and poverty. Lewis went on to investigate this further
in *The Children of Sanchez* (1961). He warned readers that it was important
to distinguish between poverty and a culture of poverty, and pointed out
that not all people who live in poverty share a common subculture. But he
used the phrase inconsistently, and failed to make it clear that most of his
informants did not live in a culture of poverty.8 Lewis was further influenced
in his interest in the culture of poverty by clinical psychology, through his
friendship with Carolina Lujan. It was this that provided the basis for his list
of the characteristic traits in the culture of poverty. Lewis was to later find
that he had gone too far in explaining the culture of poverty by reference to
psychological damage.9

Fieldwork in Puerto Rico gave Lewis the chance to test out his theory, and
the classic account of the culture of poverty appeared in the introduction
to *La Vida* (1966), although this was simply an expanded version of the
introduction to *The Children of Sanchez*. In this work, Lewis compared 100
low-income Puerto Rican families from four slums in Greater San Juan with
their equivalents in New York. He wrote that as an anthropologist he had
tried to understand poverty as ‘a culture or, more accurately, as a subculture
with its own structure and rationale, as a way of life which is passed down
from generation to generation along family lines’.10 Thus the culture of
poverty was not just a matter of economic deprivation, but had a positive
connotation. It had advantages for the poor, and indeed it was arguable that
without it, they would be unable to carry on. According to Lewis, the culture
of poverty flourished in particular types of societies. But certain features
had to be in place. These included a cash economy; high unemployment;
low wages; a lack of social, political, or economic organization for the
low-income population; the existence of a bilateral kinship system; and
the existence, in the dominant class, of a set of values that stressed the
accumulation of wealth and property, upward mobility, and thrift. Thus the
culture of poverty showed how the poor both reflected the environment in
which they found themselves, and adapted their culture accordingly. It was
‘both an adaptation and a reaction of the poor to their marginal position in
a class-stratified, highly individuated, capitalistic society’.11
Lewis argued that the culture of poverty could be studied from a number of viewpoints, of which the first was the relationship between the subculture and the larger society. One characteristic of adults as opposed to children was the way that the poor did not participate in, or were not integrated by, the major institutions of the larger society. People with the culture of poverty, it was alleged, did not belong to trade unions, were not members of political parties, were not participants in the welfare system, and did not make use of banks. It was this ‘low level of organisation’ that gave the culture of poverty its marginal quality in a highly complex and organized society. Even so, Lewis was quick to point out that the culture of poverty was not just an adaptation. Once established, it tended to perpetuate itself through the generations, because of its effect on children. By the age of six or seven, argued Lewis, children ‘have usually absorbed the basic values and attitudes of their subculture and are not psychologically geared to take full advantage of changing conditions or increased opportunities which may occur in their lifetime’.12

Lewis claimed that the families who displayed the features of the culture of poverty had various other characteristics. At the family level, these included the absence of childhood as a ‘prolonged and protected stage in the life cycle’, early initiation into sex, abandoned wives and children, authoritarianism, and lack of privacy. At the individual level, individuals were said to suffer from feelings of marginality, helplessness, dependence, and inferiority. Other significant ‘traits’ included a high incidence of maternal deprivation, a ‘strong present-time orientation with relatively little ability to defer gratification and to plan for the future’, and a sense of resignation and fatalism.13 However, Lewis was also keen to distinguish between a culture of poverty and poverty per se, and he pointed to countries where the poor did not have a way of life that could be described as a culture of poverty. These included many primitive or preliterate peoples studied by anthropologists; the lower castes in India; the Jews of eastern Europe; and socialist countries like Cuba. Lewis argued that the culture of poverty existed in countries like Mexico that were at an early free-enterprise stage of capitalism, whereas the United States had much poverty but little culture of poverty. Overall, Lewis argued that improved economic opportunities were not the only solution. It was easier to eliminate poverty than the culture of poverty.14

Susan Rigdon points out that by this stage, Lewis was heavily dependent on collaborators and assistants, and his project had become unmanageably large. The culture of poverty was a dramatic yet conveniently vague phrase that helped to call attention to the problem of the poor.15 Of all Lewis’s voluminous writings, it was the relatively brief section that proposed the existence of a culture of poverty that proved to be the most influential. It was reprinted in numerous different collections, and had a profound influence on the ‘War on Poverty’. Historian Michael Katz has noted that the culture of poverty had complex origins. It originated among liberals, and was used to justify more active, generous, and interventionist policies.
This in turn, reflected a larger assumption in the liberalism of the time – that dependent people were mainly helpless and passive, and, without the leadership of liberal intellectuals, were unable to break the cycles of deprivation that characterized their lives. By the early 1960s, American commentators who were reporting on the rediscovery of poverty began to discuss this phenomenon in terms of a culture of poverty or underclass. Michael Harrington’s book, *The Other America* (1962), for example, was widely read, including by President Kennedy himself. Harrington presented an eyewitness account of poverty in contemporary America. He argued that a culture of poverty did exist. The poor had their own language, psychology, and view of the world. To be impoverished, wrote Harrington, was ‘to be an internal alien, to grow up in a culture that is radically different from the one that dominates the society’.

However, and despite his intentions, Lewis’s theories were easily appropriated by conservatives in search of a modern label for the undeserving poor. The problem of poverty could be solved without major political or economic restructuring. Alice O’Connor writes that this deprived population was perceived as needing the galvanizing force of outside intervention to break the vicious circle of deprivation in order to benefit from the opportunities the affluent society could provide. Furthermore, in the hands of a writer like Edward C. Banfield, the culture of poverty became a conservative concept. In *The Unheavenly City Revisited* (1974), for example, Banfield argued there was a single problem – ‘the existence of an outlook and style of life which is radically present-oriented and which therefore attaches no value to work, sacrifice, self-improvement, or, service to family, friends, or community’. Noting that within the poverty areas were huge enclaves that were almost entirely Negro, Puerto Rican, or Mexican-American, Banfield argued that ‘the existence of a large enclave of persons who perceive themselves, and are perceived by others, as having a separate identity’, constituted a danger to law and order and to the well-being of society in the long run. Banfield claimed that, along with an allegedly high incidence of mental illness, this warranted the implication that lower-class culture was pathological.

In part, this disjunction between Lewis’s intentions and the way in which his ideas were used by others reflected Lewis’s premature death in 1970. Ridgon argues that Lewis had little interest in the analysis of data. She sees it as a paradox that a man who was so innovative in his fieldwork was so derivative in his conclusions. She writes that ‘in reading Lewis on the culture of poverty one sees not the results of a reasonably systematic analysis of his data but a mosaic of shards culled from the literature of anthropology, psychology, psychiatry, sociology, and economic history, as well as from novels about the poor’. Lewis was always imprecise in his use of language, as in his use of the term ‘slum culture’, and the selective use of his data. Summing up his life and work, Rigdon argues that ‘his research was not the revolutionary act he idealized it to be, nor was it even a catalyst for
serious reform. It was, however, at the very least, a good work passionately pursued.\textsuperscript{22}

The inventor of the term ‘culture of poverty’ was the anthropologist Oscar Lewis in the 1950s and 1960s. But with hindsight, it is clear that Lewis’s notion was simply the latest in a line of similar ideas that had been around in the United States since well before World War II. As James Leiby has noted, Amos Warner had written in 1894, for example, of a ‘vicious circle’ or cycle of poverty – what was new 70 years later was the academic respectability implied in the term ‘culture’.\textsuperscript{23} Between these two periods there was much writing that adopted a pathological view of urban life, and also explored in some detail lower-class culture. In 1925, for instance, the Chicago sociologist Robert Park had written that the city had a moral as well as a physical organization, and cities and their inhabitants moulded and modified each other. Under the influence of the urban environment, he suggested, local attachments broke down, and restraints and inhibitions were weakened. The result was an increase in vice and crime. Park argued further that ‘in the great city the poor, the vicious, and the delinquent, crushed together in an unhealthful and contagious intimacy, breed in and in, soul and body’.\textsuperscript{24} In fact ‘moral regions’ and the people that inhabited them were part of the normal life of the city. There were areas where a ‘divergent moral code’ applied, and good and evil were to be found side by side. In general, suggested Park, the city revealed all the human characteristics and traits that were hidden in smaller communities. It was this that made urban areas so suitable for research, and would ‘make of the city a laboratory or clinic in which human nature and social processes may be conveniently and profitably studied’.\textsuperscript{25}

Park’s argument was about the way that urban life allegedly undermined working-class culture, and was not specially about race. Ideas that provide antecedents for the culture of poverty can also be found in the work of Franklin Frazier, then Professor of Sociology at Howard University. In his influential book, \textit{The Negro Family in the United States}, for example, first published in 1939, Frazier argued that although the ending of slavery had emancipated black Americans, increasing urbanization since 1900 had ‘torn the Negro loose from his cultural moorings’.\textsuperscript{26} Welfare agencies, he suggested, were unable to cope with the new tide of family disorganization – ‘family traditions and social distinctions that had meaning and significance in the relatively simple and stable southern communities have lost their meaning in the new world of the city’.\textsuperscript{27} Social problems that had been unimportant in rural areas gained much greater significance in the city. Illegitimacy, for instance, had become a much more serious economic and social issue. Overall, Frazier concluded that immorality, delinquency, and broken homes were the inevitable result ‘of the attempt of a preliterate people, stripped of their cultural heritage, to adjust themselves to civilisation’.\textsuperscript{28}

Although Frazier’s subject was the black family, his arguments were echoed in studies of other migrant groups. During World War II, the
anthropologist-ethnographer William Foote Whyte published a study of a slum district in a city on the East Coast that he called ‘Cornerville’. Seeking to ‘build a sociology based upon observed interpersonal events’, Whyte had lived there for three and a half years, including eighteen months with an Italian family – he admitted he had been heavily influenced by the work of the Chicago School of sociologists. His argument was that in ‘Cornerville’, the only opportunities for people to get on were through racketeering and local politics. Whyte argued that the problem was not that the society was ‘disorganised’, but that the people of the district had insufficient opportunities to participate in the wider society. Whyte’s recommended solutions followed from this analysis. Thus he argued that if people had access to greater economic opportunities, they would be in a position to take more responsibility to shape their own destinies.29

Other work associated with the Chicago School in the 1940s explored opportunities and motivations, and began to argue that culture was an adaptive response to the wider environment. One of these writers was Allison Davis. Davis had trained in social anthropology, was the co-author of *Children of Bondage*, an examination of the black adolescent personality, and had also written *Deep South*, a study of the social organization of a southern city. In a collection edited by Foote Whyte, he argued that the habits of ‘underprivileged workers’, such as ‘shiftlessness’, ‘irresponsibility’, lack of ambition, absenteeism, and ‘quitting’ were normal responses to the environment in which they lived. They constituted ‘a system of behaviour and attitudes which are realistic and rational in that environment in which the individual of the slums has lived and in which he has been trained’.30

Davis subsequently argued further that each social class had developed its own differentiated and adaptive form of the basic American culture. Behaviour regarded as delinquent, shiftless, or unmotivated was in fact a realistic and respectable response to the wider physical, economic, and cultural environment. Davis claimed that studies of child-rearing practices had found numerous differences between white, Negro, middle-class, and lower-class families. For example, lower-class children stayed up longer, were in the streets later, and went to the cinema more often. Davis concluded that lower-class children had ‘fuller gratification of their organically based drives’ – in the case of a habit like eating, these drives were trained and eliminated much more gradually in the lower-class, and relapses were treated more leniently. Davis concluded that ‘lower-class people look upon life as a recurrent series of depressions and peaks, with regard to the gratification of their basic needs’.31

These arguments about the alleged characteristics of lower-class culture were further elaborated in the 1950s. One of the most influential articles of the early post-war period, on ‘lower-class culture’ in the context of adolescent street gangs, was published in 1958 by Walter B. Miller. Miller argued that the ‘lower-class’ way of life was characterized by a set of focal concerns which together constituted ‘a distinctive patterning of concerns
which differs significantly, both in rank order and weighting from that of American middle class culture'. These focal concerns included trouble, toughness, smartness, excitement, fate, and autonomy. For Miller, the adolescent street gang represented an adolescent variation of this lower-class structural form, and had two additional concerns – with belonging, and with status. In general, Miller suggested that lower-class culture should not be seen simply as the opposite of middle-class culture. Instead it was ‘a distinctive tradition many centuries old with an integrity of its own’.

However, while influential, these ideas coexisted with alternative explanations. One example of the latter was the ‘lower-class value stretch’ elaborated by Hyman Rodman. In 1959, Rodman wrote that many of the alleged characteristics of lower-class life – illegitimacy, promiscuity, and desertion – should be seen not simply as ‘problems’, but as solutions to the problems that people faced. Rodman had carried out fieldwork in Trinidad, in the Caribbean, and he claimed that on issues such as illegitimacy, observers tended to judge lower-class behaviour with middle-class values. In fact, argued Rodman, the lower class both subscribed to the general values of society, and had its own values. With regard to illegitimacy, it tolerated both legal marriages and non-legal unions. Rodman elaborated his theory of the ‘lower-class value stretch’ in 1963. By the ‘value stretch’, Rodman meant that the lower-class person, without abandoning the general values of the society, developed an alternative set of values. With regard to questions such as the value placed upon success, or on marriage and legitimate childbirth, the lower-class person had a wider range of values. This might be called a ‘stretched value system with a low degree of commitment to all the values within the range, including the dominant, middle-class values’. Rodman argued that the lower-class value stretch provided the best explanation for juvenile delinquency and illegitimacy. He concluded that ‘the lower-class value stretch is the predominant response of lower-class individuals to their deprived situation’. It was through this mechanism that some of the apparent contradictions about a common or class-differentiated value system could be explained.

A more sensitive approach to culture than that displayed by Franklin E. Frazier was evident in the work of the sociologist Herbert Gans. In The Urban Villagers (1962), Gans had presented a study of an inner-city Boston neighbourhood where many native-born Americans of Italian parentage lived. Gans argued that in the West End the working-class subculture differed considerably from lower- and middle-class subcultures. These subcultures were ‘responses that people make to the opportunities and the deprivations that they encounter’ (Gans’s own italics). In the long run, the form they took was closely related to the availability of employment – the lower-class female-based family was a response to, or means of coping with, the lack of stable male employment. Downward mobility was possible. But conversely, when opportunities were available, individuals and families responded by attempting to put into practice their hopes for a better life, and improved
their standard of living accordingly. Gans suggested, therefore, that what was distinctive about lower-class life may simply have been a situational adaptation.

One of the most sophisticated of these researchers was Elliot Liebow, whose work on 24 black men who shared a street corner in a district of Washington was summarized in the book *Tally's Corner* (1967). Most were unskilled manual workers or were unemployed, and were aged between 20 and 50. Liebow tried to explain their behaviour as a direct response to the conditions of lower-class life, rather than a compliance with historical or cultural imperatives. Taking the case of unemployment, Liebow argued that ‘this inside world does not appear as a self-contained, self-generating, self-sustaining system or even subsystem with clear boundaries marking it off from the larger world around it’.\(^3^8\) Unemployed men turned to the street corner where a shadow system of values accommodated their perceived failure. The street corner acted as a kind of sanctuary, where failures could become successes, and weaknesses strengths. In general, Liebow wrote that the ‘streetcorner man’ did not have his own subculture, but his outlook was ‘his way of trying to achieve many of the goals and values of the larger society, of failing to do this, and of concealing his failure from others and from himself as best he can’.\(^3^9\)

Overall, then, there was a tradition of writing about the poor that embraced blacks and migrant groups such as Italians. Charles Valentine was later to locate the culture of poverty in the context of this earlier writing. With regard to Franklin E. Frazier, for instance, Valentine argued that Frazier’s picture of the family life of blacks was of a world without culture. Frazier appeared unaware of the biased nature of evidence from social work, the police, or the courts, and he made a leap from social statistics, deviant in terms of middle-class norms, to a model of disorder and instability. Valentine wrote that ‘one comes to suspect that “social disorganisation” is little more than an academic-sounding label for behaviour which Franklin Frazier feels is contrary to his own value system’.\(^4^0\) Valentine was similarly critical of the work of Walter B. Miller. He claimed that Miller’s interpretation illustrated how the middle class tended to view the poor as a threat to public order, and to project their unresolved problems onto it. In this, Miller reflected middle-class ambivalences about legality, masculinity, shrewdness, boredom, luck, and autonomy.\(^4^1\) But while some of these commentators had advanced theories about a distinctive lower-class culture, others were more concerned with the way that behaviour might be adapted because of the influence of the environment.

This early writing continued to exert an important influence on debates in American social policy in the 1960s. Frazier’s *The Negro Family in the United States*, in particular, went through numerous editions and became known to successive generations of social scientists. His approach was later reflected in the work of Nathan Glazer in the 1960s, who argued that the book had not been supplanted – ‘its major framework remains solid and
structures all our thinking on the Negro family'. But its most direct link with policy came with the Moynihan Report on *The Negro Family*, published in 1965. Its author, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, was Assistant Secretary of Labor, and Director of the Office of Policy Planning and Research. Moynihan wrote that ‘Negro social structure, in particular the Negro family, battered and harassed by discrimination, injustice, and uprooting, is in the deepest trouble’. A quarter of urban black marriages were dissolved, one in four black births were illegitimate, and a quarter of black families were headed by females. Overall, Moynihan claimed that the breakdown in the black family had led to a startling increase in welfare dependency. Noting that 14 per cent of black children, but 2 per cent of white children, were in receipt of Aid for Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), Moynihan argued that the steady expansion of this welfare programme charted the steady disintegration of Negro family structure in the previous generation. At the centre of the ‘tangle of pathology’ was the weakness of family structure. This was ‘the principal source of most of the aberrant, inadequate, or anti-social behaviour that did not establish, but now serves to perpetuate the cycle of poverty and deprivation’.

The response to the Moynihan Report has been well-documented. It has been suggested that it deterred liberal scholars from acknowledging the role of agency or behaviour in debates about race and urban poverty for decades. Certainly the theory of the culture of poverty came in for sustained criticism. Among the earliest critics were Jack Roach and Orville Gursslin. In 1967, they argued that there were several problems with the theory that Oscar Lewis put forward. The first, they claimed, was that Lewis moved from the theme of subcultures to generalize about an assumed culture of poverty. Second, they suggested that Lewis failed to show what purpose the theory really served. Third, they argued that the description of the subcultural characteristics that Lewis claimed to have detected was inadequate. Fourth, they maintained that independent and dependent variables were not specified. Perhaps most importantly, Roach and Gursslin argued that it was important to distinguish between description and causation, and they emphasized what was, to their mind, the key role played by structural factors in poverty and deprivation.

The article by Roach and Gursslin was an important early contribution to an emerging debate. However, the most thorough and perceptive exploration of the culture of poverty was by the anthropologist Charles Valentine, in a book-length critique published in 1968. One of the most valuable parts of Valentine’s book was the way that he placed the culture of poverty in the longer-term history of social investigation. Valentine’s training as an anthropologist meant he was able to examine the culture of poverty more thoroughly than had been done previously. For one thing, he looked much more closely at the way that culture and poverty were defined. Valentine argued that this was a misapplication of the original concept of culture. Valentine’s point was that, like the approach taken by Franklin E. Frazier
and other earlier writers, the culture of poverty concept served to distract attention from the structural characteristics of the social system. In his writing, Lewis moved between the individual, the family, and culture, but transitions between the different levels of analysis were not entirely clear. For Valentine, this problem was highlighted by the way that Lewis’s books were organized. In general, argued Valentine, the autobiographies remained a mass of material that needed more analysis and evaluation. It was difficult to determine their validity, reliability, and relevance. In addition to looking at how the books were written, Valentine argued that families and local communities had wider interests and concerns than Lewis gave them credit for. What the reader ended up with instead was ‘a series of overlapping family portraits or self-portraits presented in isolation from their natural or actual context’. The argument was that all those writers who wrote about a cultural way of life peculiar to the poor failed to outline the relationship between individuals or families and the society as a whole. They ignored important aspects of the concept of a subculture.

Charles Valentine’s book was a powerful statement of the case against the concept of the culture of poverty. At the time, his criticisms were echoed by other writers, such as Eleanor Burke Leacock, Professor of Anthropology at the Polytechnic Institute of Brooklyn, and William Ryan. But the culture of poverty remained an influential interpretation, its identified weaknesses notwithstanding. More important was the way Valentine’s suggestions for ethnographic fieldwork were taken up by other researchers – and the way their findings strengthened his criticisms of Lewis. These included the work of the sociologist Herbert Gans, following on from *The Urban Villagers*, and fieldwork carried out by Ulf Hannerz and Lee Rainwater. Rather than a debt to Franklin E. Frazier and Walter B. Miller, this work owed more to Hyman Rodman and the ‘lower-class value stretch’, and to Elliot Liebow’s *Tally’s Corner*. As William Julius Wilson was to suggest later, its emphasis on structure rather than behaviour may have been in part a reaction to the Moynihan Report and the reception it received. The general thrust of this literature was to support the argument that the admittedly different culture of the lower class was an adaptive response to the wider society and environment.

Eleanor Burke Leacock, for example, now argued it was through the culture of poverty, that the nineteenth-century idea that the poor were poor through their own lack of ability and initiative had ‘re-entered the scene in a new form, well decked out with scientific jargon’. Like Valentine, she argued that the culture of poverty theory focused on a negative, distorted, and truncated view of the cultural whole, and implied an untenable view of the process whereby cultural traits were evolved and transmitted. In a collection published in 1971, she concluded that ‘sociocentric methods of data collection and analysis, plus a nonhistorical theory of culture and its relation to personality, have contributed to stereotypical and distorted views of these class-linked cultural variations’. William Ryan’s famous book
*Blaming the Victim* was published the same year. Ryan argued that in the vast sociological literature on differences between the poor and the middle class, the middle class came out top every time. For Ryan, the most important aspect in understanding poverty was that it was caused by lack of money. The ideology of the culture of poverty was therefore a means of avoiding the obvious solution – that the poor needed money and power – which would require substantial changes and the redistribution of income. For Ryan, the theme of lower-class culture was similarly a means of maintaining inequality between social classes in America.53

Valentine had argued that empirical studies and rigorous fieldwork were necessary to test the hypothesis of the culture of poverty. He suggested that Elliot Liebow’s ethnographic approach was thorough and that (unlike Frazier) he was aware of biases. Liebow had argued that men experienced their lives as being devoid of success and satisfaction because they shared the standards and criteria for success of the wider society. Rather than having his own subculture, the streetcorner man lived ‘in continual and painful awareness of American values and sentiments’.54 Other research studies carried out at this time produced findings that supported the argument of Gans and others that the behaviour of lower-class people was essentially adaptive. Ulf Hannerz, for instance, argued that the culture of poverty thesis tended to imply that the way of life of the poor was self-perpetuating. His fieldwork did not fit the pattern described by Lewis. On the basis of fieldwork conducted in the Winston Street neighbourhood of Washington, DC, in 1966–68, Hannerz felt there was a need for new analyses to show how the actions of these people were adaptations or understandable reactions to the situations in which they found themselves. Hannerz favoured an approach similar to Rodman’s ‘lower-class value stretch’, and he tended to define culture as something that could easily change in response to outside influences.55

Lee Rainwater’s argument was that in their own communities, black families developed their own solutions to recurrent human issues. His study *Behind Ghetto Walls* (1970) dealt with the Pruitt-Igoe project in St Louis, Missouri, an all-black housing project of more than 10,000 adults and children. The subculture of these families, Rainwater argued, was a creation of a range of institutions, notably social networks, entertainment, and the family, that represented a response to the conditions of life set by white society. Such a culture, then, was ‘the repository of a set of techniques for survival in the world of the disinherited, and in time these techniques take on the character of substitute games with their own rules guiding behaviour’.56 The critical element of any culture was its dynamic, adaptive quality. Rainwater claimed that in Pruitt-Igoe, the lower-class world was defined by deprivation and exclusion – ways of living were adaptations to the disjunction between the demands society made, on the one hand, and the inadequate resources that these people held, on the other.57

By 1970, Herbert Gans was arguing that the most important question in the area of culture and poverty was ‘to discover how soon people will
change their behaviour, given new opportunities, and what restraints or obstacles, good or bad, come from that reaction to past situations we call culture. Many if not most of the problems of poor people could be solved by providing incomes and jobs. Nevertheless Gans also conceded that new research methods were needed to answer the question of whether there was a culture of poverty and a lower-class way of life. Nearly 20 years later, William Julius Wilson was to argue that it was Hannerz’s book *Soulside* that had identified the key question – whether there was a difference between the person affected by structural change, and the person influenced by the behaviour of others affected by those changes.

Hyman Rodman attempted to revive the concept of the culture of poverty through his on-going studies of Trinidad. However, David Harrison pointed out in a review of this work that there were problems in the concept of poverty as used by Hyman Rodman. One was the extent that the culture of poverty was connected with material deprivation. A second was that Lewis’s traits were found in cultures which were not poverty-stricken. Third, the descriptions of individual participants focused on negative aspects, and concentrated on the family. Finally, there were difficulties in the notion that the culture of poverty was an adaptation and reaction by the poor. Overall, Harrison claimed that Rodman’s study, based on the concept of the culture of poverty, had inherited many of the conceptual inadequacies inherent in the model as put forward by Lewis. Harrison argued that cultures and subcultures should be regarded as positive, and a meaningful framework for those who participated in them. Cultures and subcultures should be studied on their own terms. And research problems should not interfere with the basic aim to understand other cultures.

It is important to examine the extent to which the concept of the culture of poverty, invented in the United States, was taken up in Britain, and the processes of policy transfer by which this transmission of ideas occurred. John Macnicol has pointed out that the apparent similarities between American and British social policy in this period were rooted in shared economic experiences. Structural changes in the economy reawakened concern about social problems, particularly the persistence of poverty and social disadvantage. Similarly, the solutions that were proposed reflected the different welfare traditions of the two countries, with each having both radical and conservative elements. At the same time, there is also evidence of considerable resistance to the idea of the culture of poverty among British commentators.

Some earlier British studies had attempted to untangle the effects of structure and behaviour. A study of families and social networks, for example, by the psychiatrist Elizabeth Bott, had argued in 1957 that there was a general bias in favour of economic and sociostructural rather than cultural interpretations. She argued that the work of American academics like Walter B. Miller and Herbert Gans was meaningful only when related to economic and occupational factors. But in the second edition of her
book (1971), Bott was more willing than she had been in 1957 to admit that economic and social determinism could also be naïve. As we have seen in the previous chapter, the stress on the problem family in the British context provided potentially fertile ground for a favourable reception for the culture of poverty. Other policy developments, such as the stress on Education Priority Areas (EPAs) in the Plowden Report (1967), reflected a similar preoccupation with culture, deprivation, and environment. It has been suggested that the EPAs provide an example of how social science theory is translated into public policy. Nevertheless, the proposal was remoulded to fit the contours of administrative and political life, and the resulting policy was a pale reflection of the original idea.

One early example of these ideas in circulation was provided in the Plowden Report, *Children and their Primary Schools* (1967). In August 1963, the then Minister for Education, Sir Edward Boyle, had asked a group ‘to consider primary education in all its aspects, and the transition to secondary education’. The two-volume report produced by this group was in many ways a progressive document. It initiated a move against rote learning for instance, was one of the first reports that gave a place to parents, and favoured systematic nursery education. The Plowden Report also favoured granting schools in socially deprived areas extra staff and funds. But one innovation was the proposal to create EPAs, where there would be positive discrimination for the Areas and the children in them. The criteria for the selection of EPAs included such features as family size; overcrowding; poor attendance and truancy; the proportions of ‘retarded’, disturbed, or ‘handicapped’ pupils; and the number of children unable to speak English. It was assumed that the number of these Areas would increase quickly, and that a maximum of 10 per cent of the child population would be in EPAs by 1972–73. The emphasis on EPAs in the Plowden Report was one of the first examples of a new-found enthusiasm for area-based initiatives, reflecting the experience of the United States in the ‘War on Poverty’. Reactions to the Report indicated the strength of lay beliefs in individual pathology. The *Economist*, for example, argued that education was ‘of course not designed to solve the social problems of the present generation of adult slum-dwellers among whom lie to a pretty large degree the origins of the other social disorders that our society is heir to’. Nor, it claimed, could the measures advocated by the Plowden Committee tackle problems of deprivation that were behavioural rather than structural, and which might exist in the best-planned suburbs.

While there was no direct mention of the culture of poverty, the Plowden Report seemed inspired by American initiatives. This is supported by the review of EPAs that was edited by A. H. Halsey, then Director of the Department of Social and Administrative Studies at Oxford. Halsey argued that it was more accurate to speak of ‘poverties’, since poverty had multiple if related causes. Halsey argued that, in the United States, the culture of poverty had dominated the War on Poverty and the 1964 Economic
Opportunity Act, providing the rationale for the emphasis on community action and social work, rather than employment policies and a redistribution of income. He suggested that the poverty of industrial societies:

must be understood to have their origins in both situational and cultural characteristics of those minorities which suffer disadvantage and discrimination and to have their cures in both economic and cultural reform, not only at the local or community level but also in the total structure of society. \(^{69}\)

For Halsey, the choice was between emphasizing opportunities and motivation, and in the British context it was the latter that the EPAs concentrated upon.

Similar debates about the relative important of structural and behavioural factors were evident in the Community Development Projects (CDPs) that were announced by the Wilson Government in 1969 as part of the larger Urban Programme. These were a direct copy of the Community Action Areas that had been created during the ‘War on Poverty’ in America. The aim of these was to provide feedback to central and local government on the impact of existing policies and services, to encourage innovation, and to improve co-ordination. In Britain, the CDPs ran for 10 years, and comprised twelve projects in all. Most were in large provincial cities such as Coventry, Newcastle, and Liverpool, or in deprived London boroughs including Southwark and Newham. The budget was £5m. Arguably the most interesting feature of the CDPs was the way in which control of the projects shifted from the Home Office and into the hands of local activists.

Martin Loney has argued that one of the key developments in the background to the establishment of the CDPs was the development of social work. Social work was attractive to the Labour Government, since it held out the promise of ameliorating social problems in a non-punitive fashion, it was relatively cheap, and it involved limited social change. The same climate that facilitated the Seebohm Report helped the CDPs. There was also interest in community work funded by the Gulbenkian Foundation, and a growing community focus within social work itself. \(^{70}\) These social workers increasingly rejected the traditional model of social work, leading to conflict. It was these developments that provided the context for the establishment of the CDPs. Loney argues that the original assumptions of the CDPs were strongly focused on personal rather than structural failings, and those societal failings that were recognized had more to do with the failure of the social services to direct appropriate attention to the deprived. A more effective social services approach was seen as a possible way of changing the characteristics and lifestyle of the deprived themselves. \(^{71}\) It was likely that a programme that originated within the civil service would operate within that consensus. Martin Loney has written that social pathology
approaches are attractive to governments who are reluctant to engage in significant social change. He notes that ‘by analysing social problems in terms of the characteristics of individuals, families, or even communities such approaches legitimate small-scale programmes of social intervention which do not threaten powerful interests in society’.72

The community development objectives of the CDPs followed logically from the same basic project assumptions. Community development could act as a catalyst to break up social pathology by revitalizing the poor and involving them in constructive plans for improvement. Community malfunctioning was to be tackled from within. Thus claims Loney, ‘the role of community action was closely related to the underlying suppositions about the nature of deprivation and its social pathology’.73 A further premise was that problem families were found in particular areas. This was both a cause and effect of the individual pathology of the poor. Aspects of Oscar Lewis’s culture of poverty, such as blaming the victim, were accepted, but the rest was ignored. Thus a diluted version came to complement traditional casework methods. Initially the Home Office perspective was to break the cycle of deprivation, and its instructions emphasized a behavioural analysis of poverty. In the event, the local CDPs rebelled against this and produced reports that emphasized the structural causes of poverty. The result was conflict between the Home Office and the more radical CDPs. The effect was that by 1976 the programme had been abandoned.74 The CDPs incorporated elements of the culture of poverty; but like Coates and Silburn (see below), also reflected the British preoccupation with problem families.

By the time that the CDPs petered out, the culture of poverty was also coming in for criticism from the wider social science academic community. Halsey was a member of the Social Science Research Council (SSRC) Panel on Poverty, along with other leading researchers and social policy analysts of the day – David Donnison, Michael Young, and Brian Abel Smith. More direct evidence of the influence of the culture of poverty was provided in the Panel’s review of concepts of poverty, published in 1968. The SSRC included the culture of poverty as one of six main strands it identified – the others were crisis poverty; long-term dependencies; life-cycle poverty; depressed-area poverty; and downtown poverty. In the case of the culture of poverty, the Panel conceded that ‘a combination of financial hardship, squalid environment, family structure and personal capacities and relationships may produce a pattern of adaptation characterised by particular time orientations and value systems’.75 But it also argued that more research was needed on the links between income and behaviour, exclusion from the labour market, and the operation of the social services. The SSRC’s Panel concluded that the term ‘culture of poverty’ was ‘as likely to mislead as to enlighten: the word “culture” covers too many different factors which are better studied separately’.76 Thus while it conceded that the concept of the culture of poverty had been influential, the SSRC Panel interpreted it as an adaptive phenomenon, and was generally hostile.
Other British commentators were attracted to the concept of the culture of poverty, but were unsure whether it really provided a convincing theoretical framework for their empirical work. Ken Coates and Richard Silburn were lecturers at Nottingham University. In their famous exploration of deprivation, *Poverty: The Forgotten Englishmen* (1970), Coates and Silburn thought that Lewis’s theory did have parallels with what they had observed in the course of their research in Nottingham. Among the people that they studied, there seemed to be the same feeling of hopelessness and despair, and a similar lack of participation in institutions. At the same time, Coates and Silburn argued it was difficult to decide what were middle-class values, writing that:

rather, there are clusters of subcriminal groups, colonies of problem families, which, as we have shown, are among the heaviest crosses which their respectable but equally poor neighbours feel themselves unjustly called upon to bear.77

Despite this emphasis on problem families, Coates and Silburn argued that the poorer and more isolated workers in their study did not comprise a homogeneous group. In fact, there seemed to be two groups. One shared the values and criticisms of the mainstream culture. The other had more modest aspirations, and a complacent and resigned approach to family and social life. It was reviled by residents and labelled by authorities as ‘multi-problem’ families, but it did not have any common identity. The aspirations of this second group seemed more modest than those of the rest, but Coates and Silburn argued this could not be attributed to a cultural pattern. In fact the poorer households in the second group had the same expectations and demands as the rest of the population. They wrote that:

excepting the so-called ‘problem families’ the poorer households could not be said to be culturally distinct from the richer; they appeared to respond to the same values, to share the same basic assumptions, to accept similar restraints.78

Coates and Silburn tried to relate what they had discovered in Nottingham back to what Lewis had written on the culture of poverty. However, they concluded that ‘from our knowledge of this one urban community, it would be very hard to maintain with any assurance that the poor constitute a single subcultural entity’.79 There were some contradictions in the position that Coates and Silburn adopted. It was not clear if they viewed problem families as an invention of local authorities, or a group whose existence could be empirically proven. These issues notwithstanding, they managed to combine a belief in problem families with a resistance to the idea that there was a culture of poverty.

More clear-cut was the position of other British academics concerned with poverty who displayed a fiercer resistance to the idea that poverty might
have anything other than structural causes. Peter Townsend (1928–2009) was perhaps foremost among British academics in this field. In a collection published in 1970, when he was Professor of Sociology at the University of Essex, Townsend argued that poverty was produced by systems of international social stratification. Thus he rejected theories that placed the responsibility for poverty with the individual, or with a culture of poverty. Townsend wrote that:

the concept of the culture of poverty concentrates attention upon the familial and local setting of behaviour and largely ignores the external and unseen social forces which condition the distribution of different types of resources to the community, family and individual.80

Townsend argued that the elimination of poverty required not the reform, education, or rehabilitation of the individual, or even, as in the American ‘War on Poverty’, the creation of additional opportunities for upward mobility. What was needed was the ‘reconstruction of the national and regional systems by which resources are distributed, or, alternatively, the introduction of additional systems which are universalistic and egalitarian’.81 This was the position that Townsend maintained through the 1970s. In his classic work Poverty in the United Kingdom (1979), Townsend argued that Oscar Lewis’s approach was interesting but was concerned with individuals rather than societies. The methodology was uncontrolled, biased, ambiguous, it was difficult to confirm the theory, and the concept could not be applied consistently. Townsend conceded that the author of La Vida did provide an accurate description of the penalties and stresses of being poor. But Lewis did not distinguish clearly between working-class culture and a subculture of poverty. In the view of Townsend, Lewis could not disentangle the effect of a lack of resources on behaviour from other cultural influences.82

What is perhaps most surprising from the standpoint of today is the exclusive focus of these researchers on structural factors. Certainly the viewpoint of Townsend was shared by many other British social scientists. Dorothy Wedderburn (1925–2012), Lecturer in Industrial Sociology at Imperial College, London, argued that evidence generated in studies of older people illustrated that this was a type of poverty where there was little opportunity for a common culture to develop. Older people who were poor might come from working-class backgrounds. But these were not necessarily backgrounds of working-class poverty, and the working life of these people had, for the most part, not been spent in poverty.83 Her point was that evidence based on the experience of older people tended to cast doubt on the culture of poverty. Bill Jordan, then in the Department of Sociology at Exeter University, made the point that Lewis’s choice of phrase was misleading. The culture was not characteristic of uniformly poor communities, but of stratified social structures. And the continuities in family patterns observed by social workers were ‘part of a subcultural adaptation to the conditions of
Questions about the way the culture of poverty was received in Britain, and how much influence it exerted, are therefore not easy to answer. The EPAs, and the corresponding focus on educational and cultural deprivation, did appear to mirror the War on Poverty. It is interesting that the SSRC did include the culture of poverty as one of its six key poverty concepts, and some researchers, such as Coates and Silburn in Nottingham, were initially attracted to the theory as a means of explaining the findings of their fieldwork. The CDPs, too, reflected American experiences in their social work and community emphasis. However, there was also much resistance in Britain to cultural or behavioural explanations of poverty from the mid-1970s. The SSRC’s review of concepts of poverty showed that it was critical of the work of Oscar Lewis, preferring an adaptive explanation. In the CDPs too, there was a marked difference between the behavioural perspective of the Home Office and the much more structural analysis adopted by social workers at the grassroots level. Much more typical of the reaction of the British social science community was the Townsend view that poverty was caused by large-scale structural factors. The role of culture, and by implication behaviour, was at best a distraction, at worst an irrelevance. This reflected a much older tradition in social administration, which, guided by its chief theorist Richard Titmuss, had always steered clear of the view that the poor might in any way be responsible for the situation they found themselves in. In light of later research interest, which increasingly sought to combine structural and behavioural explanations of social exclusion, the stance taken by the British social science community in this period was strikingly united.

It is important to see the culture of poverty in the context of a much longer-term tradition of writing about blacks, lower-class culture, and migrant groups. Even within this tradition there were marked differences of emphasis. It is possible to contrast, for instance, the pathological interpretation of Franklin E. Frazier with the much more sensitive analysis of Elliot Liebow. The analysis adopted in the Moynihan Report was that of Frazier, but the adaptive interpretation taken on board by later researchers was recognizably that of Liebow. What is perhaps most interesting is how influential the culture of poverty was, its weaknesses notwithstanding. Charles Valentine, in particular, presented a sustained and devastating critique. Even so, Oscar Lewis gained an international reputation on the basis of the culture of poverty, one that would have been further perpetuated had he not died in 1970. There were several features that explain why the theory proved so enduring. First, it provided a deceptively simple explanation for complex problems to do with poverty. Second, the focus on alleged characteristics was always a proven means to popular acceptance, as we have seen with the problem family. Aspects of this, such as the alleged focus on the present, and corresponding inability to plan for the future, were recurring elements
in underclass stereotypes. Third, Lewis made the important point that these patterns were passed on in successive generations, through the effects on the children. In the end, in terms of popular acceptance, these elements were much stronger than Valentine’s sophisticated critique of ethnographic methodology and anthropological fieldwork.

Howard Glennerster has made the point that seminars on poverty in 2000 were dominated by economists, and by the analysis of large data sets, whereas in the 1960s they were influenced by sociologists. That says something about how the study of poverty changed over 40 years. At the same time, the culture of poverty thesis has continued to attract attention. William Julius Wilson, for instance, argued that it was the cultural-transmission aspect of the theory that has received most attention. At the same time, he wrote, it was possible to recognize the importance of wider structural factors, but also to see the merits of a cultural analysis of a life in poverty. Ghetto-specific practices, such as public drinking, were more common in inner-city ghetto neighbourhoods, and the transmission of these modes of behaviour by precept and role modelling was made easier. At the time, the British response to the culture of poverty was more subdued. In fact it was only in the early 1970s that the next step in the history of the underclass was created. As ever, its origins were unusual, and can be dated with some precision to a speech by Sir Keith Joseph, in June 1972. In Britain, it was not the culture of poverty notion that was to gain both research funding and popular attention, but a rather different notion, called the cycle of deprivation. The rise and fall of the cycle of deprivation is the subject of the next chapter.
One of the main aims of the Labour Governments from May 1997 was to end child poverty, and it was striking that descriptions of policy initiatives, such as the Sure Start programme for under-fives, used the phrase ‘cycle of deprivation’. What was interesting was that journalists and civil servants appeared ignorant of the earlier history of the term, and its historical resonances. The 1970s and early 1980s were marked by battles between academics and civil servants over the same terrain. The books that were produced at that time were now largely forgotten, and instead gathered dust on the shelves of the social policy sections of university libraries. This debate raised key questions. Was there evidence that a pattern of deprivation was in some way transmitted from parents to their children, so that there are marked inter-generational continuities in experiences of poverty? If true, to what extent was this because of cultural patterns of behaviour, and how far was it the result of wider structural factors? And was the phrase ‘cycles of disadvantage’ in fact a more appropriate term than the ‘cycle of deprivation’?

This chapter examines debates over the cycle of deprivation in the 1970s and early 1980s, and the way that these fit into the longer-term concept of the underclass. The key figure in this field was the Conservative politician Sir Keith Joseph, then Secretary of State for Health and Social Services. In June 1972, he espoused the theory of a cycle of deprivation, and a large-scale Department of Health and Social Security (DHSS)-Social Science Research Council (SSRC) research programme followed directly from his speech. We trace the wider political context for both the 1972 speech, along with a better-known speech given in October 1974, and the origins of the cycle in Joseph’s earlier concern with problem families. We are concerned too, with the ways in which academics drawn into the DHSS-SSRC programme sought to challenge and subvert Joseph’s original thesis. By the mid-1980s, academics had displaced the theory of a cycle of deprivation, and wrote
instead of patterns of cycles of disadvantage. In Chapter 9, we will consider again how far the Labour Governments of 1997–2010 remained attached to the theory of a cycle of deprivation.

Sir Keith Joseph (1918–1994) is a fascinating political figure. Educated at Harrow School and Magdalen College, Oxford, his father had largely founded the successful Bovis construction company. As Conservative MP for Leeds North East, Joseph displayed a compassionate interest in questions of health care and social policy from the 1950s onwards. He first entered Cabinet in 1962, under Harold Macmillan, as Minister of Housing and Local Government, but had been a junior minister from 1959. As Secretary of State for Health and Social Services, 1970–1974, Joseph played a central role in the background to the 1974 health service reorganization. Joseph was a key advocate of monetarism in the mid-1970s, as well as the founder of the think-tank, the Centre for Policy Studies. In the 1980s, he served in the Thatcher governments as Secretary for State, first for Industry and then Education and Science. Some have argued that increasingly Joseph could be seen as an ‘intellectual godfather’ to New Labour.

Joseph remained an enigmatic character whose honesty, belief in intellectual rigour, courtesy, agonizing scrupulousness, and ‘intensely nervous disposition’ were apparent to all who met him. As his obituary in The Times noted, though with some inaccuracy, ‘tense and intense, and much moved by his religious certainties as a Jew, his personality, despite public parody, was not that of someone given to extreme views’. It was all the more surprising then, that in a speech, given on 29 June 1972, Joseph raised the theme of a cycle of deprivation. The speech prompted much discussion, both at the time and since. Nicholas Timmins, for instance, has written that:

The speech brought forth profoundly different interpretations. To some on the left it looked like an appeal for community action. To others it appeared to blame the individual’s and deny the state’s responsibility. To the right it appeared to be a defence of the family. To many it seemed just common sense.

Yet the origins of the speech and the controversy it provoked have never been properly explained. No attempt has been made to explore how and why Joseph suddenly expressed these ideas in the 1972 speech. Little is known about the ways in which the academics recruited into the DHSS-SSRC Research Programme sought to subvert the original thesis. And little work has been done to show how the cycle of deprivation fits into the longer-term history of the underclass.

Although relatively well known, the cycle speech has usually been judged through an abridged version, and the full text contains some surprises. The speech was given at a conference for local authorities organized by the Pre-School Playgroups Association, at Church House, Westminster, on 29 June 1972. In it, Joseph announced a capital grant of £9,500 towards the work of
the Association, and a recurrent annual grant of £45,000. This came under the umbrella of the Urban Programme, since in May 1972 the Government had allocated over £1m for day-care provision for the under-fives. This money was to be spent on building day nurseries, as well as providing additional funding for playgroups. But it was in the second half of the speech that Joseph developed his main theme, asking why it was ‘that, in spite of long periods of full employment and relative prosperity and the improvement in community services since the Second World War, deprivation and problems of maladjustment so conspicuously’ persisted. By deprivation, Joseph meant ‘those circumstances which prevent people developing to nearer their potential – physically, emotionally and intellectually – than many do now’. He acknowledged that deprivation took many forms and had complex causes, including those that were economic, personal, and to do with patterns of child rearing. But he continued ‘perhaps there is at work here a process, apparent in many situations but imperfectly understood, by which problems reproduce themselves from generation to generation’. He proposed there was not a single process. But it seemed that in a proportion of cases, the problems of one generation were repeated in the next. Social workers and teachers could often be sure that because of family background, a child ‘is operating under disadvantage and prone to run into the same difficulties in his turn as his parents have experienced’.

Part of Joseph’s speech was a call for more research, since he recognized that the cycle was poorly understood. Joseph admitted that his theory was not underpinned by scientific research. He maintained that ‘the cycle is not a process that we fully understand, but a number of objective studies do tend to bear out the subjective belief of many practitioners that cyclical processes are at work’. Nevertheless the evidence that he advanced in its support was decidedly shaky. It included follow-up studies in Sheffield on problem families; research at the Cambridge Institute of Criminology; evidence from the National Child Development Study; studies that seemed to show that parents who had been ill-treated went on to ill-treat their own children; and a comparison of parenting in the United States and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics that appeared to put England at the bottom of an international league table of parental involvement.

Interestingly, Joseph acknowledged that poverty did play a role in the causation of deprivation. For this reason, he said, the Government recognized the need to increase welfare spending, introduce new benefits, and improve access to those that already existed. Research was also needed into the dynamics of family poverty – ‘about such matters as not only the mechanisms and circumstances which lead families into poverty, but also its duration and effects, and the mechanisms and circumstances which enable some to leave whilst others remain in poverty’. This was relevant to, and complementary to, the cycle. Sir Keith therefore recognized the value of longitudinal studies. In the meantime, his remedies were noticeably more limited. Apart from playgroups and services for the under-fives, they focused on family planning;
support for parents; and attention to the needs of children. He claimed, for instance, that if effective family planning was more widely practised, the numbers caught up in the cycle would be much reduced. Similarly Joseph argued that ‘inadequate people tend to be inadequate parents and that inadequate parents tend to rear inadequate children’.11

Joseph ended the speech with the hope that there would be more discussion about these issues, since he wished to see ‘a development of fresh thinking and fresh initiative in this whole area’.12 The speech was reported in the main broadsheet newspapers, but met with a fairly muted response. In a leader article, The Times noted that the most urgent requirements were more playgroups and domiciliary family planning. Nevertheless the paper also argued that improved co-operation between parents, teachers, and social workers had to go hand in hand with attention to poverty, poor housing, and the impact that living in a decaying area had on individual morale and ambition. The paper commented that ‘all these causes need to be tackled as part of a combined approach to the problems of deprived areas, because deprived areas and deprived people go together’.13 What was needed, according to The Times, was an enlarged version of the Urban Programme that looked at improvements to service delivery, notably the personal social services, and also explored the influence of these wider structural factors.

The cycle of deprivation speech is in fact less well known than a speech that Joseph made in Birmingham 2 years later, in October 1974. The wider context was that the Conservative Party had lost the election of 10 October, and there was speculation as to who (if anyone) might succeed Edward Heath as leader. Joseph had been urged to stand by Norman Fowler and Norman Lamont, and his speech to the Edgbaston Conservative Association on 19 October was clearly designed to highlight his leadership potential. Joseph began his speech by arguing that politics was about more than economics. He attacked left-wing theorists and the permissive society, and held up Mary Whitehouse as an example of one who had opposed post-war decadence.14 Yet Joseph also went on to claim that ‘a high and rising proportion of children are being born to mothers least fitted to bring children into the world’. Many of these mothers in social classes IV and V were unmarried, deserted, or divorced, and were of low intelligence and low educational attainment. According to Joseph, they were ‘producing problem children, the future unmarried mothers, delinquents, denizens of our borstals, subnormal educational establishments, prisons, hostels for drifters’. Overall, ‘the balance of our population, our human stock is threatened’.15 Unless family planning was extended to these groups, the nation would move towards degeneration.

In drafting this section of the speech, Joseph was particularly influenced by an article in the journal Poverty, a publication of the Child Poverty Action Group. In this paper, the social researchers Arthur and Margaret Wynn had examined the question of whether family planning could do more to reduce child poverty. The Wynns pointed out that the number of
children with parents on Supplementary Benefit had doubled, to a total of 936,000 in 1972. Falls in the birth rate meant that the proportions of children born into poorer families had increased, compared to the numbers born into social classes I, II, and III. Poverty seemed to be both a cause and a consequence of illegitimacy, but so far family planning had not been very effective among women in social classes IV and V. The Wynns concluded by pointing out that there were no cheap solutions to the problems of child poverty. Allowances for one-parent families, increases in family allowances, cheap milk, and free school meals were all essential.

Joseph focused on the Wynns’ parting shot that mothers under 20 might, in future, be the mothers of possibly 35 per cent of all British people, and he singled out family planning as a means of alleviating poverty at minimal expense. Although this section came towards the end of the speech, the effect was similar to the Enoch Powell ‘rivers of blood’ tirade. In the words of his biographers, Joseph had underestimated ‘the extent to which careless words could be taken as validation for the prejudices of the ignorant’. The Times noted the speech provoked a ‘tinderbox of reaction, most of it hostile’, and the Labour MP Frank Field, for example, argued that the speech was disturbing in that it attempted to show that the poor were undermining society. Joseph’s attempts to respond to press criticism only did further damage, and provided revealing insights into his interest in problem families. Joseph argued, for instance, that ‘I suppose I had regarded myself as a person long associated with concern for problem families, and it seems to me grotesque for people to suggest that my motives in making this speech were improper or sinister’. He said he had been ‘intensely interested and concerned with problem families’ from the beginning of 1971. The difference between the 1972 and 1974 speeches was that the latter was given in the context of a leadership challenge, and as a consequence received much greater attention. Given to promote Joseph’s leadership claims, the speech had the opposite effect, and effectively ended his chances of succeeding Edward Heath as leader of the Conservative Party.

It has been suggested that the hypothesis of transmitted deprivation was a ‘sort of burp from a debate about poverty and pathology that had been rumbling on for decades, if not centuries’. The earlier chapters of this book support that argument. While the publications that were generated by the DHSS-SSRC Research Programme after the 1972 speech are relatively easy to trace, even if now largely forgotten, a more difficult task is to explore the background to the 1972 speech. It is unclear to what extent the speech expressed ideas that Sir Keith Joseph had previously voiced in speeches and articles. Was he influenced by the British problem family debate, or was the American culture of poverty notion a more significant aspect of his thinking? In what ways was the cycle of deprivation associated with other aspects of social policy, such as the inner city, deprivation, and family planning? And what exactly determined the timing of the delivery of the speech, in the summer of 1972?
As Conservative MP for Leeds North East, Joseph was in the 1950s clearly interested in the effectiveness of health and social care provision for vulnerable groups. Parliamentary questions by him, for example, focused on such issues as the geographical coverage of the home help service. But Joseph was also at this stage keenly interested in the future of the family. In the 1950s, in his policy work on Arts and Amenities, for example, Joseph had noted that young people lacked ‘a sense of purpose and of personal responsibility’. In 1959 he suggested that work camps, or youth clubs in church halls, might provide a means of channelling the energies of adolescents. It is clear, too, from policy documents published in the 1960s, that Joseph’s thinking was influenced by the concept of the problem family. In his speech ‘Social Security: The New Priorities’, published as a pamphlet in 1966 by Conservative Political Centre, Joseph, at that time Opposition Spokesman for Labour, put forward ideas for social policy. Joseph argued that a competitive society could be a compassionate society: in fact ‘unless society is efficient – and only competition can ensure that – there just will not be the resources for effective compassion’.

Among categories of need, Joseph included problem families whose poverty was not caused primarily by lack of income, but by difficulties in managing it and in using social help. He wrote that:

problem families have a number of inter-related difficulties – of temperament, of intelligence, of money and of health. The numbers involved may be small but their difficulties tend to be chronic, to recur in the next generation and to blight the lives of the children.

Joseph located problem families within a larger set of groups – deprived children, deserted wives, families of alcoholics and prisoners, and those who had experienced broken marriages or broken homes. What these groups had in common, he suggested, was that their misfortunes were inflicted from within. He called this group ‘home-made casualties’. In language that echoed the Wood Report (1929), he argued that these groups were dominated by families of low income and low intelligence, with more than the average number of children. A cycle was created and repeated, whereby broken homes and bad parents reproduced broken homes and bad parents.

Joseph acknowledged that structural and behavioural factors were mutually reinforcing. He conceded, for instance, that ‘we know some of the breeding-grounds of warped lives; we know the close interaction of poverty, bad housing, over-sized classes, inadequate parents’. Nevertheless the solutions he proposed for problem families were more modest. More social workers and home helps should be recruited to provide care in the home. Money was important, but an effective social service – that provided a means of identifying families at risk early, that channelled additional resources into school, and that offered opportunities for adolescents to gain self-respect – was also crucial. Joseph claimed that ‘if the community can
intervene effectively in what is often in itself misery and may also be an incubator of future misery and delinquency, then we would be narrowing the breeding-grounds of crime and unhappiness.\textsuperscript{27}

The key elements of the 1972 speech were thus already evident some 6 years earlier. Similar themes are evident in some of his speeches on housing. In 1967, he commented about the two to three million people who were living in privately-rented houses that ‘here are the overcrowded: the families living in single rooms carved perfunctorily out of unconverted, insanitary, multi-occupied rabbit warrens. Here are the seed-beds of delinquency and even crime’.\textsuperscript{28} There was also evidence that, in the context of housing policy, these ideas influenced his thinking well after the 1972 speech. In 1975, for example, Joseph questioned what had been achieved through compulsory purchase orders and slum clearance programmes. In his view, bulldozers had destroyed communities. And many council estates had inevitably become ‘foci of social pathology’.\textsuperscript{29}

It is therefore possible to trace the influence of these ideas in Joseph’s speeches from the mid-1960s. In the early 1970s, as Secretary of State for Health and Social Services, Joseph was more closely involved with the translating of policy into practice. He was actively involved in debates about abortion and family planning, and played a key part, for example, in the setting up of the Lane Committee. Many people were unhappy about existing provision, seeking a comprehensive and free family planning service, with abortion on demand. It has been argued that Joseph’s proposals for abortion and family planning were heavily influenced by his thinking on social deprivation. Joseph instructed officials to concentrate on a comprehensive domiciliary service for problem groups, with encouragement for sterilization in the case of ‘really bad problem families’.\textsuperscript{30} The Community Development Projects (CDPs) provided a means of funding family planning services, and Joseph linked family planning and deprivation in speeches in early 1971. In the event, the new arrangements for family planning passed into law in July 1973.

It is clear that, Joseph’s recognition of the complexities of the issue notwithstanding, the cycle of deprivation matches a number of key strands in the underclass concept. Joseph was concerned with the transmission of deprivation between generations; his solutions were behavioural rather than structural; he acknowledged that there was little evidence to support the existence of the cycle, so that more research was necessary; and the main appeal of the phrase was symbolic and rhetorical. In fact, as we have seen, the 1972 cycle speech was only a more dramatic version of the ideas that Joseph had been thinking about from the mid 1960s. What was new was the suggestion that the situation of problem families was in some way repeated in successive generations. In this, Joseph may well have been influenced by the research carried out in Sheffield into successive generations of problem families. What is clear is that the problem family idea played a more influential part in his thinking than the rival American culture of poverty concept.\textsuperscript{31} There is no evidence that Joseph was influenced by Oscar Lewis
or other American theorists. Instead his thinking on the cycle was moulded by a genuine concern with family poverty; by the earlier debates about problem families; and by wider debates in the early 1970s about family planning and deprivation.

Joseph’s biographers note that the 1972 speech was not so much ‘a call for open debate as an invitation to researchers to find empirical support for ideas which he held already’. They suggest that, following his experiences at the Department of Housing, Joseph tended to be torn between a desire to reach firm conclusions and a need to think things through carefully before stating his own position. Recognizing that the issues were complex and the research likely to be long-term in nature, advice was taken from the SSRC as to whether the problem of the cycle of deprivation could in fact be researched. It was international research on parenting that led to early discussions between the DHSS and SSRC on a possible research programme. This Joint DHSS-SSRC Working Party on Transmitted Deprivation was convened in June 1972, and a discussion paper on possible research strategies was presented at a seminar at All Souls College, Oxford, in April 1973. This was attended by researchers and others involved in the implementation of social policy. Joseph’s way of working was that of an academic – he had won a Prize Fellowship at All Souls in June 1946, and was to remain closely linked to the College for the rest of his life. In addition, a review of the literature was commissioned, to be carried out by Professor Michael Rutter and Nicola Madge. Though this was not finally published until 1976, a large part was ready remarkably quickly, by June 1973. It had an important impact on the Working Party.

By August 1974, when its first report was published, the membership of the Joint Working Party had changed slightly. There were seven DHSS representatives on it, including two each from the Local Authorities Social Services Division, the Social Work Services Division, and the Research Management Division. Other bodies represented were the Central Statistical Office; Department of Education and Science; and the Medical Research Council. There was a similar number of SSRC representatives, but from more diverse backgrounds, including Professors Tony Atkinson, the economist then at Essex; Maurice Freedman from the Institute of Social Anthropology at Oxford; Roy Parker from the Department of Social Administration at Bristol; and Michael Rutter, of the Department of Child Psychiatry at the Institute of Psychiatry. Richard Berthoud has suggested that whereas the SSRC regarded the problem as one taking in all the social sciences, the composition of the DHSS representatives reflected its belief that it was a problem of individuals, and that the personal social services would hold the key.

The real purpose of the Working Party at this time was to consider whether the cycle of transmitted deprivation would in fact be a fruitful area for research. When it met in June 1973, the Working Party decided that there was so much material in the literature review that it would be sensible to allow more time for it to be studied before outlining areas in which research
might be undertaken. The first report by the Working Party, presented in October 1973, outlined why research would be worthwhile and the kinds of research that might be undertaken. The Working Party acknowledged that both ‘deprivation’ and ‘transmitted’ were ambiguous terms. ‘Deprivation’ was used to describe a condition, such as being poor, unemployed, badly housed, and so on, and also a hypothesis as to the causes of that condition – having been deprived of certain advantages. People might not agree on characteristics of ‘deprivation’, including the deprived people themselves. Moreover ‘transmission’ might also assume how continuities were caused. The Working Party noted that they might be not familial, but the influence of a common environment on successive generations.34 These problems notwithstanding, the Working Party also concluded that:

there is convincing evidence that intergenerational continuity is an important feature of deprivation, but that the causal mechanisms are not well understood, and that there is a good prospect that more research will contribute to improvements in social policy.35

It recommended a number of parallel studies, including additional work being grafted on to studies that were already under way, and it thought that roughly 7 years would be required for the research. Statistical data relating to samples of individuals or families was a key resource, as were longitudinal studies such as the National Child Development Study. These, though, were to be supplemented by intensive studies of samples in particular regions, and no new longitudinal studies were to be commissioned. Attention was also to be directed to the ‘distinguishing personal or environmental characteristics’ that enabled individuals to break out of the cycle.36

There was no firm theoretical framework for the whole programme. Thus there was room for anthropological studies of families in their social context that would produce hypotheses rather than test them. Other areas for research included the components of deprivation; intragenerational continuities; and concepts of deprivation. On the theme of intergenerational continuities, it was suggested that research might explore income and poverty; reliance on social services; ‘colour’; and housing. It was recognized that identifying causal mechanisms would be the most difficult part of the research. These might include the influence of the family; social stratification; the educational system; areas and neighbourhoods; and stigma. Interestingly too, the Working Party did not discount the influence of the culture of poverty, where families and individuals ‘form a sub-culture of their own, with mores dissonant with those of the broader culture, but adapted to their own circumstances’.37 Intervention was also covered, such as housing policies, social security, and provision for the under-fives. Overall, the Working Party recommended that the DHSS and SSRC should begin to explore how this research might be carried out. This would include the completion of the literature review, and discussions about how the proposed research might
be managed. The programme of research could take 7 years, with a budget rising to £150,000 per year – an extremely large research programme at that time.

At the same time as the deliberations of the Working Party, there were also in the early 1970s consultations with professional, voluntary and other organizations. These indicated that Joseph had become more cautious. In *Preparation for Parenthood* (1974), Joseph stressed that debate about the cycle had not distracted the government from its priorities in the areas of low income and poor housing. He admitted that he had used the term ‘cycle’ to describe the apparent persistence of problems from one generation to another, and conceded that the term was ‘a shorthand one and, as such, imprecise and open to much conceptual questioning’. One aim was to prepare people better for parenthood, partly through providing knowledge, understanding, and support; but Joseph was cautious, noting the need for more research. This was amplified by the experience of the All Souls seminar held in April 1973. Again, writing in the foreword to *Dimensions of Parenthood* (1974), Joseph conceded that the effect of early discussions in territory which, for the government at least, was unfamiliar, had been to ‘alert us to the complex issues involved and to warn us against over-simple and under-sensitive reactions to the problems we perceive in families, struggling to cope with multiple deprivations’.

Joseph’s more conciliatory stance was partly in reaction to the hostility that the theory had provoked in some quarters. At a social work conference held in March 1974, Peter Townsend condemned the cycle of deprivation as being ‘a mixture of popular stereotypes and ill-developed, mostly contentious, scientific notions. It is a conceptual bed into which diverse travellers have scrambled for security and comfort’. Townsend made four points about the theory as expounded by Joseph. First, only certain types of deprivation had been chosen. Second, only certain causal factors had been selected. Third, certain interpretations of the term ‘transmission’ had been chosen. Finally, only particular solutions to the problem had been selected. Townsend’s paper was also important in that it showed an appreciation of the historical antecedents of these ideas, including the Wood Report and the Lidbetter research of the early 1930s. He repeated his earlier criticisms of Oscar Lewis and the culture of poverty. In general, Townsend argued that the theory diverted attention from structural factors, and tended to blame the victim.

A different critique was put forward by Bill Jordan, then Professor of Social Work at Exeter University. Jordan suggested that it was perfectly proper to ask why, in an era of increased prosperity and improved public services, some people were still poor. He argued, however, that this question had nothing to do with maladjustment. It was confusing to set up research into poverty and maladjustment among the poorest sector, when only the former was a distinguishing characteristic of this group. Jordan argued ‘it is not a question of how these factors persist, as Sir Keith Joseph suggests, but of how they are reinforced by conditions of prosperity’. Jordan concluded of the cycle
of deprivation theory that it ‘encapsulates a number of myths that are very prevalent in both the academic and the political spheres of social policy at the present time’. Another critic at this time was Bob Holman, then Senior Lecturer in Social Administration at the University of Glasgow. Holman was critical of the behavioural emphasis of the concept of the cycle of deprivation. Holman subsequently pointed out that there were differences between the cycle of deprivation and the culture of poverty. In the latter, the poor were seen as a subculture separate from the rest of the population, whereas in the former they were part of mainstream culture, but their upbringing and education in conditions of deprivation meant that they were unable to take advantage of the wider opportunities that society offered. They were deprived of those aspects of culture that allowed other members to keep themselves from poverty. Nevertheless, Holman linked the two theories together as essentially behavioural interpretations of poverty. Overall, Holman rejected the cycle of deprivation thesis, claiming that the research was inadequate and that child-rearing practices were essentially adaptive.

These criticisms notwithstanding, by August 1974, when the report of the Working Party was published, the DHSS and SSRC had signed a contract whereby the former would finance and the latter administer a programme of research into transmitted deprivation. A smaller Organising Group, chaired by Professor Peter Willmott, was to consider applications for funds from researchers wanting to work on transmitted deprivation, to discuss areas that needed to be investigated, and to encourage applications in those areas. Richard Berthoud argues that the Working Party failed to identify the fundamental relationship between individual behaviour and the power of social institutions. He notes that ‘by failing to define deprivation, [the Working Party] allowed researchers working on the programme to interpret it as they liked, but also permitted a strong assumption in favour of the equation of poverty with personal inadequacy’. Perhaps more importantly, the SSRC at that time operated very much in responsive mode. It publicized its presence to the research community, and waited for social scientists to come up with projects. This meant that promoting a pre-planned multidisciplinary research programme was something of an uphill struggle. Berthoud alleges that, in 1972, the SSRC had ‘never been asked an important question by an outsider’. The research programme that was organized through the Working Party was to span 8 years. It cost around £750,000 (at 1970s values), and generated some nineteen studies, fourteen literature reviews, and four feasibility projects. Richard Berthoud wrote in 1987 that:

Sir Keith Joseph is widely reported nowadays to scorn the social sciences in general, and sociology in particular. Such a blanket condemnation suggests little power of discrimination, but if the contribution to the debate on deprivation made by his most direct critics from the social sciences contributed to his view, one can have some sympathy for it.
Thus it is important to explore the research programme to see why it played such an influential role in colouring Joseph’s view of the social sciences in general. To what extent did the researchers diverge from the original cycle of deprivation theory, as propounded in the 1972 speech? What was the relationship between the civil servants at the DHSS and the academic community? And what changes occurred in the wider social and political climate, in the period between the first report of the Working Party in 1974 and the final report on the programme published in 1982?

As we have seen, one of the first tasks undertaken by the Working Party was to commission a literature review, a consultancy subsequently accepted by Michael Rutter and Nicola Madge. Both were based at the University of London – Rutter was then Professor of Child Psychiatry at the Institute of Psychiatry, while Madge was a Research Officer at the Thomas Coram Research Unit. The purpose of their review, published in 1976, was to examine what evidence existed that might support the ‘cycle of transmitted deprivation’, and to consider what it was that created these alleged continuities between generations. Rutter and Madge admitted, however, that it had quickly become clear, when they had begun work, that there were some serious problems with their brief, and that changes would be necessary. Most importantly, Rutter and Madge decided that they preferred the term ‘disadvantage’ to the original ‘deprivation’; they substituted the plural ‘cycles’ for the singular ‘cycle’; and they dropped the phrase ‘transmitted’.

These changes would have an important bearing on the research programme as a whole. In trying to summarize the current state of knowledge, Rutter and Madge also made several other important provisos. They emphasized that they did not equate poverty with maladjustment; the suggested focus on the family was too narrow; and they would discuss environmental and constitutional factors bearing on deprivation and disadvantage. Rutter and Madge pointed out, for instance, that there were as many discontinuities as continuities in the experiences of these families. They argued further that intergenerational continuities in disadvantage were only part of the broader question of disadvantage, and should be examined in that context. Rutter and Madge argued that many children brought up in conditions of severe disadvantage developed normally and went on to produce perfectly happy families of their own. Although intergenerational cycles of disadvantage did exist, ‘the exceptions are many and a surprisingly large proportion of people reared in conditions of privation and suffering do not reproduce that pattern in the next generation’. They pointed out that there was little research on people trying to break out of cycles of disadvantage. Rutter and Madge remained sceptical about Oscar Lewis’s culture of poverty, claiming that ‘neither a wholly sub-cultural nor a wholly situational interpretation of the behaviour and attributes of poor communities is tenable’. Each had its own limitations and both failed to take account of individual differences. It was also unlikely that the concept was relevant to Britain – Lewis had said it was most likely to develop in ‘rapidly changing societies’, which Britain
plainly was not. Overall Rutter and Madge concluded that ‘the culture of
poverty concept is inadequate for an analysis of British society’.49

The literature review included historical studies. In the case of problem
families, for instance, Rutter and Madge traced the work of Charles Booth,
E. J. Lidbetter, the Wood Committee, and C. J. Blacker, and the shift in
emphasis from social conditions to personal problems. Studies of problem
families were essentially studies of particular characteristics, the analysis was
tautological, and therefore the concept of a distinct problem family lifestyle
was open to serious objection.50 In many ways, the findings of different
studies, and the differences between investigators, were simply a function
of how the groups had been defined, and merited little serious attention.
It was not justifiable to discuss problem families as a homogeneous group
separate from the rest of the population – in the opinion of Rutter and
Madge they were not. Nonetheless, Rutter and Madge argued that it was
important to consider families who suffered from a combination of severe
disadvantages or problems. There was a marked overlap between different
forms of social disadvantage, and for problem families an improvement in
social circumstances might be as important as help with personal problems
and relationships. Problem families did not constitute a group that was
qualitatively different from other members of the population. Rutter and
Madge concluded that ‘just as stereotypes of “the problem family” are to
be distrusted, so are package remedies based on notions of a homogeneous
group’.51 Yet families with multiple social disadvantages and/or personal
problems did give cause for concern, both in terms of the present and with
regard to problems that might persist into the next generation. While the
concept of the problem family was too vague for it to be possible to estimate
numbers, the evidence apparently showed there were a substantial number
of families with multiple problems, some of which involved extended
dependency on social services.

In terms of Sir Keith’s original thesis, the authors of the literature review
argued that there was no single problem of a cycle of transmitted deprivation.
Rather there were many forms of disadvantage that arose in various ways,
and which showed varying degrees and types of continuities between
generations. There certainly were continuities over time. However, only
some were familial – there were marked regional continuities, for example,
in disadvantage. There were many discontinuities. Many children born into
disadvantaged homes did not repeat the pattern of being disadvantaged in the
next generation. Even where continuities were strongest, many individuals
broke out of the cycle. Equally, many people became disadvantaged without
having had disadvantaged parents. Rutter and Madge summed this up by
stating that ‘familial cycles are the most important element in the perpetuation
of disadvantage but they account for only a part of the overall picture’.52 For
instance, they thought the continuities were weaker over three generations
than two. They noted that the extent of continuity varied according to the
type and level of disadvantage.
Despite these arguments, Rutter and Madge did echo Joseph in arguing that behavioural and educational factors might be as significant as socio-economic deprivation. They claimed, for example, that it was possible to influence cycles of disadvantage without necessarily embarking on wholesale social change. In the first place, cycles of disadvantage were found at all levels of society. Second, Rutter and Madge argued that in other respects, correlations with inadequate living conditions provided a poor guide to levels of disadvantage. Although overcrowding, for example, was worse in Scotland than in England, evidence from schools indicated that Scottish children were better readers, on average, than their English counterparts. The reasons for this remained unclear. Thus research into why children might be disadvantaged in one respect, but were often not disadvantaged in another was needed. It was in this way, argued Rutter and Madge, that patterns in cycles of disadvantage might be broken.

Many of the books that resulted from the various projects were published by Heinemann in the series that was associated with the Research Programme. Some studies, such as those by psychiatrists and psychologists, appeared to support Sir Keith Joseph’s original behavioural emphasis. For example, the team led by the psychiatrist W. L. Tonge focused on problem families in Sheffield. Similarly the team of paediatricians and psychologists led by Professor Israel Kolvin, then Professor of Child Psychiatry at the University of Newcastle-Upon-Tyne, sought to follow up some of the families interviewed in Newcastle as part of the famous ‘thousand families study’ conducted by Sir James Spence in the 1950s. Others, published by academics whose sympathies lay more with the Townsend emphasis on structural factors than with the Joseph thesis, ended up far from their starting point, and in some cases showed barely disguised scorn for it. What is perhaps most striking, from the standpoint of today, is the rejection of the role of behaviour, and the emphasis on the essentially passive role of the family or recipients of welfare. Writing in 1979, Peter Townsend argued that the cycle of deprivation showed little awareness of its historical antecedents. On the other hand, it had a clear political ideology, and reflected the government’s interest in area deprivation policies. Both the concept of area deprivation and assigning responsibility to the individual and family were in his view closely linked to the culture of poverty hypothesis. Deprivation was ‘treated as a residual personal or family phenomenon rather than a large-scale structural phenomenon’.

Townsend’s work was an important influence on many of the researchers who worked on the Transmitted Deprivation research programme. For example, Mildred Blaxter (1925–2010), a sociologist then based at the Institute of Medical Sociology at the University of Aberdeen, sought to examine questions to do with continuities in health disadvantage among children. Blaxter tended to downplay the social patterning of beliefs, in favour of the effects of poverty and other environmental factors. A study published by Juliet Essen and Peter Wedge in 1982, was based on the National Child Development Study (NCDS) at the National Children’s
Bureau, a source of longitudinal data since it had monitored the progress and circumstances of all people in Great Britain born in one week in March 1958. Overall, Essen and Wedge argued that there was much discontinuity in disadvantage. The same was true of the literature reviews of housing, education, and managing money. Research by the economist Tony Atkinson and his team examined continuities in economic status between generations. The Atkinson team focused on disadvantage, however, and denied the existence of a cycle. The authors of a literature review of the impact of social policy on transmitted deprivation admitted quite openly that they had departed from their original brief. Roger Fuller and Olive Stevenson, both from the University of Keele, acknowledged that the terms of their remit were ‘deeply problematic’ – transmitted deprivation was difficult to define, and the cycle of deprivation a shadowy phenomenon. Overall, ‘the tight conceptual framework misleadingly promised by the terminology of our remit was inevitably lacking’.

It is not possible here to look at all the projects that were commissioned. Among the projects funded by the Working Party was one that sought to examine the cycle of deprivation through intensive case studies. The project was interdisciplinary in scope, and aimed to combine the approaches of psychology, sociology, and anthropology. It was based on participant observation of a small number of ‘multi-problem’ families in an industrial town in the Midlands, and the team was led by Frank Coffield, then at Keele University. Four families were selected – the Barkers, representing a large family; Ada Paterson, an ‘inadequate’ mother; the Martins, a long-term unemployed family; and the Fieldings, a family regarded as coming out of deprivation. The team entered the social world of these families for 2 years, and acted as participant observers by joining family celebrations such as wedding anniversaries, birthday parties, and christenings, as well as more general family activities.

The volume that Coffield and his team produced was published in 1980, the first of the original studies to appear in book form. But as with Rutter and Madge’s literature review, the findings of this study tended to challenge, rather than confirm, the theory of the cycle of deprivation. Vince Barker, head of the Barker family, in many ways fitted the culture of poverty stereotype put forward by Oscar Lewis. He lived for the present and did not defer gratification, perhaps because he anticipated a time when he might be less physically robust and incapable of earning an adequate wage packet. Nonetheless there were other features that contradicted the traditional stereotype. For one thing, the Barkers possessed fire insurance following a fire at their home. Similarly Elsie Barker saved for Christmas, and managed her debts as carefully as she could. Coffield and his colleagues argued of the Barkers that it was only the dynamic interplay of both personal and structural factors ‘which, in our opinion, can in any way do justice to the complexity of the lives we are struggling to understand’. The case of the other families was similarly complex. In the Martin household, for example,
there was evidence that possessions were not neglected but in fact were looked after carefully. The garden was cultivated, at least for a time, and ornaments were carefully arranged in the front room. Sally Martin spent a lot of her time washing and ironing, while Peter Martin was constantly repairing or improving household objects. He, too, was interested in gardening, and also managed to keep his first job at a garage for over a year.

Reviewing the problem family literature, Coffield and his colleagues argued that this phrase, along with the term ‘transmitted deprivation’, should be abandoned. They were also critical of the follow-up studies conducted in Sheffield that influenced Joseph in the run-up to the 1972 speech. An individual explanation of failure was favoured in these studies, and the authors were unable to explain how the children came to be involved with the same social work agencies. Overall, Coffield and his colleagues argued from their fieldwork that the cycle of deprivation was too simple an idea to explain the complex lives of the four families that they had spent so long studying in such minute detail. Employing a different metaphor, they concluded that ‘the web of deprivation, rather than the cycle of deprivation, depicts more accurately the dense network of psychological, social, historical and economic factors which have either created or perpetuated problems for these families’. The complexity lay in the interacting and cumulative nature of the deprivations – no single hypothesis could explain the complex mesh of factors. Although the cycle of deprivation had an appealing simplicity, the reality was that families moved in and out of established categories of deprivation. In general, Coffield and his colleagues argued that the term ‘cycle of deprivation’ tended to simplify complex issues. While there were factors that might increase the probability of a family being labelled as a problem, ‘the causal processes are many, complex and interrelated, the exceptions numerous, and the critical precipitating events different in each case’.

Reflecting on the project a year after publication, in his inaugural lecture as Professor of Education at Durham University, Frank Coffield came to the same conclusions. The idea of a circle created the wrong mental image, because it implied a simple linear progression, whereas the data that his team had collected showed how the different variables were complex, and both interacted with, and were contaminated by, each other. The transmission of deprivation could not be attributed to any one single factor. Importantly, in light of recent debates, Coffield argued the data indicated that it was a mistake to focus exclusively on either behaviour or structure. The team rejected the idea that there was a small group that could be labelled as problem families. Coffield concluded:

our families were caught in a dense web of economic, medical, social and psychological problems which overlapped and interacted; their problems needed amelioration, no matter what their parents or grandparents were like. Moreover, our families moved in and out of the official categories of deprivation even during the two years of fieldwork.
However, Richard Berthoud has argued that while the Coffield team identified the key issues, it adopted a research method which was unlikely to yield answers. The project was extremely small-scale, and was only able to illustrate the characteristics of ‘deprived’ individuals and families. In this it replicated the earlier problem family studies, though it was critical of them. Berthoud argues that the Coffield study was more useful in ‘advancing the question, than in providing an answer’.  

Given the diverse nature of the books and literature reviews, it was hardly surprising that these modifications of the original concept were noted by those who had the task of reviewing the whole programme. In the words of Richard Berthoud, they had to ‘make bricks with very little straw’.  

Reviewing the Transmitted Deprivation programme 10 years on, in 1982, Muriel Brown and Nicola Madge, from the London School of Economics, drew several conclusions. Much of the research had been concerned with broader issues of deprivation and disadvantage in society at large, and had in fact been concerned with the influence on poverty of structural rather than behavioural factors. Perhaps not surprisingly, the research had not been guided by a consistent viewpoint, and Sir Keith himself had changed his stance. As we have seen, the original speech was dogmatic, mentioning the role of economic factors and living conditions, but highlighting personal factors and child-rearing. Whereas in 1974 Joseph had stressed parental influence, by 1979 he was convinced that the cycle was not inescapable. There was similar caution on the part of the academics, notably on the difference between ‘attributes’ and ‘burdens’, and on the meaning of transmission and the means by which it could be studied.  

Brown and Madge noted that researchers had diverse approaches. While general understanding of the meaning of deprivation had been enhanced by the debate, they concluded that ‘it is fair to conclude that no real consensus was reached on the subject’. Brown and Madge found that there were some correlations between income level and occupational level across generations, and noted that health, criminality, and emotional experiences in childhood could lead to poor parenting behaviour in adulthood. With regard to housing circumstances, educational attainment, and general parenting skills, however, it was harder to say if the continuities were any more than coincidental. One of the main findings was that there were many exceptions, even when the strongest family patterns were found. Brown and Madge argued that ‘cycles of deprivation do not inevitably exist although they may emerge in relation to particular individuals and families’.  

Like Coffield and his colleagues, Brown and Madge concluded from the research that there was no single simple explanation of deprivation. First, deprivation was not unitary, with both consistent and idiosyncratic patterns. Second, most forms of deprivation were influenced by so many factors that it was impossible to single out specific variables – the patterns of association could not be assumed to be cause and effect. They concluded that ‘neither the notion of causation implicit in the “cycle of deprivation” thesis, nor
the diametrically opposed view that structural factors are all to blame for society’s troubles, can be accepted. It was impossible to disentangle the many influences important for deprivation and its transmission.

Richard Berthoud has argued that Brown and Madge reviewed the research programme in rather a neutral way, without putting forward their own independent views. There was no hint that any of the studies were disappointing, or that the activities were less than well-conceived or successful. Brown and Madge accepted the failure of the Working Party to define deprivation adequately, and did not explore what deprivations had in common. They claimed, unconvincingly, that despite their diverse approaches, the researchers came up with similar conclusions. Brown and Madge summarized this common ground through the hypothesis that ‘much deprivation is deeply rooted in the structure of our society and affected by the network of unequal opportunities and life chances that the structure maintains’. Berthoud contrasts the approach of Brown and Madge with the earlier literature review by Rutter and Madge, which in his view had asked questions, opened doors, and refused to reach conclusions. He was also critical of their use of the American term ‘invulnerable’ for those who had escaped deprivation, writing:

If social forces merely alter probabilities, those ‘who escape’ are simply those whose number did not come up, but the term ‘invulnerable’ suggests they may have had some special armour which protected them from an otherwise inescapable destiny.

Finally, Berthoud noted Brown and Madge were poor on policy recommendations. Given the problems in establishing the causes of deprivation and agreeing on explanations, Brown and Madge argued that no single policy change could touch on more than a fraction of the problem of deprivation and disadvantage.

What is interesting is how the inspiration for the cycle of deprivation thesis lay in the earlier problem family debate. It was typical of Joseph that in private he continued to study his alleged cycle. As Secretary for State for Education and Science in the early 1980s, Joseph came to the Department determined to help those he regarded as the victims rather than the beneficiaries of policy. Yet Joseph’s social philosophy also explains why he was intellectually attracted to opposition to the voucher scheme. The idea behind vouchers was that parents could use them to choose schools for their children, thereby forcing schools to compete for the ‘custom’ of parents. Joseph opposed vouchers. He argued that, badly educated themselves and transmitting their lack of ambition to their children, parents in the lower classes would fail to make the effort. Instead the state should pour resources into these ‘sink’ schools, in an effort to try to recruit the best teachers. However, having learnt from some of the mistakes he had made earlier in his political career, Joseph was careful not to openly link his theories on deprivation to his opposition to the education voucher scheme. A further
example of the continued influence of the cycle of deprivation came in Joseph’s support for the Home-Start charity in the House of Lords in the early 1990s. This organization used volunteers to befriend families and provide assistance to those struggling to bring up children.76

It is clear that the research programme departed dramatically from Sir Keith Joseph’s original thesis. A cycle of deprivation that was essentially a behavioural interpretation of poverty, that stressed the importance of intergenerational continuities, became instead a cycles of disadvantage concept. It was concerned more with structural factors and emphasized the discontinuities in the experiences of families. There were several factors involved here. First, part of the problem lay with the original report of the Working Party, which failed to define both ‘deprivation’ and ‘transmitted’ adequately. Second, in this period the SSRC was not accustomed to running a pre-planned multidisciplinary programme of this kind, and found it difficult to commission the type of studies that were thought to be required. Third, the composition of the DHSS and SSRC membership of the Working Party indicated important differences between the two groups on the possible causes of the ‘problem’. Fourth, what is perhaps most striking in light of current debates is the lack of consensus among the academics. While they were able to reject the term ‘cycle of deprivation’ in favour of ‘cycles of disadvantage’, they were less successful in identifying the relative roles of behaviour and structure in the perpetuation of poverty.

As we noted at the outset, the idea of a cycle of deprivation continued to have currency at a policy and popular level. On the death of the then Lord Joseph in December 1994, The Times noted in a leader article that ‘tough decisions rather than sentimental social engineering were needed to break the “cycle of deprivation” which so afflicted, and afflicts, our inner cities’. It defended the 1974 speech, arguing that it reflected not eugenics but Joseph’s ‘lifelong concern with poverty, the family and the growing dependency culture’.77 Moreover there were marked similarities between the ideas espoused by Joseph and the policies adopted by Labour. In introducing the Sure Start programme in April 2000, Health Minister Yvette Cooper echoed Joseph in arguing that increased benefits alone could not compensate for other factors affecting disadvantaged children.78 The early Thatcher governments were unlikely to be influenced by the literature reviews and books that were generated by the Working Party on Transmitted Deprivation. Nevertheless, what is again striking from the perspective of today is the way that researchers are only beginning to respond to the challenge of unravelling the combination of behavioural and structural factors identified by Brown and Madge and their colleagues. The link between the cycle of deprivation and the emphasis on social exclusion from the mid-1990s is provided by the underclass concept of the 1980s. As with the culture of poverty, it requires us to cross the Atlantic once again, to examine the emergence of the underclass idea in the United States.
Uncovering the underclass – America

The life-skills class convenes on Tuesday and Friday mornings, and among the twenty-two students registered for it are people who have been murderers, muggers, stickup men, chain snatchers, pimps, burglars, heroin addicts, drug pushers, alcoholics, welfare mothers, and swindlers.¹

By any standards this was an unusual school. The class was called ‘Basic Typing 27’, and it was run through the auspices of the Wildcat Skills Training Center in New York, a training programme in life skills for ex-offenders, ex-addicts, unemployed women, and school dropouts. It was devised by a non-profit-making organization, the Manpower Demonstration Research Programme. The teacher of the life-skills class was Howard Smith, a former heroin addict who had spent several years in jail. The writer was Ken Auletta of the New Yorker magazine. It was 1981.

There are parallels between the uncovering of the underclass in the 1980s, and the discovery of the social residuum 100 years earlier. Economic recession and high unemployment exacerbated fear and anxiety about the apparent emergence of a group detached from society as a whole. Moreover in both cases, journalists made the running, with academic interest lagging some way behind. Although, as we shall see, there were mentions of the underclass in the social science literature of the 1970s, its real emergence as a theme of much greater social and political significance can be attributed to its articulation in the popular press. As with the culture of poverty in the 1960s, the earliest moves came from the United States. In particular, the work of two writers, Ken Auletta and Nicholas Lemann, gave the concept of an underclass much greater prominence.

In previous chapters, we have examined such concepts as the social problem group of the 1930s, the problem family of the 1950s, and the cycle of deprivation in the 1970s. However, it is fair to say that although these
were important themes in social thought, they were never part of mainstream public debate. Confined to a narrow though influential band of experts, or distinctive professional groups, they were never taken up by the popular press. It was only in the 1980s, with the emergence of the concept of the underclass, that questions about its origins, composition, and implications became issues of interest to a much wider constituency. As with the culture of poverty, the theory of the underclass initially proved popular with both Right and Left. In the case of the former, the term was used to refer to a group of apparently unemployed and unemployable people who faced lives of misery in the inner-city, characterized by violent crime and illegitimacy. With regard to the latter, the underclass was seen as a group of undereducated and unskilled workers apparently left behind by profound shifts in technology and in the economy as a whole. For the first time, academics began to look at the history of these labels, and to explore the processes through which they rose to prominence and subsequently lost favour.

In this chapter, we examine the limited use of the term ‘underclass’ in academic studies published in the 1960s and early 1970s. We then contrast this interpretation with the rather different analysis that was offered by journalists in magazine articles published in the early 1980s. We also explore the different positions that were adopted by contributors to the underclass debate in the 1980s and early 1990s. In many respects these present an over-simplification of the complex and often contradictory positions taken by various observers. Even so, it is possible to disentangle four – first, a position that saw the problems of the underclass as essentially those of behaviour; second, those that located its emergence more in terms of structural factors; third, a group that was attracted to the idea, but found no empirical evidence; and fourth, those who rejected the idea outright. Moreover, although there were important links between the debate about the underclass in the United States and in Britain, there were also significant differences in the way that the debate was constructed. Most obvious, of course, was the way that discussion of the underclass in the United States was dominated by the theme of race. We look first of all at the debate in the United States. In the following chapter, we turn to the British experience.

Recent American writers, such as Jacqueline Jones, in her study of the history of the dispossessed between the American Civil War and the present, have used the term ‘underclass’ as a synonym for the poor, and this creates some problems of definition. In his study of the parole system in the United States between 1890 and 1990, Jonathan Simon argues that crises in the criminal justice system were caused not so much by problems of punishing offenders, but by much wider changes in society and the political system. Thus he claims that the great increase in prison populations must be seen in relation to the decline of industry as a source of employment for the labour force, and the emergence of an urban underclass. Simon’s underclass is made up of ethnic minorities, and lives in zones of poverty. In his view, the aim of the criminal justice system has been to consolidate a process of social control ‘both to secure the underclass and to secure others against
Writing in 1993, Simon was well aware of the contested nature of the underclass debate, and of its key contributors. Nevertheless he argued that it was not necessary to resolve this debate, since for him the underclass was a synonym for the poor. Most of the chapters in Michael Katz’s potentially useful collection similarly focus more on urban poverty than on the underclass debate as a form of discourse.

However, it is arguable that regarding the underclass as a synonym for urban poverty in practice limits the opportunities for exploring successive re-inventions of the label over time. The phrase ‘underclass’ was first used in the early 1960s by Gunnar Myrdal, who used it to describe the effects of technological change on the American workforce. Myrdal was then Professor of International Economics at the University of Stockholm. In *Challenge to Affluence* (1963), Myrdal, commenting on economic change, wrote that the causes of unemployment were comparatively well known in America. Less often commented upon was the way technological and economic change tended to trap an underclass of unemployed and unemployable people at the bottom of society. Myrdal argued that unemployment and poverty were creating ‘an “underclass” of unemployed, unemployables, and underemployed, more and more hopelessly divorced from the nation at large and without a share in its life, its ambitions and its achievements’. Myrdal argued further that the effects of these processes were perpetuated in successive generations. The fact that underclass children tended to share their parents’ resources and life chances limited the extent to which the education system could contribute to social and economic mobility.

Myrdal’s book is generally accepted as the first modern use of the term ‘underclass’. He suggested that most people in America thought of themselves as being middle-class, and were therefore unfamiliar with what might be seen as a neo-Marxist analysis. But there were studies published shortly after *Challenge to Affluence* that, like Myrdal, claimed to demonstrate the emergence of a separate lower-class culture. These included those by Elliot Liebow, Lee Rainwater, and Ulf Hannerz. What was interesting was that they did not use the term ‘underclass’ for the changes that they claimed to be observing, preferring instead ‘lower-class culture’. Debate focused on whether these groups had a separate subculture, or their behaviour was simply an adaptation to the circumstances in which they found themselves. The most likely explanation for this is that, through the work of Myrdal, the term ‘underclass’ was associated with technological and economic change. It was linked to a structural rather than a cultural or behavioural explanation of the causes of poverty.

Even studies that did look at the impact of structural change on the outlook of workers did not use the phrase ‘underclass’ for the changes that they detected. This was true, for example, of John Leggett’s study of race and labour relations in American cities. In Detroit, Leggett drew a distinction between what he called ‘the marginal and the mainstream working class’. He claimed that the former group belonged to ‘a subordinate ethnic or racial group which is unusually proletarianized and highly segregated’. Workers
of this type had marginal roles in heavy industry, and faced economic insecurity, whereas the mainstream working class were more educated and highly skilled, and more economically secure as a result. Sharing the same subcultural traditions, the marginal group was isolated from the rest of society and from the middle class in particular. Leggett noted the distinction that Marx made between the employable workers and the *lumpenproletariat*. He agreed on the basis of his study that at the bottom of the working class was the *lumpenproletariat*, similar in many ways to the poor of early modern society. Nevertheless he did not use the term ‘underclass’.

So despite the example of Myrdal, very few writers used the term ‘underclass’ before the mid-1970s. It is possible, of course that this was simply a difference of language, and that the same ideas were expressed through different labels. However, the shift in language was more significant than this implies. Several reasons can be put forward to account for it. First, politicians, whether Democrat or Republican, continued to accept the ideological premises that underlay the ‘War on Poverty’ – the conservative argument that welfare programmes helped develop and maintain an underclass was not evident in this period. Second, the economy remained comparatively buoyant, and this masked the need for fundamental change in the older heavy industries. Third, poverty in the inner cities seemed to be less intense than it was later to become, and was not viewed as a growing racial problem – possibly because more affluent blacks had not yet migrated to the suburbs. Fourth, commentators were less concerned about aspects of behaviour – violent crime, illegitimacy, and welfare dependency – that were later to be viewed as hallmarks of the underclass. The result was that within the academic community, discussion focused on the culture of poverty debate, with the reference point being Oscar Lewis rather than Gunnar Myrdal.

For much of the 1970s, the underclass debate was fairly quiet. However, by the late 1970s, recession and unemployment meant there was a disillusionment with the idea that social welfare could achieve a process of social engineering. Rapid decline of the older heavy industries and an obvious worsening of the condition of the poorest challenged the belief in inexorable economic progress. The recession of the early 1980s increased the proportion of the population in poverty in the United States of America, from 11.7 per cent in 1979, to 15.2 per cent in 1983. In this situation, the re-emergence of the underclass as an important theme in public discourse was arguably inevitable. As in the 1960s, it provided a means of portraying, in dramatic form, the effects of technological and economic change on those at the bottom of the class system. But in the 1970s, Myrdal’s concept was also to be transformed in intellectual and ideological terms, so that by the end of the decade it had become a behavioural term for poor people, mainly black, who behaved in ways that were viewed as criminal, deviant, or simply different from the middle class.

The way that Oscar Lewis’s work on the culture of poverty was reinterpreted by conservative commentators such as Edward Banfield was
an early example of this process. Then, in August 1977, for reasons that remain unclear, but were linked to a spate of looting in New York, *Time* magazine decided to feature the underclass as its cover story. Much of the content was a descriptive account of the minority poor in large-scale cities, accompanied by a series of photographs that featured blacks and Hispanics. Although the *Time* journalist did not link the characteristics of the underclass with a definition, the emphasis on behaviour was a departure from Myrdal. The definition of the underclass was vague, but several points stood out. In the mind of the writer, the underclass was a subset of the poor; it was urban; it was prone to crime and violence; its family structures were weak; and it had values that could be regarded as deviant. For instance, the *Time* article noted that:

... out there is a different world, a place of pock-marked streets, gutted tenements and broken hopes. Behind its crumbling walls lives a large group of people who are more intractable, more socially alien and more hostile than almost anyone had imagined. They are the unreachables: the American underclass.14

The writer noted that in cities like Chicago and New York, the underclass had been hit by the movement of manufacturing firms to the suburbs and the sunbelt. It was jobs, improvements to education, and training projects embracing partnerships between the federal government and private business that were needed most.

The *Time* article did not succeed in generating a public debate about the emergence of an underclass. Only in 1981, with the publication of the three-part article by Ken Auletta, did the underclass debate really take off. Initially appearing in the *New Yorker* magazine, these ideas gained a wider readership in the book that Auletta published in 1982. Based on the case study of the Wildcat Skills Training Center in New York, Auletta concentrated on the behaviour and characteristics of the underclass, and it was this that gave his writing a greater impact. He cleverly moved between individual case studies of those who attended the life skills class, and more general comments on the emergence of the underclass. Auletta claimed that there was no doubt that an underclass did exist. There had always been beggars, criminals, and damaged individuals that had operated outside the normal boundaries of society. At the same time, something new seemed to be happening. What was disputed were the causes of this phenomenon. Those on the Left claimed that the underclass was the victim of much larger economic forces, while those on the Right said the problems were caused essentially by the behaviour of individuals. In reality, claimed Auletta, there were as many causes of the underclass as ‘there are combinations of notes on a piano keyboard’.15

How big was the underclass, and was it a growing problem? Auletta acknowledged that this depended partly on the way the term was defined. In 1979, there were 25m Americans classified as poor, of whom it was
estimated 30 per cent were ‘acutely poor’. Other estimates based on studies of poverty dynamics claimed that around 45 per cent (9.5m people) were the long-term poor. Including the unemployed, those with mental illness, or those who lacked support networks would raise the figure still higher. Earlier work by Oscar Lewis and Edward Banfield, among others, had produced estimates of between 1 and 20 per cent. Auletta argued the underclass was made up of four distinct groups. First came street criminals. Next were mothers whose dependency on welfare had become a way of life. The third group were ‘hustlers’ who earned a living in the black economy. Finally there were the ‘traumatised’, including patients released from mental asylums into the community. But the example of the street criminals and the hustlers showed that members of the underclass were not necessarily poor. The underclass could be defined as much through behaviour as simple lack of income. What was not in doubt were the effects of the underclass. Auletta wrote, for instance, that ‘members of the underclass are responsible for a disproportionate amount of the crime, the welfare costs, the unemployment, and the hostility which beset many American communities’.

Auletta was concerned not just to describe the underclass, but also to see what might be done about it. He argued that policy-makers needed to agree on the nature of the problem. If it was an issue of racial and economic discrimination, then clearly structural changes were necessary. If it was a problem of behaviour linked to a culture of poverty, there was little that could be done. If it was assumed the causes were varied and complex, there was a midway position between revolution and resignation. In reality, argued Auletta, it was difficult to agree on what to do about the underclass because there was no agreement on the causes of the problem and its scale. The Left believed in fundamental economic and social change, the Right favoured intervention by business, and there was also a laissez-faire option. John Macnicol has observed that one of the enduring features of the underclass debate has been the recurring call for more research. For Auletta, this meant study of the medical and biological causes of the underclass, rather than its economic, sociological, and psychological background. He concluded that ‘one of the few subjects about which there is a consensus is the need for further research in the underclass’.

If Auletta provided a readable but superficial account of the underclass, rather in the tradition of picaresque writing, Nicholas Lemann offered an analysis of the emergence of an underclass that was arguably more convincing. Published in the Atlantic Monthly in 1986, the location for Lemann’s case study was the South Side and West Side of Chicago, and the Robert Taylor Homes housing project where some 20,000 people lived. Lemann was interested in the way in which the existence of a black underclass culture might be linked to the migration of sharecroppers from the South, and subsequent changes in the composition of ghetto areas. Lemann wondered how the two versions of black life fitted together, and concluded that there was a divide in black America, a split between a middle
class and an underclass that never made it. He argued that his study of a
ghetto showed:

The black underclass did not just spring into being over the past twenty
years. Every aspect of the underclass culture in the ghettos is directly
traceable to roots in the South – and not the South of slavery but the
South of a generation ago. In fact, there seems to be a strong correlation
between underclass status in the North and a family background in the
nascent underclass of the sharecropper South.20

Lemann pointed out that the first wave of migration from the rural South
to the urban North occurred in the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s. The effect of
this migration north was to transfer the black societies of small southern
towns to Chicago. The second wave began in the late 1960s, when the black
working and middle classes began to migrate out of the Chicago ghettos
to the suburbs. Around 1970, for instance, the composition of the ghettos
changed from being exclusively black to exclusively black lower class, and
there was no alternative to the ‘venerable, but always carefully contained,
disorganised side of the ghetto culture’.21 Several factors then turned the small
underclass from the South into the large separate culture that it had become,
and facilitated a descent into ‘social disorganisation’. Lemann suggested that
in Chicago, the area of North Lawndale showed these processes at work –
first, the migration north; next the migration from the ghettos; finally the
decline into disorganization.

In the second part of his article, Lemann tackled the question of what could
be done about a culture that appeared to be self-sustaining.22 He reiterated
that the problems that seemed overwhelming – illegitimacy, unemployment,
crime, and poor educational achievement – had existed in the ghettos for half
a century. Until the late 1960s, when the middle class migrated from inner-
city areas, these problems had been kept in check. Indeed, ghetto culture was
defended as being a rational response to economic and social circumstances.
Community development, Lemann claimed, was the most appealing idea,
since this could tackle both cultural and economic problems. The key theme
should be integration, since the ghettos were the product of years of complete
segregation from the neighbourhoods, schools, economy, and values of the
rest of the country. Lemann concluded ‘people don’t like living in ghettos.
They want to get out. Society should be pushing them in that direction’.23

Leaving aside the article in Time magazine, it was only in the early 1980s
that the underclass debate really took off. As had happened in London a
century earlier, articles in popular magazines served to provoke more serious
academic study. Together, the articles in the New Yorker and the Atlantic
Monthly provide a clear summary of the main themes of the two sides of the
underclass debate. Auletta’s insistence that the underclass could be defined
as much by behaviour as by income was in the tradition of Oscar Lewis and
others, and set off a chain of writing by commentators that could broadly be
identified with the New Right. The work of Lemann, in contrast, associated underclass behaviour with changes in the social composition of American cities, and in the nature of southern black cultural patterns, and anticipated that of William Julius Wilson. Thus these two early articles contained the essence of the two strands of the underclass debate. They were to raise fundamental questions about the nature of economic change, the social composition of American cities, the effects of welfare on behaviour, and about patterns of racial segregation.

We will turn first to the position that defined the underclass in terms of the behaviour of its members. But before that it is necessary to examine briefly the work of one of its most influential writers – Charles Murray. Arguably the most influential book on social policy published in America in the 1980s was Murray’s *Losing Ground* (1984). This was a brilliantly argued polemic against liberal assumptions about the American welfare programmes of the 1960s. Murray’s point was that, through encouraging patterns of dependency and deterring people from working, welfare was part of the problem rather than the solution. Murray argued, for example, that basic indicators of well-being took a turn for the worse in the 1960s, most noticeably in the case of the poor. The causes of this phenomenon were rather surprising. In Murray’s words, the poor responded, as they always had, to the world as they found it. But what had been changed were the rules that governed their behaviour. He claimed that the poor were encouraged to behave in ways that were advantageous in the short term but destructive in the long term. Second, social policy masked these long-term losses, and subsidized mistakes that ultimately could not be corrected. Thus Murray argued that ‘steps to relieve misery can create misery’, and a moral dilemma underlay the history of American social policy between 1950 and 1980.24

Murray’s analysis reflected his unconventional academic background. He had studied Russian politics at Harvard University, and then worked in Thailand, initially for the Peace Corps and then for the US Agency for International Development. In the mid-1970s, he was employed on an evaluation of Great Society programmes. The research for *Losing Ground* was funded by the conservative think-tank, the Manhattan Institute. Important criticisms were made of Murray’s radical interpretation.25 But Murray’s arguments were influential. His argument was that the rules and regulations that governed entitlement to benefits and services must reward those activities and attributes which should be encouraged, and penalize those that need to be discouraged. Otherwise they would lead people to damage themselves and the communities in which they lived.

Murray only mentioned the underclass in passing. He wrote that ‘if the behaviours of members of the underclass are founded on a rational appreciation of the rules of the game, and as long as the rules encourage dysfunctional values and behaviours, the future cannot look bright’. However, the impact of *Losing Ground* was to focus attention on the apparently intractable nature of trends in unemployment and out-of-wedlock births. In many
ways, it served to strengthen the behavioural interpretation of the underclass advanced by Ken Auletta. Clement Cottingham, for example, argued that, as some Marxists had predicted, technological change had seen the emergence of a redundant black and Hispanic underclass. It lay at the bottom of the urban class system, and seemed unable to adapt to the requirements of an advanced industrial society. The problems of the underclass included very low incomes, erratic employment patterns, low levels of skills, and limited access to education and social services. To these, Cottingham added what he called ‘defective familial and individual socialisation processes’, claiming that these had existed for generations. The problem, then, was not just poverty, but the fact that patterns of deprivation showed continuities between generations. And there was a high degree of disconnectedness from family and economic institutions. Cottingham’s pathological analysis recalled some of the writing of the Chicago School in the 1920s. He wrote that, trapped in homogeneous ghettos, the underclass suffered from ‘nutritional, health, neurological, or organic afflictions associated with densely populated, poverty-ridden, inner-city, urban environments’.27

This interpretation was supported in some of the academic research commissioned through the National Research Council’s Committee on National Urban Policy. It had been established in February 1981, to carry out a 4-year study. Kenneth B. Clark, author of *Dark Ghetto* (1960), and Richard P. Nathan, an academic at the Urban and Regional Research Centre at Princeton, contributed a chapter on the underclass to its first annual report. They agreed with Auletta that the underclass was not simply distinguished by lack of income, arguing ‘the people in this group generally lack education, experience in the labour market, literacy skills, mobility options, and stable family relationships’.28 What made the problem particularly serious was that underclass status appeared to be a permanent condition. Clark and Nathan identified some of the key questions and tasks. In particular, they tried to use multiple indicators from the 1980 census to answer the questions they had posed. They claimed, for example, that the underclass was concentrated in large cities, especially in the North Eastern and Northern states. Evidence on welfare dependency among black families suggested that poverty was passed to successive generations.29 Clark and Nathan hypothesized that:

The underclass appears to be walled off from the benefits of economic growth because of low earned incomes, low rates of labour force participation, and welfare dependency. People in the urban underclass are not geographically and occupationally mobile in a manner that enables them to respond to new opportunities, thus isolating them from the benefits of economic growth.30

Nonetheless they admitted that many of the questions they had posed could not be answered. Echoing Auletta, they argued that more research was needed.
In an article published 5 years later, Nathan, by then Professor of Public and International Affairs at the Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University, queried whether the problem of the underclass would ever be solved. He argued that underclass conditions were multifaceted – they were economic, behavioural, and geographically focused. Nonetheless Nathan maintained that the underclass was ‘a distinctively urban condition involving a hardened residual group that is difficult to reach and relate to’. On the question of solutions, Nathan was more optimistic, arguing that the principles of new-style workfare offered an important way forward. The principle was that welfare dependency was bad for people; it undermined their motivation to support themselves; and it isolated and stigmatized welfare recipients.

The approach taken by George Cabot Lodge and William R. Glass was to ask what business could do for disintegrated urban communities. Both were associated with the Harvard Business School. They looked at the potential of neighbourhood organizations, organizations that could channel funds, co-operative efforts sponsored by the federal government, semi-governmental development organizations, and direct corporate intervention. Their analysis was that the underclass had to be reintegrated into social and economic life, but they conceded the task was not an easy one. Private businesses would have to show commitment, but also have a strong community perspective, and corporations should co-operate with other organizations, while at the same time leading the federal government. Nevertheless Cabot Lodge and Glass still used a behavioural definition. They wrote that ‘disproportionately black, Hispanic, and young – although by no means exclusively so – the underclass is composed of single mothers, high school dropouts, drug addicts, and street criminals’.

A writer whose analysis fitted this frame was Myron Magnet. His warning was that the problems that characterized underclass communities – ‘urban knots that threaten to become enclaves of permanent poverty and vice’ – could affect the larger society. The underclass comprised around 5m people, a relatively small proportion of the 33m Americans with incomes below the poverty line. What distinguished this group for Magnet was its behaviour – ‘their chronic lawlessness, drug use, out-of-wedlock births, nonwork, welfare dependency, and school failure’. It was both a state of mind and a way of life, as much a cultural as an economic condition. One cause was that identified by Lemann and later elaborated by William Julius Wilson, the flight of the middle class and respectable working class from the ghettos, leaving behind the unsuccessful who gave themselves up to underclass behaviour. A second was that highlighted by Charles Murray – a welfare system that allegedly encouraged cohabiting, out-of-wedlock births, and unemployment. Magnet’s proposed solutions included a consensus on welfare reform that embraced workfare, and specific measures targeted at children.

Gaither Loewenstein, from Lamar University, argued that it was unemployed young people who constituted the new underclass in the United States. As young people became increasingly aware that they were confined
to a secondary labour market, and had limited chances for upward career mobility, they took on behavioural characteristics normally associated with the underclass. These included ‘low self esteem, present orientation (inability to plan for the future), high incidence of social alienation, low aspirations and a propensity towards deviant behaviour, such as alcohol and drug misuse and sexual promiscuity’. In forming this argument, Loewenstein drew on labour market segmentation theory, the concept of a dual labour market, and the culture of poverty. The hypothesis was tested through a quantitative analysis of government statistics, interviews with the unemployed, and life histories. However, Loewenstein claimed there were important differences between this new phenomenon and the classic underclass. First, patterns of the new underclass were cyclical; second, the parents of the children were workers who were relatively well-off, and who had contributed to a sense of relative deprivation in their children; third, not all these young people had fallen into the ranks of the permanent underclass.

Others acknowledged that defining the underclass was difficult, but continued nonetheless to develop definitions based on behavioural criteria rather than income. Erol Ricketts and Isabel Sawhill, for example, developed a definition of the underclass that was essentially based on behaviour, and used this to estimate its size and composition using the 1980 census. Rickets was a Sociology Professor at the City University of New York, while Sawhill was a Senior Fellow at the Urban Institute. They defined the underclass as ‘people whose behaviour departs from these norms [attending school, delaying parenthood, adult men and women in regular work, and being law-abiding] and in the process creates significant social costs’. Thus it followed that an underclass area was one where the proportion of people engaged in these behaviours was significantly different from the average for the population as a whole. They focused on high school dropouts; males aged 16 and over not regularly working; welfare recipients; and female heads of households. Ricketts and Sawhill concluded that in 1980, 2.5m people, or about 1 per cent of the population of the United States, lived in underclass areas, which were overwhelmingly urban.

One of the main efforts on the part of the research community was the Social Science Research Council’s Committee for Research on the Urban Underclass. Papers given at a conference held in October 1989 were subsequently published by the Brookings Institution. Many of these looked in great detail at the economic situation of the underclass and at issues such as racial segregation. Yet for Christopher Jencks, the underclass was synonymous with what was previously called the lower class – both were characterized by unemployment, poor literacy, out-of-wedlock births, violence, and despair. His argument was that the underclass could be defined in various ways: according to income, where that income came from, cultural skills, and moral norms. Thus it was possible there was an impoverished underclass; a jobless male underclass; a jobless female underclass; an educational underclass; a violent underclass; and a reproductive underclass.
Despite the work of Myrdal, there was not much mention of the underclass in the 1960s and early 1970s. Even books that looked at related themes, such as that by Leggett, chose not to use the term ‘underclass’. In other respects, the focus was on the culture of poverty and the work of Oscar Lewis. This began to change with the *Time* article of 1977, and in particular following the publication of the Auletta articles in 1981. But the change was not just in the use of the word ‘underclass’, but in what was meant by that term. Here the work of Murray, and the argument advanced in *Losing Ground*, seemed to have a decisive impact. The argument now had a novel dimension: that it was the welfare system that was to blame rather than people themselves. By the 1980s, the meaning of the term ‘underclass’ had changed significantly. The focus was less on welfare and more on people. In the words of William Julius Wilson, the dominant image had become ‘one of people with serious character flaws entrenched by a welfare subculture and who have only themselves to blame for their social position in society’.\(^40\)

But those who favoured this interpretation did not have it all their own way. Other observers agreed an underclass was emerging in American cities, but gave precedence to structural rather than behavioural causes. They argued that if cultural factors were at work, they were evidence of an adaptive response to a wider environment, rather than evidence of a separate subculture. It was an argument that built on Lemann’s points about successive waves of migration, first north to the cities and then from the inner cities to the suburbs, but also went back to the work of Lee Rainwater and Ulf Hannerz in the late 1960s. These commentators tended to link the underclass more closely with economic change and income, and to emerging patterns of racial segregation in the inner cities. In this scenario, the underclass was the outcome of social and economic change, the result of which was that a significant minority had become economically redundant. This version of the concept was espoused by economists such as John Kasarda, radical black academics like Douglas Glasgow, and liberal scholars such as William Julius Wilson. Wilson’s contribution to the debate was particularly interesting, in that he argued that scholars should move beyond the old dichotomy between structural and cultural interpretations.

The influence of this view was evident in some of the earliest official reports on the underclass. In October 1979, President Jimmy Carter had established the President’s Commission for a National Agenda for the Eighties. One panel was on Policies and Prospects for Metropolitan and Non-metropolitan America. Its report (published in 1982), on urban America in the 1980s, was one of the most controversial. Interestingly, though the report appeared amid the controversy aroused by the Auletta articles, its chapter on the underclass viewed the issue almost entirely in economic terms. Its solutions included retraining those whose skills had become redundant or obsolete, with the report employing the appropriate industrial metaphor of assisted mid-life retooling. Another key suggestion was that of internal migration, in order to improve access to economic opportunities. The report
stated that public policies should seek to loosen the ties between distressed people and distressed places.41

This analysis closely followed that of sociologists and economists. The work of John Kasarda, a sociologist based at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, served to highlight the wider structural trends that allegedly provided the background to the growth of the underclass. Kasarda argued that cities were experiencing important changes in their functions, in that they were moving from being manufacturing to predominantly service industries. Change was also evident in their demographic make-up, in that the residents were now predominantly blacks and Hispanics. As the number of jobs decreased, the white middle class had moved to the suburbs, while there was a developing gap between the jobs that did exist and the skill levels of the disadvantaged residents. This process had particularly affected cities in the northern industrial belt, such as New York and Chicago. The result was that low-income communities had become spatially isolated, and these cities were characterized by urban poverty. Moreover, federal urban programmes had had little effect. Kasarda wrote that many people found themselves ‘socially, economically, and spatially isolated in segregated inner-city wastelands, where they subsist on a combination of government handouts and their own informal economies’.42

The underclass concept was also drawn on by radical black writers, the earliest of whom actually preceded the Auletta New Yorker articles. Douglas Glasgow, for example, had initially gathered data in the Los Angeles suburb of Watts following the riots in 1965, and completed a follow-up study in 1975. Professor of Social Welfare and former Dean of the School of Social Work at Howard University, Glasgow wrote:

Over the past fifteen years, the nation’s inner cities have witnessed the growth and consolidation of a population of poor and unused Black youth, confined in economic poverty and social decay. A significantly younger population than the poor of previous generations, these young Blacks, some as young as thirteen or fourteen, are already earmarked for failure – they are undereducated, jobless, without saleable skills or the social credentials to gain access to mainstream life.43

Glasgow’s aims were to see what institutional rejection could do to individual aspirations; to identify the structural factors responsible for the development of an underclass; and to see why attempts to improve the life of the poor in the inner-city had failed. Thus for Glasgow the key themes in the formation of a black underclass were a declining domestic market, technological change, an increasing reliance on overseas labour leading to a decline in entry-level jobs, and institutional racism.44

Glasgow noted that, almost unnoticed, the term ‘underclass’ had become part of a national vocabulary, conveying the message that another problematic group required society’s help. Although poorly defined, and
thought by some as undeserving of serious attention, he maintained there was ‘a permanently entrapped population of poor persons, unused and unwanted, accumulated in various parts of the country’. Large numbers of blacks were persistently poor and unable to move, and the fact that these problems persisted from one generation to the next meant they were long term in nature. A further feature identified by Glasgow was a lack of connections with social institutions, such as unions, the civil service, banks, and credit unions. He claimed the underclass was distinguished from the lower class by its lack of mobility rather than its moral unworthiness – its members were not necessarily lacking in aspirations or motivations to achieve. In fact, wrote Glasgow, many of the long-term poor, employed at a bare subsistence level, were essentially part of the underclass. For these reasons, the key issue was employment and jobs the solution, both inside and outside the inner city. He argued that ‘no amount of social rehabilitation, community participation, or motivational programs will substitute for being able to earn a way with self-respect’.

Glasgow thus located the underclass in relation to wider structural changes in technology and the economy, while at the same time arguing that it was a problem of cultural isolation and intergenerational transmission. It was difficult to separate the underclass from the long-term poor. Glasgow’s position and arguments were reinforced by similar views expressed by other writers. Alphonso Pinkney’s *The Myth of Black Progress* (1984) was an influential work in the early 1980s. For Pinkney, the most obvious characteristics of the underclass were its poverty, including youth unemployment, and the social decay in which it lived. Like Glasgow, he thought that one of the characteristics of the underclass was that it had few organizational ties. But Pinkney was more willing to link it with an urban street culture in which drugs, dropping out of high school before graduation, and standing on street corners featured prominently. It was an analysis that Pinkney acknowledged was similar to that advanced by Elliot Liebow in *Tally’s Corner*.

The most important contributor to the underclass debate in the United States has arguably been William Julius Wilson, Professor of Sociology at the University of Chicago. Wilson had written that in the 1970s, economic class had become more important than race in securing employment and occupational mobility. He estimated that in 1974 around 31 per cent of the underclass had been black; and by 1978, a third of the entire black population was in the underclass. But it was in the 1980s that Wilson made his most distinctive contribution to the underclass debate. One of Wilson’s points was that following the debate about the Moynihan Report (1965), liberals had left discussion of these issues to the conservatives. Liberals avoided ascribing any behaviour that could be regarded as unflattering or stigmatizing to the residents of the ghetto. In fact, they refused to acknowledge the term ‘underclass’, and emphasized selective evidence that denied its existence. While they acknowledged that there had been important changes in the
inner city, they argued that racism provided the explanation. Wilson argued that the liberal perspective on the underclass became less influential and persuasive because many of its advocates failed to address straightforwardly the rise of social pathologies in the ghetto.49 The combined effect was to render liberal arguments ineffective, and to enhance the arguments of the conservatives, even though these had their own problems of interpretation and analysis. Whereas the most influential arguments in the 1960s had been by liberals, in the 1980s they were by conservatives. But Wilson claimed that these amounted to little more than the application of Lewis’s culture of poverty theory to the ghetto underclass. Although Lewis had noted the effect of structure, conservatives focused on the links between cultural traditions, family history, and individual character. The change in the 1980s, illustrated by Losing Ground, was that conservatives also now argued that the problems were exacerbated by liberal social policy.50

Wilson’s declared aim was to show how the liberal perspective might be refocused to challenge the dominant conservative views about the ghetto underclass, and provide a more balanced intellectual discussion. He concluded that liberals would have to propose explanations of the rise in inner-city social dislocations that emphasized the dynamic interplay between cultural characteristics and social and economic opportunities. The task for liberals was to produce an alternative or competing view of the underclass that was more rooted in empirical research and theory.51 Wilson pointed out that poverty in the United States had become more urban, more concentrated, and more firmly entrenched in large cities, especially the older industrial cities with large and highly segregated black and Hispanic residents. This increase in ghetto poverty was mainly confined to cities in the Northeast and Midwest. Wilson’s argument was that historical discrimination and a migration to large cities that kept the urban minority population relatively young created a problem of weak labour force attachment among urban blacks. Especially since 1970, this had made them particularly vulnerable to the industrial and geographical changes in the economy. These problems were particularly severe in the ghetto neighbourhoods of large cities, because the poorest people lived there, and because the areas had become less diversified. Since 1970, inner-city neighbourhoods had experienced a migration of middle and working-class families to the suburbs. Combined with the increase in the number of poor caused by rising joblessness, this meant that poverty was more sharply concentrated in these areas. The number of inner-city neighbourhoods with poverty rates above 40 per cent had increased dramatically.52

One of the interesting aspects of this analysis was how Wilson dealt with changes in behaviour. He conceded that by the 1980s there was a large subpopulation of low-income families and individuals whose behaviour was different to that of the general population. In contrast, and in the years before 1960, inner-city communities had shown signs of social organization. People had a sense of community, they identified with their neighbourhood,
and they adopted norms and sanctions against behaviour they regarded as wrong. Wilson argued that the central problem of the underclass was unemployment that was reinforced by an increasing social isolation in impoverished neighbourhoods. What he called ‘weak labour-force attachment’ was caused by two factors: macrostructural changes in the wider society and economy, and the social milieu of individuals. Cultural values emerged from specific circumstances, life chances, and class structure. Like other writers in the 1960s, he argued that culture and behaviour were an adaptive response to the circumstances in which individuals found themselves. Wilson wrote, for example, that:

if ghetto underclass minorities have limited aspirations, a hedonistic orientation toward time, or lack of plans for the future, such outlooks ultimately are the result of restricted opportunities and feelings of resignation originating from bitter personal experience and a bleak future.53

Wilson further clarified how his approach differed from the culture of poverty as defined by Oscar Lewis. He noted that it was the cultural-transmission aspect of the thesis that had received most attention, and Ulf Hannerz had made the point that Lewis had failed to distinguish between causes and symptoms. He had not separated objective poverty created by structural constraints, and culture as people trying to cope with objective poverty. The notion of the culture of poverty was thus used in a diluted sense as a ‘whole way of life’, and the emphasis was on the modes of behaviour learnt in the community.54 Wilson preferred the term ‘social isolation’, arguing that reducing structural inequalities would decrease the frequency of ghetto practices, and also restrict the way that they were spread. The transmission of these practices was part of what Wilson called ‘concentration effects’ – that is, the effects of living in an impoverished neighbourhood. With regard to the social milieu of individuals, Wilson wrote that:

a social context that includes poor schools, inadequate job information networks, and a lack of legitimate employment opportunities not only gives rise to weak labour-force attachment, but increases the probability that individuals will be constrained to seek income derived from illegal or deviant activities.55

It followed, then, that the problems of the underclass could be most meaningfully addressed by a comprehensive programme that combined employment and social welfare policies, and featured universal rather than race- or group-specific measures. Macroeconomic policy should include child support, family allowances, and a child care strategy. Wilson was opposed to workfare-style solutions.56 He wrote that the challenge for liberal policymakers was to enhance life chances for the ghetto underclass
by emphasizing programmes ‘to which the more advantaged groups of all class and racial backgrounds can positively relate’.57

With regard to the concept of the underclass itself, Wilson was aware that its meaning had changed significantly, as it had come to be focused on behaviour. Some scholars argued it was not scientifically useful, and should be dropped altogether. However, he argued that to ignore the term ‘underclass’ in favour of more neutral terms such as ‘working class’ was in his opinion to ‘fail to address one of the most important social transformations in recent United States history’.58 Changes had taken place in ghetto neighbourhoods, and the groups left behind were different to those that had lived there in earlier years. It was difficult to describe these trends accurately if the term ‘underclass’ was rejected. At times, Wilson used the alternative term ‘ghetto poor’.59 But while accepting the arguments of those who argued that the term ‘underclass’ should be dropped, he maintained that the underclass could be defined. He reaffirmed that ‘what distinguishes members of the underclass from those of other economically disadvantaged groups is that their marginal economic position or weak attachment to the labour force is uniquely reinforced by the neighbourhood or social milieu’.60

The importance of Wilson’s contribution has been that it has attempted to combine structural and cultural interpretations. Yet Douglas S. Massey and Nancy A. Denton, from the Universities of Chicago and New York, pointed out that major gaps in knowledge remain. No study had tested Wilson’s hypothesis that the degree of spatial separation between poor and non-poor minority families has increased, and that this helped explain the rising concentration of poverty. They argued that race and racial segregation held the key to understanding the underclass and urban poverty. Racial segregation rather than class segregation was the crucial factor. Rejecting the notion of a culture of poverty, Massey and Denton argued that residential segregation had created a structural niche, and within this a culture of segregation had arisen and flourished. They claimed this resolved several issues in the underclass debate. It explained why the underclass is composed of blacks and Puerto Ricans; it explained why it was confined to the Northeast and the Midwest; and it was also consistent with research showing that upper-income blacks remain highly segregated from whites. Thus Massey and Denton concluded racial segregation should be the central focus of the underclass debate.61

The result of this increasing agnosticism regarding the term underclass was that writers interested in poverty in the inner-city preferred to use the term ‘ghetto poor’. Paul A. Jargowsky and Mary Jo Bane, for example, suggested that there were various concepts of poverty – persistent poverty, linked to long periods of time; neighbourhood poverty, associated with geographically defined areas; and underclass poverty, seen in terms of attitudes and behaviour. But Jargowsky and Bane did not attempt to define or measure the underclass. Instead they defined ghettos and counted the ghetto poor in all metropolitan areas. A ghetto was defined as being an area
in which the overall poverty rate in a census tract was greater than 40 per cent – the ghetto poor were those who lived in these areas. Measured in this way, the number of ghetto poor in the United States increased by 29.5 per cent between 1970 and 1980. To an extent this supported the Wilson thesis, since the dynamics of these areas suggested that the increase in ghetto poverty was caused by movements of the non-poor out of areas which in 1970 had been mixed income. But in the four cities Jargowsky and Bane studied – Cleveland, Memphis, Milwaukee, and Philadelphia – the processes by which they became, stopped being, or stayed ghettos were complex.62

Despite the popularity of the term ‘underclass’ in the United States, from the outset some commentators remained sceptical, pointing out it was more a mirage than a moral threat. Data taken from the Michigan Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) survey has played a central role in these debates, and deserves to be looked at more thoroughly. The PSID is a longitudinal survey on family economic status that is co-ordinated from the Survey Research Center at the University of Michigan. It is based on repeated annual interviews with a sample (or panel) of 5,000 American families. Some have claimed that the PSID data shows the dangers of using cross-sectional data to draw conclusions about the extent and causes of change. However, the early results showed that there was much turnover in the low-income population. While many people were forced to have recourse to welfare at some point in their lives, very few were dependent on it for extended periods of time. And evidence indicated that there was little association between people’s behavioural patterns or attitudes and economic success.63 All of this therefore served to cast doubt on the existence of an underclass.

The PSID data serves as an introduction to a third group of commentators – those who were agnostic in that they believed the underclass was a theoretical possibility, but could find no empirical evidence. Reviewing Auletta’s book in 1983, for example, Douglas Muzzio argued that discussion of the underclass had always been characterized by the vague and shifting nature of the term. Based at Baruch College, at the City University of New York, Muzzio pointed out that there had always been underclasses in American society, and periodic outbursts of concern about the extent and effects of severe poverty. Above all, the failure to define the term ‘underclass’ meant that confusion and misunderstanding were guaranteed, with explanations spanning a spectrum from Marxism to Social Darwinism. For Muzzio the more interesting question was why the debate persisted. He suggested the answer lay in the way it served as a useful weapon in much bigger political and ideological battles. In his view, the underclass generated more commitment than detachment.64

Other observers pointed out that the term ‘underclass’ covered too many disparate groups of people, and thereby inflated their numbers. William Kornblum thought the key questions were whether the diverse population of the underclass formed a homogeneous group with its own institutions and culture of poverty, and what policies should be adopted to deal with
Kornblum provided some case studies of typical members, but suggested restricting the use of the term to people below the poor:

in that they cannot survive unharmed for any length of time by themselves, because they lack both material resources and the ability to organise their lives. They are the people who are outside both the class system of capitalist production and any local community.65

To his mind, criminals and the poor should not be included in a definition of the underclass. Kornblum noted that, in the hands of conservatives, the culture of poverty thesis too easily became an excuse for ignoring the issue. His proposed solutions embraced community-based education and training opportunities, and improved employment in working-class areas.

Like Kornblum, Emmett D. Carson thought that it was community-based self-help strategies that could do most to change the attitudes of the underclass and enable its members to take advantage of the opportunities that existed. However, Carson, who had completed a Princeton PhD thesis on the underclass, agreed it was not a homogeneous group, but was composed of subgroups that were defined as ‘any group of economically disadvantaged individuals who display a common deviant behaviour, and who also possess specific deviant attitudes with respect to the behaviour they display’.66 One programme with ex-offenders had used criteria based on low incomes (economic status), deviant activity (behaviour), and asocial attitudes towards work (attitudes). However, like the PSID team, Carson argued that it was not possible to decide if attitudes caused behaviour or behaviour caused attitudes. He argued that there needed to be better understanding of the dynamics of the underclass before any government programmes aimed at helping its members could be devised. It was too early to settle on self-help strategies that tried to help the black population, but limited the role of government to reducing discrimination and promoting full employment.67

Others shared the concerns that these writers expressed regarding problems in defining the underclass. Robert Aponte, a colleague of William Julius Wilson at the University of Chicago, pointed out that the term had never been defined, despite 30 years of sporadic use. Aponte was particularly critical of the behavioural definition advanced by Ricketts and Sawhill, asking to what extent the underclass really represented a class, and what evidence there was of turnover. Aponte himself preferred a definition based on persistent poverty.68 The academics Sheldon Danziger and Peter Gottschalk agreed with William Julius Wilson that a reduction in segregation and a rise in the living standards of some blacks had enabled the middle class to move out of inner-city neighbourhoods. Nevertheless they pointed out that although Wilson had put forward an attractive argument, much of it had not been tested. They accepted that changes had occurred in the spatial concentration of poverty, but argued that it was not possible to
answer the question of whether they had contributed to the development of an underclass among the black poor.69 Danziger and Gottschalk, later based at the Universities of Michigan and Boston College, remained hesitant about using the term ‘underclass’. They argued that the popular American ideal that anyone who works hard could get ahead tended to foster the idea that those who did not were personally responsible for their situation. In fact, they claimed, people’s behaviour was much less important in determining income level than major economic changes.70

Walter W. Stafford and Joyce Ladner fit into the agnostic position, that the underclass is a theoretical possibility, but there is little hard evidence. Like Morris, they pointed out there were both similarities and differences between debates about a culture of poverty and debates about an underclass. In both cases, there was a widespread assumption that low-income groups could be reintegrated into society if they changed their behaviour, and that cultural and behavioural traits associated with poverty were transmitted between generations. They suggested the concepts had been promoted at times of racial tension, and that both had been characterized by broad generalizations about patterns of deviant behaviour based on limited observations. Nevertheless there were also important differences. In the underclass debate, the role of structural factors had been more prominent; there had been more serious attempts to shape and use the concept; and there was more emphasis on class differences within the black community. Furthermore, with the underclass, there had been more emphasis on dependency as a political concern; more explicit assumptions had been made about the relationship between racism and poverty; and blacks themselves had played a more prominent role in the promotion of the underclass concept.71

Importantly, Stafford and Ladner have pointed out that the debate has had a much wider political dimension. The underclass underwent a ‘claims-making process’, similar to that associated with medical breakthroughs, in which newspapers and magazines, policy institutes, and social scientists were all involved. The term gained popularity for three reasons: it was a broad term that easily stratified groups who appeared to be deviant; it enabled liberals to become involved again in debates about behaviour and dependency; and it encouraged wider participation in the debate about the norms and values of non-white populations. But they also suggested that despite the efforts of William Julius Wilson and others, definitions remained ‘value laden, concerning behaviour, and difficult to measure’.72 Measuring the underclass – through such variables as concentration and isolation, intergenerational welfare dependency, crime, marriage and families, and labour markets – was also problematic. Stafford and Ladner argued that some liberal proponents of the underclass concept were in fact reinforcing conservative assumptions about the poor and their behaviour.

Other writers were more hostile to the term ‘underclass’. Unlike the agnostics, who suggested there was a theoretical possibility but no evidence, the critics argued that the term had no scientific value or useful purpose.
This strand of the debate is more difficult to trace, since many of these commentators simply write about problems of urban poverty without mentioning the word ‘underclass’. But Adolph Reed, for example, then Professor of Political Science at Northwestern University, claimed in 1990 that the concept of the underclass was based on prejudice, focused on inner-city blacks and Hispanics, and concentrated on behavioural indicators. An important aspect was perceived deviance from behavioural norms, and it was for this reason that the term was attractive to so many different groups. Reed suggested that prejudice should be exposed, and efforts should concentrate on exploring the causes of poverty in the American political and economic system – on deindustrialization; inequalities of wealth, income, and opportunity; race and gender; and public policy. Policy changes should be fought for – in employment, housing, education, and drug rehabilitation. For Reed, the main problem was the poverty of discourse about poverty.73

Some writers maintained an outright opposition to the term ‘underclass’. Michael Sherraden, for example, argued that it was unclear who the underclass were, where its members were located, and when it emerged as a perceived social problem. More importantly, the phrase tended to set people apart and dehumanize them. Interestingly and unusually, Sherraden located the contemporary interest in the underclass in the longer-term context of the studies of the Jukes and Kallikak families in the late nineteenth century. In his view, the main shortcomings were that, like the concept of the culture of poverty, there was an exaggeration of the deep-seatedness of poverty, and second, that effects were emphasized rather than causes. Sherraden was based in the School of Social Work at Washington University. He advised social workers to avoid the word ‘underclass’ since in his opinion this had served to separate and to oppress the disadvantaged.74

In reality these different positions in the debate were more complex than this implies, since they tended to merge into one another. Often it was not possible to distinguish between analyses that had both structural and behavioural components. But a final, and distinctive, position on the underclass was occupied by those academic commentators who were hostile to the idea of an underclass, but interested in the functions the term had served. This is important in the context of this book since these writers acknowledged the longer-term history of these concepts, and they were interested in exploring the similarities and differences between them. Michael Morris, for example, Professor of Psychology at the University of New Haven, compared and contrasted the debates on the culture of poverty in the 1960s with those on the underclass in the 1980s. He suggested that both Left and Right had something to gain from a change in language, and suggested while the term ‘underclass’ remained flexible, changes in the wider political climate were unlikely to threaten its popularity.75 In the hands of these writers, the term ‘underclass’ became an important metaphor of social transformation.

As we noted in Chapter 5, Herbert Gans had been a contributor to this debate since the 1960s. He is well aware of how the meaning of underclass
had changed, from unemployment in the 1960s, to persistent poverty in the 1970s, and to behaviour in the 1980s. By the 1990s, he was Robert S. Lynd Professor of Sociology at Columbia University. Writing in the journal of the American Planning Association, Gans argued that for planners, the term had numerous dangers. These included its power as a buzzword, its use as a racial codeword, its flexibility, and its synthesizing function. It covered a number of different groups of people, and became a stereotype. Furthermore the term interfered with anti-poverty planning, was extremely persuasive, was associated with particular neighbourhoods, and was linked to the concentration and isolation hypothesis put forward by William Julius Wilson. Finally the term sidestepped issues of poverty, and was unpredictable in how it might be used. He argued that the term ‘underclass’ should be dropped, as it had become ‘hopelessly polluted in meaning, ideological overtone and implications’.

While Gans had become critical of the term ‘underclass’, he nonetheless continued to search for an alternative that might provide a suitable description of the changes that were occurring in the nature of work. His argument was that workers who had become marginalized when Myrdal was writing in the 1960s had become excluded from the post-industrial economy 30 years later. Gans speculated that they had become an undercaste, whose members were blamed for their joblessness and regarded as undeserving. Many people now faced the prospect that they would never be included in the formal labour market, and would spend all their working lives in the informal sector. As with those at the bottom of caste systems, they would be shunned by the rest of society, and have extremely limited chances of higher social status and mobility. Gans admitted that he wrote about an undercaste with some hesitation, since once the shock value had worn off, the basic problems with any form of alarmist terminology would become apparent. Both underclass and undercaste were umbrella terms, and the umbrella was ‘open to anyone who wishes to place new meanings, or a variety of stereotypes, accusations and stigmas under it’.

Subsequently, Herbert Gans looked at the longer history of terms like undeserving poor and underclass, and at the functions of these phrases as well as their causes. The undeserving poor, for example, had functions that were both positive and negative, adaptive and destructive. Among these Gans listed risk reduction, scapegoating and displacement, norm reinforcement, spatial purification, the reproduction of stigma and the stigmatized, and the extermination of the surplus. But the idea of the undeserving poor and the stigmas with which people were labelled persisted, he argued, because they were useful to people who are not poor.

Writing of the history of the underclass in the United States, the historian Michael Katz was critical of the phrase ‘underclass’. To his mind, the word had little intellectual substance, it reinforced the tradition of blaming the victim, and it was a concept that ‘muddies debate and inhibits the formulation of constructive policy’. The contributors to a book Katz edited...
did not manage to agree on a definition of the underclass, or even on how useful the term really was. They claimed that what united their work was a common concern with persistent and concentrated urban poverty. But Katz was also aware that there had always been attempts to distinguish between the able-bodied and impotent poor, and that these labels had had important functions. In the 1980s, conditions within the inner cities were new, they had complex causes, and they were perceived as a danger to the rest of society. But for the middle class, at least, the underclass was a comforting discovery. The perceived problem was small and concentrated enough to be helped or contained, and its prominence refocused attention on culture and behaviour, and away from income equality and the class structure. Katz claimed the concept served to focus attention on a subset of the poor, and it encouraged targeted approaches through reviving discredited notions of the culture of poverty. Elsewhere Katz claimed that the term ‘underclass’ was simply a metaphor of social transformation. It evoked three widely shared perceptions: of novelty, complexity, and danger.

British commentators were extremely interested in developments on the other side of the Atlantic. John Macnicol concluded of the underclass debate in the United States that it was ‘kaleidoscopic and multi-layered, operating on both an empirical and a symbolic level’. Writing in June 1990, Macnicol argued that the empirical evidence did not support the underclass interpretation. Like the Webbs and Stedman Jones, he argued that a massive stimulus of the old industrial sector would be accompanied by the disappearance of the underclass – as had happened during the Second World War. By 1994, Macnicol had altered his stance somewhat. He suggested the key questions were whether a new type of poverty was emerging, and, more controversially, over the question of causation. Macnicol made three points in relation to the United States – that it was not welfare that had caused the rise of single-parent families and new family forms, but changes in marital and reproductive behaviour; that unemployment was the most important factor destroying social life in inner-city communities; and that the economic trends were long-term ones originating well before the 1960s. He argued that if people allowed themselves to be swayed by the well-orchestrated campaign to popularize the welfare-created underclass model, they were in danger of misunderstanding ‘what may turn out to be the major item on the social agenda of the twenty-first century’.

Commentators seemed to adopt one of at least four positions. For many on the right, the underclass represented a group whose problems were essentially those of behaviour – illegitimacy, family breakdown, violent crime, and unemployment. This interpretation was strengthened by the distinctive contribution of Murray, in Losing Ground, which claimed that it was the social policies of the 1960s, rather than people themselves, that were to blame. The second position was typified by writers like William Julius Wilson, who tended to locate the emergence of the underclass in terms of structural factors such as shifts in employment trends and changes in the
spatial concentration of poverty in the inner cities. Wilson acknowledged that culture and behaviour was important, but like Rainwater and Hannerz in the late 1960s, he argued that underclass culture was an adaptive response to the social environment. A third group was attracted to the notion of an underclass, but argued there was no real empirical evidence. In the case of the PSID data, this tended to indicate that behaviour and attitudes were relatively unimportant, and that people moved in and out of poverty. Finally a fourth group was less interested whether there was empirical evidence for the existence of an underclass, and preferred instead to look at the functions of the term, seeing it much more as a metaphor for urban transformation. As we shall see in the next chapter, these positions were replicated almost exactly in the debate on the underclass in Britain. However, there were also important differences, of which arguably the most significant was the much less prominent role of race. It is to the experience of Britain that we now return.
The underclass debate in the United States was wide-ranging and multifaceted, raising fundamental questions about poverty, economic change, the effects of social policies adopted in the 1960s, and patterns of racial segregation in American cities. In earlier chapters we have noted that some underclass concepts did reflect an intellectual dialogue between America and Britain. This was most evident, for example, in the culture of poverty theory of the 1960s. At this time, social scientists were clearly interested in the ways that Oscar Lewis’s ideas might be applied in the British context. On the other hand, American commentators often seemed impervious to ideas generated on the other side of the Atlantic. This was certainly true of the concept of the problem family in the 1950s. There was little evidence that in developing the notion of the cycle of deprivation Sir Keith Joseph had in any way been influenced by the theory of the culture of poverty. Robert Moore has suggested that there are problems in applying the arguments of William Julius Wilson in the British context. First, Britain does not have an equivalent of the black ghettos of American cities. Second, the rise of the welfare state has implied a contract between capital and labour that makes it different from the more open and competitive American society.¹

Nevertheless, by the 1980s, in Britain the term ‘underclass’ had become part of a popular vocabulary in discussions of poverty and social change. The direct link was through Charles Murray. Writing in 1997, Andrew Adonis and Stephen Pollard suggested that ‘for all its drawbacks, the word underclass captures the essence of the class predicament for many at the bottom: a complete absence of ladders, whether basic skills, role models, education or a culture of work’.² As was the case in America, British commentators adopted several different stances on the underclass. Observers can be regarded as holding one of four basic positions. First, a ‘moral turpitude’ thesis that stressed behaviour and saw the underclass as threatening the moral and social order. This approach tended to be dominated by ideas of culture and
individualism, and was essentially a conservative analysis. Second, a position that was endorsed by some on the Left and accepted that an underclass had been created by structural factors in economic and social change. Third, a more agnostic view that acknowledged that there was a theoretical possibility of an underclass but no real empirical evidence. In arguing that more research was needed, their arguments sounded suspiciously like those of the Eugenics Society in search of the social problem group in the 1930s. And fourth, a position that rejected the concept outright, regarding it as politically dangerous, empirically unsupported, and theoretically confused. For them, the underclass was a kind of ideological red herring. This typology forms a framework for the analysis attempted here. But first we look more closely at the earlier history of the term ‘underclass’ in the British context.

The *Oxford English Dictionary* records that the Scottish communist John Maclean was one of the first to use the term ‘underclass’. In 1918, Maclean wrote that ‘the whole history of Society has proved that Society moves forward as a consequence of an under-class overcoming the resistance of a class on top of them’. This is rather different from the way that the term has been used since, in that the connotation was positive, and it was not clear that the underclass was necessarily at the bottom of society. Moreover, as we have seen in earlier chapters, the phrase ‘underclass’ was absent from subsequent discussions about the social problem group, the problem family, and the cycle of deprivation. These were seen as groups that were poor, as much through behaviour as lack of income, and there was a corresponding focus on mechanisms and processes, including an alleged inter-generational transmission of deprivation. Yet the type of neo-Marxist interpretation that was implied by the term ‘underclass’ was alien to these commentators – it implied a class interpretation of society that was not part of their mental outlook. There were times when observers came close to this position, as in discussions of the social residuum in the 1880s. But in general, it is not surprising that the term ‘underclass’ did not enter the lexicon of discussions of social change in Britain until the 1980s. It was only with the emergence of long-term unemployment that it appeared to offer an appropriate description for those apparently left behind by economic and social change.

In the mid-1960s, at least one British commentator endorsed Gunnar Myrdal’s argument that economic change and technological advances were threatening to create an underclass of under-educated and potentially unemployable people. Richard Titmuss, Professor of Social Administration at the London School of Economics, argued in 1965 that technological change was responsible for ‘the solidifying of a permanent underclass of deprived citizens, uneducated, unattached and alternating between apathetic resignation and frustrated violence’. But when the term ‘underclass’ was used in discussions of British society, it was usually in relation to the position of ethnic migrant workers. In a textbook on class structure published in 1973, Anthony Giddens argued that where ethnicity served as a disqualifying factor in the market, and where ethnic groups were concentrated in the poorest
paid jobs, or were unemployed or semi-employed, it was possible to talk about an underclass. Drawing on the research carried out by John Leggett in Detroit, Giddens argued that these distributive groupings were formed by neighbourhood clustering and by certain types of status group formation. However, their form varied according to differences in the size and density of urban areas, and in the social and political structures of capitalist societies. Giddens suggested that the existence of a large underclass cut across any clear-cut distinction between middle- and working-class neighbourhoods.6

Giddens accepted that the size and demographic composition of the United States made it something of a special case. Nevertheless he maintained that in Europe, too, it was possible to see an emerging underclass. In many European countries, the lack of an indigenous ethnic minority led to a transient underclass being imported from outside. Similar developments were evident, Giddens argued, in Britain and France. Composed of recent migrants in urban and industrial areas, the underclass formed the basis of a pool of highly disposable labour. First, its members had few educational qualifications, and were unskilled manual workers. Second, if certain jobs were done by migrant workers, the existence of an underclass made it easier to separate jobs that would be more acceptable to the working class.7 Like Leggett, Giddens was interested in whether this underclass was of potential political significance. He argued that the underclass could be viewed as a force for revolutionary change, or as reinforcing conservative attitudes. Giddens predicted that hostile outbursts were likely, because the underclass was unable to exercise the kind of citizenship rights enjoyed by everyone else. However, despite its radical potential, he concluded it was more likely that the overall effect would be conservative.8

The way that Giddens identified the existence of an ethnic underclass is particularly interesting in light of his later writing on the third way and social exclusion. Other commentators in this period, though, were more hesitant about using the term ‘underclass’ to describe the position occupied by ethnic minority groups in Britain. This was true of the work of John Rex and Robert Moore in Birmingham in the late 1960s. Although they argued that migrants were excluded from the full benefits of the welfare state, for instance in areas such as housing, they did not use the term ‘underclass’.9 In 1975, the sociologists John Westergaard and Henrietta Resler argued similarly that in Britain, ethnic minorities were not concentrated uniformly at the bottom of the economic order. Although they undoubtedly faced serious obstacles in the labour market, as indeed in society in general, they did not constitute an underclass. Descriptions of migrant labour as an underclass, they suggested, were more applicable to other continental countries, such as Germany and Switzerland, that had recruited large numbers of foreign workers into poorly-paid jobs.10

When the term ‘underclass’ was used, it was deployed in a rather different way, and had a more positive connotation. In their Birmingham case study, John Rex and Sally Tomlinson argued that there was much evidence that
migrants were discriminated against, and also stigmatized in the way that the welfare state operated. They acknowledged that there was some tendency for the black community in Britain to operate as a separate class or underclass, but resisted the idea that its members were an inert mass with a ghetto mentality or a culture of poverty. Rather they argued that ethnic minorities organized and acted in their own underclass interests. But two factors pulled migrant workers away from a quasi-Marxist underclass for itself. First, the affiliations that migrant workers had with the mainstream working class, and second, the influence of their homelands. Rex and Tomlinson concluded of their Birmingham case study that the car industry provided unstable but highly unionized conditions, with good wages for workers. Other factories and foundries had few unions, and provided work that was poorly paid but secure. They claimed that distinctions of this kind in the labour market were a necessary but not sufficient condition for the emergence of an underclass.

In later work, John Rex restated this position, conceding that migrant workers had been excluded from business activity and from participation in employment, housing and education. He argued, however, that they had organized themselves and demonstrated a degree of political consciousness. Thus Rex again dissociated himself from the negative definition of an unemployed and unemployable class caught in a culture of poverty, in favour of an analysis where migrants had their own forms of organization, culture, ideology, and politics. In the phrase adopted by Rex, this was an underclass-for-itself. Other writers on ethnicity followed Rex in dissociating themselves from the underclass thesis, arguing that despite the attempts of William Julius Wilson, the term was part of a racist discourse, and a vocabulary of coded panic terms. Even in the 1980s, the concept of the underclass in Britain had much less connection with race than it did in the American context.

Overall, in the period before 1980, the term ‘underclass’ was only used in a very limited sense in the British context. Even when it was thought it might provide an apt description of the position of workers from ethnic minority groups, researchers subsequently decided that the concept was not supported by empirical evidence. This work was concerned with migrant workers and ethnic minority groups rather than with the white working class. One of the few early attempts to apply the term ‘underclass’ to other social groupings was by Peter Townsend. In his classic survey of poverty, published in 1979, Townsend noted that older people, the disabled, the chronic sick, the long-term unemployed, and one-parent families were not part of the conventional workforce. He argued that the way in which they had been denied access to paid employment, had subsistence-level incomes, and low social status meant that they constituted a kind of modern underclass. Thus Townsend widened the concept of the underclass away from ethnic minority groups to embrace the experience of vulnerable white groups whose low income separated them from the rest of society. This is all the more interesting given
Townsend's rejection of behavioural factors in poverty and deprivation, and his hostility to the notions of the culture of poverty and cycle of deprivation. Townsend saw the underclass in structural terms, and included the long-term unemployed as one of his vulnerable groups. As unemployment worsened in the early 1980s, the term ‘underclass’ would come to be seen by many as an appropriate description for the kind of society that these economic and social changes were threatening to create.

Inspired in part by the Ken Auletta articles in the *New Yorker*, a new approach became evident in Britain in the early 1980s. Writing in the *New Statesman*, for instance, the sociologist Ralf Dahrendorf claimed that mass unemployment and reductions in the real value of wages had increased the size of an underclass that threatened social order and morality. For Dahrendorf, the underclass was ‘a cancer which eats away at the texture of societies and metastasises in ways which can increasingly be felt in all their parts’. In addition to unemployment and low wages, the underclass suffered from an accumulation of social pathologies – poor education, illiteracy, incomplete families, and poor housing. In the United States, it was clearly also an issue of race. Above all, according to Dahrendorf, a syndrome of deprivation led to a ghettoized existence – people were ‘clinging precariously to a “normal” world of jobs and expanding life chances, but settling in a life cycle of their own’. Although caused partly by economic dislocation, for Dahrendorf the underclass was expressed in other changes. One was the increasing problem of football hooliganism. The traditional working-class sport had apparently become an underclass game. The culture included ‘a lifestyle of laid-back sloppiness, association in changing groups of gangs, congregation around discos or the like, hostility to middle-class society, peculiar habits of dress, of hairstyle, often drugs or at least alcohol’. Dahrendorf himself doubted whether the phrase ‘class’ was appropriate, but had no doubt that striking changes were evident.

These comments notwithstanding, Dahrendorf’s approach was also a liberal one, since he argued that there were moral, social, and practical reasons why the members of the underclass should not be forgotten by the rest of society. He pointed out that the affluent middle class did not endorse social mobility, and he argued that ‘the existence of an underclass casts doubt on the social contract itself’. With regard to solutions, Dahrendorf claimed there was no macroeconomic answer to the problem of the underclass, and in fact there was no single solution. Education was clearly critical, as a means of improving employment chances. Basic income held the key in affirming the basic principle of citizenship. For Dahrendorf, the ‘existence of an underclass violates the fundamental assumption of modern, free societies which is that everyone without exception is a citizen with certain entitlements common to all’. Thus the main task of government was to extend full citizenship rights to all.

While Dahrendorf’s approach was a curious mixture of conservatism and liberalism, the key writer in this arena was again Charles Murray. As we
saw in the previous chapter, his book *Losing Ground* (1984) had been a brilliantly argued polemic against liberal assumptions about the value of the welfare state. Encouraged by the *Sunday Times* newspaper and the Health and Welfare Unit of the Institute for Economic Affairs (IEA), Murray’s ideas were widely publicized in Britain. In an article in the *Sunday Times Magazine* in November 1989, Murray described himself as ‘a visitor from a plague area come to see whether the disease is spreading’. He repeated some of the arguments of *Losing Ground*. Murray was quite clear that underclass did not refer to poverty, but to the type of poverty identified by Henry Mayhew in nineteenth-century London and referred to as the undeserving poor. He argued that Britain had an underclass, though it was out of sight and smaller than in the United States. He wrote that Britain had ‘a growing population of working-aged, healthy people who live in a different world from other Britons, who are raising their children to live in it, and whose values are now contaminating the life of entire neighbourhoods’. According to Murray, the underclass was growing rapidly, and was characterized by three features – out-of-wedlock births, violent crime, and unemployment.

Murray attempted to explain the causes of the emergence of the underclass by applying the analysis of *Losing Ground* to the British situation. He disagreed that it was linked with the election of the Thatcher government in 1979, and a subsequent increase in inequality. Instead, as in the United States, ‘the rules of the game changed fundamentally for low-income young people. Behaviour changed along with the changes in the rules’. Murray argued that social policy in both the United States and Britain was driven by the same intellectual impulses and had had similar effects. Britain, however, could learn little from America, since politicians were unwilling to face the fact that they were powerless to deal with an underclass once it existed. Murray’s solution was more self-government for poor communities, giving them greater responsibility for criminal justice, education, housing, and the benefit systems. Murray’s message for Britain was bleak, in that there was evidence of an underclass, and it was growing. But there also seemed little evidence that a Conservative or Labour government would do much about it. It was clear that Murray defined the underclass through behaviour. He wrote, for example, that:

> When I use the term ‘underclass’ I am indeed focusing on a certain type of poor person defined not by his condition, e.g. long-term unemployed, but by his deplorable behaviour in response to that condition, e.g. unwilling to take jobs that are available to him.

Nevertheless Murray claimed that he did not agree with the notion of a culture of poverty, and was well aware that some families managed to break out of a cycle of disadvantage. At several points, Murray indicated that his arguments were based on direct observation in deprived communities, including Birkenhead and the Easterhouse estate in Glasgow. But as the
above summary makes clear, the analysis was essentially the same as in *Losing Ground*, supported by different data.

Murray’s writing was extremely influential, especially in the popular press. The Director of the IEA’s Health and Welfare Unit, David G. Green, for example, wrote that Murray did not apply the term ‘underclass’ to all the poor, but only those ‘distinguished by their undesirable behaviour, including drug-taking, crime, illegitimacy, failure to hold down a job, truancy from school and casual violence’. Murray made a further contribution to the underclass debate, in a two-part article published in the *Sunday Times* in May 1994. This again looked at three symptoms – crime, illegitimacy, and economic inactivity among men of working age – but was based on figures for 1992. Murray’s figures indicated that since 1989, property crime in England and Wales had increased a further 42 per cent, and violent crime by a further 40 per cent. The illegitimacy ratio had increased to 31.2 per cent in 1992. In terms of economic inactivity, the 1981 census had indicated that 11.3 per cent of working-aged men (aged 16–64) were unemployed, and that 9.6 per cent of working-aged men were economically inactive altogether. The 1991 census showed that 11.0 per cent of working-aged men were unemployed, but that the percentage of working-aged men who were economically inactive had increased by a third, to 13.3 per cent. It was not clear what this meant, but Murray regarded it as a worrying development. Furthermore he claimed that the term ‘underclass’ had a new legitimacy compared to 4 years earlier.

Murray made three main points. The first was that the family was undergoing unprecedented change. Second, the family in the upper middle class was ‘in good shape’, but in the lower classes was likely to deteriorate further. Third, that wholesale overhaul of the benefit system was necessary. He claimed that the evidence could be found in four areas of family life – out-of-wedlock births; divorce; cohabitation; and their relation to social class. Murray argued further that British social policy would sustain the disintegration of the family in the lower income groups. Part of Murray’s argument was that fraud and abuse were widespread in the benefit system. But he also argued that individuals were making choices to opt for benefit rather than paid work. As with Harold and Phyllis in the United States of America, to people in the low-skilled working class, marriage made ‘no sense’. An additional element of Murray’s argument was that these cultural norms would become embodied in successive generations. For young men, marriage acted as a ‘civilising process’, but unmarried parenthood offered no means of socializing young boys. In terms of solutions, Murray argued that full employment would have little effect on out-of-wedlock births. He advocated changes to the benefit system, so that single mothers were not favoured over married mothers, arguing that ‘the welfare of society requires that women actively avoid getting pregnant if they have no husband, and that women once again demand marriage from a man who would have them bear a child’.
Murray’s later comments on changes in family life found some supporters. The journalist Melanie Phillips, for example, agreed with Murray, writing that ‘the collapse of the family is a social disaster. It weakens the cultural and moral transmitters down through the generations. It lies at the heart of many of our social problems’. There were communities in which fatherlessness had become the norm. Phillips wrote that:

These communities are truly alarming because children are being brought up with dysfunctional and often antisocial attitudes as a direct result of the fragmentation and emotional chaos of households in which sexual libertarianism provides a stream of transient and unattached men servicing their mothers.

Marriage had become devalued, and children were simply another set of consumer commodities. At the same time, Phillips disagreed with Murray’s scenario of the ‘New Victorians’ and the ‘New Rabble’, and also disputed that it was welfare that had created these new social norms. The greatest increases in out-of-wedlock births had occurred in Classes I and II, and arguably the danger was that society would become divided within each class. Phillips argued that intellectuals and politicians should support the family, as should the state, through the tax and benefits system.

Whereas in 1989 Murray had been interested in economic change and the emergence of an underclass, 5 years later he was more concerned with changes in the family. This change was significant, reflecting the criticism that his arguments had aroused. We will look more closely at those criticisms shortly. For the more thoughtful commentators on the Right, the underclass continued to pose problems of definition, making them more cautious than their American counterparts. David Willetts, for instance, was at the time associated with right-wing think-tanks, and a prospective Conservative Parliamentary candidate. Willetts suggested that three groups were likely to be on Income Support – the long-term unemployed, unskilled workers in erratic employment, and younger single mothers – and the underclass could be defined most simply as long-term or frequent claimants of benefit. He agreed with Murray’s economic model, and claimed there was a group called ‘the respectable poor’ for whom values were important. While the idea of an underclass was controversial, it forced people to look at questions of poverty and social security. Willetts also acknowledged that there appeared to be little connection between his three underclass groups. He used the term provisionally and hypothetically, and ‘enclosed within imaginary quotation marks’. Willetts noted that in Losing Ground, Murray was mainly concerned with AFDC, and thus welfare in the United States and social security in Britain were not the same thing.

The point in summarizing Murray’s arguments here is not to endorse them, but to try to indicate why they attracted so much attention. As he had argued in the American context, Murray’s analysis was essentially about the
effects of social policies on human behaviour. His closest counterpart in the
British context was Frank Field, who had earlier been Director of the Child
Poverty Action Group and later was Director of the Low Pay Unit. In 1971
he was the co-author of an article that had invented the term ‘poverty trap’
to describe the ways in which means tests penalized paid workers. In May
1997, Field was appointed Minister for Welfare Reform, with the brief to
‘think the unthinkable’ on social policy. In part, Field’s attitude to behaviour
was influenced by his Christian beliefs – these underlay his views on the
‘fallen side of mankind’. Like Murray, Field stressed the importance of self-
interest. He believed that welfare affected people’s attitudes and behaviour,
and in part he came to this point of view through observing how welfare
operated on the ground. At the same time, he differed from Murray in that
he was seeking to reconstruct welfare, not to abolish it.32

In an early book on the underclass (1989), Field sought to reclaim the
term for the liberal Left. He argued that important economic and social
trends threatened to overturn the concept of citizenship as proposed by
T. H. Marshall. Marshall had earlier written of history in terms of the
successive emergence of political citizenship, economic citizenship, and
social citizenship. One trend was the emergence of record post-war levels of
unemployment. A second was widening class differentials. Another was the
exclusion of the very poor from rising living standards. Finally, there was a
significant change in the attitudes of those in mainstream society towards
those who had failed to make it. These changes, argued Field, had combined
to ‘produce an underclass that sits uncomfortably below that group which
is referred to as living on a low income’.33 Field claimed that the underclass
lived under a form of political, social and economic apartheid, and that
the emergence of this group marked a watershed in British working-class
politics. The very poorest were separated, not only from other groups on
low incomes, but more importantly from the working class. The difference
was that the working class still shared with other classes the hope of rising
living standards and opportunities.

Field claimed that the underclass comprised three groups – the long-term
unemployed (especially older workers and school-leavers if they had never
had a job); single-parent families; and elderly pensioners. He acknowledged
that this typology was crude, and dangerously close to the arguments of
Dahrendorf. There was a danger that the characteristics of the underclass
could be seen as its causes, and this was a short step away from blaming
the victim. It was too similar to a culture of poverty approach. Field
acknowledged that even in his own city of Birkenhead there was evidence
that there was nothing new in a concentration on the moral weaknesses of
the underclass. In the 1930s, for example, the local newspaper had carried
stories about those who had allegedly stopped wanting to work.34 Field
argued that the personal pathologies of the underclass and its culture were
induced by poverty and were only part of the problem. The underclass of
working age was not responsible for its own exclusion. Rather its members
Field argued that there were six forces involved in a cycle of deprivation that effectively locked the underclass in place. Unemployment had increased, and downward social mobility meant that many of the working class were unemployed. There were more temporary, part-time, and poorly-paid jobs, and the tax and benefits system destroyed initiative. The 1980s had seen a striking increase in owner-occupation and share-ownership. Finally, pension reforms meant that there was a strong chance that the most disadvantaged would have to subsist on a low income. Field claimed that after the election of the Conservative government in 1979, a minority of the population became cut off from other people on low income. This underclass was thus increasingly isolated, in terms of income, life chances, and political aspirations. He wrote that ‘psychologically, the underclass is being increasingly isolated by the growth of a drawbridge mentality amongst those who feel they are “making it” in Thatcher’s Britain’.

Field’s book on the underclass provided an early example of ideas that he was later to develop into a blueprint for welfare reform. He argued, for instance, that Titmuss’s influence on social policy had meant that discussions of the role of behaviour had been neglected. It was this that lay behind the invention of the term ‘stakeholder welfare’, and the ideas that Field would express in *Making Welfare Work.* Field’s approach to attitudes and behaviour was in some ways similar to that of Murray, though he was also concerned with the impact of structural factors on poverty and deprivation. It was therefore interesting to see how Field responded to Murray’s article in the *Sunday Times Magazine.* Field reiterated that he believed that Britain did now have a group of people so poor they could be considered an underclass. Pensioners, for example, had been hit hard by the decision of the Government to break the link between pensions and rises in earnings or prices. Field echoed Murray in arguing that it was necessary to integrate the disillusioned young unemployed worker back into mainstream society. He claimed that it was crucial to enforce an availability-for-work test so that people took work when it was available. At the same time, Field remained hostile to the notion of a culture of poverty.

Field was not a lone voice. At a popular level, many in the 1980s found the term ‘underclass’ helpful in focusing attention on growing poverty and deprivation. Within the academic community there were some who argued that the underclass was an identifiable feature of the class system. The sociologist W. G. Runciman, for instance, included the underclass among the seven classes that he claimed constituted British society. He wrote ‘[that] there is below the two working classes an underclass which constitutes a separate category of roles is as readily demonstrable as that there is an upper
class above the middle class in contemporary British society’. But this was not workers systematically disadvantaged in the labour market, but people unable to participate in the labour market at all, and living permanently on benefits. Many were members of ethnic minorities, or single mothers, and some were both. Runciman noted that the submerged tenth of Edwardian society had included not just vagrants and petty criminals, but also casual labourers. Also in this group were the long-term unemployed who might supplement their benefits by undeclared work, begging, or petty theft. Aware of these historical continuities, he suggested that if the stereotypical member of the underclass in 1910 had been the loafer – a white male casual labourer living in rented accommodation – in 1980 it was a single mother from an ethnic minority living in council housing and entirely dependent on state benefit.

Others agreed with Dahrendorf that the underclass posed interesting theoretical problems for social citizenship. Maurice Roche suggested that its members were excluded from citizenship or disdainful of it, and represented a limit beyond which the order of the democratic and welfare state and civil society broke down. He noted that neoconservatives (like Murray) claimed that the welfare state was partly responsible for the growth of the underclass. Thus the dominant paradigm in the post-war welfare state had been responsible for the progressive breakdown of the very social citizenship it had sought to promote. While this was a more abstract, theoretical argument, it appeared to concede that the underclass was an empirical reality.

The sociologist Alan Buckingham was a comparatively late entrant into the underclass debate. He set out to define the underclass and then test three competing theories. He traced what he termed behavioural, labour market, and critical approaches to the underclass, and attempted to evaluate them using the National Child Development Study (NCDS). Buckingham argued from this data that an underclass did exist, suffering from a lack of qualifications, low cognitive ability, and chronic joblessness. Furthermore, Buckingham claimed the underclass was distinct from the working class in terms of patterns of family formation, work commitment, and political allegiance. Buckingham noted that debate about the underclass had often been divided along ideological lines, and he conceded that further analysis was required. However, he concluded from his analysis that ‘the distinct attitudes of the underclass, when coupled with evidence of inter- and intra-generational stability of membership, provide early evidence that a new social class, the underclass, may now exist in Britain’.

More common was the view that a growing underclass was potentially a very important development, but remained a matter of empirical investigation. These commentators continued to struggle with the issue of how the underclass might best be defined. At a seminar funded by the Joseph Rowntree Foundation and organized by the Policy Studies Institute, David J. Smith proposed that the underclass could not be defined as a group
characterized by a culture of dependency, or as the political undeserving poor. The underclass also fell outside a Marxist class system. Instead he saw it as being comprised of ‘family units having no stable relationship at all with the “mode of production” – with legitimate gainful employment’. For Smith, the idea of an underclass only made sense if there was some stability in its membership. However, he also resisted the idea that people in a secondary labour market, where jobs offered poor security and low pay, or were part-time, were also in the underclass. It was difficult to define the secondary labour market, and many of these jobs were an additional source of income for the family unit. On structure and agency, Smith suggested that the underclass might be defined in structural terms, but it could be cultural factors that determined economic power, and consigned some people to the underclass. Others struggled with the same problems. Whether the underclass was defined as the secondary labour market, including ethnic minorities and unskilled female workers; the long-term unemployed; families dependent on benefits; or simply as people on low incomes, there appeared to be little or no empirical evidence for its existence.

Sociologists interested in changes in Britain’s employment structure sought to explore the idea that the most significant source of social change had been the growth of an underclass that cut across traditional class divisions. Duncan Gallie, for instance, attempted to explore whether there was evidence that an underclass, of the type previously described by Giddens, was emerging in Britain. The arguments of Giddens relied on a particular view of the way that the employment structure had evolved, and on a growing distinction between primary and secondary sector jobs. Nevertheless there was little evidence, Gallie argued, of a growth of secondary sector jobs that were poorly paid, short-term, and where untrained labour was tightly supervised. There was little evidence that internal labour markets had become widespread in British industry, and not much sign of an expansion in temporary jobs. In the case of ethnic minorities, Gallie thought there was little evidence that their undoubted disadvantage in the labour market was being translated into the revolutionary consciousness described by Giddens. As far as women were concerned, they suffered gender inequalities at work, and were concentrated in routine non-manual work and lower-skilled manual work. But as with the ethnic minorities, the high degree of internal differentiation within their employment meant they were unlikely to develop a sense of common economic interest.

Even so, Gallie conceded it was possible that the concept of the underclass might be useful in highlighting the social position and attitudes of the unemployed. The emergence of mass unemployment in the 1980s seemed to indicate that a major divide was opening up between those in and out of work. There was no doubt, suggested Gallie, that unemployment led to deprivation. However, the fact that the overall level of unemployment was relatively stable hid the fact that as far as individual people were concerned, there was much movement in and out of employment. In 1985, for instance,
half of the people becoming unemployed found work again within 3 months. Even the long-term unemployed were very heterogeneous, in terms of the reasons why they became unemployed, their personal characteristics, and their age. Psychological depression and a lack of financial resources made collective action difficult, and there was evidence that their plight engendered sympathy rather than hostility from employed manual workers. Overall, Gallie argued that there was little evidence from the labour disadvantages experienced by ethnic minorities, women, or the unemployed that they were of a type that supported the emergence of an underclass. Rather, the idea of an underclass relied on lumping together very different types of labour-market disadvantage. It was unlikely that this would create a distinctive cultural identity and lead to political radicalism. Finally the idea of an underclass took little account of the way institutions tended to adapt to, and contain, new types of demand. In general, Gallie argued that predictions of the emergence of an underclass had proved largely unfounded.

Gallie further explored the particular case of the unemployed using data on six labour markets collected for the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC)’s Social Change and Economic Life Initiative. Gallie provided a helpful definition of the underclass – it was a social stratum that suffered prolonged labour market marginality; it experienced greater deprivation than the manual working class; and it had its own subculture. In order to test if it existed, Gallie provided empirical evidence on the work histories and attitudes of employed and unemployed people. Three of the labour markets (Swindon, Aberdeen, and Northampton) had been economically buoyant in the 1980s, while three (Coventry, Rochdale, and Kirkcaldy) had experienced prolonged recession. However, Gallie found from past work histories that the long-term unemployed were no more likely than the employed to have changed jobs frequently, and they did not have a markedly lower commitment to work than those in employment. There was no doubt that the unemployed suffered serious disadvantage. But there was little evidence that this supported some sense of cultural distinctiveness. The unemployed neither engaged in direct action nor became politically passive, and in fact increased their support for the Labour Party. Thus the evidence fitted neither the conservative nor the liberal versions of the underclass thesis.

Gallie’s arguments were similar to those of Ross McKibbin on the social psychology of unemployment in the 1930s, and it was striking that it was the same areas, South Wales and the North East, that experienced high unemployment. In 1989, Hartlepool was again in decline following the rundown of shipbuilding and restructuring of steel production. Lydia Morris and Sarah Irwin used Hartlepool to explore whether there really was any dividing line between an underclass and the rest of the population. They selected three groups of households – couples where the man had been unemployed continuously in the last 12 months; couples in which the man had been in the same job in the last 12 months; and couples where the man had started a job within the last 12 months, though he might be
employed or unemployed. The idea was to compare the work histories and characteristics of these three groups, and to explore two definitions of the underclass. These were non-participation and systematic disadvantage in the labour market. The study did show that between the long-term unemployed and the securely employed there was a group of male workers experiencing broken employment interspersed with short-term unemployment. This suggested that the underclass might not consist only of the unemployed. Overall, however, Morris and Irwin found that the characteristics of the under-employed, although disadvantaged, were too heterogeneous for the group to be seen as a class. Evidence of mutual aid and informal exchange throughout the whole sample population tended to rule out the idea of a distinctive underclass culture.46

Gordon Marshall, Stephen Roberts and Carole Burgoyne set out to explore whether class analysis was undermined by its neglect of economically-inactive people. W. G. Runciman, for example, had argued that the underclass constituted one of the seven classes in British society. Marshall, Roberts, and Burgoyne noted several points about the underclass. First, the underclass was characterized as being excluded from society on account of its extreme deprivation (due to poverty or lack of employment), or was seen as at variance with mainstream behaviour and values. Second, in practice, most researchers associated it with either extreme poverty or long-term unemployment. Third, it was widely held that the underclass had a distinctive subculture of cynicism, resignation, and despair. Marshall, Roberts, and Burgoyne admitted that fatalism was a rather imprecise concept. However, from interview data they did not find that the chronically economically-inactive were more prone to defeatism and mistrust than those in employment. Moreover, their evidence suggested that in terms of attitudes the groups usually said to comprise the underclass were not distinct from the rest of the population. Marshall, Roberts, and Burgoyne therefore concluded of the underclass that ‘the concept itself looks increasingly flawed, and certainly fails to provide a platform from which to launch a convincing critique of class analysis because of its “missing millions”’.47

Other researchers looked at the underclass from the perspective of housing, drawing on local case studies. Peter Lee argued that debates about new forms of poverty were incomplete, and needed to explain new spatial patterns of poverty and deprivation. He argued that local housing and economic conditions, along with welfare delivery, interacted to produce new regions of social exclusion. However, while showing an appreciation of the historical dimension to the underclass discourse, Lee noted disagreement over definitions, and rejected the underclass as an explanatory device, since in his view it concentrated too heavily on the role of welfare dependency. Rather (and drawing on a case study of the northern town of Morecambe) Lee argued that it was housing that created and sustained deprivation.48

In the 1980s, unemployment grew particularly rapidly in the Republic of Ireland, and here, too, researchers were attracted to the underclass concept as
a possible explanation, or result of, social change. Between 1980 and 1987, unemployment in Ireland increased to 232,000, or nearly 18 per cent of the workforce. Brian Nolan and Christopher T. Whelan adopted Duncan Gallie's three-part definition of the underclass. They were particularly interested in William Julius Wilson's argument that weak labour-force attachment and social isolation created a vicious circle and distinctive underclass subcultural characteristics. The Irish data certainly showed that labour market marginality was associated with a level of deprivation significantly greater than that experienced by the rest of the manual working class. However, this group was not concentrated in urban centres, though its members tended to live in rented urban public-sector housing. Nolan and Whelan concluded that since there was little evidence for subcultural characteristics, the underclass framework was redundant, and it was sufficient to refer to marginalization and deprivation. They argued that:

widespread long-term unemployment, the concentration of the unemployed in public sector housing, and the existence of significant pockets of concentrated deprivation do not, of themselves, generate the cultural distinctiveness that characterizes an underclass.49

Other researchers looked at households that were classed as economically inactive. At the Policy Studies Institute seminar, Nick Buck used data on labour market behaviour to explore how far it was possible to identify and measure an underclass. Like Smith, Buck defined the underclass as families that did not have a stable relationship with legitimate gainful employment. He analyzed economic activity at the household or family level, focusing on households with no labour market activity, measuring how their numbers had changed in the 1980s, and what characteristics they possessed. Longitudinal data was not available. But data from the Labour Force Survey indicated that the estimated total population in inactive couple households grew from 1.96m in 1979 (4.2 per cent of the total population in working age households), to 4.58m in 1986 (9.9 per cent of the total population). All of these groups had expanded rapidly at a time of rising national unemployment. But Buck argued the rationale for defining an underclass remained problematic. For most people, unemployment came as an interruption to a normal working life, and was not a permanent condition. In the words of Buck, these people were ‘not so much stable members of an underclass as unstable members of the working class’.50

If one persistent defining characteristic of the underclass was its relationship to stable working patterns, another was its attitudes towards work and the family, and its involvement in the mainstream economic and political processes of society. Anthony Heath used the 1987 British Election Survey and the 1989 British Social Attitudes Survey to see if the underclass had distinctive attitudes, and in particular if there was evidence of a culture of dependency. He defined the underclass as those dependent on benefits,
though excluding pensioners. Heath argued that this data confirmed that the underclass was poor, lacked educational qualifications, lived in rented accommodation, and was less likely to correspond to the nuclear family ideal. It indicated, though, that the underclass made up only a quarter of residents even in the poorest neighbourhoods, suggesting that it was unlikely it had a separate culture. Compared to the rest of the population, the underclass had similar attitudes towards children, but different attitudes towards marriage. With work, members of the underclass were more likely to give financial reasons for not working, but overall the evidence did not provide support for a culture of dependency. As far as politics was concerned, the underclass was more cynical, but nevertheless turnout at elections was still quite high (68 per cent). Heath concluded that the differences that did exist were not evidence of a distinct culture, and that the underclass was heterogeneous, both in terms of its members and their attitudes.51

Other studies, including some based on diaries and interviews, were similarly dismissive of the idea that the underclass might have a separate culture. One by Elaine Kempson, then at the Policy Studies Institute, attempted to look at the lives of people on low income. Her study combined 31 studies commissioned by the Joseph Rowntree Foundation as part of its social policy and housing research programmes. These had drawn on detailed accounts by 2,100 people in a wide range of circumstances, and on some 300 interviews. But Kempson concluded that while her study showed that some people managed their limited budget better than others, it demonstrated little evidence of fecklessness among the poor. She argued:

One thing is clear from the analysis in this report – people who live on low incomes are not an underclass. They have aspirations just like others in society: they want a job; a decent home; and an income that is enough to pay the bills with a little to spare.52

Thus it appeared that when the concept of the underclass was tested against the empirical evidence, there was little support that it existed. First, there was little evidence of the expansion of secondary labour markets, or of a growth in the radical potential of ethnic minority groups or female workers. Second, although undoubtedly deprived, even the long-term unemployed were too heterogeneous a group to constitute an underclass; they seemed as committed to work as the employed; and what political energies they had were directed through conventional channels into increased support for the Labour Party. Third, the Irish data showed that groups which occupied a marginal position in relation to the labour market were not concentrated in urban centres, and undermined the argument that weak labour force attachment and social isolation created a vicious circle. Fourth, unemployment statistics hid movement in and out of unemployment, and the under-employed did not seem to be a separate class with a distinctive subculture. As in the United
States, panel data of income dynamics indicated that within the low-income population there was much movement in and out of poverty. Fifth, survey material and qualitative data suggested that the aspirations and attitudes of those on low incomes were the same as the rest of society. The argument of David J. Smith was that although the existence of the underclass could not be proven, it might turn out to be a good way of explaining the society that would be created if current conditions persisted. As the Eugenics Society in the 1930s never tired of repeating, more research was needed.

In these respects, the underclass debate in Britain in the 1980s was similar in shape if not in scale to that in the United States. The apparent lack of empirical evidence led many to reject the term ‘underclass’ outright. John Macnicol, for example, was one of the first to examine the historical antecedents of the term, and point out the recurring nature of this phenomenon. Writing of the research undertaken as a result of Sir Keith Joseph’s 1972 speech on the cycle of deprivation, he argued that in all the painstaking and expensive research ‘surprisingly little cognisance was taken of the history of the concept’. Macnicol claimed that the concept of an inter-generational underclass displaying a high concentration of social problems had been reconstructed periodically over the previous 100 years. The concept had been sustained in different ways – by simple class prejudice, theories of heredity in the interwar years, and later by psychological models of personal inadequacy. Macnicol claimed that there were problems in defining the underclass. A populist version of the concept had been internalized by ordinary working-class people as the obverse of respectable. The underclass concept had to be differentiated from wider assumptions about the inheritance of intellect and ability. And both Right and Left had used the concept, with the latter using it to describe the casualties of capitalism.

Charles Murray’s 1989 article in the *Sunday Times Magazine* also generated much hostility and criticism. Alan Walker argued that Murray’s thesis was part of a long tradition of dividing people into two groups, those whose poverty was due to structural factors and those whose situation was their own fault. He suggested, first, that Murray had failed to provide any scientific evidence that an underclass existed, and second, that his guide to policy was at best misleading and at worst a dangerous diversion from poverty and deprivation. Thus the Murray argument fitted very neatly into the earlier legacy of the culture of poverty and cycle of deprivation, with its ‘characteristic mixture of popular stereotypes, prejudice about the causes of poverty and ill-founded quasi-scientific notions’. Walker was Professor of Social Policy at the University of Sheffield. From evidence on unemployment and single mothers, Walker argued that there was no evidence of a different type of poverty, or of a subculture separated from the rest of society and with different values to it, or of a process of transmission and contamination. For Walker, the problem was the degree of poverty, not the type of poverty. In general Murray’s approach, like those before it, diverted attention from blaming the mechanisms through which resources were distributed.
Commentators were particularly critical of Murray’s focus on single mothers. It was claimed that he had used statistics to present a picture of a growing army of one-parent families, mainly fatherless, who were dependent on state benefits. But it was pointed out that statistics also showed that while the duration of single mothers on benefit increased (1981–87), they still spent shorter periods on benefit than divorced or widowed mothers. The main reason why single mothers did not spend long years on benefit was because they married. By the time a child was 5 years old, 60 per cent of single mothers had married, and 70 per cent by the time the child was 7 years old. It was claimed that it made little sense to point the finger at single mothers, and not at divorced or separated mothers. If these mothers remarried, they did not seem to be permanently rejecting either marriage or the role of men in families. Murray’s solution of social reorganization based on local community empowerment was also dismissed. Instead, the key was seen to be government helping mothers to combine their responsibilities in the home with paid employment.\

Some commentators focused on the gender politics of the popular underclass discourse. Kirk Mann and Sasha Roseneil, for example, argued that in 1993, in the wake of the James Bulger case, a high degree of consensus developed, uniting politicians and commentators in hostility to never-married mothers. In this process, never-married mothers were identified as the source and cause of juvenile crime. They located this discourse within the context of the restructuring of the welfare state, and as part of patriarchal reconstruction which constituted a backlash against long-term changes in gender relations and feminism. In 1993, they argued, moral panic, economic individualism, and anti-feminist backlash combined to make lone mothers the focus of public debate about the reproduction of the underclass. But Mann and Roseneil were also sceptical about the underclass concept itself. In their view, the concept had no theoretical coherence and only anecdotal evidence to support it. The fact that it had gained credibility from liberal and socialist commentators could not disguise the fact that it was a profoundly conservative and anti-feminist concept. Mann and Roseneil concluded that ‘the threat we perceive comes not from the supposed constituents and reproducers of the underclass but from those who propagate the concept of a dangerous class’.\

Other commentators adopted an approach similar to that of Macnicol, in pointing to historical continuities in underclass concepts. Paul Bagguley and Kirk Mann, for example, noted that Murray drew on the key themes of a classic right-wing moral panic – illegitimacy, violent crime, and drop-out from the labour force. The underclass were seen as ‘idle thieving bastards’. But in Britain, there was no evidence that an underclass had been comprised of the same groups since the 1880s. The criteria for defining it changed easily with changes in economic and social conditions, and the dominant ideas of the day had been consistently used by the middle class to redefine the poor. Bagguley and Mann were critical of the stance of William Julius Wilson,
claiming that he further weakened the liberal position in that he appeared to support the culture of poverty notion, but provided no empirical evidence. In their view, the cycle of deprivation had been examined systematically in the 1970s and found wanting. In fact, the underclass was essentially ‘a set of ideological beliefs held by certain groups among the upper and middle classes’ which helped to sustain relations of domination of class, patriarchy and race. The surprising feature for Bagguley and Mann was why both Left and Right found the concept so appealing when it had been destroyed by social scientific analysis. They suggested that ‘perhaps the really dangerous class is not the underclass but those who have propagated the underclass concept’. Bagguley and Mann concluded that because of its theoretical, methodological, and empirical flaws, the underclass concept was ‘a demonstrably false set of beliefs’.

Notwithstanding his arguments in the 1970s, John Westergaard, in a Presidential address to the British Sociological Association, claimed that the underclass concept was influential, not because it fitted the facts but because it was well attuned to the contemporary mood. British sociology, he claimed, showed resistance to the pressures of the 1980s. He claimed the concept existed in three versions – a ‘moral turpitude’ version, an ‘outcast poverty’ version, and a ‘rhetorical’ version. What they had in common was that they proposed the emergence of a significant minority who were outside mainstream society, and suggested that this divide was the most challenging line of social division for the future. While increased inequality was not in doubt, what was more unlikely was that the underclass represented a segregated minority, and the majority represented a classless commonality. In answer to the question of why the underclass concept was so popular, Westergaard suggested that it satisfied both Left and Right in acknowledging that poverty persisted alongside social class. The movement was led more by the media than by social science. He suggested that changes in ideological fashion should be studied, both to see what they said about the mood of the times, and to establish whether they were empirically correct. In adopting this position, Westergaard echoed the work of Gans on the functions of the concept.

Discussions about the underclass debates in different countries were illuminating. Kirk Mann, for instance, attempted to examine how the underclass debate had developed in the United States, Britain, and Australia. He claimed that the observers who believed they were witnessing an underclass were unable to agree on what they had found; he argued that the idea was simply the most recent label for a ‘class of failures’. Like Westergaard, Mann thought the observers might be more interesting than the observed. The debate was much more subdued in Britain than in the United States, but in Australia it was notable by its absence. Mann suggested this could be because Australia had better social scientists, or because the sense of otherness embodied in the concept was complicated in Australia by the country’s criminal past. More likely was that the Australian state had sought, through a high-wage economy
and support for minimum wages, to incorporate groups, such as women, who would be excluded in Britain and the United States. The result was that there was little sense of danger generated by those who elsewhere might be consigned to the underclass – no acute racial divisions, and no riots. Mann concluded that while social divisions, poverty, and unemployment were key areas for research, policy recommendations that drew on the concept of the underclass were predicated on prejudice.64

The underclass concept was juxtaposed with that of dependency culture. Hartley Dean and Peter Taylor-Gooby suggested that whereas Thatcherism had sought to blame its victims by constructing the notion of dependency culture, its opponents had sought to blame government policy by constructing a sociostructural notion of the underclass. At the same time, the approach of Dean and Taylor-Gooby was to regard the two as discursive rather than objective phenomena. They argued that:

> the underclass concept is most interesting, not for its explanatory value, but for the way in which it has so often drawn together and illuminated preoccupations with delinquency and dependency and for the way in which it permits often unspoken associations between the two.65

Dean and Taylor-Gooby were well aware of the assumptions that lay behind the impetus to define an underclass, and the historical dimension to the debate. They argued that the underclass theory reinforced a discursive network of association between delinquency and dependency, crime and poverty, race and antisocial behaviour, and between immorality and single parenthood. Overall, the concept was nothing more than a ‘symbolic manifestation of socially constituted definitions of failure’.66 Yet although the term did not usefully define a real or tangible phenomenon, it nevertheless touched on real and important issues, to do with work, the family, and citizenship.

As we saw earlier, some commentators regarded the emergence of the underclass as a test of social citizenship. Yet for others, the concept of citizenship remained important, while that of the underclass was regarded as unhelpful. The Child Poverty Action Group, for example, argued that the term underclass was effective in capturing the intensity of poverty, and the way that its different aspects compounded one another. Yet it argued that the term was imprecise and difficult to define empirically. There was little evidence to support the cultural interpretation, behavioural interpretations distracted attention from social and economic factors, and the phrase had negative connotations.67 Its former Director, Ruth Lister, agreed that the use of such an imprecise and value-laden concept could weaken the claims of the poor to citizenship, even though it could also be effective as a means of putting poverty in the headlines. In her view, those who invoked the development of an underclass to make the case for the restoration of full citizenship rights for the poor were ‘using a stigmatising label to make the case for non-stigmatising policies’.68
The republication of the two Murray pieces by the IEA in 1996, along with the earlier commentaries, provided an opportunity to take stock. A new Introduction by Ruth Lister looked more widely at the concept of the underclass itself, the different ways it was understood, defined, and used, and their academic and political implications. Lister was well aware that the behavioural interpretation of the underclass had a long history. She suggested that arguments over the definition of the term had exposed the problems of using administrative criteria, such as dependency on the state. Lister noted that empirical investigations of lone parenthood and unemployment had provided little support for the existence of an underclass. Moreover the language associated with the discourse was one of disease and contamination. Overall, Lister claimed that the focus on the behaviour and values of the underclass distracted attention from wider structural factors. Many had begun to prefer the term ‘social exclusion’, offering as it did a more dynamic focus on the processes and institutions that created and maintained disadvantage. Perhaps most importantly, for Lister, the concept of the underclass did not provide a means of reconciling debates in social policy about the relative importance of agency and structure. For her, there was a fine line ‘between acknowledging the agency of people in poverty and blaming them for that poverty’.69

Some of this work therefore began to move towards the concept of social exclusion based on social and legal status.70 Researchers remained interested in questions of poverty, social isolation, and dispersion and concentration. However, in the British and increasingly influential European context, the language of the underclass was gradually being replaced by that of exclusion.71 Whether the theory of social exclusion was marked more by continuity or change when compared with the concept of the underclass remained an open question. In using social exclusion, researchers were attempting to overcome the more pejorative aspects of the underclass debate; to look at a dynamic process, and to resolve questions of structure and agency. Nonetheless terms like ‘cycle of deprivation’ and ‘underclass’ continued to be used by politicians and policy makers, indicating that many remained unaware of this debate’s historical legacy.

By the mid-1990s, the term ‘underclass’ had already begun to be replaced by the language of social exclusion. Even so, it is interesting to compare the debate about the underclass in Britain with its counterpart in America. There were some broad similarities in the different positions that commentators occupied in the debate. First, there was the stance, largely inspired by Charles Murray, that tended to define the underclass in behavioural terms, and examine trends in out-of-wedlock births, violent crime, and unemployment. As in Losing Ground, part of this argument was that changes in social policy had led individuals to alter their behaviour in ways that were damaging in the long term. Second, there was the position adopted by those like Frank Field, who were concerned about the impact of structural factors such as economic change and unemployment. They
acknowledged that behaviour did have a role to play, and shared Murray’s concerns about the decline of the family. Then there were the agnostics, who regarded the underclass as a theoretical possibility, but in fieldwork on lone parenthood and unemployment found no empirical evidence. Fourth, there were those who rejected the term outright, arguing that though the concept was interesting in how it was defined and used, in the end it had no explanatory value.

Murray was an important link in the debate on both sides of the Atlantic. However, these apparent similarities should not blind us to fundamental differences. First, the debate in the United States was much more racialized, with the place of black families playing a much more central role. Second, there was no real British counterpart to William Julius Wilson, and a much more deeply entrenched reluctance among social scientists in Britain to explore the role of behavioural and cultural factors in the perpetuation of poverty and deprivation. Third, the debate in Britain moved very quickly from a focus on the underclass *per se* to a much more general discussion about changes in the family, including the increase in out-of-wedlock births, the rise in divorce, the decline in marriage, and the rise in cohabitation. These characteristics reflected not so much trends in economic and social change in Britain and the United States – these were broadly similar – but differences in the earlier history of this discourse. Whereas the United States had engaged heavily in the debates about the culture of poverty, British commentators, particularly on the Left, had through the 1970s displayed almost total hostility to the notion of a cycle of deprivation. It was only in the 1990s, with the theory of social exclusion, that a means was found of bridging the age-old division between those who favoured structural and those who favoured cultural interpretations of the causes of poverty and deprivation. It is to social exclusion that we move in the next chapter.
As we have seen, the underclass debate was extremely lively in both the United States and Britain in the 1980s. The phrase continued to be used, particularly at a popular level and in the media. However, from the early 1990s, and among academics and policy-makers, the term passed out of use, at least in Britain, and was replaced by social exclusion, which was favoured by the Labour Government elected in May 1997. In December of that year, in a speech given at Stockwell Park School, in the deprived London borough of Lambeth, Tony Blair outlined government plans to tackle the problem of social exclusion. The speech marked the launch of the Government’s new Social Exclusion Unit.¹ According to Blair, part of the answer lay in ensuring that those government departments concerned with the development of policy were co-ordinated more effectively. In a phrase that was to become a New Labour buzzword, joined-up problems demanded joined-up solutions. But Blair also argued that it was in people’s own interests that social exclusion should be eliminated. The issue was ‘as much about self-interest as compassion’.²

Blair’s definition of social exclusion, with its emphasis on structural causes, behavioural factors and transmission between generations, immediately has echoes with the earlier underclass concepts with which this book has been concerned. Was social exclusion simply the latest in a series of similar labels that stretched back over the previous 100 years or was it something new and quite different? We look first at how the idea of social exclusion evolved in France and how it was subsequently embraced by other European countries. In France, debates around the issue of deprivation have always been framed by discourses of ‘exclusion’ and ‘insertion’. We look at how the language of social exclusion was imported into Britain and became part of the vocabulary of New Labour. Despite its appeal to academics and policy-makers, the concept of social exclusion was challenged, as being centred on paid work, and difficult to test empirically. We argue that the
nature of initiatives such as Sure Start, and the language in which they were cast, indicated both important continuities and marked differences when compared with the cycle of deprivation research of the 1970s. We look at policies around antisocial behaviour, the Respect initiative and the Action Plan on Social Exclusion published in September 2006. Finally the chapter looks at two initiatives in particular, Family Intervention Projects (FIPs) and the Family Nurse Partnership (FNP) – tracing the evaluations that have been conducted into their effectiveness, and wider critiques. For it was in that area that the return to the problem family discourse was most marked.

After it was established in December 1997, the government’s Social Exclusion Unit issued a range of reports, on truancy and school exclusion; rough sleepers; teenage pregnancy; neighbourhood renewal; and child poverty. The thrust of this interpretation was reflected in a plethora of government initiatives – the Sure Start programme for parents and children, Education and Health Action Zones, the New Deal for Communities, the Single Regeneration Budget, and many more. Much of the intellectual input into the work of the Social Exclusion Unit was provided by the ESRC Research Centre for Analysis of Social Exclusion (CASE), established at the London School of Economics in October 1997. In this respect, the issue of social exclusion provided a good example of the close ties that Labour developed with social science academics. Anne Power, for example, argued that social exclusion was about ‘the tendency to push vulnerable and difficult individuals into the least popular places, furthest away from our common aspirations’. Inner-city areas and some large outlying council estates had become a ‘receptacle for problems’. She pointed to the phenomenon of neighbourhood collapse, and the tendency of poorer neighbourhoods to form poverty clusters. For Power, Professor of Social Policy, social exclusion was an urban issue.

But social exclusion was a term that was imported into Britain, and Hilary Silver explored its origins. She pointed out that exclusion became the subject of discussion in France in the 1960s, and attributed the term to René Lenoir, then Secretary of State for Social Action in the Chirac Government. In 1974, for example, Lenoir estimated that the excluded made up one-tenth of the French population. But it was only in the late 1970s that exclusion was identified as the central problem of the new poverty. It referred to the rise in long-term and recurrent unemployment, and to important changes in social relations – family break-ups, single-member households, social isolation, and the decline of traditional class solidarity based on unions, workplaces, and networks. Exclusion was seen as the ‘rupture of the social and symbolic bonds that should attach individuals to society’. Conversely, the process of tackling exclusion, and of achieving goals of integration, cohesion, and solidarity, was called ‘insertion’. In France, the guaranteed minimum income, the *Revenu Minimum d’Insertion* (RMI) was one insertion policy, designed to address exclusion. There was certainly a consensus on this issue, with Presidential candidates of both the Right and Left in 1988 strongly supporting the RMI and wider policies against exclusion.
That is not to say that the meaning of exclusion was not contested, by both the Front National and the far Left. Moreover, in the 1980s the meanings of exclusion and insertion were expanded to cover emerging new social groups and problems. One example was the way insertion policies shifted from the handicapped to ‘youth in difficulty’. Another was how the twin themes of exclusion and insertion were increasingly concerned with the integration of ethnic minority groups. Young beurs, second generation North African migrants from the housing projects of the banlieues, the suburbs or outskirts of the cities, argued through their cultural associations that since they lived in France they should have full citizenship rights. An official policy was adopted to integrate migrants, that managed to keep the key elements of Republican solidarity discourse, but also tried to marry these with multicultural meanings of integration. Following disturbances on the suburban housing estates, the exclusion discourse also encompassed the issue of the banlieues. Thus in terms of public policy in France, the many meanings of exclusion were expanded in the 1980s. These included wider questions that were to do with the perceived challenge of integrating migrants; problems faced by young people; and the exclusion that resulted from economic change.

From France, the discourse of exclusion spread rapidly across Western Europe, and was adopted by the European Commission. The White Paper that it published in 1994, *Growth, Competitiveness, Employment*, called for a resolution to fight social exclusion. Graham Room noted of research on poverty sponsored by the European Union that by the time the third programme was launched (1990–94), social exclusion had become the fashionable terminology. Social exclusion was part of a continental, and particularly French, tradition of social analysis that was very different from the ‘Anglo-Saxon’ tradition of Rowntree and Townsend. Whereas poverty tended to focus on distributional issues, and the lack of resources at the disposal of an individual or household, social exclusion was concerned with relational issues – inadequate social participation, lack of social integration, and lack of power. In the latter, society was seen as a status hierarchy or number of different collectivities, bound together by sets of mutual rights and obligations that were rooted in some broader moral order. Thus social exclusion was ‘the process of becoming detached from the organisations and communities of which the society is composed and from the rights and obligations that they embody’.

These differences meant that researchers struggled to decide how social exclusion might be distinguished from older concepts of poverty and deprivation. Jos Berghman, for example, argued that the importance of social exclusion lay in the fact that it was a more comprehensive term, and referred to a dynamic process. Whereas poverty had to do with a lack of resources, social exclusion was more comprehensive, and was about much more than money. Berghman tended to restrict the use of ‘poverty’ to the lack of a disposable income, while social exclusion referred to the breakdown of the main social
systems that should guarantee citizenship rights. He concluded that poverty might best be seen as part of, or a specific form of, social exclusion. Another way of distinguishing the two might be to view social exclusion as a process, and poverty as the outcome. However, other researchers remained cautious, arguing that an emphasis on the multidimensional nature of poverty could have the effect of obscuring the dynamic processes involved. Researchers should continue to draw on the insights offered by traditional research into poverty, into the relationship between resources and deprivation, and the dynamics that lay behind patterns of disadvantage. Later work indicated that the different ways in which social exclusion had been defined continued to pose problems for researchers trying to operationalize the concept.

As in the United States, data from longitudinal studies were recognized as playing a key role. It was argued that making time more explicit in the way that poverty and social exclusion were conceptualized, defined, and measured helped to clarify the differences between them. Robert Walker, for example, found from longitudinal data for the Netherlands and Germany that although most ‘spells’ of poverty were short, much poverty was accounted for by a small number of people who were in the midst of very long spells of poverty. There was not one kind of poverty but many, with different implications for social exclusion. Qualitative research, too, indicated that the different patterning of poverty over time, and the varying trajectories that people followed, meant poverty had different social meanings and there were different risks of social exclusion. What was most useful about the availability of better longitudinal data, suggested Walker, was that it would help to illuminate causes. Previous debates had adopted a view that was static, that individuals were poor because of their attitudes and behaviour, or because of structural factors such as low-paid jobs and processes in the labour market. But the triggers that precipitated poverty might embrace both personal and structural factors. This could help in understanding poverty and social exclusion, and the relationship between them. Walker speculated that it was probable that poverty was neither a sufficient nor necessary factor in social exclusion, although certain kinds of poverty might contribute to a risk of exclusion. In these cases, social exclusion could be a destination on a journey through poverty.

Debates in France and other countries led Hilary Silver to distinguish between three different paradigms of social exclusion, each based on a different conception of integration and citizenship. Like Thomas Kuhn, she used the word ‘paradigm’ to refer to conceptual frameworks within which scientific theories are developed. She claimed that, first, a ‘solidarity’ paradigm was evident in France, where exclusion was the ‘breakdown of a social bond between the individual and society that was cultural and moral, rather than economically interested’. Second, a paradigm of ‘specialisation’ could be found, where exclusion was really a reflection of social discrimination. Third, there was a ‘monopoly’ paradigm, that described a process whereby powerful groups in society restricted the access of outsiders.
to resources through a process of ‘social closure’. The ‘monopoly’ paradigm, in particular, drew on earlier discourses on the underclass and citizenship.\textsuperscript{13} What these paradigms really mean in practice, and whether they can usefully be distinguished at all, remains uncertain. What is clear is that Silver is right in pointing out that, like ‘underclass’, the phrase ‘social exclusion’ became a keyword, a term with its own history that could serve a variety of political purposes.\textsuperscript{14}

Why do poverty discourses vary according to the country in which they have evolved? Kirk Mann had asked why there was no underclass discourse in Australia, and Hilary Silver agreed that poverty discourses were nationally specific. The exclusion rhetoric was dominant in France partly because the connotations it evoked came out of the dominant French Republican ideology of \textit{solidarisme}. The term ‘underclass’, on the other hand, had more to do with liberal and conservative ideologies of citizenship, rejected by French Republicans, which had played a key role in many aspects of British and American social policies. Whereas in Britain and the United States the underclass discourse was the most common, in France it was the exclusion discourse that tended to dominate. Silver suggested that one reason for this might be because the ‘new poverty’ really was different in France compared to Britain and the United States, although politics might also have a role to play. A second possibility was that in the 1980s the Socialists were in power in France, while it was the Republicans and Conservatives that governed in the United States and Britain. Whatever the reason for these differences, Silver concluded that these variations in labelling the poor were best examined ‘in the context of conflicting paradigms of national identity, political ideology and social science’.\textsuperscript{15}

Silver suggested that even when they were imported from other countries, poverty discourses changed their meaning to fit dominant national paradigms. In the 1990s, some commentators in Britain thought that social divisions seemed to be widening and hardening. In \textit{The State We’re In} (1995), for example, Will Hutton had written of a new 30/30/40 society, where 30 per cent of the population were disadvantaged; 30 per cent were marginalized and insecure; and 40 per cent were privileged. Hutton found a world of ‘us’ and ‘them’, a privileged class and the working poor.\textsuperscript{16} In between these two groups were growing numbers of people who were more insecure, worried about losing their jobs, and about maintaining a decent standard of living. Hutton concluded there was a general sense of fear and beleaguerment.\textsuperscript{17} Groups such as the Child Poverty Action Group (CPAG) were equally aware of these widening inequalities, and, by the mid-1990s had begun to move away from the concept of the underclass towards that of social exclusion. This reflected the influence of the earlier European debates, and also the increasing emphasis placed on citizenship. In part, too, social exclusion offered a means of describing poverty that had fewer pejorative connotations. Individuals as well as pressure groups began to rethink the way that they had conventionally viewed poverty. Peter Townsend, for
example, now admitted that he had earlier been wrong in thinking that
the term ‘social exclusion’ was a diversion from more important issues. He
conceded that social exclusion was crucial, because of the way it focused
attention on the denial of rights, and on the ways in which needs were
created and controlled by external forces.18

Intellecuals close to New Labour helped to popularize the concept of
social exclusion. In his influential book on the Third Way, Anthony Giddens
argued that social exclusion could occur both at the bottom of society
and at the top.19 Giddens can be seen to have been heavily influenced by
the interpretation of William Julius Wilson of concentration effects in
American cities, by longitudinal studies, and also by the revival of interest in
questions of agency among social policy specialists, that stressed the ability
of individuals to influence their own circumstances.20 Solutions should
therefore have an enabling approach, building on the action strategies of the
poor, with a stress on initiative and responsibility.21 Social exclusion directed
attention to the social mechanisms that produced or sustained deprivation,
and research might usefully focus on how people got out of poverty. How
did New Labour come to adopt social exclusion as the label for its attempts
to tackle poverty? In some respects, the ideas embodied in the concept
simply represented an updating of Peter Townsend’s earlier formulation of
poverty as relative deprivation.22 Although Townsend focused on poverty,
he stressed how the lack of resources that characterized the poor meant
they were unable to participate in activities that other people regarded
as normal. The task for academics was to construct social surveys that
captured this sense of relative deprivation. This approach was subsequently
applied in Britain in the early 1980s, in the ‘Breadline Britain’ survey, which
similarly defined poverty in terms of ‘an enforced lack of socially perceived
necessities’.23

Townsend’s theory of ‘relative deprivation’ in some respects anticipated
the idea of social exclusion. But arguably more important was the way that
New Labour was much more prepared to consider the influence of behaviour
on poverty and deprivation than the Labour Party had been previously. It has
been argued that in America the publication of the Moynihan Report (1965)
led to a void in which Liberals were unwilling to discuss issues of race and
poverty. In Britain too, the post-war period (what is often called the Titmuss
era) had been marked by a refusal to consider that poverty could have
anything other than structural causes. But this was increasingly questioned
by some thinkers and policy makers on the Left. In his book Making Welfare
Work (1995), the Labour MP Frank Field argued that welfare had to be
based on a realistic view of human nature, since self-interest, not altruism,
was the main driving force of mankind. Influenced in part by his Christian
beliefs, Field wrote that ‘welfare influences behaviour by the simple device
of bestowing rewards (benefits) and allotting punishments (loss of benefits)
. . . the nature of our character depends in part on the values which welfare
fosters’.24 Thus Field advocated a system of ‘stakeholder welfare’, where
welfare aimed to maximize self-improvement, reflected the significance of self-interest, and rewarded good behaviour.

Field was subsequently criticized for using the terms ‘behaviour’ and ‘character’ interchangeably, and for evoking the judgementalism of the nineteenth-century Charity Organisation Society (COS). It was suggested that this had links with the debates on the social residuum in the 1880s, and problem families in the 1950s. What is clear is that Field, and New Labour more generally, had been heavily influenced by American writers such as Charles Murray and Lawrence Mead. Alan Deacon claimed more generally that the Blair administration looked to America for ideas for welfare reform, and that the language in which these policies were presented and justified drew heavily on that of American politicians and commentators. New Labour’s debate on welfare marked its response to the challenge of Murray and Mead to pay more attention to issues of personal responsibility and moral obligation. Field was influenced by his Christian beliefs in coming to this conclusion, and other key members of the Blair government followed a type of Christian Socialism that made it possible to address inequalities while at the same time acknowledging the role of behaviour. It has been suggested, therefore, that the approach of the Blair government to welfare reform was rooted in ‘Anglicised communitarianism’. A welfare system was envisaged which was active rather than passive; which combined opportunity and responsibility; and which was based around paid work. Deacon concluded that the influence of American thinking was crucial to the shift from ‘the problem of inequality to the problem of dependency’, and in increasing the attention New Labour paid to issues of values and social morality.

The important differences between Britain and America notwithstanding, with regard to welfare reform New Labour was more influenced by the experience of the United States than by that of France. As David Marquand noted, ‘the Blair government looks across the Atlantic for inspiration, not across the channel’. In particular, Blair and other intellectuals on the Left were influenced by the American emphasis on communitarianism. Its leading advocate, Amitai Etzioni, had written that ‘we are a social movement aiming at shoring up the moral, social, and political environment. Part change of heart, part renewal of social bonds, part reform of public life’. Thus he had drawn attention to the roles of the family; schools; the ‘social webs’ that bound individuals together; and the overarching values that a national society embodied. Anthony Giddens, too, argued that civic decline was real and visible, and was seen in ‘the weakening sense of solidarity in some local communities and urban neighbourhoods, high levels of crime, and the break-up of marriages and families’. Civic involvement was least developed in areas and neighbourhoods marginalized by the sweep of economic and social change. One of the lessons of the 1960s social engineering experiments, contended Giddens, had been that external forces could best be mobilized to support local initiative.
These different influences – of the new emphasis on behaviour, of debates about American welfare reform, and of communitarianism – could be seen in a speech given by Tony Blair in June 1997, at the Aylesbury Estate in the London borough of Southwark. This preceded the speech in December 1997, at the Stockwell Park School in Lambeth, that marked the launch of the Social Exclusion Unit. The Prime Minister stated that the Government would deal with those living in poverty – what he called the ‘forgotten people’. But he stressed it was not just a question of poverty, but one of fatalism, and about ‘how to recreate the bonds of civic society and community in a way compatible with the far more individualistic nature of modern, economic, social and cultural life’.30 Blair continued, ‘there is a case not just in moral terms but in enlightened self-interest to act, to tackle what we all know exists – an underclass of people cut off from society’s mainstream, without any sense of shared purpose’.31 What was needed was a modern civic society based on an ethic of mutual responsibility and duty. Although problems were caused by changes in the nature of work, and long-term unemployment, there was also the danger that people were becoming detached from society, and from citizenship in its widest sense. Welfare had to be reshaped to reward hard work. Solutions were long term; would require greater co-ordination across government departments than previously; and would be based on policies that had been shown to work.32

Nevertheless other observers contested the meaning of social exclusion in Britain. Ruth Levitas, for example, argued that social exclusion had become integrated into a new ‘hegemonic discourse’, where it was contrasted with integration into the labour market, and obscured inequalities. The discourse treated social divisions endemic to capitalism as resulting from an abnormal breakdown in the social cohesion which should be maintained by the division of labour. Although linked to Townsend’s theory of relative deprivation, social exclusion ‘actually obscures the questions of material inequality it was originally intended to illuminate’.33 The concept of social exclusion devalued unpaid work, obscured the inequalities between paid workers, and disguised the fundamental social division between the property-owning class and the rest of society. Levitas argued that social exclusion was embedded in three different discourses – a redistributionist discourse that was primarily concerned with poverty; a moral underclass discourse that focused on the moral and behavioural delinquency of the excluded; and a social integrationist discourse whose focus was on paid work. One reason why social exclusion had been so powerful a concept had been because it could have different meanings and move between these discourses. Levitas wrote that, like the word ‘underclass’, the phrase ‘social exclusion’ could, almost unnoticed, ‘mobilise a redistributive argument behind a cultural or integrationist one – or represent cultural or integrationist arguments as redistributive’.34 Labour had moved away from a concern with poverty towards an inconsistent combination of the moral underclass approach with an emphasis on social integration whose focus was on paid work.
In *New Labour, New Language?*, Norman Fairclough offered a more intensive study of New Labour speeches and policy documents. He made the point that whereas Labour used the word ‘poverty’ in an international context, it tended to use social exclusion for domestic policy. As in other areas of policy, Labour favoured lists of achievements, rather than explanations of the relationship between causes and outcomes, and the relationships between different problems and agencies. For Labour, social exclusion was a condition people were in, not something that was done to them. Words such as ‘exclusion’ were used more than verbs such as ‘exclude’, and the focus was on outcome rather than process. There was evidence that the behavioural and moral delinquency suggested by the term ‘underclass’ had been carried over into the construction of social exclusion. The Labour discourse of social exclusion was based in part on a social integrationist discourse that emphasized the importance of paid work. Social exclusion combined this with a moral underclass discourse, where exclusion was due to deficiencies in the culture of the excluded. It was the perceived cultural deficiencies of socially excluded people that provided the justification for government interventions to change cultures. In fact, there was evidence that the socially excluded developed their own (effective but at times illegal) social capital and social networks to survive. These were a rational response to the situation that people found themselves in. Labour was committed to tackling social exclusion because of a combination of compassion and self-interest. Alleviation of social exclusion had replaced the longer-term Labour goal of equality, which was based on the belief that capitalist societies created inequalities and conflicting interests. Social exclusion focused on those who were excluded from society, shifted attention away from inequalities and conflicts of interests, and assumed there was nothing wrong with contemporary society as long as it was made more inclusive through government policy.

Moreover on an empirical level, researchers found it difficult to find evidence of social exclusion on the ground. Tania Burchardt, Julian Le Grand, and David Piachaud suggested that ‘an individual is socially excluded if (a) he or she is geographically resident in a society and (b) he or she does not participate in the normal activities of citizens in that society’. They tried to operationalize a definition of social exclusion based around five types of activity: consumption, savings, production, political engagement, and social interaction. This was because they thought there were five dimensions for ‘normal activities’ – to have a reasonable standard of living; to possess a degree of security; to be engaged in an activity which was valued by others; to have some decision-making power; and to be able to draw support from immediate family, friends and a wider community. Using the British Household Panel Survey, and interviews conducted in the years 1991–95, they found that for individuals there were strong associations between exclusion on one dimension and exclusion on another, and between exclusion in one year and exclusion in subsequent years. However, very few people were
excluded on all dimensions in any one year, and most were not excluded on any dimension. Burchardt, Le Grand, and Piachaud concluded that using these indicators there was no clear-cut category of socially excluded people. It seemed better to treat different dimensions of exclusion separately than to think of the socially excluded as being one homogeneous group.40

Summaries of research explored the meaning of social exclusion, acknowledging that because it was a broad term, views on its causes could differ markedly. Some, as in the underclass debate, put individual behaviour and morals at the centre; others highlighted the role of institutions and systems; and others emphasized discrimination and lack of rights. One of the important points was that is necessary to look not just at material resources but at other indicators of deprivation or of an inability to participate in society. This work concluded, for example, from the evidence of income dynamics that ‘there is little evidence in the UK for a permanently excluded “underclass”, doomed from childhood’.41 Hence it was argued that social exclusion could change the way people thought about poverty and deprivation, and that traditional concerns with poverty need not be left behind.

Whether this was actually true in practice can be explored in relation to government initiatives on child poverty and child health. The use of the phrases ‘cycle of disadvantage’ and ‘cycle of deprivation’, and the emphasis on the transmission of poverty between generations were among the most striking aspects of Labour policy in the field of child health.42 This hint is confirmed by the existence of a more explicit attempt to revisit the Transmitted Deprivation Research Programme of the 1970s and 1980s, and to link academics and policy-makers. In November 1997, a conference entitled ‘New Cycles of Disadvantage’ was organized by CASE on behalf of the ESRC. The aim was to broaden Treasury links with sociologists and social policy specialists. The Treasury was interested in cycles of disadvantage for three reasons. First, its core aim was to raise the sustainable growth rate and increase opportunities for everyone to share in the benefits of growth. Second, Treasury policy cut across different government departments, and cycles of disadvantage were seen to result from multiple problems that required multiple solutions. Third, substantial amounts of public expenditure were devoted to mitigating the effects of cycles of disadvantage.43 The aim was to revisit the idea of cycles of deprivation in light of new evidence, and the subsequent conference indicated some new elements when compared to the earlier SSRC-DHSS research programme. One was the emphasis placed on the evidence for genetic influences on individual differences in anti-social and other behaviour. Another was the availability of new longitudinal studies, which meant more importance was attached than previously to income mobility and poverty dynamics, with evidence indicating that the poor did not generally remain persistently poor. And there was much reference to the role of place in poorer neighbourhoods, to drugs and crime, and to single parenthood. Despite these differences, the November 1997 conference illustrated interesting continuities with the earlier cycle of deprivation
debates. The conference was introduced by Professor Michael Rutter. Moreover academics seemed no closer to deciding if a cycle of deprivation actually existed, or to detecting transmission mechanisms and risk.

Norman Glass, then Chief Economist at the Department of Social Security, and later Deputy Director at the Treasury, has shown how Sure Start was announced in July 1998 as part of the Cross-Departmental Review of Young Children in the Labour Government’s Comprehensive Spending Review (CSR).44 Moreover in 1999, Tony Blair’s Beveridge Lecture marked a sea change in the Government’s language and policy approach. Blair made a historic commitment to end child poverty within 20 years. Blair said he would ‘set out our historic aim that ours is the first generation to end child poverty forever, and it will take a generation. It is a 20-year mission, but I believe it can be done’.45 He also presented a blueprint for a new modern popular welfare state. The welfare state would tackle child poverty, social exclusion, and the decay of communities. But people also had a responsibility to take the opportunities that were offered. The welfare state should be an enabler, not a provider. Most help should go to those in most need, but fraud and abuse should also be rooted out. Public-private partnerships and voluntary organizations would have an increasingly important role in delivering welfare. And welfare was not just about benefits, but about services and community support.46 Analysis has indicated that the aim of ending child poverty within 20 years is unlikely to be achieved with current policies. More relevant to the discussion here is that Labour was concerned to strike a balance between responsibility and opportunity. Its policy on child poverty provides a good example of the ‘third way’ on welfare. Thus the ending of child poverty was often presented less as an objective in itself, and more as a means of reducing inequalities in opportunity.

The emphasis that people should take up the opportunities that are offered led Labour to revisit earlier debates, including the cycle of deprivation research of the 1970s.47 In April 2000, for example, a report in the Guardian argued that Sure Start provided a means of tackling the ‘cycle of deprivation’.48 Similarly, an editorial in the British Medical Journal in July 2001 argued that the result of social exclusion could be that children living in poverty ‘may enter a cycle of poor educational achievement, unmanageable behaviour, drug misuse, unemployment, teenage pregnancy, homelessness, crime, and suicide’.49 But differences in this vocabulary also reflected Labour uncertainty about the relative importance to be attached to behavioural and structural causes of deprivation. The declared aim of Sure Start was to ‘break the cycle of disadvantage for the current generation of young children’.50 It was claimed that Sure Start was founded on evidence that sustained support for children could help them succeed at school and help reduce crime, unemployment, teenage pregnancy, and other economic and social problems.51 The Breaking the Cycle Report (2004) by the Social Exclusion Unit, for example, referred to an intergenerational cycle of deprivation, along with the transmission and inheritance of disadvantage.52
Alan Deacon suggested from these and other sources that Labour’s understanding of the cycle of disadvantage drew on five conflicting interpretations of continuities in disadvantage. First, the cultural explanation of the culture of poverty; second, the rational explanation associated with Charles Murray; third, a permissive explanation linked to the work of Lawrence Mead; fourth, the adaptive explanation adopted by William Julius Wilson among others; and fifth, the structural explanation that denied the role of behavioural factors and was embodied in William Ryan’s book *Blaming the Victim*. Deacon compared Labour’s approach to child poverty with the earlier research into transmitted deprivation in the 1970s. He concluded that Labour’s interpretation of the cycle of disadvantage did recognize the significance of structural factors, and in general its rhetoric was closer to the adaptive explanation. However, its emphasis that people should take full advantage of the opportunities that were created also reflected elements of the rational, permissive, and cultural explanations. Thus in Deacon’s words, Labour sought both to ‘level the playing field’ and to ‘activate the players’.

Whereas the Labour Party, in the years immediately after the May 1997 election, had committed itself to the abolition of child poverty and establishment of interventions such as Sure Start, particularly towards the end of Tony Blair’s period in office, the then Government moved to a much more authoritarian and punitive stance on anti-social behaviour and ‘problem families’. As early as 2004, there were signs that the focus on social exclusion was perceived as misdirected. Yvette Cooper, then a Minister in the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, suggested that the promotion of a communitarian notion of inclusion was not enough; long-term inherited inequalities had to be tackled too. Child poverty remained a significant problem, and the focus on the root causes of exclusion – unemployment, poverty, and early childhood opportunities – had to be sustained. Nevertheless with hindsight more interesting was Cooper’s image of inequalities cascading from one generation to the next, and what she variously termed ‘inherited disadvantage’ or ‘inherited class injustices’. Moreover the *Breaking the Cycle* report (2004) that took stock of 7 years of the work of the Social Exclusion Unit (SEU) focused much more than previously on the factors that allegedly transmitted poverty and disadvantage from one generation to the next. This was interpreted as meaning that many of the people with the greatest and most complex needs had benefited least from efforts to tackle social exclusion.

The change was flagged up in a speech by David Miliband, then Minister of Communities and Local Government, but delivered by Phil Woolas, MP, at the London School of Economics in November 2005. Miliband wrote that a war on poverty was not sufficient to tackle social exclusion; it existed in ‘wide, deep, and concentrated forms’, and it was important not to confuse them. In February 2006, Tony Blair argued that the Government had to do more to tackle social exclusion, saying ‘we must be honest. For some, those
who from generation to generation, are brought up in workless households in poor estates, often poorly educated and frankly sometimes poorly parented the rising tide has not helped lift them'. The interim evaluation of Sure Start was critical, leading to the claim by Government that it had failed the socially excluded. Blair said ‘Sure Start has been brilliant for those people who have in their own minds decided they want to participate. But the hard to reach families, the ones who are shut out of the system . . . they are not going to come to places like Sure Start’. In June 2006, the work of the SEU was transferred from the Department of Communities and Local Government to a smaller Taskforce in the Cabinet Office. It was regarded as having lost its influence since the first term, when it was based in the Cabinet Office and reported to Blair directly. It now focused on preventive work among the most hard to reach children and families deemed to have been immune to much of the Government’s previous social exclusion drives. Hilary Armstrong, Cabinet Minister for Social Exclusion, argued the SEU programmes had failed to reach some of the poorest, most isolated and vulnerable families. The work was to be trained on the ‘high harm, high risk and high lifetime cost families’, with the aim of intervening as soon as they appeared at risk of exclusion, breakdown or criminal behaviour. Part of the work was to support the efforts of a new Respect Unit, with improved programmes to help ‘prevent the problem families of tomorrow’.

Furthermore despite New Labour’s emphasis on child poverty, and on inter-generational continuities between childhood disadvantage and adult outcomes, there continued to be countervailing pressures, of which one was the focus on antisocial behaviour. In the late 1990s, commentators had recognized that the treatment of antisocial behaviour had become individualized, rather than facing the wider difficulties faced by antisocial tenants, such as poor educational opportunities, unemployment, and substance abuse. Others suggested that policy initiatives were based around a perceived decline in moral responsibility. A communitarian outlook had led to their incorporating a strongly judgemental bias, and the adoption of punitive strategies. Tenants in council housing were seen as forming an underclass, and residualization and exclusion facilitated increasingly interventionist and authoritarian policies. As Home Secretary, David Blunkett had argued that children as young as three should be monitored for signs of behaviour that might identify them as disruptive teenagers. Moreover it was claimed that psychiatric research suggested that antisocial behaviour in children could be the result of their genetic make-up. Researchers acknowledged the importance of environmental factors. Nevertheless early intervention, including family support and pre-school education, was seen as potentially significant.

Moreover from 2006, Government policy in Britain became concerned with, not just enforcing sanctions on what was deemed anti-social behaviour, but its perceived causes, in families, in classrooms, and in communities. In particular under the Respect initiative, outlined in January 2006, Tony
Blair argued that there were intractable problems with the behaviour of some individuals and families, which could make life a misery for others, particularly in the most disadvantaged communities. The causes lay in families, in the classroom, and in communities. The Respect Action Plan stated that ‘poor behaviour and a lack of respect can be transmitted between generations and can result in children and young people getting involved in crime or anti-social behaviour’. Children who engaged in anti-social behaviour from an early age were more likely to face a lifetime of social exclusion and offending. Moreover it was a small minority of problem families that were responsible for a high proportion of problems. It was suggested that problem families could be required to go on compulsory rehabilitation courses covering anger control, money management, and parenting advice. Funding was made available for a National Parenting Academy and for parenting classes and other support groups for families. The police were to be given new powers to identify children under ten who were in problem families and at risk of becoming offenders, so that the authorities could intervene early. Moreover Anti-Social Behaviour Orders were to be extended, to include the withdrawal of housing benefit and forced eviction of families that refused to improve their behaviour. Subsequently housing benefit was to be withdrawn where a person had been evicted for anti-social behaviour and refused to address the problem using the support and help offered. This reflected the feeling that the Government’s programmes were struggling to reach out to problem families resistant to state help, which also underlay the abolition of the SEU noted earlier.

Academics had earlier noted that adult antisocial behaviour might be prevented through family and parenting programmes. In the United States, Carolyn Webster-Stratton and colleagues had demonstrated the effectiveness of the Incredible Years parenting programme, and there was interest in Multisystemic Therapy which was more broadly-based. Other initiatives went back to Head Start, and smaller initiatives such as the High/Scope Perry Preschool Programme. In Britain at that time, the preventive focus of the more intensive parenting and family support initiatives was on reducing child abuse and the need for children to be taken into care. Nevertheless in November 2006, the Government announced the setting up of a national network of parenting experts, with £4m to appoint parenting experts in 77 areas across England. Tony Blair said ‘the cost to society of a child going off the rails can run into tens of thousands of pounds by the time they are 18 just in police, court and the time of other agencies . . . it’s why the public believes that better parenting is the main key to reducing crime and disorder in our communities’. A National Academy for Parenting Practitioners was launched in November 2007, targeting both those with the greatest needs and the majority of parents who needed occasional advice.

Deborah Ghate and Neal Hazel had earlier provided a helpful overview of research on parenting in poor environments, and on stress, support, and coping. Val Gillies argued that the Labour Government’s commitment to
supporting families was driven by a particular moral agenda that sought to regulate and control the behaviour of marginalized families. Despite a rhetoric of empowerment and investment, Labour’s emphasis on support represented a top-down projection of values and standards on to families, supporting conformity rather than promoting access to parenting resources. Gillies wrote that ‘while couched in the language of support and empowerment, New Labour’s family policy agenda is unapologetically interventionist, based on value-driven understandings of parenthood, citizenship and agency’. She noted a creeping professionalization of family life, and challenged the notion that social inclusion could be promoted at the level of the family, suggesting that parenting practices and values were grounded in social and economic realities. The focus on parenting education as a policy solution overlooked ‘the extent to which economic, cultural, social, and personal resources are interdependent in families’. Jane Lewis has noted the emergence of evidence-based parenting programmes developed in the United States and Australia such as Incredible Years, Strengthening Families, Strengthening Communities, and Triple P (Positive Parenting Programme). This had occurred within the broader context of the greater emphasis attached to securing behavioural change at the individual level after 2005. Lewis argued that while evidence-based programmes were promoted to ensure that public money would be well spent, they were imported from other jurisdictions and there were problems in implementing them, notably with staffing.

A further development was the selection of 40 ‘Respect Areas’ which were seen as having a strong track record in tackling anti-social behaviour and its causes. These Areas had signed up to FIPs; parenting classes; ‘Face the People’ sessions; action on anti-social behaviour; and using the Respect Housing Standard. By January 2007, £4m in funding had been announced for 77 local authorities to employ parenting experts to help families whose children were seen as being involved in, or at risk of, anti-social behaviour. Local authorities were to be issued with a Respect Handbook. In Bolton, for example, it was reported that up to 16 hours a week intensive support was given to families at risk of losing their homes because of anti-social behaviour. The Council did not offer tea and sympathy, but rather ‘challenges parents to put their lives in order, making sure children go to school and that the family’s finances, shopping and meals are under control’.

Tackling anti-social behaviour had thus also become a key issue for the Government, drawing on earlier underclass discourses, and in particular on the vocabulary of problem families. It was suggested that the withholding of housing benefit from people deemed to be antisocial, along with anti-social behaviour legislation, marked a subtle change in the role of the welfare state. John Rodger argued that ‘the broad social policy agenda aimed at combating social exclusion is, increasingly, being re-framed in terms of the management of problem populations’. The idea of segregating and re-educating dysfunctional families provided a good example of this approach. Similar revised constructions of the child and childhood, and
new relationships between parents, children, and the state, were apparent in Scotland.\textsuperscript{81} Some of this work drew on research by psychiatrists and criminologists (Rutter, Farrington) originally fostered by the Transmitted Deprivation Research Programme. Moreover it gained prominence in the wider context of a moral panic about young people, with claims that there had been a serious rift between children and adults, one not witnessed in comparable European countries.\textsuperscript{82}

A further push on social exclusion came in September 2006, in a Joseph Rowntree Foundation (JRF) speech which followed a Chequers seminar. Four issues identified as challenges were: halving teenage pregnancies by 2010; supporting children in care; tackling chaotic parenting through a proposed National Parenting Academy, the extension of parenting orders, and a network of family support schemes; and helping benefit claimants with mental illnesses.\textsuperscript{83} In an interview with the BBC, on 31 August, Blair defined those he was talking about variously as people with multiple problems, families where identification and intervention came too late, hard to reach families, or dysfunctional families. As in the social exclusion speeches in 1997, the problems that these families faced were perceived as being not simply about low income. But there was also now a belief that it was possible to predict, with reasonable accuracy, those families that were going to prove troublesome in the future. Families with alcohol and drug problems were being identified too late, and action might even be taken pre-birth if necessary.\textsuperscript{84}

In the JRF speech in York, on 5 September, Blair’s thesis was that ‘some aspects of social exclusion are deeply intractable. The most socially excluded are very hard to reach. Their problems are multiple, entrenched and often passed down the generations’.\textsuperscript{85} While for some families material poverty was the root of their problems, for others it was the result of a multiplicity of lifestyle issues. Moreover the success of measures to tackle child poverty, reduce unemployment, and improve public services meant that the persistent exclusion of a small minority stood out. Blair stated that ‘about 2.5 per cent of every generation seem to be stuck in a life-time of disadvantage and amongst them are the excluded of the excluded, the deeply excluded’.\textsuperscript{86} Health visitors and midwives would seek to identify those most at risk, and for these children a 2-year visiting programme would be put in place; on teenage pregnancy an expanded media campaign would be begun, and better access to contraceptives provided. Overall, where children were involved and in danger of harm, or where people were a risk to themselves or others, it was a duty not to stand aside: ‘their fate is our business’.\textsuperscript{87} Blair suggested that this was about coupling rights with responsibilities, acknowledging that both individual agency and structural causes were relevant. Reporting of the speech the following day was limited because of speculation about Blair’s departure date as Prime Minister.\textsuperscript{88} However, in the content of the speech itself, the focus on those left behind by rising living standards and improved public services, and the selective use of evidence to support its arguments there were many similarities with the Joseph cycle speech.\textsuperscript{89}
In the Government’s Action Plan on Social Exclusion (September 2006), much more detail was given about why individuals and families allegedly remained socially excluded despite Government policies on poverty and unemployment, and what should be done about it. In his Preface, Tony Blair wrote that it examined ‘why, despite the huge progress we have made, there are still individuals and families who are cut off’. Thus the Action Plan argued that because of increasing affluence and Government efforts to reduce poverty, ‘the persistent and deep-seated exclusion of a small minority has come to stand out ever more dramatically’. International evidence had shown that around 2.7 per cent of 15-year olds could be described as having multiple problems. Nonetheless understanding of risk and protective factors for outcomes perceived as negative had become more sophisticated and had the potential to identify warning signs early. The report was underpinned by the belief that through early identification, support, and preventative action, problems could be tackled before they became entrenched and blighted the lives of both individuals and the wider society. Longitudinal research had revealed more about risk and protective factors. What was advocated was a lifetime approach. Intensive health-led home visiting during pregnancy and the first 2 years of life could radically improve outcomes for both mother and child, particularly in the most at-risk families. In childhood and the teenage years, the focus should be on children in care and on teenage pregnancy. Finally in the adult years, it should be on people ‘with chaotic lives and multiple needs’, including those with severe mental health problems. These were people who ‘become parents who are unable to parent effectively, therefore perpetuating the cycle of problems in their children’. It had become apparent that what worked for the vast majority of disadvantaged groups might not work for the most hard-to-reach individuals.

Reviews of progress on social exclusion after the publication of the Action Plan were careful to stress the growth in household income for families in the bottom fifth of the population from 1997–98, and improvements in employment, education, disadvantaged areas, health, and housing. Nevertheless Labour argued that it was precisely because of the success in improving outcomes for the poor that Government was able to focus on those ‘facing deep and persistent exclusion’. These were perceived to be the 2–3 per cent of families with multiple problems, such as mental health issues, drug and or alcohol dependence, low or no basic skills, crime and antisocial behaviour, and poor housing or homelessness. This meant that the perceived priority was the poorest households, early intervention, and a life cycle approach as a means of breaking cycles of disadvantage. Parenting moved centre stage, since it was claimed ‘many of adults suffering multiple problems are already parents (or may become parents), who are unable to parent properly and therefore perpetuate the cycle of problems in their children’. Government needed to work harder to identify who was at risk and intervene in ways that were proven to work; to attune performance
management systems to identify when people were missed; and to promote multi-agency working and address the needs of the whole family.

The Children and Young People’s Review (January 2007) noted that families caught in a cycle of low achievement could harm their local communities and cost the taxpayer dearly. Moreover the Social Exclusion Task Force had reviewed the situation of families with multiple disadvantages. New analysis by the Social Exclusion Task Force, using the Families and Children Study, had shown that around 2 per cent of families in Britain experienced five or more disadvantages, or around 140,000 families in 2004. Moreover the costs to public services of supporting families with multiple problems were particularly large. A report from the Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit in May 2007 argued similarly that a small minority of families faced multiple and entrenched problems. These families cost the state between £55,000 and £115,000 a year. Publicly, Prime Minister Tony Blair admitted that his approach to the ‘most unruly in society’ had been misguided, in that he had assumed that public investment in poor neighbourhoods would rid society of dysfunctional families and their children. Instead policies were needed ‘that target failing and dysfunctional families early and place those families within a proper, structured, disciplined framework of help and insistence on proper behaviour’.

He knew intervening early with problem families would be controversial. But Blair said ‘for some of these families and their children, a nanny state is what they need – for their sake as much as ours’.

The Government’s Social Exclusion Task Force led a cross-Whitehall review on excluded and at-risk families, exploring how intergenerational cycles of exclusion could end up resulting in problematic behaviour. This Families at Risk Review was completed in the summer of 2007. What worked for many families did not work for all, and what was needed was to address ‘the distinctive challenge of the small minority of families who have been left behind’. The review had examined a wide range of ‘parent-based risk factors’, while parents who engaged in antisocial behaviour could ‘perpetuate a cycle of criminal behaviour where the children of parents who behave anti-socially are more likely to be both perpetrators and victims of crime themselves’. At a local level too, local authorities began to target particular families. Westminster, for example, identified 600 families (3 per cent of the total) whom it said ‘have a long-term negative effect on society as a whole’. Moreover the potential of early intervention was flagged up in other areas. The Youth Crime Action Plan (2008) argued that vulnerable children at particular risk of offending could often be identified early on. It was argued that a minority of young people committed crime and a much smaller number – about one in twenty – committed half of all youth crime. The report claimed that ‘people in this group are often disadvantaged by poor or indifferent parenting, and display a range of personal and family difficulties which mean they can often be identified early when problems begin to manifest themselves’.
Particularly interesting are the residential projects that have aimed to rehabilitate problem families. Again there was an earlier history to these – in the 1950s, for instance, local authorities generally tackled problem families in their own homes, but some had sent mothers to the Brentwood Recuperation Centre for Mothers and Children. Located near Stockport, south of Manchester, it closed its doors only in 1970. Subsequently the Dundee Families Project had been established to assist families who were homeless or at severe risk of homelessness as a result of anti-social behaviour. The service was offered in three main ways: by admission to a ‘core block’ comprising accommodation for three to four families, where families received intensive support, often involving daily contact; in support to a small number of dispersed flats; and on an outreach basis to families in their existing accommodation. One evaluation (2001) claimed that the Dundee Project was successful in producing change in many of the families it served.

An interim evaluation (2006) of six initiatives modelled on the Dundee Families Project, in Sheffield, Manchester, Bolton, Salford, Oldham, and Blackburn with Darwen, claimed good results. Particularly noteworthy were the rules and regulations governing the core accommodation, which comprised a strict code of conduct; a requirement for adults and children to be in at a set time each evening; restricted access in and out of the project building, with visitors by permission only; together with specific rules deemed appropriate for individual families. The data related to 99 families who had been involved in the 6 projects in their first year of operation (2003–04). While 26 per cent of families had disengaged from the process, 50 of 62 families (82 per cent) had achieved a reduction in the level of complaints about anti-social behaviour; 73 of 77 families (95 per cent) had maintained their tenancies or made a planned move; 45 of 56 families (80 per cent) had managed to reduce the threat of possession action to their homes; and 31 of 38 families (84 per cent) had improved school attendance. A subsequent report, based on 256 families who had worked with the projects in 2003–05, was similarly positive. A third and final report by the same team explored the longer-term outcomes associated with the FIPs by tracking 28 families over the period 2004 to 2006–07. For 20 of the 28 families, positive change had been sustained, and no significant complaints about anti-social behaviour had been received. Of the 28 families, 12 were regarded as a ‘resounding’ success; 8 as a qualified success; and 8 as having continuing difficulties. The evaluation claimed FIPs had beneficial outcomes and were highly cost effective.

A wider network of FIPs was created as a result of the Respect Action Plan. Of 53 FIPs established in the period 2006–07, 19 had existed prior to 2006 and the remaining 34 were set up from scratch. In most cases, the service was delivered to families in their own homes. Louise Casey, then in charge of the Respect Agenda, said ‘these families can cause untold misery to those who have to live alongside them and destroy entire neighbourhoods
with their frightening and disruptive behaviour’. It was claimed that results were impressive. The areas included Blackburn, Camden, Hackney, Leeds, Plymouth, Southampton, and Westminster. Different levels of intervention were used at different times; at the most intensive level, families who required supervision and support on a 24-hour basis stayed in a residential unit. The Government provided £15m funding over 2 years, with £13m of this coming from the Respect Task Force. Average project costs ranged from £8,000 per family for those receiving outreach support in their homes, to £15,000 for more intensive services. One evaluation (2008) found in the period February to October 2007, 885 families were referred to a FIP, and it was claimed that 90 families who had completed the intervention displayed considerable improvements. There were reductions in the number engaged in anti-social behaviour; anti-social behaviour enforcement actions; house enforcement actions; and children reported to have educational problems. The Youth Crime Action Plan (2008) anticipated that local authorities would use the FIPs to focus on an average of 40 families in each area, and that, by 2010, 20,000 families across the country would have been reached.

Some commentators were critical, especially of the residential component of the schemes. Paul Michael Garrett pointed to the ‘forgetfulness’ of social policy, locating the history of ‘sinbins’ in terms of residential projects for ‘asocial’ families in the Netherlands and Nazi Germany. He suggested that evaluations of the FIPs were insufficiently critical. He pointed to the restrictions placed on families admitted to the ‘core block’ in the Dundee Families Project. All the families were poor and in ill health, and some clearly resented the amount of supervision and intrusion they were subjected to. With the six projects in the North West of England, many of the families had been themselves the victims of harassment, but much of the emphasis was placed on the containment and surveillance of families. The evaluation seemed too positive.

On the other hand, those responsible for the evaluations argued that Garrett presented an ‘ill-informed, selective and distorted’ view of work on FIPs. Judy Nixon, for example, argued that the FIPs were not solely a punitive, disciplining mechanism, and rejected Garrett’s historical comparisons. She claimed while the interventions had a coercive element, they aimed to promote social inclusion for families, to assist in promoting better outcomes in health, education and well-being, and to increase community stability. It was clear that the majority of families valued highly the experience of working with a FIP, examples of resistance notwithstanding. Similarly the researchers on the Dundee Families Project argued that Garrett’s selection of historical roots was partial and biased, and that he focused on the residential component of the scheme. Sadie Parr suggested that some FIPs were implemented in a way that provided staff with an opportunity to engage in the kind of creative practice that was impossible to achieve in mainstream social work. The character and impact of any FIP was conditioned by the uniqueness of its geographical and historical context. She accepted that projects were
relabelled by the Labour Government, from family support projects to FIPs. Parr has argued that while projects had controlling and disciplinary qualities, particularly for families in the residential accommodation, they could help disadvantaged and troubled families access better lives. Rather than explicit resistance, women displayed a passive acceptance of projects, and they built a relationship of trust with project workers. Thus Parr argued that while women experienced projects in punitive and disciplinary terms, they also identified aspects that had a constructive or positive impact on their lives. The project worker had a significant befriending role, and this raised women’s levels of self-esteem and confidence, allowing them to feel competent and successful. The FIPs were therefore neither inherently good nor bad.

The origins of the Family Nurse Partnership (FNP) were similar to those of the FIPs, but otherwise there were important differences between them. As with the FIPs, the FNP was begun by the Labour Government and was unveiled by Tony Blair in May 2007. A £7m pilot scheme had begun to recruit the first of 1,000 families in 10 areas in England. Young first-time mothers were assigned a personal health visitor at between 16 and 20 weeks into their pregnancy, and they continued to have weekly or fortnightly visits until the child was 2 years old. Support included help in giving up smoking or drug use when in pregnancy, followed by a focus on bonding with the new baby, understanding behaviour such as crying, and encouraging a mother to develop her skills and resources to become a good parent. Signalling the thrust of the new policy on social exclusion, Blair said ‘what we have become aware of is that there is a section of families or people in particular situations who the general run of provision doesn’t seem to reach, and they are often people with a multiple set of problems, hugely challenging lives and if we are not able to bring them into some form of structured framework or discipline then they end up in very difficult circumstances indeed’. Hilary Armstrong, then Cabinet Minister for Social Exclusion, said that ‘there is still that group who in many senses haven’t moved because they have not been effectively accessing the services that are available’. The trial was run by Kate Billingham, previously Deputy Chief Nurse at the Department of Health, and lasted for 2 years.

Professor David Olds, a developmental psychologist from the University of Colorado, was at the launch, because he had pioneered the scheme (called the Nurse-Family Partnership in the United States). His programme was grounded in theories of human ecology, self-efficacy, and human attachment. It was designed for low-income mothers who had no previous live births. The home-visiting nurses had three main goals – to improve the outcomes of pregnancy by helping women improve their prenatal health; to improve the child’s health and development by helping parents provide more sensitive and competent care of the child; and to improve parental life course by helping parents plan future pregnancies, complete their education, and find work. Three large trials had seen consistently positive results, including higher IQ
levels and language development in children, lower levels of abuse, neglect and child injuries in families, and improvements in the antenatal health and job prospects of mothers. Proponents of the scheme also claimed large savings, estimated at $25,000 (£12,500) by the time a child was 30. The programme had thus been tested in three separate, large-scale, randomized controlled trials with different populations living in different contexts. These indicated that the programme had been successful in improving parental care of the child (fewer injuries and ingestions associated with child abuse and neglect, and better infant emotional and language development), and the improvement of maternal life course (fewer subsequent pregnancies, greater workforce participation, and reduced dependence on public assistance and food stamps). The functional and economic benefits were greatest for the families at greater risk.123

The stated aims of the FNP were thus to improve maternal and child pregnancy outcomes, to improve child health and developmental outcomes, and to improve parents’ economic self-sufficiency. The selected pilot sites in England (one from each Government Office region with two in London) were County Durham, Darlington, Manchester, Barnsley, Derby, Walsall, South East Essex, Slough, Somerset, Southwark, and Tower Hamlets. With some provisos, the evaluation of the first year found that the FNP could be delivered effectively in England, in a variety of different areas; it had reached those likely to benefit most; and it was acceptable to first-time young mothers, to fathers, and to practitioners.124 It was found similarly that the FNP could be delivered well in infancy; clients valued it highly and reported it was making a difference. Clients were overwhelmingly positive about their Family Nurses, and clients and Family Nurses indicated they believed good progress had been made in parenting and in other life skills.125 The FNP was taken up in policy documents and promoted in speeches. The 2008 Youth Crime Action Plan claimed that the FNP in the United States had reduced arrests in both mothers and their children by 50 per cent.126 In his conference speech of September 2009, the then Prime Minister Gordon Brown said he would expand the FNP.

On the other hand, researcher Anneliese Dodds argued that although the FNP marked a considerable discontinuity with previous approaches to family health, it was congruent with an emerging new approach to social exclusion. The new approach maintained that the most important task was to identify the most at risk households, individuals and children so that interventions could be targeted most effectively at those at risk, either to themselves or others. The FNP might enable family members to access available resources better. But it did not itself try to change the material context within which individuals lived, nor to reduce the risks they faced. Instead it focused on how individuals might become more ‘resilient’, through the exhortation and encouragement of professionals.127

As we have seen, the concept of social exclusion emerged in France, and was associated with a relational view of poverty that was very different
to the traditional British concern with individual and household resources. From the mid-1990s, Labour adopted the language of social exclusion. In part, this reflected a determination to focus on the structural causes of deprivation, and to use the new evidence on poverty dynamics that resulted from the availability of longitudinal data sets. Nevertheless part of the appeal of social exclusion to Labour was that it made it possible to combine a commitment to tackle poverty with a cultural interpretation that reflected the importance it attached to behaviour, and to people taking advantage of the opportunities that were offered to them. In this, as in the ‘Americanisation’ of debates on welfare, Labour was arguably much more influenced by experiences on the other side of the Atlantic than across the Channel. In Britain, social exclusion remained a contested concept, with its opponents arguing that it reflected an undue emphasis on the importance of paid work, illustrated continuities with the earlier underclass debates, and was difficult to test empirically. Powerful critiques of social exclusion were mounted by Ruth Levitas and Norman Fairclough among others.

In terms of policy, on the one hand, New Labour made a commitment to ending child poverty, and showed a recognition of the role of structural factors. This emphasis continued during Gordon Brown’s period as Prime Minister (June 2007–May 2010). But on the other hand, the stress on the cycle of disadvantage in the Sure Start initiative, and the focus on the transmission of poverty between generations, shows how the Blair government drew on aspects of the earlier cycle of deprivation debate. It is for this reason, among others, that it was suggested that Sir Keith Joseph was the intellectual godfather of New Labour. These emphases were most marked in the renewed push on social exclusion, from September 2006, where the key elements were all there in Joseph’s speech of 34 years earlier. Moreover later initiatives on social exclusion, in 2006–07, meant that these continuities became much stronger than ever before. Whereas the Labour Party, in the years immediately after the May 1997 election, had committed itself to the abolition of child poverty and establishment of interventions such as Sure Start, particularly towards the end of Tony Blair’s period in office, the then Government moved to a much more authoritarian and punitive stance on anti-social behaviour, parenting, and problem families, exemplified in the Respect initiative and the establishment of the FIPs and FNP. As we will see in the next chapter, it is the FIPs and FNP that have been continued and expanded under the Coalition Government from May 2010, as part of the drive against families deemed to be troubled.
I opened the book with Prime Minister David Cameron’s troubled families speech. On 15 December 2011, at the Sandwell Christian Centre, in Oldbury, in the West Midlands, Cameron gave a speech in which he argued that a ‘social recovery’ was needed in Britain just as much as an economic one. For a long time, he had felt, he had been criticized for talking about the ‘broken society’. But his mission in politics, and what he was really passionate about, was fixing what he termed a ‘responsibility deficit’. While the summer riots had been a wake-up call, Cameron recognized that talking about these problems was difficult territory for politicians – he said, ‘you’re talking about blame, about good behaviour and bad behaviour, about morals’. Nevertheless a situation where one group in society was living apart from the rest could have a ‘corrosive’ effect. That was why Cameron wanted to talk about ‘troubled families’. Whether they were called ‘families with multiple disadvantages’ or ‘neighbours from hell’, he said, ‘we’ve known for years that a relatively small number of families are the source of a large proportion of the problems in society’.

These included drug addiction, alcohol abuse, crime, and ‘a culture of disruption and irresponsibility that cascades through generations’. It was estimated that the state had spent £9 billion on just 120,000 families the previous year, or £75,000 per family. Action had to be taken to ‘turn these troubled families around’. Everyone should take responsibility for their actions, but when the state failed, it could amplify the worst in people. Reforms to education, welfare and criminal justice were not enough, and the Government had to change completely the way it interacted with these families, and the state intervened in their lives. Tens of thousands of troubled families had been swamped with bureaucracy, smothered in welfare and were never able to escape. While some FIPs were doing great work, more often the approach failed. Thus Cameron outlined an approach that he
believed was human and empowering, ‘supporting these families to take control of their own lives’.3

The Prime Minister had appointed Louise Casey as Head of a Troubled Families Unit in the Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG). As we have seen, under the Labour Governments she had been in charge of the Respect Agenda. She was to lead the nationwide task of ‘getting to grips’ with the number of troubled families and working out where they were. There were estimated, for instance, to be 4,500 of these families in Birmingham, 2,500 in Manchester and 1,115 in Sandwell. For many of the most troubled, a family worker would be appointed, who would agree a plan of action. By February 2012, local authorities were to have identified who the troubled families were, where they lived and what services they used. The Government was committing £448m to turn around the lives of these families by the end of the Parliament, funding 40 per cent of the total cost. A Big Society approach was required here as elsewhere, and what was needed was a ‘revolution in responsibility’. Thus Cameron ended by proclaiming that ‘we must get out there, help them turn their lives around and heal the scars of the broken society’.4

Immediate press reaction to the speech focused on the perceived inadequacy of the offered funding. Matt Cavanagh, for example, Associate Director of the Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR), argued ‘there is still a big question mark over whether the funding will be enough’, while Helen Dent, Chief Executive of the charity Family Action, called for extra resources for councils, saying ‘we would like to see further investment in early intervention and the early years’.5 Critics pointed out councils would be paid only if they met goals such as getting children back into school and reducing criminal and anti-social behaviour. Moreover research into the FIPs indicated mixed results, more successful with poor parenting, family breakdown, domestic violence, and bad behaviour at school, and less so with regard to mental health problems and worklessness. While a majority of families had kept up improvements when they were surveyed 9–14 months later, a minority had failed to do so.6 Gloria De Piero, Shadow Home Office Minister, noted the scheme would be hard to introduce when council budgets had been cut back so much, saying ‘expecting cash-strapped local authorities to provide 60 per cent of the funding for new projects seems unrealistic when ring-fences have been removed and local services are already being closed down’.7 In the Guardian newspaper, columnist Mark Johnson argued that the Government should be funding consultations with communities and families, to help define the kind of help that was really needed.8

This chapter traces the troubled families discourse and its use by the Coalition Government since May 2010. It explores where the concept came from, in terms of the Conservative Party’s ‘Broken Britain’ analysis, and where it might lead. Politicians from both Parties – notably Graham Allen, Frank Field, and Iain Duncan Smith – have argued for the benefits of early intervention. Moreover the chapter looks at more critical perspectives on
the troubled families initiative, where commentators have challenged the basis for the 120,000 figure, and where the continuities with the problem families debate of the 1950s are particularly striking. It argues that this is the most recent example of the reinvention of the underclass concept, and that, along with the revival of ‘One Nation’ Conservatism, the troubled families of 2013 are the problem families of the 1950s.

The more recent origins of the speech lay in comments made by David Cameron shortly after taking office in May 2010, with the plans being given added urgency following the riots of the summer of 2011. In a speech about families given to Relate in Leeds, on 10 December 2010, for instance, the Prime Minister had argued that many social problems were sown in the early years – ‘where parents have bad relationships, their child is more likely to live in poverty, fail at school, end up in prison, be unemployed later in life’.9 Cameron claimed that parenting was the single most important determinant of the life chances of a child, but some families needed extra help.10 Some estimates indicated that 46,000 families cost the taxpayer £4 billion a year – £100,000 each. The previous Government had never ‘got to grips’ with troubled families. What worked was personalized support, and Emma Harrison, then Chief Executive of A4e (the company Action for Employment), was to pioneer innovative work with 500 troubled families in different local authorities.

In another speech, given in his own constituency in Witney, Oxfordshire, on 15 August 2011, Cameron had argued that the riots had been about behaviour, and it was partly politicians shying away from speaking the truth about morality that helped to cause social problems. Cameron argued that ‘in this risk-free ground of moral neutrality there are no bad choices, just different lifestyles . . . people aren’t the architects of their own problems, they are victims of circumstances’.11 Thus given that ‘bad behaviour’ had ‘literally arrived on people’s doorsteps’, the riots had been a ‘wake-up call’ for the country. The question was whether the Government was determined to confront the ‘slow-motion moral collapse’ that had taken place in parts of the country over previous generations. The Broken Society was back at the top of the Prime Minister’s agenda, and ministers within the Coalition Government would be reviewing every aspect of its work – on the police, gangs, and on families too. Urgent action was needed on the families that some people called ‘problem’, others ‘troubled’. This was an issue that had ‘deep roots’ in British society.12

Cameron offered no criteria by which families would be selected, nor did he define how success would be measured. There were plans for ministers and advisers to become ‘family champions’, and to adopt or mentor workless families in order to get the long-term unemployed off benefits and into work. The Employment Minister Tim Loughton said that there were 50,000 ‘hard core families with multiple problems’ and 70,000 ‘second-tier’ problem families who ‘disproportionately gobble up resources’.13 More significantly, it was reported in October 2011 that Eric Pickles, Secretary of State for
Communities and Local Government, had been put in charge of turning around the 120,000 troubled families. The unit headed by the then Victims’ Commissioner Louise Casey was to be set up in his Department following debate over whether Iain Duncan Smith (at the Department for Work and Pensions) or Michael Gove (at the Department for Education) should take control instead. Liberal Democrats had suggested that it was councils that had the ‘most levers to pull’.

It was suggested that troubled families were characterized by five of seven criteria – no one was in work; the family’s income was low; it had poor accommodation; no one had a qualification; the mother had mental health problems; a parent had a long-term illness or disability; or the family could not afford all the food and clothing it needed. It was claimed that one estimate showed that, in over a third of troubled families, there were child protection problems. Another estimated that over half of all children who were permanently excluded from school in England came from these families, as did one in five young offenders. In December 2011, all local authorities were provided with figures on the indicative number of troubled families in their areas. It was noted that ‘the numbers presented in the table are based on area data rather than actual data on families, and should therefore be treated as an indicative number. Further work is required to identify specific families in each local authority’. However, this figure represented the number of families that a local authority was being asked to turn around. Guidance for local authorities suggested that troubled families were those households that were involved in crime and anti-social behaviour; had children not in school; had an adult on out of work benefits; and caused high costs to the public purse. But it was also thought that it was unlikely local authorities would be unaware of these families; most would already be on the radar of different services, ‘sometimes through generations’.

The first stage was the compilation of a list of families who would be part of the programme. This revealed striking continuities with the methods used by the Problem Families Committee of the Eugenics Society in the late 1940s. Any family that met the first three criteria (crime or anti-social behaviour; education; and work) should automatically be part of the programme, but local authorities could add other families they were concerned about. Guidance suggested that the total number of families on the lists should match the indicative number of families sent in December 2011. Local authorities were to identify approximately one-third of their families in 2012–13, and the majority in 2013–14. They were offered up to 40 per cent of the cost of extra interventions that could help turn around the lives of the families, paid on a payment-by-results basis. The DCLG made available up to £4,000 for each troubled family in each area; a proportion was to be paid upfront as an ‘attachment fee’, and the rest after ‘positive outcomes’ had been achieved. Local authorities would be able to claim their results-based payments around 12 months after the intervention started.
Both the thrust of the troubled families initiative, and the wider argument that poverty was not simply about income, were incorporated in the Social Justice White Paper, published in March 2012. The Government believed that the focus on income over the previous decade ‘has ignored the root causes of poverty, and in doing so has allowed social problems to deepen and become entrenched’. Perceived challenges included worklessness, lone parenthood, school attainment and exclusions, drug and alcohol dependency, debt, and crime. Many areas were developing multi-agency, locality-based teams to provide support for troubled families. Another £200m, funded by the European Social Fund, offered family members the opportunity to engage in work-related activities. Case studies of troubled families, in Sheffield, Bradford, Lancashire, Leeds, and Norfolk, were published by the DCLG.

Guidance was amplified by comments by Louise Casey. In April 2012 she said at a conference for local authority staff, ‘I want to see people rolling up their sleeves and getting down and cleaning the floors if that is what needs to be done . . . If it takes going round three times a week to get Mum up, then do it’. Equally revealing was her report on interviews with 16 troubled families involved with the FIPs in six local authorities. She claimed that the themes that emerged were ‘the complexity of these families’ lives and the length of time the problems had gone on for – in many cases from generation to generation’. She conceded that this was not formal research and the interviews were not representative of families. Nevertheless Casey claimed that the interviews revealed the significance of the intergenerational transmission of problems – ‘we did not meet many families whose problems did not start in their own childhood, or whose children, or some of their children, were not now repeating the same patterns as their parents’. Many of the families had large numbers of children; extended family networks were characterized by instability and chaos; and linked to these were a broader set of dysfunctional relationships. The prevalence of child sexual and physical abuse was ‘striking and shocking’, and for many parents Social Services Departments had been an on-going presence in their lives. Children who had been in care were more likely to become teenage parents, and violence was a major problem identified by the families. At least one child in every family had behavioural difficulties, and nearly every family had experienced difficulty with their child in school. Mental health problems were often a response to a very difficult life, while drugs and alcohol had a huge impact on family life. Overall, it was claimed that what could be established was ‘the extent to which the problems of these families are linked and reinforcing. They accumulated across the life course, passed on from parents to their children across generations of the same family’. The key issue was an absence of basic family functioning which had to be restored (or created for the first time) if these families were to really change.

In June 2012, the troubled families scheme was expanded after all 152 councils in England agreed to take part in it. Eric Pickles was reported as saying ‘I think there’s a kind of acceptance that we tend to throw money at
these folks for them to go away and we have a chance now, a window to actually break the cycle of deprivation . . . these families are ruining their own lives, they’re ruining their children’s lives and they’re ruining the lives of their neighbours’. Moreover it was the issue of large families that was picked up in the press. Louise Casey said ‘I think we should be better at talking about things like shame and guilt. And not being afraid to call a criminal a criminal’, while the Daily Mail commented that the report laid bare ‘a shocking culture of criminality at the heart of Britain’s most feckless families who think nothing of having children they cannot afford’.

Where did the policy on troubled families come from? The term was more familiar in the United States than the United Kingdom. A book published in 1994 by Carolyn Webster-Stratton and Martin Herbert had the title Troubled Families – Problem Children. Based at the Parenting Clinic at the University of Washington in Seattle, Washington State, in the United States, Webster-Stratton was a clinical psychologist best known for the ‘Incredible Years’ parenting programme, which was subsequently taken up in Britain.

However, understanding the roots to the current troubled families initiative requires looking at the longer-term history of the Conservative Party’s approach to the poor, and at the particular brand of modern Conservatism proposed and implemented by David Cameron as leader and, subsequently, Prime Minister. In particular, Iain Duncan Smith and the Centre for Social Justice have played a key role, while Labour MPs, notably Graham Allen and Frank Field, have also had bit-parts in the specific sphere of intervention at the pre-school stage.

Stephen Driver has suggested that post-war Conservative politics were shaped by ‘one nation’ Tories such as Harold Macmillan and R. A. Butler, but that three themes characterized Conservative social policy in the period 1979–97 – control of public spending, including under spending on public services; the idea that work was better than welfare, and the welfare state should promote employment rather than state dependency; and altering the supply and delivery of services by government. Similarly Kevin Hickson has argued that while all sections of the Conservative Party have sought to justify inequality and to reject social democratic arguments for greater equality, there was considerable debate in the 1970s and 1980s, between New Right and One Nation Conservatives, over the issue of poverty. In terms of the New Right, Keith Joseph and Jonathan Sumption had accepted in Equality (1979) the economic liberal critique of social justice, equality, and other related concepts. In their view, the pursuit of equality suppressed incentives and undermined the nation’s economic performance, and the market was a more effective means of reducing poverty. Margaret Thatcher later wrote in her memoirs (1993) that the Victorians had a way of talking which summed up what the Government was discovering – they talked about the deserving and the undeserving poor. The New Right argued that greater inequality was desirable, and there had been a trend towards greater equality since 1945 that had to be reversed; it defined poverty in absolute rather than
relative terms; and it believed that the free market was a more effective means of reducing absolute poverty than the welfare state. Against this, the One Nation Conservatives defended the relative conception of poverty and the welfare state, not in the belief that it would promote greater social equality, but that it would maintain social harmony.\(^{32}\)

In particular, Labour thinking on social exclusion was challenged by the emergence of the ‘Broken’ or ‘Breakdown Britain’ rhetoric in which the Conservative politician Iain Duncan Smith and his Centre for Social Justice played a central role. Duncan Smith had made a much publicized visit to the Glasgow housing estate of Easterhouse, in April 2002, and founded the Centre for Social Justice in November 2004, trying to develop new solutions to social problems and working particularly closely with voluntary sector groups and charities. In April 2006, Oliver Letwin, the Conservative Party’s then Head of Policy, announced the start of a Social Justice Policy Review by stating that the Conservatives backed Labour’s goal to end child poverty by 2020. Letwin wrote that ‘this deep deprivation is all too often passed down the generations . . . if we don’t empower people to break free from this trap, we will not end child poverty by 2020, or any other date’.\(^{33}\) What was striking was the coupling of the child poverty objective with the cycle of deprivation rhetoric. Letwin ended by saying ‘we have to begin the great debate that, as a country, we have been shy of having – the debate about the causes and cures of the cycle of deprivation’.\(^{34}\) Iain Duncan Smith’s Social Justice Policy Group had been commissioned by David Cameron, then Leader of the Opposition, to make policy recommendations to the Conservative Party. Cameron and other modernizers realized that it was the Party’s emphasis on such issues as unmarried mothers that had done much in the 1980s to perpetuate public perceptions of the Conservatives as ‘the nasty Party’. Certainly, Cameron has tended to focus more on social problems than economic issues.

In its interim report (2006), the Social Justice Policy Group claimed to have identified five pathways to poverty – family breakdown; educational failure; worklessness and economic dependence; addictions; and indebtedness. The report argued that if these drivers of poverty were not addressed, ‘an ever-growing underclass will be created’; the report described an ‘increasingly dysfunctional society’ that bred criminality.\(^{35}\) The degree to which patterns of behaviour were repeated by successive generations was ‘depressing, if somewhat unsurprising’.\(^{36}\) In areas of breakdown it was voluntary organizations that could most effectively transform lives. The Group argued that family breakdown could be summed up through ‘dissolution, dysfunction and dad-lessness’, and that marriage was at the heart of stable families and communities. The costs of breakdown were immense. Moreover the Group challenged Labour’s definition of poverty, arguing that the use of income as a sole measure was inadequate. Poverty was not just a question of money – while money was important, so was the ‘social structure of our lives’.\(^{37}\)
Writing in the *Guardian* at the launch of the review, the journalist Polly Toynbee was sceptical. She wrote of Duncan Smith that he seemed ‘a blind man in a foreign land heading for a precipice’, of the members of the Centre for Social Justice that ‘they seem more Christian than Tory, nice people, maybe a bit politically naïve’. She argued that the report ‘takes the party back to good solid Tory terra firma’, that the causes of poverty were the poor. She wrote of the report that ‘its arguments are circular, confusing causes and effects, citing symptoms as if they were reasons’. Toynbee was particularly critical of the report’s focus on marriage. When the Group’s final report was published, in July 2007, Toynbee argued that ‘marriage may be the rock on which society is founded, but it could well be the rock on which Cameronism founders’. The Breakdown Britain theme was a dangerous temptation. Toynbee wrote that it ‘maroons Cameron on blame-the-poor island, ending his brief flirtation with poverty alleviation’. If Toynbee was sceptical of the work of the Centre for Social Justice, other journalists were equally dismissive of the notion of ‘Broken Britain’. In the *Guardian*, Amelia Gentleman wrote that ‘Broken Britain’ had become ‘an accordion-like concept, stretching and squeezing to fit different definitions depending on what the major worry of the hour is – youth crime, teenage pregnancy, or anti-social behaviour’.

In July 2008, David Cameron had hardened the Tory attack on what was increasingly called Britain’s ‘Broken Society’, calling for an end to the ‘moral neutrality’ whereby people refused to distinguish between good and bad behaviour. In a speech in the Glasgow East constituency, for example, Cameron said that ‘of course, circumstances – where you are born, your neighbourhood, your school and the choices your parents make – have a huge impact. But social problems are often the consequence of the choices that people make’. At the time, Tim Montgomerie, editor of the Conservative Home blog, argued that the Tories were ‘getting serious’ about poverty, and becoming the home of social justice. The Edlington case, when two brothers were sentenced to an indefinite period of detention for torturing two boys in Doncaster, in April 2009, was seen not as an isolated incident but as evidence of a broken society. Cameron argued, on the launch of the Party’s election manifesto, in January 2010, it should prompt people to ‘ask some pretty deep questions about what has gone wrong in our society’. Cameron’s speech led to comparisons with Tony Blair’s speech on the James Bulger case, in February 1993.

The Times newspaper agreed, that while the phrase ‘Broken Britain’ was an over-simplification, Britain ‘does have a depressingly static underclass’. Iain Duncan Smith conflated poverty and bad parenting. The focus on the ‘Broken Society’, with its emphases on a shift away from marriage, and prevalence of divorce, was taken up by other Conservative commentators. Jill Kirby, from the Centre for Policy Studies, for example, claimed that much British and American research demonstrated a link between family breakdown and poorer outcomes for children. She claimed that children of separated
families were twice as likely to have behavioural problems, perform less well in school, become sexually active at a younger age, suffer depression, and turn to drugs, smoking, and heavy drinking. Kirby suggested that Cameron’s emphasis was on evidence, rather than the morality that had characterized earlier speeches by William Hague. Nevertheless she was arguably closer to the mark in noting that it was only after Duncan Smith’s departure as leader that he gained a significant platform as a key advocate of ‘family values’. Moreover Kirby noted, perhaps unwittingly, that the ‘Broken Society’ had acquired ‘the potential to become a peg for almost any social policy reform’.46

Similarly Charlotte Pickles, Policy Director for the Centre for Social Justice, suggested that social breakdown was the greatest challenge facing Britain. In her view, Labour’s focus on income levels and poverty thresholds was flawed. First, poverty was not just the absence of money, and people trapped in poverty were facing multiple challenges. Second, focusing on income without regard to the source of that income ignored the role that benefit dependency played in maintaining people in poverty and reducing life chances across the generations. Third, solely income-related poverty targets could create perverse incentives for policy. She was supportive of early years initiatives such as the FNP, which could provide support for those with particularly high levels of need. But she also argued that the previous 10 years had been characterized by the (in her view) mistaken view that poverty was simply the absence of money – despite significant expansion of the welfare state there had been limited improvement in the outcomes for children and adults. Repairing the broken society would require ‘a new government narrative that places families at its heart, and wholesale reform of Britain’s welfare and education systems’.47

While in Opposition, Conservatives had echoed the Labour emphasis on early intervention that had formed the background to the establishment of Sure Start and other smaller initiatives in the field of anti-social behaviour. Iain Duncan Smith subsequently worked with Graham Allen, Labour MP for Nottingham North, on early intervention, and a joint report was published by the Centre for Social Justice and the Smith Institute. Allen and Duncan Smith wrote that early intervention was about ‘breaking the intergenerational cycle of underachievement in many of our communities and enabling our communities over time to heal themselves’.48 Duncan Smith argued that ‘as the fabric of society crumbles at the margins, what is left behind is an underclass, where life is characterized by dependency, addiction, debt and family breakdown’.49 He was particularly exercised by the ‘creeping expansion’ of this underclass, and argued that ‘the codes such families live by is becoming increasingly determinative of the rhythms of life throughout many communities’.50 But Allen was equally determined to break ‘the intergenerational cycle of underachievement’, through a virtuous cycle of interventions covering those aged 0–18.51

The Conservative Manifesto, in May 2010, argued that the Broken Society could be mended through a new approach, ‘social responsibility, not state
control; the Big Society, not big government. Only in this way will we tackle the causes of poverty and inequality, rather than just the symptoms’.

Once in Government, David Cameron in June 2010 commissioned Frank Field, Labour MP for Birkenhead, to provide an independent review on poverty and life chances. Field argued that his team had found overwhelming evidence that children’s life chances were heavily predicated on their development in the first 5 years of life. By the age of three, he claimed, a baby’s brain was 80 per cent formed, and his or her experiences before then shaped the way the brain grew and developed. Field proposed a set of Life Chances Indicators, and that the Foundation Years should become the first pillar of a new tripartite education system.

In July 2010, the Government also requested from Graham Allen a Review of Early Intervention. This was less heavily research-based than Field’s report, and more messianic in tone. Allen argued that all parties should accept the core message of Early Intervention; make it a ‘social and emotional bedrock’ for current and future generations of babies, children, and young people; encourage Early Intervention Places; promote an independent Early Intervention Foundation; and take forward policies to make sure all children were ‘school ready’ at five. Early intervention was ‘an approach which offers our country a real opportunity to make lasting improvements in the lives of our children, to forestall many persistent social problems and end their transmission from one generation to the next, and to make long-term savings in public spending’.

Allen wrote that ‘children who grow up in dysfunctional families are more likely to create such families themselves’. Much of Allen’s evidence came from clinical research, and much of his appeal was linked to potential savings in public expenditure. Allen wrote that Early Intervention reaped ‘massive savings in public expenditure for the smallest of investments in better outcomes’. Without it ‘we will be facing increasing dysfunction, more violent crime, an increasing number of families dependent on the welfare state etc, and we will be subjecting our vulnerable children to more years of underachievement and disadvantage’.

Much of the work of the Centre for Social Justice reached a logical conclusion, in a sense, in the Consultation on Measuring Child Poverty, in 2012. Iain Duncan Smith’s visits to specific locations such as Easterhouse were heavily publicized and were themselves a kind of throwback to an earlier era. As we have seen, the desire to move from a purely income based measure had been flagged up as early as 2006. As Duncan Smith wrote in the Foreword to the Consultation, while the Government stood by its commitment to tackle child poverty, income (stressed for instance in the Child Poverty Act, 2010) was not necessarily the cause and solution. People needed to think differently about child poverty, and a new measure of child poverty was required, one which reflected what it meant to grow up ‘experiencing deep disadvantage’.

Other dimensions included living in a workless household; with ‘problem’ or ‘unmanageable’ debt; in poor housing or a ‘troubled’ area; in an ‘unstable’ family environment; attending...
a failing school; with parents without the ‘skills’ they needed to get on; or with parents in poor health. The Consultation argued that ‘looking at income in isolation does not give an accurate picture of child poverty as seen and experienced by ordinary people’. The focus on subjective measures of debt, family environment, and parenting threatened to push definitions of poverty back in a behavioural direction.

Robert Page has identified four key features of the modern Conservative approach to poverty and social justice – first, an acceptance that poverty should be perceived as a relative rather than an absolute concept; second, that poverty should be viewed as a holistic problem requiring a diverse, multifaceted response, which deals with the deep roots of the phenomenon, and not just income levels; third, that while the state has an important role to play, it is civic society and responsible individuals who will take the lead in combating disadvantage; and fourth, that labour market participation is vital in the fight against poverty. Thus Cameron has linked modern Conservatism with social justice, and while it is argued many of the social problems affecting British society result from poor personal choices or irresponsible behaviour, modern Conservatives believe that government has an important part to play, providing it does not repeat some of the policy mistakes of the past. Page notes that some have argued Cameron’s modern Conservatism represents an attempt to return to the One Nation approach of the 1950s and 1960s.

Stephen Driver had written in 2009 of the period in Opposition that to bundle social policy issues together under the umbrella of the ‘Broken Society’ might be good politics for Conservatives seeking to establish themselves as a party of radical social reform, but ‘may not make for clear thinking on future social policy-making’. Kevin Hickson has noted that while the Centre for Social Justice claimed the aim of policy should be collective action to combat the causes of deprivation, it was family breakdown that was highlighted, and the tone became one of upholding traditional morality and institutions such as marriage. Thus although the idea of social justice comes from the Left and has statist and egalitarian implications, the new Conservative formulation of the term ‘strips it of such implications’. Jay Wiggan has written that the underlying analysis of the Centre for Social Justice ‘is of Britain suffering from poor and anti-social choices made by individuals, supposedly facilitated by excessive and poorly targeted social expenditure, with social security blamed for fostering fractured social relationships, dysfunctional communities, and the transmission of poverty and unemployment across the generations’. Similarly Tom Slater has argued that the Centre for Social Justice has actively manufactured ignorance with regard to the structural causes of unemployment and poverty, giving the impression that welfare is a lifestyle choice made by dysfunctional families.

As we saw in the previous chapter, two initiatives begun by the Labour Government in 2006 – the FIPs and the FNP – are particularly relevant to the troubled families agenda. Indeed former Prime Minister Tony Blair,
in responding to David Cameron’s focus on troubled families from 2011, himself confirmed the continuities with earlier Labour policy. In August 2011, for instance, Blair argued that the main cause of the riots was ‘the group of young, alienated, disaffected youth who are outside the social mainstream and who live in a culture at odds with any canons of social behaviour’.  

While the Left said that they were the victims of social deprivation, and the Right said they needed to take personal responsibility for their actions, both missed the point. It was not a case of moral decline, but of individuals out of control in communities where the majority were decent, law-abiding, and desperate for action to correct the situation. Blair said many were from families that ‘are profoundly dysfunctional, operating on completely different terms from the rest of society, middle class or poor’. It was a phenomenon of the late twentieth century, and general policies did not reach this special group. By the end of his time in office, Blair had concluded that the solution was specific and different – ‘we had to be prepared to intervene literally family by family and at an early stage, even before any criminality had occurred’. Highlighting the continuities with Labour, Blair said that, after he had left office, the agenda had lost momentum, ‘but the papers and the work are all there’.

The development of the FIPs has been characterized by increasing attempts to evaluate their effectiveness. These have been commissioned from independent researchers by Government departments. A report relating to the period February 2007 to March 2011, for example, was based on families referred to family interventions in 159 local authorities. It noted that the original focus of the FIPs was to address antisocial behaviour to prevent families becoming homeless and their children being taken into care. Subsequently, families were targeted who were living in poverty, who were affected by intergenerational unemployment, and with children at risk of offending. Each key worker had a small caseload of about six families. Of the 12,850 referrals to a family intervention, 8,841 families (69 per cent) had completed or were still working with an intervention in March 2011. The average length of an intervention was 11 months. At least half the families had a successful outcome in areas including domestic violence (65 per cent), involvement in crime (65 per cent), and antisocial behaviour (60 per cent), but were least likely to achieve a successful outcome in relation to mental health (40 per cent) and worklessness (20 per cent). The authors argued that FIPs reduced crime and antisocial behaviour, and education and employment problems among the families they worked with, but that there was limited evidence they generated better outcomes, on family functioning or health issues, than other interventions. It was suggested that ‘the findings from the impact assessment provide the first indication that the positive outcomes achieved by families can be attributed to a family intervention and go some way to address an important gap in the evidence base’. At the same time, the authors conceded that the efficacy of FIPs still needed evaluations which compared outcomes with those of a control group of families.
Other evaluations focused on the 20 Intensive Intervention Projects (IIPs) for young people that were set up by the Department for Children, Schools and Families (later the Department for Education) between April 2009 and March 2011 at a cost of £13m. The key difference between the FIPs and the IIPs was that in the latter the primary focus was on the young person rather than the whole family. The aim was to turn around the lives of 1,000 young people aged 8–19 whose perceived problems included learning difficulties, violence, bereavement, family break up, and mental health issues. Longitudinal case studies of 15 young people, economic analysis, and interviews with stakeholders found that progress was complicated and seldom linear. In two-thirds of cases, ‘hard’ transformative outcomes had been achieved, including reductions in antisocial behaviour and improvements in education. ‘Soft’ transformative outcomes were often achieved, including reduced risky behaviours, enhanced psychological well-being and social and parenting skills, and improved domestic environments. The average cost of a closed case was about £35,000. A separate report found that, by 21 January 2011, 1,836 young people had been referred to an IIP, and 790 had exited or had been working with an IIP for at least 8 months. A high proportion achieved a successful outcome in areas such as disengagement from the family (65 per cent); parenting outcomes (55 per cent); domestic violence (75 per cent); and involvement in crime (54 per cent), and were least likely to have achieved one in areas like school attendance (38 per cent) or at risk of becoming a NEET (Not in Education, Employment, or Training) (25 per cent). Evidence suggested IIPs were reaching their targets but again this was coupled with caveats about the need for a control group and the sustainability of outcomes.

Apart from the FIPs, the Coalition Government has also pledged to expand the FNP. The evaluation of the whole FNP scheme – through pregnancy, infancy, and toddlerhood – found that it could be delivered successfully, and many positive outcomes could be identified. Of 1,177 clients, 690 had remained enrolled throughout the whole programme, from early pregnancy to 24 months, and the programme had been highly acceptable to nurses, clients, and their partners. A randomized controlled trial of 18 sites – 8 of the original sites plus 10 new ones – was set up to determine the programme’s effectiveness. The Social Justice White Paper, published in March 2012, stated that FNP capacity was to be doubled, so that it would help 13,000 young families by 2015.

Subsequently, the debate moved even more towards the evidence on effective intervention, the associated costs, and the potential savings for the taxpayer. Writing in December 2012, Louise Casey noted that she had been shocked by her interviews with 16 troubled families, published in July, and the stories of ‘neglect, child abuse, violence and hopelessness that stretched out often from generation to generation’. What she wanted to stress was that these were families that were either completing, or had already been through, family intervention. She argued that ‘their lives may not have been suddenly
perfect, but the strides they had made were remarkable, from such appalling beginnings’. The five key factors for successful family intervention comprised a worker dedicated to a family; practical ‘hands on’ support; a persistent, assertive, and challenging approach; considering the family as a whole, and gathering the intelligence; and common purpose and agreed action. There was a tension in the report. On the one hand, the DCLG did not pretend that this was ‘a comprehensive research report into family intervention’. There were limitations that were common to many of the studies that were cited. First, the lack of control or comparison groups made it difficult to establish the extent to which improvements for families were down to the intervention. Second, many evaluations were dependent on individual project or worker assessments of outcomes, rather than more objective external data sources. Third, many studies had been based on qualitative interviews and case studies with small numbers of families or family members. This meant that the evidence should not be taken as representative of all troubled families. Nevertheless this was at odds with many of the more speculative statements made in the report. Troubled families were ‘those that have problems and often cause problems to the community around them, putting high costs on the public sector’. Some of the starkest evidence for the failure to help families was ‘the frequency of problems which are transmitted from one generation of the same family to another’.

What was most striking in the report was the emphasis on the perceived value of practical help. Areas were using three basic models, depending on the needs and problems of the families – family intervention (where case workers had loads of up to five families); family intervention light (case loads of 5–15 families); and family intervention super light. Moreover impact had been demonstrated in terms of a reduction in the problems experienced and caused by families; positive feedback about the approach from participating families; and assessments of cost effectiveness. In language reminiscent of the FSU approach to problem families in the 1940s, it was said it involved workers and families ‘rolling up their sleeves’ and ‘donning the marigolds’, working alongside families, showing them how to clear up and make their homes fit to live in. Workers thus helped to provide a routine for those living in ‘chaotic’ circumstances, showing parents how to get children up in the morning and feed them, how to prepare meals, and how to put them to bed. It was noted day-to-day skills such as cooking, hygiene, and daily routines might often have been taken for granted by other agencies, and families might need to learn these things for the first time. Family workers did much of the work ‘on the job’, showing the family what to do, and teaching them, sometimes for the first time, basic household skills such as shopping and cooking rather than referring them to courses run by other agencies. Thus a key component of effective family intervention was looking at the family ‘from inside out rather than outside in’.

If there has been an increasing focus on the perceived effectiveness of intervention, this has run alongside an emphasis on the costs of intervention, and the potential savings for the taxpayer. Local agencies have been asked to
consider what they spend on troubled families, how they spend it, and how effective that expenditure is in helping turn lives around and preventing the emergence of future troubled families. Local agencies spent more on troubled families than the ‘average’ family, but nevertheless it was suggested that the projected financial benefits of investing a small amount in family intervention services was compelling. Overall, it was claimed that troubled families cost around £9 billion a year, while £1 billion was being spent on targeted interventions. It was claimed that disproportionately more was spent on troubled families than ‘average’ families. Estimated costs for individual troubled families included £47,235 (Oldham), £85,396 (Cornwall), £47,000 (West Cheshire), £96,062 (London Borough of Barnet), and £46,217 (Solihull), where 3 per cent of the area’s families were receiving 18 per cent of the local authority’s total spend. Local authorities had also produced estimates of projected savings. These included £20,000 per troubled family in West Cheshire, £25,700 in Leicestershire, £32,600 in Manchester, and £29,000 in the London Borough of Wandsworth. Much of this was early stage work undertaken by local authorities, and figures were indicative. However, in general it was claimed that whether the impetus was in terms of the social good of helping families change, or cutting costs for the taxpayer, the end result was the same. In most areas ‘saving money and improving services go hand-in-hand, as service managers look to offer a more effective and coherent response to the challenges faced by these families’.

Certainly in January 2013, the Government announced that the troubled families scheme was working. By December 2012, 62,000 families had been identified, 23,000 were being ‘helped’, and there were 1,675 families deemed to have been ‘turned around’. Eric Pickles was quoted as saying, ‘this programme is getting to grips with some of the hardest-to-help families in the country and, in doing so, will help bring down the costs they incur to the taxpayer and the damage they do to communities’. Finally, in March 2013, the DCLG and Local Government Association announced that the Troubled Families Programme would be independently assessed. Following a tendering process, a consortium led by Ecorys UK had won a three-year evaluation contract worth up to £435,000 per year. The five organizations comprised a market research company, Ipsos MORI; two academic units, the National Institute for Economic and Social Research, and the Thomas Coram Research Unit, Institute of Education; and independent researchers, Clarissa White Research, and Bryson Purdon Social Research. Several of these had been involved in earlier evaluations of the FIPs. The study would look at the families who received interventions and what changes they had made; how local authorities were working with troubled families, and which ways were most successful; and the cost savings made for the taxpayer from turning families’ lives around. The evaluation contract would run from 2013 to 2016. Speaking in April 2013, Louise Casey said ‘There is no way around this. The cuts have come and we need to respond to them. One of the best ways to respond is to transform the way you work with your high-cost families... Then you are able to release resources’.
Researcher David Gregg argued that FIPs present a classic case of ‘policy-based evidence’, and they failed in multiple ways. They targeted the wrong people for the wrong reasons; they targeted false causes of antisocial behaviour; they failed to deliver support in key areas like mental health; and they failed to deliver sustained changes in family behaviour or reduce antisocial behaviour in the community. In the Dundee Families Project, for instance, 91 per cent of the families were referred for rent arrears, poor house upkeep, or other minor misdemeanours. Government claimed 85 or 92 per cent success rates despite reservations expressed by researchers. For Gregg, they were not so much ‘families from hell’ as ‘families in hell’, and what distinguished them across all the evaluations was a high level of mental and physical disorders and extreme poverty. The Labour Government had not set up a longitudinal study of families leaving projects, but even so, the existing evaluations demonstrated the failure of the FIPs. Thus overall, families were wrongly targeted and misrepresented. Rather, risk factors included being a poor lone mother; living in bad social housing; having mental health problems; and having a child with schooling problems, learning disabilities or a special educational needs statement. There were marked weaknesses in evaluation methodology and database quality, with qualitative measures, small family samples, no control groups, and subjective evidence. Gregg concluded that the FIPs ‘demonstrates the nightmare place to which populist political rhetoric and “policy based evidence” can deliver us’.

Moreover the Government’s broader emphasis on troubled families has not gone unchallenged, particularly in an era of deep cuts in public spending. Ian Mulheirn, for instance, Director of the Social Market Foundation, had said back in August 2011, ‘it is not clear whether this is a reprioritisation of existing spending or a pledge of new spending. If it is the former, then it will be controversial. If it is the latter, it will be expensive’. And Anne Marie Carrie, Chief Executive of Barnardo’s, warned that budget cuts by local authorities were hampering efforts to help troubled families. Research on the reasons for the riots of the summer of 2011 broadened the focus. The ‘Reading the Riots’ enquiry led by the London School of Economics and the Guardian newspaper, based on large numbers of interviews, concluded that anger at the way the police engaged with communities was a significant factor, and that the role of gangs had been significantly overstated by the Government. Furthermore the final report of the Riots, Communities and Victims Panel argued there was not much overlap between the families of rioters and troubled families. While the report believed in the value of early intervention, including the FIPs, it argued that outside the troubled families were another 500,000 ‘forgotten families’ who ‘bump along the bottom of society, often not receiving the interventions required to move them successfully down the hierarchy of need’.

It was Ruth Levitas, of the University of Bristol, who showed that the research on which the figure of 120,000 troubled families was based had been misused. As we have seen in the previous chapter, the original research
was a report carried out for the Social Exclusion Task Force in 2007. It had carried out some secondary analysis of the Family and Children Study, a longitudinal survey carried out by the National Centre for Social Research for the Department for Work and Pensions. This analysis had shown that in 2004 about 2 per cent of families in the survey had five or more of seven characteristics, and were multiply disadvantaged. It was that 2 per cent of families figure which generated an estimate of 140,000 families for Britain, later recalculated as 117,000 for England, rounded to 120,000.92 Levitas noted this ignored both sampling error and sample bias. Moreover the DCLG had discursively collapsed families that were troubled, into families that caused trouble. Levitas made the point that it was very difficult to understand how the £9 billion figure, on the alleged costs of troubled families, was reached. Overall, she argued that the Government ‘misrepresents the research background’, with the attributed costing being ‘obscure and certainly open to question’.93 Levitas subsequently wrote of the interviews with troubled families published in July 2012 that this was ‘little more than tabloid journalism masquerading as research’, which focused on very large, dysfunctional families, and was ‘a grossly unrepresentative calumny’.94

It was suggested that the departure of analysts and specialists from DCLG had had a bad effect on its research capacity.95 Moreover some local authorities struggled to find anywhere near the number of troubled families that the Government estimated they had. Whereas DCLG had estimated there were 1,720 such families in Hammersmith and Fulham, Kensington and Chelsea, and Westminster, only 32 were found. When local definitions were added the number rose to only 385.96 Local authorities could make up the numbers by working with extra families that met locally-set criteria, but would only be paid for outcomes linked to education, crime and anti-social behaviour, and worklessness. One Assistant Chief Executive was reported as saying that the DCLG’s definition of a troubled family ‘does not tally well’ with the local authority’s own assessment. Another respondent said Government estimates ‘could be no better than a decent guess’ because the DCLG did not have access to relevant figures.97 The claim that the troubled families scheme was working met with dissenting voices; Family Action observed in March 2013 there was ‘some way to go’ to reaching the target of 120,000 families.98

Others suggested that the Troubled Families Programme was a scaling up of a non-negotiable version of the FIPs. Targeted interventions could cause harm because labelling individuals could exacerbate risky behaviours. It was an ‘eye catching populist response to the riots’, and a ‘non-negotiable-non-evidence-based intervention’.99 Instead, policy makers should focus on a combination of evidence-based targeted and universal interventions, and ensure the broader policy environment supported these. Clare McNeil, of the IPPR, traced descriptions of social exclusion from 1997 to 2012, ranging from ‘the forgotten people’ (1997); ‘those with multiple disadvantages’ (2004); the ‘hardest to reach families’ (2006); ‘families at risk’ (2007);
‘individuals experiencing multiple disadvantage’ (2010); and ‘troubled families’ (2012). She argued that under Tony Blair, the social exclusion agenda understood that the most excluded needed different forms of support than the post-war settlement plus universal services could provide; the mistake was to paint a picture of 2.5 per cent of the population as different to the rest. The Coalition Government’s social justice strategy also focused on a narrow group whose poverty is attributed to behavioural issues while neglecting wider economic inequalities. The lesson of the past decade was that ‘both approaches lead to a settlement for the most disadvantaged that is residualised and unstable’.100

Who, then, are the troubled families? Evidence from Manchester, where family intervention workers had, by April 2013, made a start with 1,150 of the 2,865 troubled families that the city had been told it had, indicated they were families with problems with money, education, and work. The local caseworker disliked the term, saying ‘we wouldn’t say to a family: “You have been identified as being troubled”’.101 She was reluctant to tell families they were part of the programme, anxious not to alienate them unnecessarily, and telling them the council had decided to offer extra support. Nevertheless her report on the same family stated that ‘Mum struggled to understand her responsibilities as a parent. She presented with a low level of understanding and potentially an undiagnosed learning disability. The children had taken on the role of parenting and decision-making’.102 Work in Manchester was more advanced than in other local authorities, with families that it preferred to categorize as having ‘multiple and complex needs’. It had used the funding to expand a project that had already been underway. Moreover families themselves were dismayed when they heard the programme’s title. A member of another family said ‘I think it’s an insult – just the name. It makes you sound as if people should keep away from you, because you are trouble’.103 While the payment-by-results system depended in part on the family finding work, that did not seem very likely.

Thus an alleged underclass in the guise of troubled families came back onto the political agenda in Britain from 2011 onwards. While the immediate trigger was the summer riots, the roots of the initiative can be found in both Labour and Conservative Party policy. The Conservatives had committed themselves to the Labour child poverty target, but nevertheless favoured, through Iain Duncan Smith and the Centre for Social Justice, a ‘Broken’ or ‘Breakdown Britain’ analysis. Despite that, there were many continuities with the previous Labour Governments, and in particular with policies initiated in 2006–07. Both parties highlighted the potential of early intervention, Duncan Smith for the Conservatives, and Graham Allen and Frank Field for Labour. Moreover as we have seen, the specific claim that around 2 per cent of families, or around 120,000 families, were multiply disadvantaged, had emerged from the Social Exclusion Taskforce in 2007. The appointment of Louise Casey was another continuity, given her responsibility for the Respect Agenda under Labour. Both Parties were desperate to find ways of reducing
what they perceived to be the cost to the taxpayer of these families, and this made for good populist politics. If Tony Blair blurred the boundaries between problem and problematic families, David Cameron has elided troubled and troubling families. And both the FIPs and the FNP are policy initiatives, small-scale but nevertheless important, that were begun under Labour, but which have been continued by the Coalition Government.

The troubled families agenda emerged with particular force from 2011, with the key Department being the DCLG. Despite the lack of evidence for the 120,000 families and £9 billion cost claims, the perception took hold again that a small percentage of families, characterized by multiple issues, large families, and intergenerational continuities, were responsible for a high proportion of social problems. There has been an increasing interest in research methodology, with a focus on the effectiveness of the FIPs and FNP, a move towards longitudinal studies, and an acceptance of the need for control groups. Nevertheless despite this nod towards evidence-based policy, the statements by Louise Casey in particular have been very selective, often anecdotal, and highly speculative. As so often, how these families are defined, and the attempts made to tackle them, tell us more about the people defining the ‘problem’, and less about the families themselves. While it is often argued that such problems are transmitted inter-generationally, these issues are extremely complex, there are also many discontinuities, and the mechanisms for such transmission continue to elude researchers. The Government should focus its energies more on implementing and evaluating specific policies and rather less on counting how many such families allegedly exist, and how much they cost the state, which are little more than rhetorical devices of dubious policy value. Because of this misplaced energy, we still know surprisingly little about the families, and why they behave as they do.

Moreover the way that responsibility for the initiative has been delegated to local authorities, and the methods employed, indicate striking continuities with the efforts to tackle problem families in the 1950s. Bearing many similarities with the work of the Problem Families Committee of the Eugenics Society in the late 1940, numbers of families have been calculated at the national level, and then local authorities have been given an indicative total; it is their task to find them, to rehabilitate them through a combination of residential and outreach services, and then to claim the funding on a payments-by-results basis. The focus on practical help in the home resembles the efforts of the FSUs, while the emphasis on a minority of large families recalls the articles written by the MOsH. If, as has been suggested, Cameron’s modern Conservatism represents an attempt to return to the One Nation approach pursued in the 1950s and 1960s, then the similarities between the problem families and troubled families initiatives are perhaps not so surprising. Certainly overall, and with significant continuities in the longer-term history of the underclass concept since the 1880s, troubled families have once again provided a convenient, if simplistic, explanation for social problems at a time of economic recession and deep cuts in public spending.
Conclusion

This book has been concerned with the invention and reinvention of the concept of the underclass and related ideas in the period since 1880. In terms of earlier work, it has been the alleged emergence of the underclass in the 1980s that was given most attention; and the earlier antecedents have been much less recognized. One of the aims of this book has been to ensure that sociologists and policy-makers are more aware of the historical dimension to these debates. Having charted the rise and fall of successive labels, we are now in a position to draw out some general themes that have emerged. First, in relation to changes and continuities in how the underclass has been defined. Second, in terms of which individuals and groups have been doing the defining. Third, with regard to the question of whether there is sufficient similarity between these ideas to sustain the argument that there is a linear process at work. Fifth, in terms of how and why these concepts emerge, including processes of policy transfer, especially between the United States and Britain. And sixth, with regard to the impact of these concepts on practical policy-making.

What is in no doubt is that there have been a series of similar labels, both in terms of earlier antecedents and in the particular period since 1880. Ideas of the deserving and undeserving poor were evident in the early modern period, and are arguably timeless. But in the modern period there have been at least nine reconstructions. In the 1880s, social investigators such as Charles Booth became concerned about the emergence of a social residuum in London. In turn, this was replaced by anxieties about the unemployable in the writings of William Beveridge and the Webbs in the early 1900s. While this language was less evident in the social surveys published in the first decade of the twentieth century, the 1920s and early 1930s were characterized by the search for a social problem group. In the early post-war period, this metamorphosed into the problem family notion of the 1950s, which cast a powerful spell over volunteers involved in the Family Service Units, public health doctors, and some social workers.

The fifth reconstruction of the concept was in terms of Oscar Lewis’s notion of the culture of poverty in the 1960s. Interestingly, it was not the culture of poverty but the British theory of the problem family that was more influential on Sir Keith Joseph when he came up with the cycle of deprivation in his 1972 speech. But it was again the United States that was the real driving force behind the concept of the underclass in the 1980s.
At the same time, the idea of an underclass also became attractive to observers of economic change and social polarization in Britain. We have explored the ways in which the theory of social exclusion attempted to shed its links with these earlier labels, but nevertheless continued to have echoes with the underclass discourse. Continuities were evident in specific aspects of policy on child health, most obviously in the way that the phrase ‘cycle of deprivation’ continued to be used in relation to child poverty and the Sure Start initiative for under-fives. The final years of Tony Blair’s period in office were characterized by a narrowing of social exclusion policy; the creation of the FIPs and FNP; and an increasingly authoritarian and punitive stance on anti-social behaviour. Finally, we have explored the revival of the discourse under the Coalition Government from May 2010, where the focus on troubled families reflects many continuities with policies adopted by the Labour Governments, and indeed with local authority involvement with problem families from the 1940s.

But while it is comparatively easy to trace this process, though requiring some fascinating historical detective work, it is more difficult to account for its longevity as a recurring phenomenon. It is important to try to distinguish underclass stereotypes from related, but more general, ideas about the deserving and undeserving poor; about unemployment and public attitudes towards scroungers; and about behaviour more generally. As John Macnicol has previously argued, underclass concepts have a number of different strands. One is the way that they have been used to signify and denote the alleged behavioural inadequacies of the poor, whether an inability to form attachments to other individuals and agencies, a failure to plan for the future, or a tendency to engage in crime and other forms of antisocial behaviour. Second, there is the use of the phrase to denote the ways in which wider structural processes, whether technological and economic change, unemployment, racial and social segregation in cities, or the move to a post-industrial economy, have contributed to a situation in which groups with poor access to education and skills risk being left behind. Third is the recurring belief in inter-generational continuities, whether of cultural aspirations and habits, or in terms of poverty and teenage pregnancy. Fourth is the belief that the underclass exists separately from the working class, as a subset or what has been called the ‘lower class’. Fifth is the combination of rhetorical symbolism and empirical complexity, where the term ‘underclass’ has served as a powerful metaphor for social change on the one hand, but where its supporters have also searched – without much success – for empirical proof of its existence.

This historical investigation also illustrates marked differences in these concepts and in the individuals or organizations that have used them. In many cases it has been individuals who have had a prominent role, such as Charles Booth in the 1880s, Oscar Lewis in the 1960s, Sir Keith Joseph in the 1970s, and Louise Casey from 1997, though it has been more central to the thinking of some than to others. At other times, voluntary organizations and professional groups have been more prominent, such as the Eugenics Society
in the 1930s, the Women’s Group on Public Welfare in the 1940s, and the Family Service Units of the 1950s. For these individuals and organizations, underclass stereotypes have had important scapegoating and legitimizing functions. It is only more recently that government has taken a more active role in sponsoring research, and interestingly the studies sponsored by the DHSS-SSRC Working Party on Transmitted Deprivation in fact found little evidence to support the original cycle of deprivation hypothesis. The involvement of the Social Exclusion Unit, Treasury, and DCLG in more recent debates suggests a move away from individuals and voluntary organizations to more centralized policy research processes, illustrating how arguments about behaviour have become more central to public policy.

What support, then, does this survey offer for the framework proposed by Herbert Gans? As we saw in the Introduction, Gans has argued that the ‘label formation’ process includes a number of interested parties – label makers (both alarmists and counters), label users, legitimators, the labelled themselves, and finally the romanticizers who revive old labels. It certainly is the case, as has been suggested in the American context, that terms follow a trajectory of emergence, popularity, the acquiring of a pejorative character, and then a falling out of favour. The role of the ‘alarmists’ does appear critical, since discussions of this type are invariably provoked by alarm about the characteristics of the relevant groups and its members. Similarly the role of the legitimators is also important, although as we have seen, they can include academics, professionals, journalists, and politicians. The role of the popular media shows some important continuities, wider changes in its technology and scale notwithstanding. In the 1880s it was contemporary periodicals and newspapers that were crucial to the propagation of the concept of the social residuum. Similarly a hundred years later, in the 1980s, it was again magazines and newspapers that were crucial to the rise of interest in the underclass, specifically through Ken Auletta’s *New Yorker* articles, and the way that the *Sunday Times* sponsored the visits of Charles Murray to Britain. In between, the role of the media was much more muted and the influence of the ideas themselves was limited to a professional rather than a popular arena. The role of the romanticizers seems less evident – once a concept has dropped out of favour and popular usage, it has been difficult for them to make a comeback.

Arguably the most important aspect of this story is the question of whether there is sufficient linearity between these related concepts to support the argument that there has been a successive reinvention of the underclass concept over the past 133 years. Clearly the economic, political and social landscape within which these ideas have evolved has changed dramatically. The way that the concept has been defined in different periods has said as much about broader trends in the economy and labour market, the role of women and the emphasis placed on the family, migration and urbanization, and ideas about behaviour and agency as about the underclass itself. At various times it has been joblessness, household squalor, mental health, long-term poverty,
illegitimacy and crime that have been drawn into underclass stereotypes. Ideas of class formation and biological determinism have played into this, as well as eugenics and a vague and indefinable fear of the ‘other’. The social problem group of the 1930s represented a medicalization of the concept of the residuum, while it was the idea of transmission, more usually associated with infectious disease, that was central to the cycle of deprivation research of the 1970s. Nevertheless, this study has also sought to bring out some of the striking continuities between these ideas – in terms of the alleged physical and mental characteristics of the poor; the stress placed on inter-generational continuities; the focus on behavioural inadequacies; the focus on the size of the threat (the 120,000 troubled families); and the emphasis on the costs to the state (the £9 billion a year).

It is arguable that there are chronological gaps in the history, periods when no underclass concept was available or taken up by social investigators. At these times, a more structural interpretation of poverty and unemployment seemed to be dominant. These include the periods from the outbreak of the World War I to the late 1920s; the shorter period from the late 1930s to the mid-1940s; and perhaps the period from 1972 to the early 1980s, when social scientists resisted the imposition of the cycle of deprivation hypothesis. Policy in this field was markedly different once Gordon Brown took over as Prime Minister from Tony Blair (June 2007 to May 2010). Some of the chronological stepping-stones were more about processes than the delineation of the parameters of a social group, most obviously in the case of the cycle of deprivation, and less obviously with the culture of poverty, and the processes by which one concept replaces another remain unclear. But what is perhaps more noticeable is that these periods are remarkably brief. Above all, the argument that the post-war period was dominated by an emphasis on structural factors, and by economic determinism on the part of social researchers, or by ‘knightly’ behaviour by professionals in the public sector, seems difficult to sustain in light of the evidence presented here. Rather it appears that at most times in the period since 1880, there has been a variant of the underclass theory available to researchers, although of course the scale and influence of the ideas have varied greatly. This, in turn, problematizes attempts to identify shifts (as has been suggested of the 1901 Rowntree survey) between behavioural and structural interpretations.

If we focus on those periods when the ideas appear to undergo a period of transition, contradictions appear to emerge. It has been proposed, for example, that the idea of the social residuum evaporated during World War I, when the advent of full employment suggested that those previously deemed ‘unemployable’ had never really existed. But conversely, it was during World War II that the notion of the problem family emerged to replace the theory of the social problem group. We can date the timing of this with some precision – to the Our Towns report, published by the Women’s Group on Public Welfare in March 1943. Similarly the problem family undermines the argument that underclass stereotypes are most likely to emerge in periods
of economic dislocation, when attention tends to become focused on the
behavioural inadequacies of a reserve army of labour. In fact, the problem
family notion, although never a major aspect of discussions of social policy,
coexisted in 1950s Britain with full employment, economic optimism, and a
strong belief in the nuclear family.

The history of the concept of the underclass offers an interesting
perspective on debates about policy transfer between the United States and
Britain. The current literature on policy transfer stresses the need to consider
not just what is transferred, but the motivations of those involved. The
history of the underclass concept shows the complexities inherent in policy
transfer. It would seem at first glance that Britain has been more influenced
by the United States than vice versa. In the early 1900s, eugenists in Britain
were well aware of the American studies of the Jukes and Kallikak families.
The 1980s underclass debate is perhaps the clearest example, with the early
debates occurring in the United States, and with one mechanism being quite
clear – the invitation that the *Sunday Times Magazine* extended to Charles
Murray in 1989. But in other cases, there has been considerable resistance
to American ideas. In the late 1960s, for example, British social researchers
were resistant to the notion of the culture of poverty, the creation of EPAs
and CDPs notwithstanding, and it is clear that Sir Keith Joseph’s hypothesis
of the cycle of deprivation owed much more to his earlier interest in the
idea of the problem family. The contemporary emphasis on social exclusion
originally owed more to ideas from across the Channel than to ideas from
across the Atlantic. It would seem, therefore, that while there are similarities
in timing between the invention of underclass concepts in Britain and the
United States, the form that they took was often very different, reflecting the
different histories, ethnic mix, and political cultures of the two countries.
Most evident was the much stronger connection with race that was forged
with the underclass concept in the United States.

Although assessing influence is notoriously difficult, it is also worth
pausing to ask what practical impact these ideas had on actual policy-
making. The different concepts were undoubtedly of considerable interest
to social commentators, but did they actually influence real policy-making
on the ground? In the case of the early concepts, there seems to have been
little direct influence. Neither the theory of the social residuum, nor the idea
of the unemployable, nor the notion of the social problem group appears
to have influenced policy directly. Some of the ideas were relatively short-
lived, and in any case attempts at legislation, whether to segregate mental
defectives or to introduce voluntary sterilization, were unsuccessful. Much
later, in the case of the cycle of deprivation, the theory was viewed with
hostility by social science researchers, and there was a marked disjunction
between the ideas as expressed by Sir Keith Joseph and what the researchers
actually found. In the 1980s it seems that the underclass concept again had
little direct influence on policy – in Britain, for instance, the failure to find
empirical support for the existence of an underclass weakened its claims to
exert a direct influence on policy.
In other cases there has been a clearer link between the ideas and particular policy initiatives. In the case of the unemployable, there was a broad link with policies on the administration of unemployment relief in the interwar period, which it has been argued was dominated by the search for the scrounger. Very similar debates were evident some 50 years later, in the 1980s, when the renewal of debates about the ‘workshy’ had a powerful influence on the 1989 Social Security Act. The idea of the problem family was central to the identity of the Family Service Units, and there was a direct link too with local authorities, first through local Health Departments and then in the 1960s through Children’s Departments. It has been argued that the culture of poverty theory did influence the American ‘War on Poverty’, and British equivalents were apparent in the EPAs and CDPs. While the underclass notion was arguably less influential, the Charles Murray analysis, on the allegedly detrimental effects of benefits on behaviour, was of considerable interest to policy-makers. The concept of social exclusion had an important influence on Labour policy from May 1997, and indeed the idea of a cycle of deprivation was reborn in relation to the Sure Start initiative. Policies in the field of anti-social behaviour, and in particular the FIPs and FNP, were influenced by a belief in problem families. Finally, from May 2010, local authorities were once again required to identify troubled families in their areas, and to tackle them through a combination of home-based and residential schemes. Thus as social scientists have become more concerned to unravel the relative influences of agency and structure in the causation of poverty and deprivation, governments have shown increasing interest in ways of influencing behaviour.

What is apparent is that the concept of the underclass has been periodically invented and reinvented in Britain and the United States over the past 133 years. The persistence of the underclass and related ideas suggests that this process of word substitution is likely to survive and perhaps flourish in the future. There are several reasons for the apparent resilience of the concept. First, the unresolved issue of the relative importance of behavioural and structural factors in the causation of poverty and deprivation. It is in part this that gives the concept much of its ambiguity and flexibility, and creates a space or vacuum which these debates can occupy. Second, the relatively early stage (at least in Britain) of such potentially important data-sources as panel data on poverty dynamics and income mobility. Third, the continued likely pace of technological change, globalization, and economic uncertainty which together are likely to continue to raise the spectre, both real and imagined, of groups perceived as left behind or cut off from the mainstream working class. Fourth, the value of the concept as a convenient symbol and metaphor for fears and anxieties whose empirical reality remains unproven. While there has already been some repackaging of terms such as ‘troubled families’, the exact forms that these labels will take can only be guessed at. But together these forces should ensure that the future of the underclass concept will be as interesting as its past.
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