

A N
E S S A Y
UPON THE
PROBABLE METHODS
OF MAKING A
PEOPLE GAINERS
IN THE
BALANCE of TRADE.

Treating of these Heads, viz.

Of the People of England.

Of the Land of England, and its Product.

Of our Payments to the Public, and in what Manner the Balance of Trade may be thereby affected.

That a Country cannot encrease in Wealth and Power but by private Men doing their Duty to the Public, and but by a steady Course of Honesty and Wisdom, in such as are trusted with the Administration of Affairs.

By the AUTHOR of
The ESSAY on WAYS and MEANS.

Inter quæ L. Piso ambitum fori, corrupta judicia, sævitiam oratorum, accusationes minitantium increpans, abire se, & cedere urbe, victurum in aliquo abdito & longinquo rure testabitur. Simul Curiam relinquebat. Tacit. lib. ii. Annal.

T H E
P O L I T I C A L
A N D
COMMERCIAL WORKS

Of that celebrated Writer

CHARLES D'AVENANT, LL. D.

Relating to the
TRADE and REVENUE of ENGLAND,
The PLANTATION TRADE,
The EAST-INDIA TRADE,
And AFRICAN TRADE.

Collected and revised by
Sir CHARLES WHITWORTH,
Member of Parliament.

To which is annexed a copious INDEX.

IN FIVE VOLUMES.

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MDCCLXXI.

**An ESSAY upon the PROBABLE METHODS
of making a People Gainers in the BALANCE
of TRADE. — — —**

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A N
E S S A Y
UPON THE
PROBABLE METHODS
OF MAKING A
PEOPLE GAINERS
IN THE
BALANCE of TRADE.

S E C T. I.

THE Writer of these Papers stands in a manner engaged to say something upon this subject, having in his Discourses promised to handle several points concerning the Balance of Trade; to which design he was principally induced by the calculations then communicated to him by Gregory King, Esq; Lancaster Herald.

The Essay upon Ways and Means, and the Discourses lately set forth on the Revenues, and on the Trade of England, did meet with so good a reception from the best sort of men, that he finds himself encouraged once more to offer to the public

public his observations of the like nature; from which, if any thing can be gathered that may promote, or that will hereafter tend to the welfare and prosperity of his country, he shall think his labours well rewarded.

It is true, his computations were attacked sometime after they were published, by two pamphlets; but so impotently, that he thinks he cannot do himself greater right, than to desire that all people who give themselves the trouble to read his writings, would likewise be pleased to peruse Mr. P. R —y's observations and Mr. T. E —d's remarks upon the said books. And he doubts not, but that any impartial reader, by comparing the schemes together, and by duly weighing the arguments of both sides, will think these answerers have rather strengthened and confirmed, than shaken his foundations.

It is an easy matter to pick out of any book, here and there, something to cavil at; which is the common method taken by the little scribblers of the town, of answering, as they call it, a writer; but all judicious men know that an able Author proceeds quite another way; and if his adversary has advanced a wrong proposition, or a false hypothesis, he sets up something in the room of what he would pull down, he offers another proposition or hypothesis, which shall visibly be truer, wiser and better founded: All other arguing (especially where any new matter has been advanced) being but wretched sophistry, that carries with it no conviction. What has been here said, is all the reply the Writer of these papers designs to make to the two forementioned pamphlets and their Authors, who (whatever they may be good for else) have shewn by their works, that figures and calculations

culations about the King's Revenue are very little their province.

He thought it might be of use (in the heat of a war that had then the appearance of lasting a great while) to propose Ways and Means by which taxes might be laid more equally, and by consequence more lightly upon the people; and when the peace was concluded, he believed he might do his country service to treat of the Public Revenues and of the Trade of England, the quiet times which the King's valour and wisdom had newly procured, seeming most seasonable to propose some kind of remedy for those disorders in the administration, which a war of such length had undoubtedly occasioned. In the tracts therefore which he published, he handled Credit, the King's Revenues, the Public Debts and Engagements, and several points relating to Trade, thereby to give some view what improvements this nation was capable of, under a careful and steady management.

And having deeply imprinted in his mind, the notion that all our thoughts, endeavours, and designments, should tend to the good and welfare of our country; and being convinced that even where abilities are wanting, the very intentions are commendable and virtuous, he is resolved to continue his studies upon the same subject, and to look yet farther into the condition and posture of this kingdom.

He is now indeed called up to a station, wherein he has the opportunity of delivering his thoughts concerning the business of England another way than by his pen; but it is many years since he had the honour to sit in parliament; and he doubts very much, whether he shall be able to arrive at any degree of expressing himself readily and well; without which, the best and most useful matter loses

loses all its energy and effect before a great assembly. Writing and speaking are talents very different; a tolerable stile may be attained to by great application and diligence; but elocution is a gift (and if employed to honest uses) one of the greatest bounties nature can bestow upon a man: He who has not the seeds of it within him, shall never come at it by art or labour; and (which perhaps is not vulgarly observed) writing much extinguishes the faculty of talking well off hand, in some persons who would otherwise have a competent share thereof; for if the Writer be of any form, he accustoms himself to a correctness and a choice of words; and this nicety and care beget a diffidency in him which is altogether inconsistent with the happiness of speaking well in public. Such therefore, as fear they cannot deliver their thoughts well and clearly another way, must commit them to writing, in order to make whatever qualities they have, of service to their country.

The matters we have hitherto handled, have been in a manner entirely new, and such wherein very little help could be had from books; and (it being the interest of some persons of no small power in the management of affairs, that many truths, important for England to be known, should rather be concealed, if possible, in the center of the earth, than laid open) the aids and lights which might be gathered from the public accounts and offices, have been industriously withheld from all who are not servile applauders of their wild and destructive conduct; however, he will proceed on with his work, notwithstanding the potent malice of such men, utterly indifferent how much his enquiries offend them, provided they yield any benefit to the king and kingdom.

His

His aim always has been and ever shall be, to shew how the wealth and strength of England is to be secured and improved; to set the matters thereunto conducing in a true light; to instill into the minds of young gentlemen a desire of looking into the Revenues and Trade of the nation; that having therein an insight themselves, they may not be, in some future reign, insnared by the wicked arts of false and rapacious ministers, who will be ever craving for large supplies, but careless how they waste the public treasure; who will be always coveting new funds, which they will lay by as so much lumber of the state, when they have borrowed all they can upon them, not minding how any new branch is managed; who will be for shearing the sheep as many times as they can every year without any care of the flock, or how the fleece shall grow again; and who will be for pulling down the commonwealth, so they may build up their own fortunes.

It shall not be here argued, whether the skill of physic be now brought to perfection, or whether it is yet capable of further improvements; but this may be safely pronounced, that the knowledge of the sinews, muscles, arteries and veins, with the late discovery of the circulation of the blood and all the parts of anatomy, conduce very much to render this dark science more plain and certain.

In the same manner, such as would understand the body politic, its true constitution, its state of health, its growth or decay, its strength or weakness, and how to apply remedies to the various distempers to which it is incident, must study and look narrowly into all the distinct parts of the commonwealth, its Trade, the current money, (which is its flowing blood) the arts, labour and manu-

manufactures, and the number of its people; with many other things which altogether are the members of which the great body is composed.

From these topics, to reason upon matters of government, has been the method we have hitherto taken, and which we shall pursue in the following tract; and the way we go of arguing and concluding upon things by figures, being in a manner new, and made use of but by two or three before us, and that too but very superficially, it is hoped grains of allowance will be made, and that we shall be looked upon as beginners of an art not yet polished, and which time may bring to more perfection.

In all arts and sciences, the first inventions have been rude and unskilful: Very anciently, the Ægyptians knew something of geometry, and the Assyrians of astronomy; but as well these, as all other parts of knowledge, were but a shapeless body, till brought into some form by the artful hands of Pherecides, Thales, Anaximander and Pythagoras; and yet philosophy had neither strength nor beauty, till it was further improved in the three successive schools of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle.

What has been here said of sublimer things, holds as well in speculations of an inferior nature, and in arts merely mechanical, whose first principles and rudiments must be imperfect. But if this our manner of enquiring into matters that relate to polity and government, be found any ways instructive and beneficial to the public, we hope hereafter to be followed by abler hands, who shall finish what we are but beginning.

We have formerly said, * “ That to find out

* Discourses on the Public Revenues and on Trade, Vol. II. Part II. p. 85, 86.

“ the true Balance of Trade, in order to adapt
 “ thereunto our laws and form of living, would
 “ bring as much wealth to this country, as is re-
 “ quisite to render a nation safe and happy.
 “ That an exact balance between us and every
 “ distinct place, perhaps cannot by any human
 “ skill be attained to; and that it is not certain
 “ whether a scrutiny so very nice would be of
 “ any use. But that without doubt, a general
 “ state of this matter formed upon strict enquiry,
 “ with deliberation and skill, and such an one as
 “ would carry with it a demonstration of being
 “ somewhat near the truth, must be a great help
 “ to the rulers and ministers of a country, and a
 “ good guide in many important counsels.”

That we have been heretofore large gainers by
 Trade, is manifest from the expensive war we
 were able to carry on for so many years; and though
 to find out in what particulars we got or lost,
 may be very difficult; yet to give some general
 view of the matter may not be impossible: And
 we shall endeavour to shew from whence such
 may take their rise, who would have some pro-
 spect of a thing so vast and that seems at such a
 distance.

And albeit to know the quantum of our yearly
 gains, may not perhaps so much import the state;
 yet to be watchful that we do not lose, waste and
 impair from time to time, must certainly be the
 concern of every one who loves his country; and
 as it behoves private men frequently to balance
 their accounts, and to see how their condition
 stands; so without doubt, it is a duty incumbent
 upon those who are in power, very often to con-
 template the posture of the nation, in order to
 this, that growing mischiefs may have a sudden
 cure.

As the wealth of all kinds stored up in this kingdom was of late our chief support, so what we are hereafter to get, must defend us against the accidents at home and abroad, to which all governments are liable; and upon this account the motions of Trade ought to be observed with a strict and careful eye.

And we owe it to our country to communicate what we think may conduce to make it flourish; and the men in power should encourage such attempts, at least they should not oppress nor contrive their ruin, who employ their whole time, and impair their own health, in studying to promote the common good.

But they who act upon a principle are not easily disheartened. In this essay we shall set forth some probable methods of making a nation gainers in the Balance of Trade; and we shall close the Discourse with endeavouring to shew, that this Balance is not to be put of our side, (by which we mean that a country cannot encrease in wealth and power) but by private men doing their duty to the public, and but by a steady course of honesty, care and wisdom, in such as are trusted with the administration.

The wounds of the late war have drained us of so much blood, and our foreign commerce has met with such a ruffle and interruption in all parts of the world, and our neighbours grow so fast upon us, some in wealth, and others in shipping and the skill of Trade, that poverty must grow upon us apace, our naval strength must decrease, and we must utterly lose the dominion of the sea, unless the legislative authority exert itself with vigour, and interpose betimes to prevent our impending ruin.

We

We have said formerly, * “ That gold and silver are indeed the measure of Trade, but that the spring and original of it, in all nations, is the natural or artificial product of the country; that is to say, what their land, or what their labour and industry produces.”

There is no man that can reasonably dispute this position; and if granted, it follows from thence, that to know rightly how the Balance of Trade stands with any nation, a due inspection must be made into their natural or artificial product.

But this natural or artificial product being most of it the result of the people’s labour and industry, we shall be still in the dark as to all enquiries of this kind, without maturely considering the numbers of the people.

In these sort of speculations not only the quantity but quality of the inhabitants must be duly pondered; they must be divided into their several ranks and classes: It must be distinguished who by their arts, labour or industry are increasing, and who by their expence, poverty or sloth, are decreasing the kingdom’s wealth. Of these subdivisions are likewise to be made, of what numbers are employed in the church, in war, in the fleets mercantile and warlike, in the law, in offices, in merchandize, in shop-keeping and trades, in handicrafts; and who both of the higher and lower degree are persons living upon their estates; who are freeholders, farmers, labouring people, servants, cottagers, alms people, and vagrants.

* Discourses on the Public Revenues and on Trade, Vol. I. Part II. p 354.

The people being thus distributed into their proper ranks, we are likewise to enquire into the quality of the land they are to cultivate and improve, in order to that natural or artificial product which is the medium whereby a superlucration of wealth is to be gotten. We should examine what proportion of it is arable, pasture and meadow, woods and coppices, forests, parks and common, heaths, moors, mountains, and barren land, houses and homesteads, &c. rivers, lakes, meers, roads, ways, and waste land.

The land is to yield the product, which product is to yield the wealth, so that we should enquire how this product stands in every particular, but more especially in the principal constituent parts of England's strength; namely, wool, corn, and our mines; for it is by the well ordering and wise disposition of these branches of our wealth, that we are to be gainers in the Balance of Trade.

We shall therefore handle distinctly these heads, viz. the people, the land and its product, and shall endeavour to lay down several matters, from whence (peradventure with good grounds of probability) some conclusions may be made in relation to our present subject; and because taxes influence very much in the Balance of Trade, as will be shewn hereafter, we shall likewise say something concerning our payments to the public.

S E C T. II.

Of the people of England.

THE Writer of these papers has seen the before-mentioned Mr. King's natural and political observations and conclusions upon the state and condition of England in manuscript. The calculations therein contained are very accurate, and more perhaps to be relied upon than any thing that has been ever done of the like kind. This skilful and laborious gentleman has taken the right course to form his several schemes about the numbers of the people; for besides many different ways of working, he has very carefully inspected the poll books, and the distinctions made by those acts, and the produce in money of the respective polls going every where by reasonable and discreet mediums; besides which pains, he has made observations of the very facts in particular towns and places, from which he has been able to judge and conclude more safely of others; so that he seems to have looked further into this mystery than any other person.

With his permission we shall offer to the public, such of his computations as may be of use, and enlighten the matter before us.

He lays down, that if the first people of England was by a colony or colonies, consisting of a number between 100 and 1000 people, (which seems probable) such colony or colonies might be brought over between the year of the world 2400 and 2600, viz. about 8 or 900 years after the flood, and 14 or 1500 years before the birth of Christ; at which time the world might have about
a mil-

a million of families, and four or five millions of people.

From which hypothesis, it will follow by an orderly series of encrease,

That when the Romans invaded England, 53 years before Christ's time, the kingdom might have about 360,000 people, and at Christ's birth about 400,000.

That at the Norman conquest anno Christi 1066, the kingdom might contain somewhat above 2,000,000.

That anno 1260, or about 200 years after the Norman conquest, it might contain about 2,750,000 people, or half the present number; so that the people of England may have doubled in about 435 years last past.

That in all probability the next doubling will be in about 600 years to come, viz. by the year 2300, at which time it may have about 11,000,000 of people, and the kingdom containing about 39 millions of acres, there will be then about three acres and a half per head.

That the encrease of the kingdom for every 100 years of the last preceding term of doubling, and the subsequent term of doubling may have been, and in probability may be, according to the following scheme:

Anno Christi.	Number of People.	Encrease every hun- dred years.
1300	2,860,000	
	—	440,000
1400	3,300,000	
	—	540,000
1500	3,840,000	
	—	780,000
1600	4,620,000	
	—	880,000
1700	5,500,000	
	—	920,000
1800	6,420,000	
	—	930,000
1900	7,350,000	
	—	930,000
2000	8,280,000	
	—	925,000
2100	9,205,000	
	—	910,000
2200	10,115,000	
	—	985,000
2300	11,000,000	

Whereby it may appear, that the encrease of the kingdom being 880,000 people in the last 100 years, 920,000 in the next succeeding 100 years, the annual encrease at this time may be about 9000 souls per ann.

But whereas the yearly births of the kingdom are about 1 in 28.95, or — — 190,000 souls.

	Brought over,	190,000 souls.
And the yearly burials 1 in		
32.35, or —		170,000 souls.

Whereby the yearly encrease
would be — — 20,000 souls.

It is to be noted,

1st, That the allow-	p. an.	}	11,000 per ann.
ance for plagues			
and great mortalities may come to,			
at a medium —	4000		
2dly, Foreign or civil		}	
wars at a medium	3500		
3dly, The sea constantly employing		}	
about 40,000, may precipitate the death			
of about —	2500	}	
4thly, The plantations (over and above the accession of foreigners) may			
carry away —	1000	}	

Whereby the neat annual encrease may be but — 9,000 souls.

That of these 20,000 souls, which would be the annual encrease of the kingdom by procreation, were it not for the forementioned abatements,

The country encreases annually by		
procreation — —		20,000 souls.
The cities and towns, exclusive of		
London, by procreation, —		2,000 souls.
But London and the bills of mortality decrease annually —		2,000 souls.

So

So that London requires a supply of 2000 souls per ann. to keep it from decreasing, besides a further supply of about 3000 per ann. for its encrease at this time. In all 5000, or above a half of the kingdoms neat encrease.

Mr. King further observes, that by the assessments on marriages, births and burials, and the collector's returns thereupon, and by the parish registers, it appears, that the proportions of marriages, births and burials, are according to the following scheme :

People

People.		Annual Marriages.			
530,000	London and bills of mortality —	1 in 106.	In all, 5000.	Producing 4.	Children each.
870,000	The cities and market towns —	1 in 128.	In all, 6800.	Producing 4.5	Children each.
4,100,000	The villages and hamlets —	1 in 141.	In all, 29,200.	Producing 4.8	Children each.
5,500,000		1 in 134.	41,000.	4.64	
Annual Births.					
	London and bills of mortality —	1 in 26 $\frac{1}{2}$.	In all, 20,000.	1 in 24.1	In all, 22,000
	The cities and market towns —	1 in 28 $\frac{1}{2}$.	In all, 30,600.	1 in 30.4	In all, 28,600
	The villages and hamlets —	1 in 29.4	In all, 139,400.	1 in 34.4	In all, 119,400
		1 in 28.95	190,000.	1 in 32.35	170,000

Whence

Whence it may be observed, that in 10,000 co-existing persons,

There are 71 or 72 marriages in the country, producing 343 children.

78 marriages in the towns, producing 351 children.

94 Marriages in London, producing 376 children.

Whereby it follows,

1st, That though each marriage in London produces fewer people than in the country, yet London in general having a greater proportion of breeders, is more prolific than the other great towns, and the great towns are more prolific than the country.

2dly, That if the people of London of all ages were as long lived as those in the country, London would encrease in people much faster *pro rata* than the country.

3dly, That the reasons why each marriage in London produces fewer children than the country marriages, seem to be,

1st, From the more frequent fornications and adulteries.

2dly, From a greater luxury and intemperance.

3dly, From a greater intemperance on business.

4thly, From the unhealthfulness of the coal smoke.

5thly, From a greater inequality of age between the husbands and wives.

6thly, From the husbands and wives not living so long as in the country.

He farther observes, accounting the people to be 5,500,000, that the said five millions and a half (including the transitory people and vagrants) appear by the assessments on marriages, births and burials,

burials, to bear the following proportion in relation to males and females, and other distinctions of the people, viz.

Vide Scheme A.

So that the number of communicants is in all 3,260,000 souls.

And the number of fighting men between 16 and 60, is 1,308,000.

That the batchelors are about 28 per cent. of the whole.

Whereof those under 25 years are $25\frac{1}{2}$ per cent.

And those above 25 years are $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent.

That the maidens are about $28\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. of the whole.

Whereof those under 25 years are $26\frac{1}{2}$ per cent.

And those above 25 years are 2 per cent.

That the males and females in the kingdom in general, are aged, one with another, 27 years and a half.

That in the kingdom in general, there are near as many people living under 20 years of age, as there are above 20, whereof half of the males is under 19, and one half of the females is under 21 years.

That the ages of the people, according to their several distinctions, are as follow, viz.

At

At a medium		Years.	
The husbands are aged	—	43 years apiece,	which at $17\frac{1}{4}$ per cent. makes 742
The wives	—	40 years apiece,	— $17\frac{1}{4}$ — 690
The widowers	—	56 years apiece,	— $1\frac{1}{2}$ — 84
The widows	—	60 years apiece,	— $4\frac{1}{2}$ — 270
The children	—	12 years apiece,	— 45 — 540
The servants	—	27 years apiece,	— $10\frac{1}{2}$ — 284
The sojourners	—	35 years apiece,	— 4 — 140
At a medium		$27\frac{1}{2}$	100 — 2750

Having thus stated the numbers of the people, he gives a scheme of the income and expence of the several families of England, calculated for the year 1688.

Vide Scheme B.

Mr. King's modesty has been so far overruled, as to suffer us to communicate these his excellent computations, which we can the more safely commend, having examined them very carefully, tried them by some little operations of our own upon the same subject, and compared them with the schemes of other persons, who take pleasure in the like studies.

What he says concerning the number of the people to be 5,500,000 is no positive assertion, nor shall we pretend any where to determine in that matter; what he lays down is by way of hypothesis, that supposing the inhabitants of England to have been 1300, 2,860,000 heads, by the orderly series of encrease allowed of by all writers, they may probably be about anno 1700, 5,500,000 heads; but if they were anno 1300 either less or more, the case must proportionably alter; for as to his allowance for plagues and great mortalities, civil wars, the sea and the plantations, they seem very reasonable, and not well to be controverted.

Upon these schemes of Mr. King, we shall make several remarks, though the text deserves much a better comment.

The people being the first matter of power and wealth, by whose labour and industry a nation must be gainers in the Balance, their encrease or decrease must be carefully observed by any government that designs to thrive; that is, their encrease must be promoted by good conduct and
wholesome

for the Year 1688.

Number of militiamen	Yearly expence per head.			Yearly encrease per head.			Yearly encrease in general.
	l.	s.	d.	l.	s.	d.	l.
100	70	0	0	10	0	0	64,000
200	45	0	0	20	0	0	10,400
300	49	0	0	6	0	0	76,800
400	45	0	0	5	0	0	39,000
500	41	0	0	4	0	0	120,000
600	32	0	0	3	0	0	288,000
700	26	0	0	4	0	0	160,000
800	17	0	0	3	0	0	90,000
900	37	0	0	13	0	0	208,000
1000	27	0	0	6	0	0	288,000
1100	18	0	0	4	0	0	280,000
1200	10	0	0	2	0	0	24,000
1300	9	4	0	0	16	0	32,000
1400	11	15	0	1	5	0	350,000
1500	9	10	0	0	10	0	330,000
1600	8	5	0	0	5	0	187,500
1700	11	0	0	1	0	0	75,000
1800	9	0	0	1	0	0	225,000
1900	9	0	0	0	10	0	120,000
2000	18	0	0	2	0	0	40,000
2100	14	0	0	1	0	0	16,000
<hr/>							
500,8	11	15	4	1	2	8	3,023,700
				Decrease.			Decrease.
50,0	7	10	0	0	10	0	75,000
364,0	4	12	0	0	2	0	127,500
400,0	2	5	0	0	5	0	325,000
35,0	7	10	0	0	10	0	35,000
<hr/>							
849,6	3	9	0	0	4	0	562,500
0	4	0	0	2	0	0	60,000
<hr/>							
500,8	11	15	4	1	2	8	3,023,700
849,6	3	7	6	0	4	6	622,500
<hr/>							
1,349,8	7	9	3	0	8	9	2,401,200

wholesome laws, and if they have been decreased by war, or any other accident, the breach is to be made up as soon as possible, for it is a main in the body politic affecting all its parts.

Almost all countries in the world have been more or less populous, as liberty and property have been there well or ill secured. The first constitution of Rome was no ill-founded government, a kingly power limited by laws; and the people encreased so fast, that from a small beginning, in the reign of their sixth king, they were able to send out an army of 80,000 men. And in the time of the commonwealth, in that invasion which the Gauls made upon Italy, not long before Hannibal came thither, they were grown so numerous, as that their troops consisted of 700,000 foot, and 70,000 horse; it is true, their allies were comprehended in this number, but the ordinary people fit to bear arms, being mustered in Rome and Campania, amounted to 250,000 foot and 23,000 horse.

Nothing therefore can more contribute to the rendering England populous and strong, than to have liberty upon a right foot, and our legal constitution firmly preserved. A nation may be as well called free under a limited kingship as in a commonwealth; and it is to this good form of our government, that we partly owe that doubling of the people, which has probably happened here in 435 years last past. And if the ambition of some, and the mercenary temper of others, should bring us at any time to alter our constitution, and to give up our ancient rights, we shall find our members diminish visibly and fast. For liberty encourages procreation, and not only keeps our own inhabitants among us, but invites
strangers

strangers to come and live under the shelter of our laws.

The Romans indeed made use of an adventitious help to enlarge their city, which was by incorporating foreign cities and nations into their commonwealth; but this way is not without its mischiefs *. For the strangers in Rome by degrees had grown so numerous, and to have so great a vote in the councils, that the whole government began to totter and decline from its old to its new inhabitants; which Fabius the censor observing, he applied a remedy in time, by reducing all the new citizens into four tribes, that being contracted into so narrow a space, they might not have so malignant an influence upon the city.

An act of general naturalization would likewise probably encrease our numbers very fast, and repair what loss we have suffered in our people by the late war: It is a matter that has been very warmly contended for by many good patriots; but peradventure it carries also its danger with it, which perhaps would have the less influence by this expedient, namely, if an act of parliament were made, that no heads of families, hereafter to be naturalized for the first generation, should have votes in any of our elections. But as the case stands, it seems against the nature of right government, that strangers (who may be spies, and who may have an interest opposite to that of England, and who at best ever join in one link of obsequiousness to the ministers) should be suffered to intermeddle in that important business of sending members to parliament. From their sons indeed there is less to fear, who by birth and na-

* Machiavel's discourses on Livy.

ture may come to have the same interest and inclinations as the natives.

And though the expedient of Fabius Maximus to contract strangers into four tribes, might be reasonable, where the affairs of a whole empire were transacted by magistrates chosen in one city, yet the same policy may not hold good in England; foreigners cannot influence elections here by being dispersed about in the several counties of the kingdom, where they can never come to have any considerable strength. But some time or other they may endanger the government, by being suffered to remain, such vast numbers of them, here in London, where they inhabit all together, at least 30,000 persons in two quarters of the town, without intermarrying with the English, or learning our language, by which means, for several years to come, they are in a way still to continue foreigners, and perhaps may have a foreign interest and foreign inclinations: To permit this cannot be advisable or safe. It may therefore be proper to limit any new acts of naturalization, with such restrictions as may make the accession of strangers not dangerous to the public.

An accession of strangers, well regulated, may add to our strength and numbers; but then it must be composed of labouring men, artificers, merchants, and other rich men, and not of foreign soldiers, since such fright and drive away from a nation more people than their troops can well consist of: For if it has been ever seen that men abound most where there is most freedom, (China excepted, whose climate excels all others, and where the exercise of the tyranny is mild and easy) it must follow that people will in time desert those countries whose best flower is their liberties, if those liberties are thought precarious or in danger.

That

That foreign soldiers are dangerous to liberty, we may produce examples from all countries and all ages; but we shall instance only one, because it is eminent above all the rest.

* The Carthaginians, in their wars, did very much use mercenary and foreign troops; and when the peace was made between them and the Romans, after a long dispute for the dominion of Sicily, they brought their army home to be paid and disbanded, which Gesco their general had the charge of embarking, who did order all his part with great dexterity and wisdom. But the state of Carthage wanting money to clear arrears, and satisfy the troops, was forced to keep them up longer than was designed. The army consisted of Gauls, Ligurians, Baleareans, and Greeks. At first they were insolent in their quarters in Carthage, and were prevailed upon to move to Sicca, where they were to remain and expect their pay. There they grew presently corrupted with ease and pleasure, and fell into mutinies and disorder, and to making extravagant demands of pay and gratuities; and in a rage, with their arms in their hands, they marched 20,000 of them towards Carthage, encamping within 15 miles of the city; and chose Spendius and Matho, two profligate wretches, for their leaders, and imprisoned Gesco, who was deputed to them from the commonwealth. Afterwards they caused almost all the Africans, their tributaries, to revolt; they grew in a short time to be 70,000 strong; they fought several battles with Hanno and Hamilcar Barcas. During these transactions, the mercenaries that were in garrison in Sardinia mutinied likewise, murdering their commander and all the Carthaginians; while

* Polybius, lib. i.

Spendius and Matho, to render their accomplices more desperate, put Gelco to a cruel death, presuming afterwards to lay siege to Carthage itself. They met with a shock indeed at Prion, where 40,000 of them were slaughtered; but soon after this battle, in another, they took one of the Carthaginian generals prisoner, whom they fixt to a cross, crucifying 30 of the principal senators round about him. Spendius and Matho were at last taken, the one crucified and the other tormented to death: But the war lasted three years and near four months with excessive cruelty; in which the state of Carthage lost several battles, and was often brought within a hair's breadth of utter ruin.

If so great a commonwealth as Carthage, though assisted at that time by Hiero King of Syracuse, and by the Romans, ran the hazard of losing their empire, city and liberties, by the insurrection of a handful of mercenaries, whose first strength was but 20,000 men, it should be a warning to all free nations, how they suffer armies so composed to be among them; and it should frighten a wise state from desiring such an encrease of people, as may be had by the bringing over foreign soldiers.

Indeed, all armies whatsoever, if they are over large, tend to the dispeopling of a country, of which our neighbour nation is a sufficient proof; where, in one of the best climates in Europe, men are wanting to till the ground. For children do not proceed from the intemperate pleasures taken loosely and at random, but from a regular way of living, where the father of the family desires to rear up and provide for the offspring he shall beget.

Securing

Securing the liberties of a nation, may be laid down as a fundamental for encreasing the numbers of its people; but there are other politics thereunto conducing, which no wise state has ever neglected.

No race of men did multiply so fast as the Jews, which may be attributed chiefly to the wisdom of Moses their lawgiver, in contriving to promote the state of marriage.

The Romans had the same care, paying no respect to a man childless by his own fault, and giving great immunities and privileges, both in the city and provinces, to those who had such and such a number of children. Encouragements of the like kind are also given in France to such as enrich the commonwealth by a large issue.

But we in England have taken another course, laying a fine upon the marriage-bed, which seems small to those who only contemplate the pomp and wealth round about them, and in their view; but they who look into all the different ranks of men, are well satisfied that this duty on marriages and births is a very grievous burthen upon the poorer sort, whose numbers compose the strength and wealth of any nation. This tax was introduced by the necessity of affairs. It is difficult to say what may be the event of a new thing; but if we are to take measures from past wisdom, which exempted prolific families from public duties, we should not lay impositions upon those who find it hard enough to maintain themselves. If this tax be such a weight upon the poor, as to discourage marriage and hinder propagation, which seems the truth, no doubt it ought to be abolished; and at a convenient time we ought to change it for some other duty, if there were only this single reason,
that

that it is so directly opposite to the polity of all ages and all countries.

In order to have hands to carry on labour and manufactures, which must make us gainers in the Balance of Trade, we ought not to deter, but rather invite men to marry, which is to be done by privileges and exemptions for such a number of children, and by denying certain offices of trust and dignities to all unmarried persons; and where it is once made a fashion among those of the better sort, it will quickly obtain with the lower degree.

Mr. King, in the foregoing scheme, [see p. 180.] (for which he has as authentic grounds as perhaps the matter is capable of) lays down, that the annual marriages of England are about 41,000, which is one marriage out of every 134 persons: Upon which we observe, that this is not a due proportion, considering how few of our adult males (in comparison with other countries) perish by war or any other accident; from whence may be inferred, that our polity is some way or other defective, or the marriages would bear a nearer proportion with the gross number of our people; for which defect, if a remedy can be found, there will be so much more strength added to the kingdom.

From the books of assessment on births, marriages, &c. by the nearest view he can make, he divides the 5,500,000 people into 2,700,000 males, and 2,800,000 females; from whence (considering the females exceed the males in number, and considering that the men marry later than women, and that many of the males are of necessity absent in the wars, at sea, and upon other business) it follows, that a large proportion of the females remain unmarried, though at an adult age, which is a dead loss to the nation, every birth

birth being so much certain treasure; upon which account, such laws must be for the public good, as induce all men to marry whose circumstances permit it.

From his division of the people, it may be likewise observed, that the near proportion there is between the males and females, (which is said to hold also in other places) is an argument (and the strongest that can be produced) against polygamy, and the encrease of mankind, which some think might be from thence expected; for if nature had intended to one man a plurality of wives, she would have ordered a great many more female births than male, her designments being always right and wise.

The securing the parish for bastard children, is become so small a punishment, and so easily compounded, that it very much hinders marriage. The Dutch compel men of all ranks to marry the woman whom they have got with child; and perhaps it would tend to the farther peopling of England, if the common people here, under such a certain degree, were condemned by some new law to suffer the same penalty.

A country that makes provision to encrease in inhabitants, whose situation is good, and whose people have a genius adapted to Trade, will never fail to be gainers in the Balance, provided the labour and industry of their people be well managed and carefully directed.

The more any man contemplates these matters, the more he will come to be of opinion, that England is capable of being rendered one of the strongest nations, and the richest spot of ground in Europe.

It is not extent of territory that makes a country powerful, but numbers of men well employed,
conve-

convenient ports, a good navy, and a soil producing all sort of commodities. The materials for all this we have, and so improveable, that if we did but second the gifts of nature, with our own industry, we should soon arrive to a pitch of greatness that would put us at least upon an equal foot with any of our neighbours.

If we had the compliment of men our land can maintain and nourish; if we had as much trade as our stock and knowledge in sea-affairs is capable of embracing; if we had such a naval strength as a trade so extended would easily produce; and if we had those stores and that wealth which is the certain result of a large and well-governed traffic, what human strength could hurt or invade us? On the contrary, should we not be in a posture not only to resist, but to give the law to others?

Our neighbouring commonwealth has not in territory above eight millions of acres, and perhaps not much above 2,200,000 people; and yet what a figure have they made in Europe for these last hundred years? What wars have they maintained? What forces have they resisted? and to what a height of power are they now come, and all by good order and wise government?

They are liable to frequent invasions; they labour under the inconvenience and danger of bad ports; they consume immense sums every year to defend their land against the sea; all which difficulties they have subdued by an unwearied industry.

We are fenced by nature against foreign enemies; our ports are safe; we fear no irruptions of the sea; our land territory at home is at least 39 millions of acres; we have in all likelihood not less than 5,500,000 people; what a nation might we then become, if all these advantages were tho-

roughly improved, and if a right application were made of all this strength, and of these numbers?

They who apprehend the immoderate growth of any Prince or State, may perhaps succeed by beginning first, and by attempting to pull down such a dangerous neighbour, but very often their good designs are disappointed. In all appearance they proceed more safely, who under such a fear make themselves strong and powerful at home. And this was the course which Philip King of Macedon, the father of Perseus, took, when he thought to be invaded by the Romans.

The greatness of Rome gave Carthage very anxious thoughts; and it rather seems that they entered into the second Punic war, more for fear the Romans should have the universal empire, than out of any ambition to lord it themselves over the whole world. Their design was virtuous, and peradventure wise, to endeavour at some early interruption to a rival that grew so fast; however, we see they miscarried, though their armies were led by Hannibal. But Fortune, which had determined the dominion of the earth for Rome, did perhaps lead them into the fatal counsel of passing the Eber, contrary to the articles of peace concluded with Asdrubal, and of attacking Saguntum, before they had sufficiently recovered of the wounds they had suffered in the wars about Sicily, Sardinia, and with their own rebels. If the high courage of Hannibal had not driven the commonwealth into a new war, while it was yet faint and weak, and if they had been suffered to pursue their victories in Spain, and to get firm footing in that rich, warlike, and then populous country, very probably in a few years they might have been a more equal match for the Roman people. It is true, if the Romans had endeavoured at the conquest

quest of Spain, and if they had disturbed the Carthaginians in that country, the war must have been unavoidable; because it was evident in that age, and will be apparent in the times we live in, that whatever foreign power already grown great, can add to its dominion the possession of Spain, will stand fair for universal empire.

But unless some such cogent reason of state, as is here instanced, intervene, in all appearance, the best way for a nation that apprehends the growing power of any neighbour, is to fortify itself within; we do not mean by land armies, which rather debilitate than strengthen a country, but by potent navies, by thrift in the public treasure, care of the people's trade, and all the other honest and useful arts of peace.

By such an improvement of our native strength, agreeable to the laws and to the temper of a free nation, England, without doubt, may be brought to so good a posture and condition of defending itself, as not to apprehend any neighbour jealous of its strength, or envious of its greatness.

And to this end we open these schemes, that a wise government, under which we live, not having any designs to become arbitrary, may see what materials they have to work upon, and how far our native wealth is able to second their good intentions of preserving us a rich and a free people.

Having said something of the number of our inhabitants, we shall proceed to discourse of their different degrees and ranks, and to examine who are a burthen and who a profit to the public; for by how much every part and member of the commonwealth can be made useful to the whole, by so much a nation will be more and more a gainer

gainer in this Balance of Trade which we are to treat of.

Mr. King, from the assessments on births and marriages, and from the polls, has formed the scheme here inserted*, of the ranks, degrees, titles, and qualifications of the people. He has done it so judiciously, and upon such grounds, that it is well worth the careful perusal of any curious person; from thence we shall make some observations, in order to put our present matter in a clearer light.

1st, This scheme detects their error, who, in the calculations they frame, contemplate nothing but the wealth and plenty they see in rich cities and great towns, and from thence make a judgment of the kingdom's remaining part; and from this view conclude, that taxes and payments to the public do mostly arise from the gentry and better sort, by which measures they neither contrive their imposition aright, nor are they able to give a true estimate what it shall produce; but when we have divided the inhabitants of England into their proper classes, it will appear that the nobility and gentry are but a small part of the whole body of the people.

Believing that taxes fall chiefly upon the better sort, they care not what they lay, as thinking they will not be felt; but when they come to be levied, they either fall short, and so run the public into an immense debt, or they light so heavily upon the poorer sort, as to occasion insufferable clamours; and they whose proper business it was to contrive these matters better, have been so unskilful, that the legislative power has been more than once compelled, for the people's ease, to give

* See Scheme B.

new funds, instead of others that had been ill projected.

This may be generally said, That all duties whatsoever upon the consumption of a large produce, fall with the greatest weight upon the common sort: So that such as think in new duties that they chiefly tax the rich, will find themselves quite mistaken; for either their fund must yield little, or it must arise from the whole body of the people, of which the richer sort are but a small proportion.

And though war, and national debts and engagements, might heretofore very rationally plead for excises upon our home consumption, yet, now there is a peace, it is the concern of every man that loves his country, to proceed warily in laying new ones, and to get off those which are already laid, as fast as ever he can. High customs and high excises both together are incompatible; either of them alone are to be endured, but to have them co-exist is suffered in no well-governed nation. If materials of foreign growth were at an easy rate, a high price might be the better borne in things of our own product; but to have both dear at once (and by reason of the duties laid upon them) is ruinous to the inferior rank of men; and this ought to weigh more with us, when we consider that even of the common people, a subdivision is to be made, of which one part subsist from their own havings, arts, labour, and industry; and the other part subsist a little from their own labour, but chiefly from the help and charity of the rank that is above them. For, according to Mr. King's scheme *,

* See Scheme B.

The nobility and gentry, with their families and retainers, the persons in offices, merchants, persons in the law, the clergy, freeholders, farmers, persons in sciences and liberal arts, shopkeepers and tradesmen, handicraftsmen, naval officers, with the families and dependents upon all these altogether, make up the number of — — — 2,675,520 heads.

The common seamen, common soldiers, labouring people, and out-servants, cottagers, paupers, and their families, with the vagrants, make up the number of — — 2,825,000 heads.

In all, 5,500,520 heads.

So that here seems a majority of the people, whose chief dependence and subsistence is from the other part, which majority is much greater, in respect of the number of families, because 500,000 families contribute to the support of 850,000 families. In contemplation of which, great care should be taken not to lay new duties upon the home consumption, unless upon the extremest necessities of the state; for though such impositions cannot be said to fall directly upon the lower rank, whose poverty hinders them from consuming such materials (though there are few excises to which the meanest person does not pay something) yet indirectly, and by unavoidable consequences, they are rather more affected by high duties upon our home consumption, than the wealthier degree of people; and so we shall find the case to be, if we look carefully into all the distinct ranks of men there enumerated,

1st, As

1st, As to the nobility and gentry ; they must of necessity retrench their families and expences, if excessive impositions are laid upon all sorts of materials for consumption ; from whence follows, that the degree below them of merchants, shopkeepers, tradesmen, and artisans, must want employment.

2dly, As to the manufactures ; high excises in time of peace are utterly destructive to that principal part of England's wealth ; for if malt, coals, salt, leather, and other things, bear a great price, the wages of servants, workmen, and artificers, will consequently rise, for the income must bear some proportion with the expence ; and if such as set the poor to work, find wages for labour or manufacture advance upon them, they must rise in the price of their commodity, or they cannot live ; all which would signify little, if nothing but our own dealings among one another were thereby affected ; but it has a consequence far more pernicious in relation to our Foreign Trade, for it is the exportation of our own product that must make England rich ; to be gainers in the Balance of Trade, we must carry out of our own product what will purchase the things of foreign growth that are needful for our own consumption, with some overplus, either in bullion or goods, to be sold in other countries ; which overplus is the profit a nation makes by trade, and it is more or less, according to the natural frugality of the people that export, or as from the low price of labour and manufacture they can afford the commodity cheap, and at a rate not to be undersold in foreign markets. The Dutch, whose labour and manufactures are dear by reason of home excises, can notwithstanding sell cheap abroad, because this disadvantage they labour under is balanced by the parsimonious

simonious temper of their people : But in England, where this frugality is hardly to be introduced, if the duties upon our home consumption are so large as to raise considerably the price of labour and manufacture, all our commodities for exportation must by degrees so advance in the prime value, that they cannot be sold at a rate which will give them vent in foreign markets ; and we must be every where underfold by our wiser neighbours. But the consequence of such duties in time of peace, will fall most heavily upon our woollen manufactures, of which most have more value from the workmanship than the material ; and if the price of this workmanship be enhanced, it will in a short course of time put a necessity upon those we deal with of setting up manufactures of their own, such as they can, or of buying goods of the like kind and use from nations that can afford them cheaper. And in this point we are to consider, that the bulk of our woollen exports does not consist in draperies made of the fine wool, peculiar to our soil, but is composed of coarse broad cloths, such as Yorkshire cloths, kerseys, which make a great part of our exports, and may be, and are made of a coarser wool, which is to be had in other countries : So that we are not singly to value ourselves upon the material, but also upon the manufacture, which we should make as easy as we can, by not laying over-heavy burthens upon the manufacture : And our woollen goods being $\frac{2}{3}$ ds of our foreign exports, it ought to be the chief object of the public care, if we expect to be gainers in the Balance of Trade, which is what we hunt after in these enquiries.

3dly, As to the lower rank of all, which we compute at 2,825,000 heads, a majority of the whole

whole people, their principal subsistence is upon the degrees above them ; and if those are rendered uneasy, these must share in the calamity ; but even of this inferior sort, no small proportion contribute largely to excises, as labourers and out-servants, which likewise affect the common seamen, who must thereupon raise their wages, or they will not have wherewithal to keep their families left at home ; and the high wages of seamen is another burthen upon our Foreign Traffic. As to the cottagers, who are above $\frac{1}{3}$ th part of the whole people, some duties reach even them, as those upon malt, leather, and salt, but not much, because of their slender consumption ; but if the gentry, upon whose woods and gleanings they live, and who employ them in day-labour ; and if the manufacturers, for whom they card and spin, are overburthened with duties, they cannot afford to give them so much for their labour and handywork ; nor to yield them those other reliefs which are their principal subsistence, for want of which, these miserable wretches must perish with cold and hunger.

Thus we see excises either directly or indirectly fall upon the whole body of the people ; but we do not take notice of these matters, as receding from our former opinion : On the contrary, we still think them the most easy and equal way of taxing a nation ; and perhaps it is demonstrable, that if we had fallen into this method at the beginning of the war, of raising the year's expence within the year by excises, England had not been now indebted so many millions ; but what was advisable, under such a necessity and danger, is not to be pursued in times of peace, especially in a country depending so much upon trade and manufactures.

Our

Our study now ought to be how those debts may be speedily cleared off, for which these new revenues are the funds, that Trade may again move freely as it did heretofore, without such a heavy clog; but this point we shall more amply handle, when we come to speak of our payments to the public.

Mr. King divides the whole body of the people into two principal classes, viz.

Heads.

* Encreasing the wealth of the king-					
dom,	—	—	—	—	2,675,520
Decreasing the wealth of the king-					
dom,	—	—	—	—	2,825,000

By which he means, that the first class of the people, from land, arts, and industry, maintain themselves, and add every year something to the nation's general stock; and besides this, out of their superfluity, contribute every year so much to the maintenance of others.

That of the second class, some partly maintain themselves by labour, (as the heads of the cottage families) but that the rest, as most of the wives and children of these, sick and impotent people, idle beggars and vagrants, are nourished at the cost of others; and are a yearly burthen to the public, consuming annually so much as would be otherwise added to the nation's general stock.

The bodies of men are without doubt the most valuable treasure of a country; and in their sphere, the ordinary people are as serviceable to the commonwealth as the rich, if they are employed in honest labour and useful arts: And such being more in number, do more contribute

* See Scheme B.

to encrease the nation's wealth, than the higher rank.

But a country may be populous and yet poor, (as were the ancient Gauls and Scythians) so that numbers, unless they are well employed, make the body politic big, but unwieldy; strong, but unactive; as to any uses of good government.

Theirs is a wrong opinion, who think all mouths profit a country that consume its product: And it may be more truly affirmed, that he who does not some way serve the commonwealth, either by being employed, or by employing others, is not only a useless, but hurtful member to it.

As it is charity, and what we indeed owe to human kind, to make provision for the aged, the lame, the sick, blind and impotent; so it is a justice we owe to the commonwealth, not to suffer such as have health, and who might maintain themselves, to be drones, and live upon the labour of others.

The bulk of such as are a burthen to the public, consists in the cottagers and paupers, beggars in great cities and towns, and vagrants.

Upon a survey of the hearth books, made in Michaelmas 1685, it was found, that of the 1,300,000 houses in the whole kingdom, those of one chimney amounted to 554,631; but some of these having land about them, in all our calculations, we have computed the cottagers but at 500,000 families. But of these a large number may get their own livelihood, and are no charge to the parish, for which reason Mr. King very judiciously computes his "cottagers and paupers" decreasing the wealth of the nation but at "400,000 families;" in which account he includes the poor houses in cities, towns, and villages,

lages, besides which he reckons 30,000 vagrants; and all these together, to make up 1,330,000 heads.

This is a very great proportion of the people to be a burthen upon the other part, and is a weight upon the land interest; of which the landed gentlemen must certainly be very sensible.

If this vast body of men, instead of being expensive, could be rendered beneficial to the commonwealth, it were a work no doubt highly to be promoted by all who love their country.

It seems evident to such as have considered these matters, and who have observed how they are ordered in nations under a good polity, that the number of such who, through age or impotence, stand in real need of relief, is but small, and might be maintained for very little; and that the poor rates are swelled to the extravagant degree we now see them at, by two sorts of people, one of which, by reason of our slack administration, is suffered to remain in sloth; and the other, through a defect in our constitution, continue in wretched poverty for want of employment, though willing enough to undertake it.

All this seems capable of a remedy; the laws may be armed against voluntary idleness, so as to prevent it; and a way may probably be found out to set those to work who are desirous to support themselves by their own labour: And if this could be brought about, it would not only put a stop to the course of that vice which is the consequence of an idle life, but it would greatly tend to enrich the commonwealth; for if the industry of not half the people maintains in some degree the other part; and besides, in times of peace, did add every year near 2,500,000 to the general stock of England, to what pitch of wealth and greatness might

we

we not be brought, if one limb were not suffered to draw away the nourishment of the other; and if all the members of the body politic were rendered useful to it?

Nature in her contrivances has made every part of a living creature either for ornament or use, the same should be in a politic institution rightly governed.

It may be laid down for an undeniable truth, that where all work, nobody will want; and to promote this would be a greater charity and more meritorious, than to build hospitals, which very often are but so many monuments of ill-gotten riches attended with late repentance.

To make as many as possible of these 1,330,000 persons (whereof not above 330,000 are children too young to work) who now live chiefly upon others, get themselves a large share of their maintenance, would be the opening a new vein of treasure of some millions sterling per ann. it would be a present ease to every particular man of substance, and a lasting benefit to the whole body of the kingdom; for it would not only nourish but encrease the numbers of the people, of which many thousand perish every year, by those diseases contracted under a slothful poverty.

Our laws relating to the poor are very numerous, and this matter has employed the care of every age for a long time, though but with little success, partly through the ill execution, and partly through some defect in the very laws.

The corruptions of mankind are grown so great, that now-a-days laws are not much observed, which do not in a manner execute themselves; of this nature are those laws which relate to bringing in the Prince's revenue, which never fail to be put in execution, because the people must

must pay, and the Prince will be paid; but where only one part of the constitution, the people are immediately concerned, as in laws relating to the poor, the highways, assizes, and other civil œconomy, and good order in the state, those are but slenderly regarded.

The public good being, therefore, very often, not a motive strong enough to engage the magistrate to perform his duty, lawgivers have many times fortified their laws with penalties, wherein private persons may have a profit, thereby to stir up the people to put the laws in execution.

In countries depraved nothing proceeds well, wherein particular men do not one way or other find their account, and rather than a public good should not go on at all, without doubt it is better to give private men some interest to set it forward.

For which reason, it may be worth the consideration of such as study the prosperity and welfare of England, whether this great engine of maintaining the poor and finding them work and employment, may not be put in motion by giving some body of undertakers a reasonable gain to put the machine upon its wheels.

In order to which, we shall here insert a proposal delivered to the House of Commons last session of parliament, for the better maintaining the impotent, and employing and setting to work the other poor of this kingdom.

In matters of this nature, it is always good to have some model or plan laid down, which thinking men may contemplate, alter and correct, as they see occasion; and the Writer of these papers does rather chuse to offer this scheme, because he is satisfied it was composed by a gentleman of
great

great abilities, and who has made both the poor rates, and their number, more his study than any other person in the nation. The proposal is as follows:

A Scheme for setting the Poor to work.

1st, **T**HAT such persons as shall subscribe and pay the sum of 300,000*l.* as a stock for and towards the better maintaining the impotent poor, and for buying commodities and materials to employ and set at work the other poor, be incorporated and made one body politic, &c. By the name of the governor and company for maintaining and employing the poor of this kingdom.

By all former propositions it was intended that the parishes should advance several years rates to raise a stock, but by this proposal the experiment is to be made by private persons at their risk; and 300,000*l.* may be judged a very good stock, which added to the poor rates for a certain number of years, will be a very good fund for buying commodities and materials for a million of money at any time. This subscription ought to be free for every body, and if the sum were subscribed in the several counties of England and Wales, in proportion to their poor rates, or the monthly assessment, it would be most convenient; and provision may be made that no person shall transfer his interest but to one of the same county, which will keep the interest there during the term; and as to its being one corporation, it is presumed this will be most beneficial to the public. For 1st, All disputes on removes which are very chargeable and burthensome will be at an end, this proposal intending, that wherever the poor
are,

are, they shall be maintained or employed. 2dly, It will prevent one county which shall be diligent, imposing on their neighbours who may be negligent, or getting away their manufactures from them. 3dly, In case of fire, plague, or loss of manufacture, the stock of one county may not be sufficient to support the places where such calamities may happen; and it is necessary the whole body should support every particular member, so that hereby there will be a general care to administer to every place according to their necessities.

2dly, That the said corporation be established for the term of 21 years.

The corporation ought to be established for 21 years, or otherwise it cannot have the benefit the law gives in case of infants, which is their service for their education; besides, it will be some years before a matter of this nature can be brought into practice.

3dly, That the said sum of 300,000*l.* be paid in, and laid out for the purposes aforesaid, to remain as a stock for and during the said term of 21 years.

The subscription ought to be taken at the passing of the act, but the corporation to be left at liberty, to begin either the Michaelmas or the Ladyday after, as they shall think fit. And

per cent. to be paid at the subscribing to persons appointed for that purpose, and the remainder before they begin to act; but so as 300,000*l.* shall be always in stock during the term, notwithstanding any dividends or other disposition; and an account thereof to be exhibited twice in every year upon oath, before the lord chancellor for the time being.

4thly,

4thly, That the said corporation do by themselves or agents in every parish of England, from and after the day of during the said term of 21 years, provide for the real impotent poor, good and sufficient maintenance and reception, as good or better than hath at any time within the space of years before the said day of been provided or allowed to such impotent poor, and so shall continue to provide for such impotent poor, and what other growing impotent poor shall happen in the said parish during the said term.

By impotent poor is to be understood all infants and old and decrepid persons not able to work; also persons who by sickness or any accident are for the time unable to labour for themselves or families; and all persons (not being fit for labour) who were usually relieved by the money raised for the use of the poor; they shall have maintenance, &c. as good or better, as within years they used to have.

This does not directly determine what that shall be, nor is it possible, by reason a shilling in one county is as much as two in another; but it will be the interest of the corporation that such poor be well provided for, by reason the contrary will occasion all the complaints or clamour that probably can be made against the corporation.

5thly, That the corporation do provide (as well for all such poor which on the said day of shall be on the poor books, as for what other growing poor shall happen in the said term, who are or shall be able to labour or do any work) sufficient labour and work proper for such persons to be employed in. And that provision shall be made for such labouring persons

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sons according to their labour, so as such provision doth not exceed $\frac{3}{4}$ parts as much as any other person would have paid for such labour. And in case they are not employed and set to work, then such persons shall, until materials or labour be provided for them, be maintained as impotent poor; but so as such persons who shall hereafter enter themselves on the poor's books, being able to labour, shall not quit the service of the corporation without leave for the space of six months.

The corporation are to provide materials and labour for all that can work, and to make provision for them not exceeding $\frac{3}{4}$ parts as much as any other person would give for such labour. For example, if another person would give one of these a shilling, the corporation ought to give but nine-pence. And the reason is plain, 1st, Because the corporation will be obliged to maintain them and their families in all exigences, which others are not obliged to do, and consequently they ought not to allow so much as others. 2dly, In case any persons able to labour, shall come to the corporation, when their agents are not prepared with materials to employ them, by this proposal they are to allow them full provision as impotent poor, until they find them work, which is entirely in favour of the poor. 3dly, It is neither reasonable nor possible for the corporation to provide materials upon every occasion for such persons as shall be entered with them, unless they can be secure of such persons to work up those materials; besides, without this provision all the labouring people in England will play fast and loose between their employers and the corporation, for as they are disobliged by one, they will run to the other, and so neither shall be sure of them.

6thly,

6thly, That no impotent poor shall be removed out of the parish where they dwell, but upon notice in writing given to the church-wardens or overseers of the said parish, to what place of provision he or she is removed.

It is judged the best method to provide for the impotent poor in houses prepared for that purpose, where proper provision may be made for several, with all necessaries of care and maintenance. So that in some places one house will serve the impotent poor of several parishes, in which case the parish ought to know where to resort, to see if good provision be made for them.

7thly, That in case provision be not made for the poor of each parish in manner as aforesaid, (upon due notice given to the agents of the corporation) the said parish may order their poor to be maintained, and deduct the sum by them expended out of the next payments to be made to the said corporation by the said parish.

In case any accident happens in a parish, either by sickness, fall, casualty of fire, or otherways; and that the agent of the corporation is not present to provide for them, or having notice doth not immediately do it, the parish may do it, and deduct so much out of the next payment; but there must be provision made for the notice, and in what time the corporation shall provide for them.

8thly, That the said corporation shall have and receive for the said 21 years, that is to say, from every parish yearly so much as such parish paid in any one year, to be computed by a medium of 7 years; namely, from the 25th of March 1690, to the 25th of March 1697, and to be paid half yearly; and besides, shall receive the benefit of the revenues of all donations given

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to any parish, or which shall be given during the said term, and all forfeitures which the law gives to the use of the poor; and to all other sums which were usually collected by the parish, for the maintenance of the poor.

Whatever was raised for or applied to the use of the poor, ought to be paid over to the corporation; and where there are any donations for maintaining the poor, it will answer the design of the donor, by reason there will be better provision for the maintenance of the poor than ever; and if that maintenance be so good as to induce further charities, no doubt the corporation ought to be entitled to them: But there are two objections to this article; 1st, That to make a medium by a time of war is unreasonable. 2^{dly}, To continue the whole tax for 21 years, does not seem to give any benefit to the kingdom in that time. To the 1st, It is true we have a peace, but Trade is lower now than at any time during the war, and the charge of the poor greater; and when Trade will mend, is very uncertain. To the 2^d, It is very plain, that although the charge may be the same to a parish in the total, yet it will be less to particular persons, because those who before received alms, will now be enabled to be contributors; but besides, the turning so many hundred thousand pounds a year (which in a manner have hitherto been applied only to support idleness) into industry; and the employing so many other idle vagrants and sturdy beggars, with the product of their labour, will altogether be a present benefit to the lands of England, as well in the rents as in the value; and further, the accidental charges in the streets and at doors, is, by a very modest computation, over and above the poor rates, at least 300,000*l.* per ann. which will

will be entirely saved by this proposal, and the persons set at work; which is a further consideration for its being well received, since the corporations are not allowed any thing for this service.

The greater the encouragement is, the better the work will be performed; and it will become the wisdom of the parliament in what they do, to make it effectual; for should such an undertaking as this prove ineffectual, instead of remedying it, it will encrease the mischief.

9thly, That all the laws made for the provision of the poor, and for punishing idle vagrant persons, be repealed, and one law made to continue such parts as are found useful, and to add such other restrictions, penalties, and provisions, as may effectually attain the end of this great work.

The laws hereunto relating are numerous, but the judgments and opinions given upon them are so various and contradictory, and differ so in sundry places, as to be inconsistent with any one general scheme of management.

10thly, That proper persons be appointed in every county to determine all matters and differences which may arise between the corporation and the respective parishes.

To prevent any ill usages, neglect or cruelty, it will be necessary to make provision that the poor may tender their complaints to officers of the parish; and that those officers having examined the same, and not finding redress, may apply to persons to be appointed in each county and each city for that purpose, who may be called supervisors of the poor, and may have allowance made them for their trouble; and their business may be to examine the truth of such complaints; and in case either the parish or corporation

ration judge themselves aggrieved by the determination of the said supervisors, provision may be made that an appeal lie to the quarter sessions.

11thly, That the corporation be obliged to provide for all public beggars, and to put the laws in execution against public beggars and idle vagrant persons.

Such of the public beggars as can work must be employed, the rest to be maintained as impotent poor; but the laws to be severely put in execution against those who shall ask any public alms.

This proposal, which in most parts of it seems to be very maturely weighed, may be a foundation for those to build upon, who have a public spirit large enough to embrace such a noble undertaking.

But the common obstruction to any thing of this nature, is a malignant temper in some who will not let a public work go on, if private persons are to be gainers by it: When they are to get themselves, they abandon all sense of virtue; but are clothed in her whitest robe, when they smell profit coming to another, masking themselves with a false zeal to the commonwealth, where their own turn is not to be served. It were better indeed, that men would serve their country for the praise and honour that follow good actions; but this is not to be expected in a nation, at least leaning towards corruption; and in such an age it is as much as we can hope for, if the prospect of some honest gain invites people to do the public faithful service. For which reason, in any undertaking where it can be made apparent that a great benefit will accrue to the commonwealth in general, we ought not to have
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an evil eye upon what fair advantages particular men may thereby expect to reap, still taking care to keep their appetite of getting within moderate bounds, laying all just and reasonable restraints upon it, and making due provision that they may not wrong or oppress their fellow-subjects.

It is not to be denied, but that if fewer hands were suffered to remain idle, and if the poor had full employment, it would greatly tend to the common welfare, and contribute much towards adding every year to the general stock of England.

Among the methods that we have here proposed of employing the poor, and making the whole body of the people useful to the public; we think it our duty to mind those who consider the common welfare of looking with a compassionate eye into the prisons of this kingdom, where many thousands consume their time in vice and idleness; wasting the remainder of their fortunes, or lavishing the substance of their creditors, eating bread and doing no work, which is contrary to good order, and pernicious to the commonwealth.

We cannot therefore but recommend the thoughts of some good bill that may effectually put an end to this mischief so scandalous in a trading country, which should let no hands remain useless.

It is not at all difficult to contrive such a bill as may relieve and release the debtor, and yet preserve to his creditors all their fair, just, and honest rights and interest.

And having in this manner endeavoured to shew that to preserve and encrease the people, and to make their numbers useful, are methods conducing to make us gainers in the Balance of Trade, we shall proceed to handle the second head.

S E C T. III.

Of the Land of England, and its Product.

IN treating of this matter, we shall again produce one of Mr. King's schemes, which are all of them so accurately done, that we may venture to say they are not to be controverted in any point so material, as to destroy the foundation of those reasonings, which the Writer of these papers, or any other person, shall form upon them.

He computes that England and Wales contain 39 millions of acres; according to the following scheme:

	Acres.	Value per acre.			Rent.
		l.	s.	d.	l.
Arable land, ———	9,000,000	0	5	6	2,480,000
Pasture and meadow, ———	12,000,000	0	8	8	5,200,000
Woods and coppices, ———	3,000,000	0	5	0	750,000
Forests, parks and commons, ———	3,000,000	0	3	8	570,000
Heaths, moors, mountains, and barren land, ———	10,000,000	0	1	0	500,000
Houses and homesteads, gardens and orchards, churches and churchyards, ———	1,000,000	The land.			450,000
		The buildings.			2,000,000
Rivers, lakes, meers and ponds, ———	500,000	0	2	0	50,000
Roads, ways, and waste land, ———	500,000				
In all,	39,000,000	about	6	2	12,000,000
	True yearly value.	Value, as rated to the 4s. tax.			Produce of the 4s. t. x.
	l.	l.			l.
So the yearly rents or value of the land is ———	10,000,000	6,500,000			1,300,000
The houses and buildings, ———	2,000,000	1,500,000			300,000
All other hereditaments, ———	1,000,000	500,000			100,000
Personal estates, such as have been reached in the 4 s. aids ———	1,000,000	550,000			100,000
In all,	14,000,000	9,050,000			1,800,000
So that whereas the tax of 4 s. per pound, one aid with another, has produced but ——— 1,800,000					
It should produce, if duly assessed, ——— 2,800,000					

The produce of the arable land be thus estimated in a year of moderate plenty :

	Bushels.	per Bushel. s. d.	Value.
Wheat,	14,000,000	at 3 6	2,450,000
Rye, —	10,000,000	at 2 6	1,250,000
Barley, —	27,000,000	at 2 0	2,700,000
Oats, —	16,000,000	at 1 6	1,200,000
Pease, —	7,000,000	at 2 6	875,000
Beans, —	4,000,000	at 2 6	500,000
Vetches,	1,000,000	at 2 0	100,000
In all,	79,000,000	at 2 3 $\frac{4}{9}$	9,075,000

This is only the neat produce, exclusive of the seed-corn, which, in some sorts of grain, being near $\frac{1}{4}$ th of the produce, and in others $\frac{1}{5}$ th, may, in general, be reckoned about 11 millions of bushels more, which makes the whole produce to be 90 millions of bushels, which, at 2s. 3 $\frac{4}{9}$ d. per bushel in common, is about 10,338,600*l*.

Note, That this value is what the same is worth upon the spot where the corn grew ; but this value is increased by the carriage to the place where it is at last spent, at least $\frac{1}{4}$ th part more.

These 79 millions of bushels of grain are the product of eight of the nine millions of acres of arable land ; the other million of acres producing hemp, flax, woad, saffron, rape, hops, dying weeds, &c. the value of the product thereof may be about one million sterling.

So that the rent of the corn-land being about 2,200,000*l*. per annum, and the neat produce thereof above 9,000,000*l*. the produce is full four rents.

But

But deducting $\frac{1}{11}$ th part of the neat produce, or 700,000 *l.* in lieu of tythes, there remains 8,375,000 *l.* or three rents, and near $\frac{3}{10}$ ths.

Now the rents, or yearly value of the pasture and meadows, woods, coppices, forests, parks, commons, heaths, moors, mountains, and barren land, being about 7,000,000 *l.*

The produce being but 12,000,000 *l.* does not make fully two rents, there being little charge either in cultivating the land, or gathering the product thereof, comparatively to what there is in arable land.

This produce is principally in and by cattle, hay, timber, and fire-wood.

The produce by cattle, in butter,	<i>l.</i>
cheese, and milk, may be about	2,500,000
The value of the wool yearly shorn,	2,000,000
The value of the horses yearly bred,	250,000
The value of the flesh yearly spent,	
as food, — — —	3,350,000
The value of the tallow and hides of	
the cattle, — — —	600,000
The value of hay yearly consumed by	
horses, — — —	1,300,000
The hay yearly consumed by other	
cattle, — — —	1,000,000
The timber yearly felled for building	
and such uses, — — —	500,000
The wood yearly spent in firing, and	
petty uses, — — —	500,000
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So the produce (including one mil-	
lion in hay spent by cattle) may be	
in all, — — — —	12,000,000

An

An Estimate of the Live Stock of the Nation.

	Yearly breed or increase.	The whole stock.	Value of each be- sides the skin.	Value of the stock.
			<i>l. s. d.</i>	<i>l.</i>
Beeves, storks, and calves,	800,000	4,500,000	2 0 0	9,000,000
Sheep and lambs,	3,600,000	12,000,000	0 7 4	4,440,000
Swine and pigs,	1,300,000	2,000,000	0 16 0	1,600,000
Deer and fawns,	20,000	100,000	2 0 0	200,000
Goats and kids,	10,000	50,000	0 10 0	25,000
Hares and leverets,	12,000	24,000	0 1 6	1,800
Rabbits and conies,	2,000,000	1,000,000	0 0 5	20,833
	<u>7,742,000</u>	<u>19,674,000</u>	<u>0 0 0</u>	<u>15,287,633</u>

So the value of the live stock for food may be	— — —	15,287,633
The value of the horses, &c. being 1,200,000 <i>l.</i> at 2 <i>l.</i> 10 <i>s.</i> each, breeding annually 100,000, may be		3,000,000
The value of the pelts and skins, over and above the wool,	—	2,400,000
The value of the wool yearly shorn or pelted, 12,000,000 of fleeces, at 3 <i>s.</i> 4 <i>d.</i> per fleece,	— —	2,000,000
The value of the whole stock of tame fowl, as geese, turkeys, hens, ducks, pigeons, swans, and pea- cocks,	— — — —	460,000
The whole stock of wild fowl about		12,000
		<hr/>
In all,		23,159,633

From these schemes we shall make such observations as we think may relate to our present subject.

Of the 39 millions of acres in territory belonging to England, he lays down that there may be above a fourth part, viz. 10 millions of acres in heaths, moors, mountains, and barren land; three millions of acres in woods and coppices, and three millions in forests, parks, and commons. This division of the land seems to be made with great judgment: 1st, Because it agrees very well with the consumption of several commodities, of which we can come at a near knowledge by the exercises now in being. 2dly, It corresponds exactly with that encrease in the kingdom's general rental, which, for these last hundred years, may have been observed from the produce of divers land-taxes, and from several other particulars.

And

And there are undeniable reasons to be given, that this general rental, anno 1600, did not exceed six millions per ann. but through the help of that wealth which has flowed in to us by our Foreign Trade, it has advanced in several periods of time from six to eight, from eight to ten, and from 10 to 14 millions per ann. When the general rental was but six millions per ann. there was a great deal more barren land; of that which was cultivated, very much was capable of melioration; and there were more forests, woods, coppices, commons, and waste ground, than there is now, which our wealth did enable us from time to time to inclose, cultivate, and improve.

And for the future, as we grow in riches, and as our people encrease, those many millions of acres which now are barren, will by degrees most of them be improved and cultivated; for there is hardly any sort of ground which numbers of men will not render fertile; but then it must be supposed, that we do not go backward in our trade, for if that should happen, instead of improving what is waste, that which is improved and cultivated will rather return to the wildness and desolation of former times; for as we have said in our former Discourses, land and trade rise and fall together. Trade brings in the stock; this stock, well and industriously managed, betters land, and brings more product of all kind for exportation; the returns of which growth and product are to make a country gainers in the balance.

As to our quantity of land, in relation to its inhabitants, as the case stands, we seem now to have about $7\frac{1}{4}$ acres per head; but there are many reasons to think that England is capable of nourishing double its present number of people, which supposing them now to be 5,500,000, would be
11 mil-

11 millions, and even then there will be as many acres per head as they have in Holland. And when we have this compliment of men, either in the natural course of time, or sooner, by the help of good conduct, we shall be in a state of power to deal with any strength in Europe. In the natural course of time this cannot happen in a great while, but the common progression of things may be hastened by art, so that if we are studious to preserve and encrease our people, peradventure in not many years, we may have hands enough, not only to make us safe from the insults of others, but to render us formidable to all our neighbours: And men being the truest strength and riches of a country, the councils of all wise states should tend to obtaining and keeping together as many as the land will nourish. There are indeed countries to whom their full compliment of inhabitants would be dangerous, and subject them to frequent famines in bad and unseasonable years for corn. As for example, if France had had as many people as the land will feed in times of common plenty, half of them must have perished during their late dearths for want of bread, because they have a vast inland country, and only the out parts upon such an emergency can be relieved by the assistance of other places. And we see that anciently, before there was much trade, there were frequent famines in the world, because one part could not then help another; for which reason the northern nations heretofore, when their people multiplied too fast, did disburden themselves by sending out numerous colonies to seek out new dwellings, in apprehension that by a scarce year they might be destroyed at home; but England (with any moderate care) is not liable to such a fear, though its present numbers should even be doubled,

doubled, because we have every where the sea to friend, and in such an extremity our wants may be supplied from other nations.

And our matter leading us into it, it may not be unnecessary here to take notice, that countries not overstocked with men, and though situated so as to be relieved by the sea, may suffer greatly, and be reduced very low for want of corn, unless they make some due provision against such a calamity.

The value of the wheat, barley, and rye, necessary for the sustenance of England, amounts at least to six millions of pounds per ann. at the common rate; from whence it is apparent, that if a long dearth should happen here, such as they lately had in France, though we may be supplied upon more easy terms than France was, and though we might still keep our people alive, yet that a disaster of this kind would exhaust more of our money than a war of ten years continuance. Suppose (which God forbid) that for two or three years successively, the season should prove so bad as to deprive us of half our usual crop; to supply such a want, what immense sums must be carried out of the kingdom? And it may be made evident, that such a scarcity did very much drain the French.

To provide against a calamity of the like nature, is no doubt of the highest consequence. That we have been deficient in this point of polity is too notorious, though providence has taken more care of us than a negligent people deserve. However, we have had outrageous famines in England, and in Edward III.'s reign, corn did once rise to 13 times the common value; this indeed can hardly happen again, because there are more different sorts of soils improved and manured

now

now than in that age; but at several times we have suffered wants of this kind very afflicting, and some time or other our negligence in a matter of such concern to the people's welfare, may come to be more severely punished.

By the best accounts we are able to procure, from such as have looked into these things, we find that in England, in a plentiful year, there is not above five months stock of grain at the time of the succeeding harvest, and not above four months stock in an indifferent year, which is but a slender provision against any evil accident. We enjoy the benefit of such different soils, viz. high lands and low lands, where one hits when the other fails, and now-a-days we seldom see corn above treble its common rate, which however would be fatal, if it should at any time continue so long as to make large supplies from abroad necessary to us. It is observed, that but $\frac{1}{10}$ th defect in the harvest may raise the price $\frac{3}{10}$ ths, and when we have but half our crop of wheat, which now and then happens, the remainder is spun out by thrift and good management, and eked out by the use of other grain; but this will not do for above one year, and would be a small help in the succession of two or three unseasonable harvests: For the scarcity even of one year is very destructive, in which many of the poorest sort perish, either for want of sufficient food, or by unwholesome diet.

We take it, that a defect in the harvest may raise the price of corn in the following proportions:

Defect.		Above the common rate.
1 Tenth	} Raises the price	3 Tenths.
2 Tenths		8 Tenths.
3 Tenths		1. 6 Tenths.
4 Tenths		2. 8 Tenths.
5 Tenths		4. 5 Tenths.

So

So that when corn rises to treble the common rate, it may be presumed that we want above $\frac{1}{3}$ d of the common produce; and if we should want $\frac{1}{2}$ ths, or half the common produce, the price would rise to near five times the common rate.

We dwell the longer upon this subject, being convinced in judgment, that nothing in the world can more impoverish a country, nor tend more to set it back with other people in the Balance of Trade for a long while, than such a calamity; it is indeed the scourge of God; but improvident states are more liable to it than wiser nations.

The Hollanders cannot nourish their people from their territory, and must always seek for assistance from abroad; but in prospect that the harvest may be bad now and then, in some, and even in all those places from whence they fetch their corn, whereby in scarce times they would be imposed upon, they take care to have granaries and storehouses, where in plenty years they lay up vast quantities of all sorts of grain against a dearer season; by which good and prudent œconomy, those dearths which in their turn have afflicted most other countries, fall but lightly upon their common people.

On the contrary, when such a calamity happens, they are able from their stores to assist other nations; and though we cannot go so high as * Sir Walter Raleigh, who is overlarge in his computations of this nature, and reckons the Dutch to get an immense sum by this sort of trade, yet it is apparent that they are very great gainers from time to time, by selling us our own corn dear, which they had bought cheap, and that they make us pay very largely for its store-room.

* Vide Sir Walter Raleigh's Remains, p. 173.

A nation that will get by foreign traffic, must carefully watch all these things; and the instance we have here given, is a great pull-back in the general Balance of Trade, and what the Dutch in this manner gain, is a dead loss to England.

But this evil is without doubt capable of a remedy. If they can afford to let their money lie dead for a time, pay freight backward and forward, and store-room, and yet be gainers by selling us our own commodity in a dearer market, why should not we think it worth our while to build granaries and public storehouses within our own dominions?

We take it that freight backward and forward in such a bulky ware as corn is, does overbalance the difference in the interest of money here and there; so that we seem to be imposed upon in this important matter, merely through that negligence of which wealthy nations are but too guilty.

It may therefore be worth the consideration of such as study the good of England, whether it would not be advisable, and for the public welfare, to settle a fund for erecting in every county granaries capable of containing such a quantity of corn as may nourish the people for a certain time, upon any emergent occasion, and as may hinder us at all times from purchasing at a dear rate our own product from our more wary neighbours.

This first step would be the most chargeable, but in the course of a few years the expence would be overpaid to the body of the kingdom; as to filling these stores with corn, sufficient to answer the people's occasions, we are inclined to think it would be best managed by private undertakers, whom the hopes of advantage will easily invite into such a business. But here again will come the common objection made to public things, that
some

some private men will be thereby gainers; and so, in the name of God, let them, provided they do the public service.

However, there are many reasons to think that such a business, from the very nature of it, would be more uncorruptibly managed than most other public matters. 1st, Some persons would look after it as a work of more meritorious charity than any that can be thought on. 2dly, In case of male administration, the clamours of the common people would be irresistible. 3dly, A great many different sorts of men would find themselves concerned in point of interest, to see it well and justly administered.

It is not here pretended to give any regular scheme of this whole matter, which would take up more time than consists with the brevity designed in these Discourses; but it is hoped the hints now given will suffice to make some good patriots in due season lay to heart a business of such high importance to their land, to its product, and to the entire body of the people.

That corporation for setting the poor to work, of which a scheme has been here proposed, may very properly provide granaries round the kingdom.

It would likewise be very advisable to review the ancient laws concerning corn, for they no ways square with the present numbers of our people, nor with the growth of London, and indeed ought to be more adapted to many other circumstances of the times we now live in.

All countries thrive or decline by trade, as they well or ill manage their product and manufactures; and wise nations observe carefully every part, where they think to have any probable advantage. If they excel in product and manufacture,

ture, as in France, the government bends itself to encourage the people in the pursuit of what is judged profitable to the public. If they have little product of their own, as in Holland, they fall to be carriers of the world, and to buy goods in one place to vend in another, whereby the bulk of their riches has been gained.

England has an excellent product of its own, wherewith to sustain its inhabitants: The woollen manufacture is a wealth in a manner peculiar to us. We have besides the product of other countries subject to our dominion, the West-Indies. The East-Indies are an inexhaustible mine of vanities, to barter for the vanities of other countries, which a rich nation will always covet. We have ports and situation, and every thing that can contribute to make us the foremost people of the whole commercial world, only a little industry may be wanting, which to stir up is the drift of these enquiries.

We have looked into Mr. King's computation of the corn, because it should be the fundamental care of a good government to provide that the people never want it, for two or three years defect there pulls down whatever the merchant has been doing for a long time.

As to his estimate of our live stock in cattle, many conclusions perhaps useful may be formed from it, which we omit, as fearing to be too voluminous: We shall only observe, that it seems more the national interest of England to employ its land to the breeding and feeding of cattle, than to the produce of corn; for, as Mr. Fortrey has well noted *, " The profit of one acre of pasture in
" the flesh, hide, and tallow of an ox, or in the

* England's Interest and Improvement, p. 15.

" flesh,

“ flesh, wool, and tallow of a sheep, or in the
“ carcase of a horse, is of so much greater value
“ abroad, than the like yield of the earth would
“ be in corn; that the exportation of this nation
“ might be at least double to what it is, if rightly
“ disposed.”

It is true, in these matters men are apt to follow what they think their particular profit, but the influence of good laws would go a great way towards inclining them more to pursue what is for the general advantage; and indeed the private concerns of men should be always made subservient to the public interest.

Nor is force at all needful to bring this about, for men, in most of their measures, where the administration is wise and steady, may be induced to pursue the common welfare by directive laws, by examples from the prince and great ones, and by some few not very expensive encouragements. As for example, it is in the power of a King of England not only to have as many horses bred, but of what shape and size he pleases; his encouragement will at any time encrease the studs, and when he countenances the shape and size that he thinks will profit his country most that way, the breeders will forthwith turn all their care and industry.

Our ancestors have not been unmindful to promote the breed of horses, as we may see by 27 H. 8. 6. 32 H. 8. 13. foreseeing what an advantage might accrue thereby to England; but those old laws want revising, and to be more adapted to present use.

Our forefathers indeed were against transporting horses and mares above such a value, 11 H. 7. 13. 1 Ed. 6. 5. but when those prohibitions were enacted, the business of trade was not so well understood.

stood as it is at present. However, in practice we have of late years consulted our national interest, which in all appearance is to let this commodity be traded for, as well as any other.

It may be convenient to restrain the carrying out of mares, but as to geldings and stone-horses we can see no danger in it. On the contrary, if such numbers were called for as would invite us to encrease our breeds, it would no doubt bring a great profit to the kingdom. Stone-horses yield most abroad, and cost no more rearing than geldings: Against this is objected, that we may thereby strengthen our enemies, by mending the breed of other countries; but there is little strength added to that enemy, whose money we take for a perishable commodity: Besides, the nation we have most reason to distrust, labour under a natural impediment of not excelling in the breed of horses; their ground is not proper for it. They do not want stallions, of which they may have as good, if not better than ours, from other parts, but they have neither mares nor fit pasture; and if they had mares, they would be yet to seek; for it is notorious that the shape, strength, and beauty of horses, proceed from the soil; and when that is changed, in the next race they degenerate.

This matter has been taken notice of, because it has been frequently desired that the ancient prohibitions here mentioned might be reinforced by some new law; but whether or no such a measure be right for England, is humbly submitted to better judgments.

Mr. King computes the value of the horses yearly bred to be about 250,000 *l*.

This estimate seems not to be out of the way, and from it we shall observe, that by good laws
and

and a due care in their execution, and by encouragement from the great ones above, it might peradventure be brought about to double our yearly breed; and if this could be compassed, and if great numbers of them should be sold in foreign markets (provided it be deemed safe for the state) it would be a new addition to our national stock, and be just so much put into the scale, yet more to incline of our side the general balance.

Our mines are another product of the earth, and undoubtedly capable of great improvements; we ought to respect them as the parents of all our Trade, and which made us known to the first merchants of the world, the Phœnicians. We have tin, lead, copper, calamy, iron, coal, culm, allom, copperas, with other sort of minerals; and what is in this manner dug out of the earth, cannot be a less article than about 7 or 800,000 *l.* per ann. in the whole rental of the kingdom.

They who work these mines and deal in these materials, know best what laws and constitutions they want to make their business more easy at home, and to give their commodities a freer vent abroad; but if they need any help from the legislative power, most certainly they ought to have it, since their stock and labour turn so much to the common good; for whatever their product yields in foreign markets, is clear national profit.

There are lately published some extraordinary accounts of the mines in Cardiganshire, where it is said there are eight large veins of silver, lead and copper ore, lying near together in one mountain, nigh a navigable river and a good port.

* It is alleged, that these mines with a large

* *Mine Adventure and Expedient*, p. 7.

stock, in a few years, may be advanced to a clear profit of 170,000*l.* per ann. This computation does not seem at all extravagant to those who have looked into the accounts of what mines produce in other countries, provided the ore be good, the vein like to last, (and large ones seldom fail) and provided there be no invincible impediment from nature to their working: they have stood still several years for want of a good agreement among the adventurers.

It is said Sir H. M. has put them in a way of being wrought; but if his expedient should not succeed, and if new discoveries should arise, legislative authority may very well and justly interpose, even to compel the partners to some agreement, whereby the work may be carried on; for it is a justice due to the public at no time to suffer a few stock-jobbing citizens to stand in the way of any national advantage, the fraud and corruption of which sort of men have hurt England in more than one particular.

If these mines come but any thing near the value Mr. William Waller * has put upon them, and with reasons very probable, they are a fit object of the state's care; and upon inspection into their true worth, if private purses cannot raise a stock sufficient to set them going, it were better done upon some public fund, to be repaid out of the profits, than to lose what is represented as so immense a treasure. But should it prove less, it is not to be neglected, for nations (like private men) who will thrive, must look into small things as well as great; and for this we have the examples of France and Holland, whose ministers examine

* Vide Essay on the Value of the Mines, &c.

into the minutest matters, where the public may possibly reap any advantage; and it is a very commendable piece of wisdom, were it but for this single reason, that to do so constantly begets a habit of care and diligence in things of higher importance.

The fishery should be here treated of as being the product of the people's labour, but this point we have elsewhere handled *. However, it falls naturally into our present subject to observe, that to recover the fishery, and to bring us to the height and perfection our coast and situation are capable of, would encrease the numbers of our people (for men always multiply where they have conveniencies of living); it would find employment for poor; it would raise rents, and give a higher value to all that land produces; it would set us right in several nations where we are believed to deal at loss, and particularly in those places where our exportations bear no proportion, at least in bulk, with our importations, which might be supplied by fish. We cannot therefore but earnestly recommend the serious thoughts of this matter, and by what methods it may be retrieved, to all such as love their country, and who wish to see us every year more and more gainers in the Balance of Trade.

Having touched upon these heads, we shall proceed to say something of wool, which is a main article in the produce of land.

Mr. King computes the value of the wool shorn, to be about 2,000,000 *l.* per ann.

And in the Discourses upon the Revenue and Trade, (Part II. p. 147) we compute by a gene-

* Vide Discourses on the Public Revenues and Trade, Vol. I. Part II. p. 426.

ral medium, that the material is improved, one with another, fourfold in the workmanship; so that the value of the woollen manufacture made here, may amount to 8,000,000*l.* per ann.

Perhaps neither of us are much out of the way in these two calculations; but suppose us a little under or over the mark, all people will agree with us, that this branch of our product is very large, and of the highest importance.

The Writer of these papers has an account from a person, upon whose judgment and experience in these matters there is great reason to rely, that our exports of all kinds in the woollen manufacture, amount to above two millions per ann. which is so large a part of our general exportation, that it must maim the whole body of our Trade, to receive any hurt in so principal a member.

Whatever goods we make up of foreign materials, and sell in the markets abroad, all above the cost of the materials is clear gain to England; in the same manner all our clear returns from the plantations which we export are neat profit.

But where the materials and manufactures too are both our own, as in this instance of the woollen goods, two millions carried out, when the general Balance of Trade is considered, must be esteemed as two millions gained to the kingdom; for the return of this exportation supplies our consumption of foreign goods (which would otherwise be bought with money) with some overplus, which overplus is what must incline the scale to turn of our side.

Some people have been apt to fear that we sink in the woollen manufacture, because the accounts of the draperies exported, have been heretofore larger than of late years; but such do not contemplate, that though the old may have lessened,
what

what is commonly called the new draperies have increased, consisting in bays, serges and stuffs: So that upon the whole, infinitely more of the material of wool has of late years been wrought up for foreign use than in former times; and herein our merchants have been only forced to follow the modes and humour of those people with whom they deal, and the course they have pursued has hitherto not been detrimental to the public.

Nor is there any cause to apprehend, but that we may increase from time to time in the general manufacture of wool, though the exportation of particular commodities may now and then vary; for, upon the whole, our material is better and fitter for all uses than that of most countries.

It were better indeed that the call from abroad were only for the fine draperies, because then we should be in a manner without a rival; no country but England and Ireland, having a soard or turf that will rear sheep, producing the wool of which most of our draperies are made. It is true, the wool of Spain is fine above all others, but it is the wear only of the richer sort; and of Spanish cloths not above 9000 pieces are sent abroad *communibus annis*. And even in the working up of this wool, perhaps it may be made out, that our very climate gives us an advantage over other countries.

The learned prelate * who has obliged England with that noble work his History of the Reformation, discoursing once upon these matters with the Writer of this Essay, did urge a thing of which the philosophy seemed very sound and right, and upon which we have since reflected often; he said, that nature had adapted different countries for dif-

ferent manufactures; that cold and moister climates are fitter for the working up of wool, because there the sun does not exhaust its natural moisture, nor make it brittle, which would render it ill to work, and bad to wear; that hot climates are best for the working up of silk, because the matter is there more disposed to imbibe the dye, and to take a more durable impression of it, the sun helping, at the same time, both to preserve and to give it lustre.

That we have many natural advantages over all foreign nations, who shall pretend to set up looms, is beyond all dispute; but it is a very great question, whether there are not weighty reasons to apprehend neighbours of another sort, we mean the people of Ireland.

The country is very large, it abounds in convenient ports; it is excellently situate for Trade, capable of great improvements of all kinds, and able to nourish more than treble its present number of inhabitants.

Its soil, soard and turf, are in a manner the same with ours, and proper to rear sheep; all which considerations beget a reasonable fear, that in time they may come to rival us in our darling most important manufacture.

That they should encrease in people, that their land should be drained and meliorated, that they should have Trade, and grow wealthy by it, may not peradventure be dangerous to England; for it is granted, their riches will center at last here in their mother kingdom.

And colonies that enjoy not only protection, but who are at their ease, and flourish, will, in all likelihood, be less inclinable to innovate, or to receive a foreign yoke, than if they are harassed and compelled to poverty, through the hard usage
of

of the people from whom they are derived. For though there are now and then instances of countries that rebel wantonly, yet most commonly great defections proceed from great oppression.

It seems therefore a point of the highest wisdom to give the planters of Ireland all encouragements that can possibly consist with the welfare of England; for it is an outwork to the seat of empire here; if it should be gained by any neighbouring power, the sum of affairs would be put in danger. It is to be preserved but by a numerous army, or by its own proper strength. How far the first way may affect our liberties is not difficult to determine, it follows then that the safest course must be to let them thrive by husbandry, and some Trade, whereby the natives and inhabitants will not only have the means, but an interest to defend themselves.

If through a mistaken fear and jealousy of their future strength and greatness, we should either permit or contrive to let them be dispeopled, poor, weak and dispirited, or if we should render them so uneasy as to incline the people to a desire of change, it may invite strangers to look that way; and if brought to be naked and defenceless, they must be a prey to the first invader.

This will be avoided if they are suffered to prosper, and not only so, but strength thus added to one member will make the body politic much the stronger.

For as all the blood with a swift motion passes frequently through the heart, so whatever wealth our countries acquire, circulates about, coming into the chief seat of empire, from whence it is dispersed into all its parts; and ever since Ireland did improve, it can be made appear England has had no small proportion of its gains.

What

What made Rome so immensely rich? Her citizens but little minded arts or handicraft, war was their chief employment. It was counted ignoble in a senator to exercise merchandize, nor indeed was the genius of the people addicted to it, but being the head of that large dominion, the fountain of law, and the spring from whence all power, honours, and magistracies were derived, thither all men resorted; some for pleasure, others upon business; so that what was got by the Sicilians, Rhodians, Cretans, and by the trading cities, not only of Greece but Asia, came at last to center there.

But this holds more strongly where the seat of dominion is in a great emporium, for such a city will not only be the head of power but of Trade, governing all its branches, and giving the rules and price; so that all parts thereon depending, can deal but subordinately to it, till at last it is found that provinces work but to enrich the superior kingdom.

That what has been here said is true, in our present case appears manifestly from this, that all people agree there is not in Ireland above 500,000*l.* in current cash, notwithstanding their large exportations for many years, which could not be, if they had not some constant drain, whereby they are exhausted. It is true, improving countries lay out a great stock in foreign materials for building, &c. So that they seldom abound much at first in the species of money; but allowing for this, yet in the natural course of things they ought to have more species, if what they got elsewhere had not been spent here, and returned hither by bills of exchange from Holland, France, Spain, the West-Indies, and other places.

But

But though we are ready to agree, that hitherto their gains both at home and abroad have chiefly centered here; yet, in process of time, it is possible that in the management of their product and foreign traffic, they may come to interfere with, and bring prejudice to their mother nation. And remote fears being allowable where the whole safety of state is concerned, they should not wonder to see England so much alarmed at the progress they make in the woollen manufacture.

As has been said before, it is so great a part of our exportation, that any considerable failure and interruption therein must set the Balance of Trade against us with a witness; it falls therefore naturally into our present subject to say something of this matter.

Last session of parliament a bill passed the House of Commons, and was committed in the House of Lords, for prohibiting the exportation of the woollen manufactures of Ireland to foreign parts.

This point has of late been much debated, and the general subject of men's discourses; the Writer of these papers was then inclined to the milder side, being indeed in his judgment against prohibitions, because most of such as are come within his observation, seem to have been pushed on (without doors) rather for private ends, and to serve some particular turn, than calculated to produce any public benefit.

But having now more maturely considered this nice controversy, he begins to lean to their opinion, who think such a bill necessary, and more especially if the promoters of it can make out the suggestions upon which it was founded.

Where the commonwealth is truly concerned, and where her safety is in question, they have very narrow minds, who let their compassion be too

too much extended to private objects; our chief tenderness should be towards her, and rough examples in the infancy of a mischief are rather merciful than cruel, because fewer people suffer then, than would otherwise do, if the evil were permitted to take deeper root.

If their manufactures interfere with ours, so as to hurt England, it must be undoubtedly advisable to intercept their growth by some effectual law betimes, before such an error in government grow too big for our correction; before too many families have turned their stock that way; before they have encreased their stock of sheep, or bred up too great a number of artists (all which circumstances would make their case yet harder); for we should preserve ourselves with as little hurt to them as possible.

But it seems some people make a doubt, whether or no we have power thus to intermeddle in their matters; questioning whether laws made here are binding upon them, till they have received a sanction in their own parliament. And Mr. Molyneux counts it a very extravagant notion, that has not the least colour from reason or record, to term them a colony from England. But we must beg leave to differ with him in opinion. For we take them so far to be a colony in the sense (by the interpretation both of law and reason) as renders them still dependant upon their mother kingdom.

Nor is this at all impugned by the concessions made to the ancient Irish by Henry II. King John, and Henry III. but to set this in a better light, the posture of Ireland in those times must be considered.

The first adventurers that went over thither, namely, Richard the son of Strongbow, and Robert

bert Fitz Stephen, who stipulated under certain conditions to assist Dermot Fitz Murchard, had not a strength sufficient to reduce the country, and little was done towards it of any consequence, till the expedition of Henry II. anno 1172, with a royal army, to whom the clergy, nobility, gentry and people, made an absolute surrender of the kingdom; and, by the description historians give of it, it seems to have been that sort of yielding which the Romans called *Deditio*, which was *se dare in Manus Potestatem & Arbitrium*. And their giving themselves up to Henry II. without a battle or bloodshed, gave him yet a stronger title, because the act was less constrained, and more flowing from the will. It is true, so wild and numerous a people were not to be kept in order by a handful of new inhabitants; the King therefore gave them a constitution, by which they were to govern themselves, as a free country under him their lord. After this, the dominion thereof was settled upon John his youngest son, and 22 years after in him re-united to the crown of England. From King John, Henry III. and their successors, the ancient Irish and the first adventurers (of whom many as Mr. Spencer* has observed, have taken the names, manners and humours of the natives) derive several franchises and immunities, and among the rest to hold a parliament. The story of those times is itself dark, but the reason of their councils is yet darker. From Mathew Paris, and Giraldus Cambrensis it appears, that these concessions were made to the body of the old Irish, though but few in practice submitted to them; for to use Mr. Spencer's own words, " To whom

* Edmund Spencer's View of the state of Ireland, p. 222.

“ did King Henry II. impose those laws? Not
 “ to the Irish, for the most of them fled
 “ from his power into deserts and mountains,
 “ leaving the wide country to the conqueror,
 “ who in their stead eftsoons placed Englishmen,
 “ who possessed all their lands, and did quite shut
 “ out the Irish, or the most part of them. And
 “ to those new inhabitants and colonies he gave his
 “ laws, to wit, the same laws under which they were
 “ born and bred, the which it was no difficulty to
 “ place among them, being formerly well enured
 “ thereunto; unto whom afterwards there repaired
 “ divers of the poor distressed people of the Irish,
 “ for succour and relief of whom, such as they
 “ thought fit for labour, and industriously disposed,
 “ as the most part of their baser sort are, they re-
 “ ceived unto them as their vassals, but scarcely
 “ vouchsafed to impart unto them the benefit of
 “ those laws under which themselves lived, but
 “ every one made his will and commandment a law
 “ unto his own vassal. Thus was not the law of
 “ England ever properly applied unto the Irish
 “ nation, as by a purposed plot of government,
 “ but as they could insinuate and steal themselves
 “ under the same, by their humble carriage and
 “ submission.”

But after this, during the wars between the
 House of York and Lancaster, they shook off
 both the rule and laws of England, repossessing
 their ancient seats, driving us by degrees to that
 which was properly called the English pale.

In truth, it does not appear, that they embraced
 our form of government for a great while; so
 that the models of it given heretofore, from hence
 seem chiefly to have been intended for the better
 rule of our own people, not but they were like-
 wise

wise meant as a benefit to the Irish, if they would be contented to become a more civilized nation.

If their ancient parliament rolls were extant, it would more plainly appear what use they made of their constitution, and thereby it would be seen whether or no both their House of Lords and Commons did not chiefly consist of the English planters.

If, as Mr. Molyneux asserts, “ Ireland, though
“ annexed to the crown of England, has always
“ been looked upon to be a kingdom complete
“ within itself, and to have all jurisdiction to an
“ absolute kingdom belonging, and subordinate
“ to no legislative authority upon earth;” these immunities must be derived from the concessions granted at Cashal by Henry II. But with whom was this compact made? With the native Irish; and their claim to it would be very just, if they had performed the conditions of the stipulation; but their title seems weakened by 52 rebellions which they have made against the government of England. We would not be thought here to insinuate, that a people may lose their natural rights by an insurrection against their prince, but certain privileges not fundamental, they may forfeit by nonusage or misuse. Besides, the case between a prince and his native subjects, and between a government and the people of a conquered country, is quite different. In the first instance, the relation is the same as betwixt a father and a son, the child may err, and the parent will forgive; but in the other case, the tie is not the same, they are not so near a kin. It is true, the prince is father of the people, in one place as well as in the other, but in his politic capacity he is at the head of another commonwealth, with whose blood and treasure the stranger country was perhaps conquered.

quered. And if a foreign people thus subdued, rebel, they without doubt forfeit several privileges, which were not any natural rights of their own, but forms of living prescribed, and concessions granted by the conquerors. And the Romans, in the best and purest times of the commonwealth, did frequently deprive subject cities and countries rebelling, of their land, and of their immunities: To be a state not subordinate to any legislative authority upon earth, is a privilege that may be forfeited by a subject country, and yet leave to the people their natural rights unhurt; the Irish were once a subject country appears from the entire resignation of themselves to Henry II. as head of the commonwealth of England. To reduce a wild nation, it was expedient to put their liberties upon a good foot. He restored them therefore to be a free people, and so they and their descendents might have been. They might have continued an independent kingdom, and the old Irish might have preserved both their land, and the immunities thereon depending, if they had not themselves altered their own constitution.

But by rebelling frequently, and by being as often vanquished, they changed their own form of government. They were heretofore proprietors of the land, and therefore had right to be the two estates in Parliament of Lords and Commons, but this was by degrees lost, and became vested in the new inhabitants; insomuch that, to use Mr. Molyneux's own words, " Now it is manifest, " that the great body of the present people of " Ireland, are the progeny of the English and " Britons, that from time to time have come " over into this kingdom; and there remains but
" a mere

“ a mere handful of the ancient Irish at this day,
“ I may say, not one in a thousand.”

Are the concessions granted by King Henry now vested in this thousandth part? And are they the body politic of Ireland, of which not one in a thousand sits in parliament; and of which very few have voices in choosing those who are to sit there: If any, these certainly are to be the distinct state, and “ To have all jurisdiction to an absolute kingdom belonging,” for with their ancestors those stipulations were made, under which Mr. Molyneux pretends to claim.

But the old inhabitants having lost the greatest part of their property, have lost so much of their share in the constitution, which is now devolved upon those colonies which England has from time to time sent to conquer and possess the land, who are now properly the body politic of that kingdom.

These we allow have forfeited nothing by any rebellion the natives have made, they are purchasers, and at a dear rate, with the frequent hazard of their lives and fortunes: We must therefore see how far the ancient rights of the Irish are devolved upon them, and whether under that claim the new inhabitants may justly term themselves an independent nation.

Whoever conquers, conquers in the right of that country at whose expence the war was made; and though the property of the land be often granted to the adventurers, the dominion thereof is always reserved to the nation that sends her people out. It is true, where a part of the people divides itself from the rest to seek new seats at their own cost, as they did among the Scythians, Goths and Vandals, there the case was otherwise,
for

for they rambled so far as no more to communicate with their mother country.

But it does not appear that Fitz Stephen, or Richard Strongbow, went out upon such terms as those northern nations did. On the contrary, their endeavours had little success till seconded by the power of England, at whose expence all the succeeding conquests of Ireland have been either made or secured; so that if the ancient Irish had any rights of dominion, and if those rights are forfeited, the forfeiture devolves upon England, and not upon the adventurers, nor their successors.

Nor is it indeed consistent with the principles of government, that a part of the people should separate from the rest, and be (especially so near at hand) an independent dominion, for that were to have protection where they owe no duty, which is an absurdity in politics.

When a part of the people divides from the rest to seek more territory, if they are at their own cost, and strong enough to eradicate or keep under the natives, they become a new empire, and may be justly termed a distinct nation: But if not at their own expence, and if they are weak, and always stand in need of being protected by their mother country, they are in all appearance to be accounted but as a colony.

Nor are names to alter the nature of things. It is granted Ireland has been very anciently called a kingdom, though our Princes did not take the stile of Kings thereof till the reign of Henry VIII. It is likewise apparent, that they have many distinct jurisdictions; that they are a state within themselves; that they have an undoubted right to hold Parliaments; but all this does not hinder them from being still a colony, nor can it make them an independent people.

Almost

* Almost every colony that the Romans planted was a model of their own republic, and framed according to it, by those whom the Senate had deputed for its settlement. They had an annual *Duumviratus*, in imitation of the consular authority. They had likewise *Censors*, *Ædiles*, and *Quæstors*; and which comes strongest to our present case, every colony had its particular Senate: But will any one pretend to argue from thence, that all these were distinct and independent commonwealths?

These branches and scions from the great trunk of the republic, had all of them the face of formal governments; they had magistracies and councils, power of life and death, and to raise money for their common safety, and to make laws for their better rule; but this is no argument that they had all the parts of sovereign empire.

It is true, the inhabitants of Ireland, from ancient concessions, have a privilege perhaps above the Roman colonies, namely to tax themselves by their own suffrages, within their own limits; but this is no more than what is claimed by several provinces of France, which nevertheless account themselves subordinate to the sovereign power of the whole state.

There is a part of empire not communicable, and which must reside sovereignly somewhere; for there would be such a perpetual clashing of power and jurisdictions, as were inconsistent with the very being of communities, unless this last resort were somewhere lodged. Now this incommunicable power we take to be the supreme judgment of what is best and most expedient for the whole; and in all reason of government this ought to be

there trusted and lodged, from whence protection is expected.

That Ireland should judge of what is best for itself, this is just and fair; but in determinations that are to reach the whole, as namely what is most expedient for England and Ireland both, there, without all doubt, the supreme judgment ought to rest in the King, Lords, and Commons of England, by whose arms and treasure Ireland ever was, and must always be defended.

Nor is this any claiming the same empire over Scotland, as Mr. Molyneux would suggest*, for there is no parity of reason in the cases: Scotland to England (as Arragon to Spain) is a distinct state, governing itself by different laws, though under the same Prince, and is truly but a kingdom confederated with the realm of England, though subject to our King. The land thereof was not acquired to the present inhabitants by the arms of England. Protect them we do, as the strongest allies always are to defend the weaker, but this puts them not in the degree of subordination we are treating of. They are not our descendents, and they are but politically our brethren; whereas the English-Irish, who are now chief lords of that soil, are naturally our offspring.

Their inferior rule and jurisdictions are not disputed, but that supereminent dominion and supreme and uncontrollable regiment over themselves, which they pretend to, is neither safe for England to grant, nor for them to ask.

Such a power would be dangerous, because by some accident it may come to be so exercised, as to be their and our ruin.

* Case of Ireland, p. 84.

We have had bad Kings, and those Kings have had evil counsellors: Suppose us then, in some future age, under such circumstances, as to have a Prince and his council so angry with the people, as to desire their destruction, which was our case once with King John *, who would have sold us to the Moors to wreak his own discontents. And suppose this Prince willing to set up Ireland in opposition to this kingdom, may not a Prince, so disposed, give the royal assent to laws in Ireland, that would utterly destroy England? And what remedy would Poining's act be in such a juncture? In a case like this, what way have the people of England to preserve themselves, but to represent their grievances to the Prince? Who, when he sees the error of his council, may be induced to join in some supreme exercise of the legislature here, coercive, and such as may keep Ireland in the degree of subordination, that seems requisite to the well-being of both nations.

Suppose a Prince bent to hurt England, should give his assent to a law there, that the Irish may transport all their wool to foreign countries, would not this, as they say, cut the turf from under our feet, and at one blow, in a manner, ruin all our woollen manufactures? There are many other instances, in which, if they were indulged, the greatest part of our traffic would be carried to their ports.

In matters of trade, even the best of kings may be surprised, of which we have a late example; and the ill consequences the Scotch act will probably have, ought to make us very watchful over what our neighbours do, especially where they depend upon us.

* Mat. Paris.

That the greatest part of the present inhabitants of Ireland, chiefly those who claim the land property, are a colony from England, has been here peradventure sufficiently made out; and we take it to be their best hold, to be always so accounted, because it gives them a lasting title to be protected and defended by us. And if they are a colony, it would be a strange defect in our constitution, if we wanted any of the powers requisite to pursue the ends of government, of which the principal is to take care that no one part of the people be permitted to hurt the other; but if the legislature of England cannot, in important matters, restrain that of Ireland, Ireland is at least in a capacity to ruin England, which would make our form of government at one and the same time ridiculous and dangerous.

But to be thus out of our jurisdiction, would in the conclusion be as fatal to them as to us; for though they should grow rich at our expence, and though a large part of our Trade were diverted thither, they would not yet be able to subsist alone and by themselves. And if we, by loss of our Trade, become weakened, how can we give them that assistance which from time to time they have always wanted? So that this division of strength would be destructive to both countries. It must therefore be their interest as well as ours, that the supreme power, and the chief wealth, should be ever preserved to center here in the seat of empire.

Upon the whole matter, it seems the right of England, and as well for the benefit of Ireland, its best and noblest colony, that the legislative authority here should, upon all emergencies, make such regulations and restrictions, relating to Trade
especially,

especially, as shall be thought for the weal-public of both countries.

And having premised these things, we shall proceed to handle more closely the subject of our question; namely, Whether it is necessary to prohibit by law, the exportation of woollen manufacture from Ireland to foreign parts?

To put an early stop to their turning their stock and industry this way, appears requisite for many reasons.

1st, Ireland contains near a half as much territory as England, and the soil being of the same nature, may be brought to produce near half as much wool as England yields; and this material being the basis upon which our Trade is built, they who can come near us in it, will come just so near us in our Trade abroad.

2dly, Countries thinly peopled, can sooner improve in the breed of cattle than any other way, because it is a work which a few hands may manage.

3dly, Where there is plenty of a material, which, manufactured, yields a good price, hands will soon be invited over to work it up.

4thly, But this holds more strongly, where not only the material, but all sorts of provisions are cheap; and in countries which have not been yet improved, where every new comer hopes to make a sudden fortune.

From which positions it follows, if Ireland be permitted to proceed in the exportation of woollen goods,

1st, That in no long course of time they may come to carry out to the value of a million per annum.

2dly, That

2dly, That the cheapness of provisions will enable them to afford their commodities cheaper than England can do in foreign markets.

All that have either writ or spoke upon this subject agree, that the whole controversy turns upon this single point, whether they can make the same woollen goods cheaper there than here.

To set this in a true light, we must consider the first material, and those who work it up.

As to the first material, beyond all doubt, wool is a third cheaper there than in England.

As to the workmanship, the clothiers affirm spinning to be one half of it, and that of all hands is agreed to be cheaper there than here. And for the combing and weaving, the price of course must abate, as workmen encrease; for handycraft in countries where living is cheap, can be dear no longer than till artists are bred up. And a great many artists will be instructed before the multitude of inhabitants can render provisions dear in such a place as Ireland. But to judge rightly of these matters, we must contemplate the body of the people in each country.

Sir William Petty affirms*, that the inferior rank of people in Ireland (through whose hands spinning must pass) do not expend, one with another, above 2*l.* 12*s.* per head. The expence of the same rank cannot be less here than 5*l.* per head.

It is an undeniable truth, that the common provisions for life are one half cheaper there than here: It is likewise as plain, that meat and drink are one half of mankind's expence, reckoned in a mass together. And these advantages of living must enable them to afford the same commodity

* Political Anatomy of Ireland, p. 76.

cheaper than we can do, where not only our numbers make provisions dear, but where new excises give all things of our home consumption yet a higher price.

Mr. Clement's (for we take him to be the Author of * that fine discourse upon this subject, inscribed to the Marquis of Normanby) makes this judicious observation, "That if any one offers his goods cheaper than the usual price, that will then become the market price; and every one else must sell at the same, or keep his goods."

The cheapness of living, and all other circumstances considered, it seems very probable, that if they should come to have the necessary complement of workmen, and to flourish in this manufacture, they will be able to sell it one-third cheaper than we can do.

If they can make for a million, and afford it by one-third cheaper than we, it follows, that at least one-half of our exportations in that commodity must immediately determine.

And the consequence of this would be, that rents must every where fall. The purchase of land must sink. The poor must want employment, and grow upon us; half our Foreign Trade must forthwith cease, and in the other half we must be losers in the balance, which is chiefly kept on our side by the woollen manufactures.

Not only a third, but an abatement of 10 per cent. forced upon us, by the rivalry in Trade of another country, would throw us into more disorders, than the most knowing man in England can readily describe.

And to ask where will be the stocks of money to set up so large a manufacture? is but an evasive

* Interest of England with relation to the Trade of Ireland.

way of arguing; for where the prospect of gain is certain, money never fails to come. And if it should ever be determined, that England cannot restrain that country in this exportation, foreigners will carry stocks to an improving place, where they may reasonably expect many more advantages than what shall arise from this manufacture. As for example, to lay out money upon good securities, at 10 per cent. interest, to buy land capable of great melioration at 10 years purchase; and to have almost all the necessaries of life half as cheap again as in other parts; are not all these circumstances sufficient to invite thither, not only foreign stocks, but very much of our own money, and a great number of our workmen, where their industry will turn to a better account than it does here.

No wise state, if it has the means of preventing the mischief, will leave its ruin in the power of another country. And if wars have been thought not only prudent, but just, which have been made to interrupt the too sudden growth of any neighbour nation, much more justifiable may a mother kingdom exercise the civil authority in relation to her own children; who from her had their being, and still have their protection, especially when her own safety is so much concerned.

Nor can this be thought rigour; it is but a reasonable jealousy of state, and only severe wisdom, which governments should shew in all their councils; it is a preventing remedy which operates gently in the beginning of the disease, before there are many, and those inveterate humours to contend with. And if a timely stop be put to these exportations from Ireland, it will hurt but a very few, (which is never to be regarded, where the good of the whole public is in question) and even that
that

that few, without any great difficulty, may have their industry turned to safer objects.

For these and several other reasons, which will occur to such as think seriously of this subject, it seems for the public good, that the Legislature of England should, by some restrictions, keep Ireland from interfering with us in this principal foundation of our whole traffic. And to do it by a positive law here, and not to leave it to the administration there, as some propose, appears to be the rather requisite; because when this step is made, and when they are rendered incapable of exporting woollen goods, there will lie a necessity upon the governing part and landed men, of doing their utmost to promote other improvements, of which their soil is capable.

Nor is it fair to urge, that we may proceed from one prohibition to another, till we leave them nothing, and till they are quite undone. They can fundamentally hurt us no other way; their rivalry is dangerous in none but the woollen manufacture, where all *Lucrum Cessans* is *Damnum Emergens* to England, since all our affairs abroad turn and depend upon it; nor can we suffer any competitors in it, if we mean to flourish and be gainers in the general Balance of Trade.

To think this kingdom will either peevishly or covetously hurt that colony, is an absurd imagination. It is obvious enough, that too much depends upon the possession of such an island, to render its inhabitants desperate, and desirous of a change; if they have a large trade, and flowing riches, the benefit thereof will redound to us at last: And the wiser a government is, the more it will desire to see them prosper, except in this single instance, where their wealth would be built upon our destruction.

But

But such a prohibition as we have been treating of will have very little effect, unless they can be likewise hindered from carrying out their wool; to prevent which, their situation considered, will be a very hard matter; but there are no difficulties of the like nature which are not to be overcome, if the administration be strict and steady.

They, who would prohibit the exportation of woollen goods from Ireland to foreign parts, have hitherto proposed setting up there the linen manufacture, but this design is likewise not without its dangers: The setting up the linen manufacture will be less hurtful than to set up the woollen, but we are to consider, that Ireland will be always able to supply itself with draperies at home, and that there will be no market for their linen but England, and its dependences. Now it is evident, that our woollen goods are sold in several countries, namely Holland, Hamburgh, Germany, the Hans Towns, and all the East country; many of which places will not be able to take off our woollen goods, unless we deal for their linens: And in fact, and by experience it has been seen, in the case of the East India Trade, since there has been imported from thence vast quantities of linens, such as calicoes, muslins, romals for handkerchiefs, which answered the end of lawns, cambricks, and other linen cloth, we have not exported that vast quantity of draperies to those northern parts, of which Sir Walter Raleigh makes mention. As our call for their linens has diminished, their call for our draperies has proportionably decreased; and not only so, but these people have been compelled by necessity to fall upon making coarse woollen cloth, by which they supply themselves and other places, which heretofore we were wont to furnish. So that it deserves
a very

a very serious consideration, what future effect it may have upon our woollen goods, to promote a considerable linen manufacture in Ireland.

Upon the whole matter, it ought to be carefully examined, whether or no a better expedient may not be thought on to stop their progress in the new draperies, than to introduce the linen manufacture there? and whether it would not be the best for both kingdoms to take off the prohibition that now lies upon Irish cattle?

This point has been formerly much debated, and it remains yet very doubtful, when this prohibition was set on foot, which was most consulted, public good, or private interest; the numbers of the breeding were without doubt stronger at that time, than those of the feeding lands; but it is to be feared, in the making that act, that the general interest of England was not sufficiently considered.

If the people of Ireland are permitted to bring their cattle hither, it will lower the price of flesh in England; a matter very important to a country that subsists so much by manufactures. It is true, the breeding counties will be thereby somewhat hurt, but it will encourage improvements and melioration of barren land, in order to feed, which will be advantageous to the whole public of the nation. It will divert those of Ireland from thinking to extend their trade too much abroad; a point not to be slighted. And it will in a manner confine the principal part of their dealings to this kingdom; which, for many reasons of state, will be best and safest for England.

It is therefore submitted to better judgments, whether or no to open the way hither for their cattle will not be most advisable, and the truest method to hinder their progress in manufactures,

without doing any thing that may look like injury or oppression.

It is no true objection to say, That the people of Ireland will not fall readily into this sort of trade, which has been now so long intermitted; for, as we are informed, the payments are very ill made, for that flesh, tallow, and hides, that are exported to foreign parts: That the merchant makes the butcher stay sometimes two or three years, upon pretence of bills of exchange, and returns expected from the West-Indies, Spain, and other parts; and if the butcher be ill dealt with, it must follow, that the landlord cannot be paid his rent: Whereas, when the trade was open for England, the gentlemen of Ireland received ready money, or if they gave credit, it was answered by the next return; and England was to them as Smithfield is to Lancashire, Lincolnshire, or any other English feeding county; besides, it would keep down the Exchange, which would be another encouragement to the Irish nobility and gentry, who spend so large a part of their estates in London.

So that in all likelihood, the people of that kingdom, if the said prohibition were taken off, would cheerfully submit to a law here, binding them not to export to foreign parts their woollen goods; nor would they perhaps think of setting up the linen manufacture, which is likewise not without consequences very pernicious; and for these reasons the expedient here proposed is now offered to public consideration.

Before we quit our present subject of Land and its Product, we shall offer another hint. The coarse draperies is that part of our woollen manufacture in which we are in greatest danger to be rivalled by other countries; it stands therefore in need of
most

most encouragement. There are many parts of the world whose poverty disables them from buying our woollen goods, because of their high price. As Russia, Poland, Tartary, &c. and therefore they are supplied by the Germans, or some other neighbours, with a sort of cloth very contemptible, in comparison of what we could make to answer the same ends and uses. Suppose then, instead of paying five per cent. custom outward bound, that such coarse cloths not exceeding such a certain value, should, for a term of years, receive upon the exportation ten per cent. bounty money by way of encouragement from the state, for so much as the exporters can make appear was carried out, to countries with whom we had no dealings of that kind before, and that such their exportation are in order to enlarge our trade. A recompence of this nature would in all probability encrease the woollen manufacture of England, in not many years, at least $\frac{1}{4}$ d.

We have the more largely handled the Irish prohibitions, because in all appearance the Balance of Trade will very much depend upon the measures England shall take in relation to that colony; since we should proceed very heavily in all our foreign traffic, if Ireland is left in a capacity to disturb us abroad in the vent of our woollen manufactures.

And having treated of the Numbers of the People, and of Land, and its Product, we shall proceed to say something of our Payments to the Public, and in what manner the Balance of Trade may be thereby affected.

S E C T. IV.

Of our Payments to the Public, and in what manner the Balance of Trade may be thereby affected.

WHETHER it be under a commonwealth, an absolute monarchy, or in a mixed government, the affairs of a country can never go on prosperously, unless the Public Revenues are well and wisely ordered. Richlieu says*, *C'est le Point d'Archimede qui estant fermement etabli, donne moyen de mouvoir tout le monde.*

Commonwealths are seldom to blame in this part of polity, and when they quit it, suffering their treasure to be embezzled by the men in power, they seldom fail of falling soon after into the hands of a single person. In absolute monarchies, where it is neglected, the Prince is compelled by his want to flea and rack his subjects, and to wink at all sorts of rapine in those whose business it is to contrive ways of supplying his necessities, till at last he becomes tyrannical and odious to the whole people.

Profusion has the same ill effects in constitutions where the regal authority is limited by laws. Richlieu says†, “A necessitous Prince can never undertake a glorious action; and necessity inducing contempt, he can never be reduced to that condition without being exposed to the attempts of his enemies, and of those who are envious of his greatness.” Besides, when the crown is brought very low, it alters the due balance of power, which should be kept even and

* Testament Politique, Part 2. §. 7.

† Ibid.

well poised, to preserve such forms of government; for it either inclines the people who hold the purse to entrench upon such prerogatives as are necessary for the Prince's safety, and to keep the kingdom's peace, or it gives bad men an opportunity of suggesting to him that wicked counsel (which was given to King Charles I.) of making himself easy, by subverting his people's rights.

This able statesman lays down *, "That good order in the revenue depends more on those who have the administration than on laws and regulations, which remain useless, unless such as are employed to see them observed be willing to perform their duty."

The legislative part of the constitution gives the money, but it principally belongs to the ministerial part to take care that what is granted be not wasted, diverted, or misapplied; and if such as are trusted fail to do this, it is incumbent on the Legislature to interpose, and call them to a strict account.

The wealth of a country is finite, as well as the substance of any private man; and when a ministry set themselves industriously about it, they can as well ruin a whole people, as the Duke of Buckingham could see an end of his great estate.

Henry III. of France, for want of order, and by being ill served, in a few years consumed an immense sum, and anticipated all the crown revenue. His successor Henry IV. with a very little care of his own, but by the infinite application, prudence, and honesty of the Duke of Sully, his treasurer, paid most of those debts off, and left behind him, at his death, five millions sterling in his coffers. And at this day, for want of conduct in the mi-

* *Testament Politique*, Part 1. c. 4. § 1.

nistry, Spain is not the richer for the silver mines of Potosi. So that the wealth or poverty of the Public does, in a manner, wholly depend upon the good or bad administration of its affairs.

Machiavel does not seem to think liberality a necessary virtue in a Prince, because, to support it, there must go so much oppression of the people. "And that a frugal Prince shall be accounted noble to all from whom he takes nothing away, which are an infinite number: And that he shall be esteemed near and parsimonious only by those few to whom he gives but little." And he says, "That a Prince ought not so much to concern himself (so he exacts not upon his subjects, so he be able to defend himself, so he becomes not despicable, and commits no rapine upon his people) though he be accounted covetous, for that it is one of those vices which fortifies his dominion." And he observes, "That Pope Julius II. was liberal till he came to the papacy, but frugal afterwards, which enabled him to do such great things against the power of France."

That the business of most kingdoms has been ill managed, proceeds from this: It imports the lower rank of men only and the people (whose cries seldom reach the Prince till it is too late, and till all is past remedy) that matters should be frugally ordered, because taxes must arise from their sweat and labour. But the great ones, who heretofore have had the Prince's ear and favour, or who hoped to have him in their possession, were swayed by another sort of interest; they like profusion, as having had a prospect to be gainers by it: They can easily set their account ever with the state, a small charge upon their land; more than balanced by a great place, or a large pension. At the same time the people who are to pay all, and expect
to

to receive nothing, are glad to see a frugal court; which, though it be not so good for its followers, never fails to enrich a nation.

It is true, Galba is an instance that the virtues of a closehanded Prince may be unsuccessful in countries governed by the sword, and where the soldier is riotous, and in long possession of a slack discipline. And perhaps in all absolute monarchies, he who governs should rather lean towards munificence than thrift. But frugality in the state can never be dangerous in a trading nation, ruled by laws of its own making; and it is not only necessary in itself, but profitable in the example, teaching private men that good husbandry in their domestic affairs, which never fails to enrich the whole body politic.

Much nobler it is to enjoy the praises of an universal people, living in plenty and at their ease, not burthened by taxes and duties, than to have the good words of a few flatterers, or those harpies which commonly haunt a court to gripe all they can; who, when they are gorged themselves, pollute all the remainder with their foul and obscene claws, so that no body else desires to touch it. Besides, we have hardly an instance of any Prince, that in time of need, was truly assisted and defended by his minions, and the creatures of his bounty and favour; but a King beloved for wise, just, and careful government, has been very seldom deserted by his people.

But suppose a Prince should desire to exercise in a very ample manner the inbred magnificence of his mind; if he will discharge the trust committed to him by the King of Kings; if he will not make what he counts virtue destructive to his people, he must find matter to supply his liberal inclinations; which he only can do who sees
that

that his ministers look well after his income and expences.

Some persons have a strange notion, that large payments to the state are not hurtful to the public; that taxes make money circulate; that it imports not what A pays, when B is to receive it: But we hope to shew, that they who argue in this manner are very much mistaken.

We have formerly touched upon this matter in the Discourses on the Revenues and Trade of England *, to which we refer the reader; but the necessity of our present argument compels us here to handle this point something more at large.

All nations have a certain annual income upon which the people live and subsist, out of which taxes of all kinds arise; which income we take to be since the war,

				<i>l. per ann.</i>
In England,	—	—	—	43,000,000
In France,	—	—	—	81,000,000
In Holland,	—	—	—	18,250,000

And we must beg leave to repeat, in this place, something which we have laid down in those tracts †: “ That to nourish the mass of mankind,
 “ as to their annual expence, in the way and form
 “ of living practised in each of the three coun-
 “ tries, such an annual income is necessary as is
 “ set down in the foregoing scheme. By annual
 “ income we mean the whole that arises in any
 “ country, from land and its product, from fo-
 “ reign trade and domestic business, as arts, ma-
 “ nufactures, &c. and by annual expence we un-
 “ derstand what is of necessity consumed to clothe
 “ and feed the people, or what is requisite for

* Vol. I. Part I. p. 252, 253.

† P. 251.

“ their

“ their defence in time of war, or for their orna-
“ ment in time of peace. And where the annual
“ income exceeds the expence, there is a super-
“ lucration arising which may be called wealth or
“ national stock. The revenue of the govern-
“ ment is a part of this annual income, as like-
“ wise a part of its expence; and where it bears
“ too large a proportion with the whole, as in
“ France, the common people must be miserable,
“ and burthened with heavy taxes. That part of
“ the Prince’s revenue that nourishes his own
“ person is very little; but in great monarchies,
“ where numerous armies, large fleets, and pom-
“ pous courts are maintained, there the expence
“ swells high, insomuch that to the maintenance
“ of the governing part, viz. the Prince, his of-
“ ficers of state, military power, &c. which are
“ not in time of peace above $\frac{1}{8}$ th of the whole,
“ there is required near the ninth penny of the
“ annual income. And in such countries the
“ governing part are rich or at their ease, but the
“ other 25 parts, who are the body of the people,
“ must be oppressed with taxes, as may be ob-
“ served in the French dominions. And this
“ holds more strongly, where the public debts
“ make the payment of $\frac{1}{6}$ th part of the annual in-
“ come necessary, which, for some time, is like
“ to be the case of France.”

To explain these assertions shall be the subject of this section, whereby it will appear how much the Balance of Trade may be affected by our Payments to the Public.

We shall endeavour to shew, in the last section, that the wealth of a country does in a great measure proceed from a right administration of its affairs: However, it may happen sometimes to encrease in riches where things are in the main ill
admi-

administered, as England did to the year 1688, in the two reigns that preceded this; but whoever looks carefully into the true reason why we grew so fast in wealth during those 28 years, will find it was because we paid all that time but small taxes and duties to the government, comparatively with other nations.

For in 1688, our gross payments to the public, in which charge of management was included, did not exceed — 2,300,000 *l.* per ann.
Which was but little above $\frac{1}{10}$ th part of the then 44,000,000 *l.* an. inc.

But our case is very much altered; now, and since that year, a great many new revenues have been erected. We still pay the old excise, the customs, and post-money; besides which, there is laid additional duties upon beer, ale, and other liquids; additional customs, the continued acts and joint stocks, duty on marriages, &c. double duty on stamped paper, duty on hackney coaches, on malt. The double tonnage, the former and last duties upon salt. The duty on windows, upon leather, paper, and coals.

The old and new impositions of all kinds reckoned together, and including the new poll, and the 3 *s.* aid, it will be found that there was collected from the people about — — 5,500,000 *l.* last year.
Which is above $\frac{1}{4}$ th part of our present — 43,000,000 *l.* an. inc.

During

During all the war, there has been levied here great sums every year, and many of the forementioned funds are to continue so long, that it will be several years before our annual payments can be considerably diminished. And there is such a difference between $\frac{1}{20}$ th and $\frac{1}{4}$ th, or indeed $\frac{1}{10}$ th, or $\frac{1}{12}$ th part, (which yet we shall not come at in some time) as must inevitably affect the nation's trade, and the whole body of its people.

When there was raised no more than about $\frac{1}{20}$ th part, there were great sums of money to circulate in foreign traffic, and to employ in enlarging our home manufactures, which two fountains of our wealth must be dry, when the springs that heretofore fed them are diverted, and let into another channel.

There is scarce any of these new revenues which do not give trade some desperate wound. The additional duties on beer and ale, and the tax upon malt, are apparently a burthen upon the woollen manufactures, affecting the carder, spinner, weaver, and the dyer, who all of them must be raised in their wages, when the necessaries of life are raised to them. The consequence of which will be, that our woollen goods must come at a heavy and disadvantageous price into the foreign markets.

There is no man will pretend that high customs are not pernicious to our commerce abroad. A nation is not gainer in the general Balance of Trade, by the dealing of a few, who are able to employ in it great stocks; such may make to themselves an immense gain, but they go but a little towards enriching the whole Public, which seldom thrives, but when, in a manner, the universal people bend their thoughts to this sort of business; when every one is ready with his small stock,

stock, and little sum, to venture and rove about the world: Of these some prosper, and others are undone; however, in the way of merchandize, men who do not thrive themselves, may yet contribute very much to make their country rich, which gets by the dealings of all, and does not suffer by the unfortunate conduct of here and there a merchant. But when the customs are high, all these under-dealers, who all along in England have made up the chief bulk of our trading men, must hold their hands, though in skill, industry, and inventive parts and wit, they may exceed merchants of more wealth, and of a higher rank. Nor is it indeed practicable for men of but a moderate fortune to deal at all, when more than treble that sum is necessary to have ready now to pay the King, which formerly would set up a substantial trader, and maintain him in sufficient business.

But of all the new impositions, none are so dangerous to the very being of trade, nor so hurtful to all its parts and members, as the high duties lately laid upon salt. 1st, They affect the common people in the whole course of their living, whose chief nourishment is bacon, and other salted flesh, so that this excise has an universal influence upon all our manufactures whatsoever. But the general prejudice it may bring to navigation, is yet of much a higher consequence.

Mr. King, in his computations of the naval trade of England, anno 1688, and the national profit then arising thereby, reckoning what proportion was navigated by ourselves at that time, and what by foreigners, is of opinion, That with relation to the value of our whole trade here at home, our own navigation was somewhat more than $\frac{3}{4}$ ths, and the foreign navigation near $\frac{1}{4}$ th; but

but reckoning the value of the foreign navigation at the market here, and of our own at the markets abroad, then the foreign navigation seems to have been at that time in proportion to our own, as one to two and three fourths, and with respect to the tonnage of ships, our own navigation seems to have been at that time $\frac{2}{3}$ ds, and the foreign navigation $\frac{1}{3}$ d, according to the following scheme :

A SCHEME of the Naval Trade of England, and the national Profit arising thereby, calculated for the Year 1688.

Exported,		Value upon the balance,		Gain by freight, &c.	
By ourfelves,	Value here.	Value abroad,	To ourfelves,	To ourfelves,	
By foreigners,	Value abroad.	Value here,	To foreigners,	To foreigners,	
	<u>£. 4,310,000</u>	<u>5,370,000</u>		<u>£. 1,060,000</u>	
Imported,					
By ourfelves,	2,870,000	Value abroad,	To ourfelves,	To ourfelves,	
By foreigners,	1,150,000	Value here,	To foreigners,	To foreigners,	
Gross imports,	4,020,000	Gross imports,	Gross imports,	Gross imports,	
Gross exports,	4,310,000	Gross exports,	Gross exports,	Gross exports,	
In all,	<u>11,430,000</u>	<u>9,390,000</u>		<u>4,160,000</u>	
So the exports by our own shipping being		Value abroad.		Value abroad.	
Imports by our own shipping,		— — —		— — —	
National gain by our shipping in the Balance of Trade,		— — —		— — —	
And the imports by foreign shipping being		— — —		— — —	
Exports by foreign shipping,		— — —		— — —	
National loss by foreign shipping in the Balance of Trade,		— — —		— — —	
		550,000		9,540,000	

From

From whence he concludes,	l.
That our gain upon the balance by our own shipping, being — —	1,250,000
And our loss upon the balance by foreign shipping, being — —	550,000
<hr/>	
The encrease of money, or adequate treasure, by the Balance of Trade in general, might be, anno 1688, —	700,000

And that the advantage to foreigners trading to England in their own ships, might be at that time in general thus :

By freight, or advance of the price of our commodities exported by them, above the value here, — —	250,000
By freight, or advance of the price of their own commodities imported here, above their value abroad, — —	400,000
Besides, the encrease of goods imported to their own countries, over and above their own exports, according to the value of them in their own countries, —	100,000
<hr/>	
In all,	750,000
<hr/>	

Upon the whole he concludes,	l.
1st, That the general encrease of our money, or adequate treasure, and of wares and commodities, over and above the value of our gross exports, was, anno 1688 — — —	2,810,000
And the gain made by foreign nations with England, in their own shipping, was — — —	750,000
So that the naval trade of England was at that time, generally profitable to ourselves and foreigners, in all —	3,560,000
2dly, That	

l.

2dly, That the national profit to Eng-
land, by foreign trade, was then at
least — — — — 1,700,000
l.

Whereof in money, or	}	1,700,000
adequate treasure, — 700,000		
And in wares or commo-		
dities treasured up, or		
applied to the encrease	}	1,700,000
of the national stock,		
besides what we con-		
sumed ourselves, — 1,000,000		

Whoever considers these computations, will find them very judiciously made, and that Mr. King has done as much as could be performed merely by the strength of numbers.

To come to an exact knowledge in this matter, and such as would be almost beyond contradiction, the books of the customs should be looked into; and from thence might be drawn an account of all the exportations from London, and the out-ports, to every distinct country; and also of all the importations to London, and the out-ports, from every distinct country, and what might at that time be the value of those goods, being computed by able merchants: And this to be done for some competent number of years by reasonable mediums, it may be very nearly guessed from such a view, how the Balance of Trade stood from time to time.

But where a thing so much within their reach (and which the French ministers are said to do in their exports and imports) has not been done by the men of business here; there is no way of knowing how the balance stands, but by consider-
ing

ing the numbers of the people, and their probable consumption of our home product, and of foreign materials, from whence a judgment may be formed, not indeed perfectly demonstrable, but very near the truth.

Mr. King observes, that by how much the nation does not consume of its imports, but either lays up, or encreases the stock of gold or silver, or other adequate treasure, or of durable commodities in specie; by so much, at least, does the nation gain by Foreign Trade, besides all other advantages of navigation.

It is difficult to know how our navigation has proceeded for these ten years last past, but it is to be feared, that the gain which foreigners have made, by fetching and carrying in their own bottoms, has been much greater of late, than it was heretofore; which must be a very considerable prejudice to England, and highly tend to set the Balance of Trade against us.

Reckoning long and short voyages together, the principal expence of fitting out a trading vessel is drink and meat. The excises and duty upon malt, without doubt, make drink sufficiently dear to the freighter: And the duty upon salt makes victualling a very heavy burthen upon him, all which must end in lessening our navigation from time to time; for undoubtedly foreigners observing how dear freight is with us, will trade in their own ships as much as possible.

In barrelling up beef and pork, we heretofore made use of St. Martin's, &c. or Oleron and English salt mixed together; and with these materials the flesh was best prepared, both for wholesomeness and long keeping; our own salt, without foreign mixture, being fiery, corrosive, and very scorbutic.

butic. As we are informed, the St. Martins, and worser sort of French salt, from 1676 to 1688, was delivered in London at about 2*l.* 5*s.* per tun, and 40 bushels to the tun; and that from Oleron from 2*l.* 10*s.* to 2*l.* 15*s.* per tun: But now the very duty for 40 bushels of Oleron salt amounts to 13*l.* 6*s.* 8*d.* besides the 25 per cent. *ad valorem*, of which formerly the prime cost came to but 2*l.* 1*s.* at highest: The duty likewise upon 40 bushels of Lisbon salt comes to 13*l.* 6*s.* 8*d.* of which the prime cost was formerly, at highest, but 3*l.* 10*s.* And as to our Newcastle and Lymington salt, which is now generally made use of in salting beef and pork for trading vessels; the very duty for 40 bushels amounts to 6*l.* 13*s.* 4*d.* of which, before the war, the prime cost came but to 3*l.* at the dearest market: Insomuch, that we are credibly informed, a merchant can store himself in Ireland, for a long voyage, with salt beef and pork, ready packed up, almost as cheap as he can buy the salt in England.

So that for long voyages, the merchant will either victual in Ireland, or salt his beef and pork on some foreign coast, as he sails along, where provisions shall be cheap, which must bring a great damage to the landed interest here; or if he does not do so, victualling will be so expensive to him, as to make freight much dearer than it ought to be in a country that expects to thrive by trade.

The consequence of all which will be, that the body of our merchants must lie under a general discouragement; they will neglect looking after national gain, which English merchants have perhaps heretofore as much considered in their dealings, as any trading men in the whole commercial

mercial world: They will have an eye to nothing but their own temporary profit, and suffer strangers to go away with those gains which England was wont to make by freight; from whence it will follow, that we must decay in our stock of shipping, and decrease every year in the breed of seamen; and when this happens, we must no more pretend to such a naval strength as has hitherto made us terrible to all our neighbours.

Trade, without doubt, is in its nature a pernicious thing; it brings in that wealth which introduces luxury; it gives a rise to fraud and avarice, and extinguishes virtue and simplicity of manners; it depraves a people, and makes way for that corruption which never fails to end in slavery, foreign or domestic. Lycurgus, in the most perfect model of government that was ever framed, did banish it from his commonwealth. But, the posture and condition of other countries considered, it is become with us a necessary evil. We shall be continually exposed to insults and invasions, without such a naval force as is not to be had naturally but where there is an extended traffic. However, if trade cannot be made subservient to the nation's safety, it ought to be no more encouraged here than it was in Sparta: And it can never tend to make us safe, unless it be so managed as to make us encrease in shipping and in the breed of seamen.

Freight is not only the most politic, but the most national and most certain profit a country can possibly make by trade; therefore all duties must be pernicious that burthen it, and make it dear. And we have dwelt the longer upon this article of the Salt Duty, because it seems to have more dangerous consequences, in relation to our
commerce

commerce abroad, than all the other impositions put together.

The late tax upon coals is a heavy burthen on all handicrafts working on iron, a manufacture in which we are now come to a great perfection. And the skill and neatness of our workmen is such in locks, keys, hinges, and other curiosities of this kind, that our exportations of these commodities may in time grow very considerable, if this new duty does not interrupt their industry.

We have shewn, in several instances, how the excises lately set a foot may affect us in the general Balance of Trade: And we have done it with a design of making it appear how much it is for the common good to endeavour to get out of those debts, for which these revenues are the security and fund.

Mr. King, in a scheme of his, of the yearly increase and decrease of the actual stock of England, from the year 1600 to 1698, and what it may probably amount to by the year 1710, if the present peace continue, (and none of those accidents of plague, war, fires, and civil discords intercede, which more or less do certainly diminish or hinder the increase of the nation's wealth, whenever they happen) computes, that anno 1600, the said actual stock was but about 25 millions, making a yearly increase of about four or 500,000*l*. That anno 1630, it was about 37 millions, making a yearly increase of about one million: That in 1664, (the year before the last great plague) it was about 64 millions, making a yearly increase of about 1,200,000*l*. and that anno 1688, it was about 86 millions, making a yearly increase of 2,400,000*l*.

And concludes,

ist, That

1st, That the last plague, the fire of London, and the Dutch war, did actually diminish the said stock at least nine or ten millions, and hindered the encrease of 18 or 20 millions more.

2dly, That the last war with France, with the other circumstances of the revolution, and the re-coining the money, has actually diminished the said stock about 12 millions, and hindered the encrease of about 28 millions besides.

3dly, That the nation will not arrive to the same degree of actual stock which it had anno 1688, till about the year 1705, nor make an encrease of 2,400,000*l.* per ann. as it did in 1688, till about the year 1706, nor then neither, unless the taxes be considerably diminished; that thereby our navigation and commerce may be fully restored, to what it was before the late war.

We do not pretend to give any account of the present posture of our foreign trade, nor how it stood during all the last war, for it would be launching into a very wide sea; but without doubt, the immense sums that have been raised every year, and the variety of new duties that have been lately levied, are a heavy burthen upon it.

And in order to give some little light into this matter, and to shew how the balance has been, and may be thereby affected, we shall briefly state what money has been annually granted since the war.

	<i>l.</i>	<i>s.</i>	<i>d.</i>
For anno 1689, granted for the war, and to pay 60,000 <i>l.</i> to King Charles's servants, and to pay 600,000 <i>l.</i> to the Dutch, in all, that year,	1,844,786	16	4
		For	

	<i>l.</i>	<i>s.</i>	<i>d.</i>
Brought over,	1,844,786	16	4
For anno 1690, granted for the war, — —	2,535,452	1	2
For anno 1691, granted for the war, and for building ships,	4,794,861	7	0 $\frac{3}{4}$
For anno 1692, granted (be- sides what was paid out of the revenue of the crown towards the war) — —	3,337,268	8	9 $\frac{3}{4}$
For anno 1693, granted for the war, — —	3,471,482	16	1
For anno 1694, granted for the war, — —	5,030,581	9	9
For anno 1695, granted for the war, — —	4,883,120	0	6
For anno 1696, granted for the war, and to make good some deficiencies, and to make good the clipped money, and for the civil list, and French Protestants,	7,961,469	0	0
For anno 1697, there was granted for the war, and to make good the deficiencies of former funds, and for the civil list, and French Protestants, — —	11,887,160	0	9 $\frac{1}{4}$
For anno 1698, there were funds given, amounting to about — —	4,500,000	0	0
Ordinary revenue of the crown, reckoned at a mil- lion per ann. by a medium during 10 years, might pro- duce in the whole about	10,000,000	0	0
In all,	60,246,182	0	5 $\frac{1}{4}$

l. s. d.
60,246,182 0 5 $\frac{1}{4}$

But in these articles	l.	
several sums are		
twice reckoned;		
as for example,		
where one fund		
was taken away,		
and another		
given in its		
place; and where		
funds have been		
granted to sup-		
ply the deficien-		
cies of other		
funds, for which		
articles there		
may be de-		
ducted about	7,000,000	
And the ordinary		
crown revenue		
might be charg-		
ed, during that		
time, towards		
the war, with		
about	— 5,000,000	
So that there has been actually		
granted but about	—	48,246,182 0 5 $\frac{1}{4}$

It is not pretended that the foregoing accounts are exact to a tittle; but according to the best information we are able to procure, they are as near the truth as is requisite in our present argument.

Having shewn what has been granted in funds, we shall now shew what was intended by the Parliament;

liament; and for five years, very little more demanded for the fleet and army.

			<i>l.</i>	<i>s.</i>	<i>d.</i>
For 1689,	—	—	3,295,628	4	5
1690,	—	—	4,010,760	6	7
1691,	—	—	4,172,393	9	7½
1692,	—	—	3,629,439	12	3
1693,	—	—	4,117,080	9	6
1694,	—	—	5,030,581	9	9
1695,	—	—	4,883,120	0	6
1696,	—	—	5,024,854	4	11
1697,	—	—	4,880,078	19	11
1698,	—	—	1,300,000	0	0
			<hr/>		
			40,343,936	17	5½

Note, that from anno 1693 inclusive, to anno 1697 inclusive, the difference between what was demanded by the ministers, and granted by the Parliament for the fleet and army during those five years, amounted in the whole time but to 1,465,623 *l.* 19 *s.* 9½ *d.*

Suppose the expence of the civil list from 1689 inclusive, to 1698 inclusive, to have been one year with another 600,000 *l.* per annum.

				<i>l.</i>
The expence of the civil list then in				
ten years may have been	—	—	—	6,000,000
Towards which the ordinary revenue				
of the crown, besides what it has				
been charged with to the war, may				
yield about	—	—	—	5,000,000
But in 1696 and in 1697, there was				
granted by the Parliament for the				
civil list per ann. 500,000 <i>l.</i> in				
the whole	—	—	—	1,000,000
				Sq

l.

So that in this computation the expence of the civil list is to be reckoned at but — — — 5,000,000

And the accounts of England may run thus :

	<i>l.</i>	<i>s.</i>	<i>d.</i>
Actually granted,	— 48,246,182	0	5½
Expence of the war,	40,343,936	17	5½
Expence of the civil list,	5,000,000	0	0
} 45,343,936 17 5½			
Remains	2,902,245	2	11¾

So that except in the articles of interest money, and except in the article of 1,465,623*l.* 19*s.* 9½*d.* in which the demands of the ministers for the state of the war exceeded what was granted by the Parliament, the expences of the government seem to have been fully supplied, and that there remains an overbalance of 2,902,245*l.* to be accounted for.

Now as to interest-money for the 5,000,000*l.* with which the crown revenue may have been charged towards the war, those funds, most of them, have and will answer the principal and all the interest allowed by Parliament : And other interest, which several funds fell short of satisfying, have been in a great measure made good by the supply of 7,000,000*l.* granted to answer the deficiencies.

And

And as to the state of the war having exceeded what was granted, in balancing the general account, this article ought to be considered, if during the whole war the muster-rolls have been full; and if all along we have had our complement of ships and seamen, according to that state of the war which was every year laid before the Parliament.

But upon the whole matter, considering what has been granted, and what may probably have been expended, there seems good reason to think that the public of England, if all accounts were narrowly inspected, cannot be much in arrear either to the fleet, army, or the civil list.

So that if there shall remain any great arrear, in all likelihood it must chiefly arise from exorbitant premiums, unwarrantable interest, and other ways of laying out money, hurtful to the King and destructive to the people.

The rough draught of our general accounts here given, which is as perfect as a bystander only could procure, may perhaps afford some little help to such as will think of these affairs; and this rude model may contribute towards the forming of a better scheme.

The 48 millions granted, as we have said, by Parliament for several years, from 1689 to 1698 inclusive, have not been actually levied. To state exactly how much of it has been already raised, and what proportion of it remains secured by remote funds, is not to be done without greater helps than the Writer of these papers can come at: But so far we know, and may affirm safely, that a great part of the product of land, our trade, and manufactures, remain still mortgaged for upwards of 20 millions.

Two of the nine-pences on beer and ale are to be esteemed as a perpetuity, the third nine-pence is engaged for a long term of time; the first duty upon salt can be looked upon no better than as a perpetual fund; the new customs, continued acts, and joint-stocks, the duty on marriages, births, &c. the first duty on stamped paper, the duty on windows, half the duty on glass-ware, the new duties on whale-fins and Scotch linen, are continued to the first of August 1706. The last duties upon salt and stamped paper, are perpetuities; there is a further subsidy of tonnage and poundage granted from the last of January 1699, for his Majesty's lifetime; and the impositions upon malt, leather and pepper are not expired.

To imagine we can buy off and redeem, in any moderate time, all these perpetuities or long funds, is a vain hope; but this may be laid down for a certain truth, that England will never flourish in trade and manufactures till the greatest part of them are cleared, and till our affairs are brought to such a posture, that we may not pay to the government either for the support of the crown, or on account of funds, where the principal is sunk above 2,300,000 *l.* per ann. or about $\frac{1}{10}$ th part of the nation's general income, which was our condition before the war.

And unless this can be compassed, it will be found, that in no long course of time we shall languish and decay every year, by steps easy enough to be perceived by such as consider of these matters. Our gold and silver will be carried off by degrees, rents will fall, the purchase of land will decrease, wool will sink in its price, our stock of shipping will be diminished, farm-houses will go to ruin, industry will decay, and we shall have upon us all the visible marks of a declining people.

It

It may indeed be objected, That France for about forty, and Holland for above a hundred years, have thriven by trade, notwithstanding that all the while they have lain under the burthen of heavy taxes. To which may be answered, That where (as in France) the administration in other things is exact and right, the subjects, though poor, may enlarge their traffic, for general good order makes amends for a great deal of oppression; but they would yet have had more trade if their Prince had left them richer: Besides, arbitrary power has compelled them to that domestic thrift, which of itself goes very far to make a people succeed in foreign commerce, though their payments to the public are excessive. And as to the Dutch, they have been so long inured to this parsimony, that the more they are to pay the state, the more they save at home; and they always take care not to clog their importations; and from this polity it comes that high taxes are not hurtful to their trade.

But in countries where the administration of affairs is loose, partly through the mildness of the laws, and partly through the bad execution of them, where the people have been in a long possession of ease and plenty, and where they think it an essential part of freedom to be as expensive and luxurious as they please, and where no man retrenches upon any public account whatsoever: Among such a people, high taxes, duties, and impositions, must inevitably occasion a decay of trade; and though their dealings seem large, and not to be interrupted, they shall carry on such a sort of traffic as will bring along with it at last their certain ruin.

A variety of new impositions and remote funds do not only hurt us in the Balance of Trade, as
we

we have shewn, but they are dangerous to liberty, without which trade can never truly flourish, and without which it is indeed of no importance; for to what end should men acquire wealth which they cannot call their own? And accordingly under despotic governments (except in some places where the administration of the tyranny is very wisely carried on) but few trouble themselves with the thoughts of foreign traffic.

Whoever considers the vast number of duties now afoot, will find that it is not impossible to make them the engines wherewith bad men, some time or other, may endeavour to undermine our civil rights. It is true, in this reign we have no reason to entertain such a fear, but a country that will preserve its constitution must provide against remote dangers.

At present we pay to the government, besides the three shillings aid and poll-money, so many duties, old and new, as amount to about 3,500,000 *l.* per ann. Some of them, it is true, expire shortly. But suppose necessity or bad management (and there is nothing which ill husbandry cannot devour) should compel us to continue what is now expiring for a longer time; and admit that for present subsistence, and to pay old debts, these funds of 3,500,000 *l.* per ann. should be settled as a security to lenders, for some certain time to come.

Suppose then a government in the possession of such a large revenue at first legally granted, put into a method of collection, and to the payment of which the people shall be accustomed.

And suppose, in some future reign, the ministers should be either weary or afraid of Parliaments, and desire to govern by the sword, and without law. That this may happen is not impossible,

possible, because we have heretofore seen statemen so disposed.

It is to be hoped this is a danger very remote indeed ; but when a ministry shall be so madly inclined, the symptoms of their approaching frenzy will be evident enough ; for at such a season we shall see them choose rather to be supplied by distant funds, than with what will produce ready money : And they will take care that revenues granted may not be well managed nor improved to the height, with this design, that the people may be kept in the dark, both as to what they give, and as to what each branch is like to yield.

Suppose then an ambitious and desperate set of men, with all these thoughts about them, and resolved to make their master absolute, may they not, with the help of such an ample revenue, quite overthrow our constitution ? Arbitrary ministers have heretofore stopped the exchequer ; and if we should ever see men of the same stamp upon the stage of business, it is not impossible but that they may run into the same wicked measures, especially if they should be backed with the support of a standing army.

The liberties of a people are but in a very precarious condition, when they can be subverted by one pernicious counsel : It should therefore be the care of such as love their country, to render this fatal advice as dangerous and impracticable as laws can make it.

At a time when there is such an immense revenue collected every year, it seems a fault in our constitution that sufficient provision is not made against diverting and misapplying the public treasure, and against breaking into appropriated funds. And to speak in plain words, there is reason to
fear

fear that the laws have not made it criminal enough to stop payments in the exchequer.

When a town that apprehends a siege finds itself weak by nature in one place, the first care of the defenders is to fortify that post as well as ever they can. In the same manner a constitution that is attackable one way, should strengthen that part with severe laws. The exchequer therefore should be fenced about with all possible skill, that it may never be invaded by bold and designing ministers.

A stop there would at once pull down all our civil rights. Nay, to stop the principal only, though the payments of the interest should be continued, would be fatal to our constitution, for there would yet remain an income large enough to make parliaments useless; and if wicked men should thus set up for themselves, they would still have a revenue sufficient to bear their expences, and to keep up an army to awe such as their conduct shall displease.

Some indeed will argue, that a corrupted ministry will as soon make new levies of money, as venture thus to divert what has been already granted and appropriated: But this objection has no weight in it. The people more willingly submit to a tax once lawful, than to pay a new duty against law. The tonnage and poundage illegally levied in the former part of King Charles I.'s reign, did not occasion half the clamour as the new imposition of ship-money. In the beginning of King James II.'s reign, the tonnage and poundage, and temporary excise, determined by King Charles's death, was paid without opposition; but if King James had attempted to raise a new tax by regal authority, his subjects without doubt would not have paid it. Besides, when a tax is
lawful

lawful in its original, it is to be feared that the people will not much concern themselves who is to receive it, the court, or such as have trusted the exchequer; but they would be alarmed to some purpose if they should be called upon to make new payments not warranted by law. So that in all probability more danger may arise to our liberties from breaking into old funds appropriated, and stopping the exchequer, than from making new and forcible levies upon the subject.

And though there is no cause in this reign to fear such attempts, yet it must certainly be wisdom to provide against future evils, especially when it is possible that one desperate and wicked council may destroy that constitution for which we have been so long contending.

The true way to hinder such a disease from ever coming upon the body politic, will be to remove the cause, by lessening as soon as possible these Payments to the Public of 3,500,000 *l.* per ann. besides polls and land-taxes; which large issues may endanger liberty, and without doubt hurt us in the Balance of Trade.

The debts for which these funds are a security, by negligence will every year encrease, insomuch that in a very short time, and with a very little more carelessness, the raising more and more will grow unavoidable for our common defence, till at last we shall come to pay constantly between five and six millions per ann. And when this kingdom shall be arrived at that period of ill conduct, we may venture to pronounce, that the common people of England will in all circumstances be then as poor and miserable as the common people of France were before the war. And we desire all good patriots to carry this reflection in their minds.

On

On the contrary, by good management, this debt may be lessened, so that the funds which are its security (instead of being continued) may be dropt every year, till at last we may come to pay to the government for its support and defence, such a sum as will not be dangerous to our freedoms, nor prejudicial to our foreign traffic.

He who proposes thrift may please the common people, but he shall be sure to disgust others: However, the Writer of these papers thinks it his duty to recommend frugality in the state; and he believes it is the wisest and honestest way of enriching the public, to make it rich out of its own revenues.

As to what improvements may be made in the revenues already granted, we refer the reader to what we have formerly said upon this subject in our Discourses on the Revenues and Trade of England*; we have laid down that several branches there specified may, by good management, and without oppression, be annually increased 736,075*l*.

Nor upon enquiry since, do we find any reason to recede from this opinion; on the contrary, we have good cause to think, that they are rather capable of greater improvements than we had then taken notice of.

The malt is indeed an article in that account; but it is an expiring duty which the people of England hope never to see continued, therefore an abatement is to be made upon that head: But the remaining branches, if well looked after, would ease us of very many burthens.

In that Discourse, we have shewn several reasons not yet answered, why the excise on beer

* Vol. I. Part I. p. 205.

and ale, single and double, is improvable in the whole 318,000*l.* per ann. but instead of rising, the excise is again fallen since the account was stated.

l.

Single and double excise, year ending			
24th June 1697, produced about	900,000		
The said duties, year ending 24th June			
1698, produced about	—	—	860,000
			<hr/>
The duties fallen, about			40,000

So that the excise now almost doubled produces but about the same sum which it yielded formerly with the single duty only upon it; for which we shall presume to say, the managers neither have given, nor can give, any well-grounded and solid reason.

When we consider how much the excise was advanced in six years by good management, we cannot but be of opinion, that a very great sum might be raised every year towards clearing the gross debt, by skill and careful conduct, in such as govern the respective branches.

But though it imports the state to a high degree to have the utmost of its legal dues, and just revenues fairly brought in, yet a great deal more depends upon having this revenue frugally and wisely laid out; for, as in private instances, he who lives with œconomy, shall be richer, though his gains are but small, than a prodigal, let his gettings be never so large; so governments which manage their affairs thriftily, shall have more wealth than states which have the way to obtain never so large contributions from their people.

What is to be got by good management in bringing in the revenues, is nothing in comparison

son of what may be saved in laying out the public treasure; one way the profit is limited and narrow, and the other boundless; one way we can reckon but by hundreds, the other way by millions.

* A Venetian Ambassador once told Cardinal Richlieu, That there needed no more to make France happy, than wisely to lay out what was vainly dissipated. “ *Qu’elle scut aussi bien des-
“ penser ce qu’elle dissipoit sans raison que la re-
“ publique scavoit bien n’employer pas un seul
“ quadrain sans besoin, et sans beaucoup de
“ menage.*”

A state must be plunged into endless debts and difficulties, unless it has a strict eye over all its expences, especially such as relate to a war, which is always a greedy monster, but devours much more when it is left to feed at random.

To come at such a future thrift as may bring us out of that debt which lies so heavy in the other scale, when we consider of the Balance of Trade, one way perhaps will be severe to enquire how the 48 millions already given have been expended: Besides, it will not peradventure be difficult to shew, that of the many millions still owing, a large sum might be saved, if the public accounts, from their very beginning, were overhauled.

A government that will get out of debt, must look nicely into every particular: It ought in prudence to examine into all grants made by the crown, when the people lay under the burthen of heavy taxes.

It is said that the forfeitures in Ireland, and the lands possessed by the crown in 1688, would

satisfy a large part of what the public is now indebted.

It is alleged that gains unwarrantable in law, and not to be justified by any necessity whatsoever, have been made in several contracts with the crown; if all this were looked into, very probably something might be saved towards discharging the nation's debts.

There is one piece of management which the Writer of these papers is very much surprized at, and it relates to the Exchequer bills.

	<i>l.</i>	<i>l.</i>
The 1st subscrip- tion at 10 per cent. was for	400,000.	Premium 40,000
The 2d subscrip- tion at 10 per cent. was for	700,000.	Premium 70,000
The 3d subscrip- tion at 10 per cent. was for	500,000.	Premium 50,000
The 4th subscrip- tion at 8 per cent. was for	400,000.	Premium 32,000
The 5th subscrip- tion at 4 per cent. was for	1,000,000.	Premium 40,000
<hr/>		
Total subscrip- tions, —	3,000,000.	Tot. prems. 232,000

Besides these premiums, there is a current interest upon the bills of above $7\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. And it is likewise observable, that the whole struck into Exchequer bills is but 2,700,000*l.* to circulate which, there has been a subscription of three mil-
lions,

lions, so that the engine which carries is heavier than the weight it bears, which seems but clumsy workmanship; besides, it is remarkable that there is yet sunk of these bills but 1,250,000*l.* and of the exchequer bills a vast sum are become specie notes at the current interest, though money now lies, or ought to lie, for their discharge.

There is likewise another piece of œconomy, after which, some time or other, it may be worth while to make enquiry. The old East-India Company offered to raise the two millions then wanted, and to deposit 200,000*l.* to make good their proposal, nor did they propose or expect any premium or deduction whatsoever; yet their offer was discouraged and rejected by some of our men of business; and the same persons have thought it reasonable to allow the new company a premium of 62,500*l.* which was defalked out of the first payment of 200,000*l.* part of which premium is contrary to the express direction of the act of Parliament.

It will cost England a large tax to raise the sums lavished in these two instances; but we shall say no more upon these particulars, leaving the reader to make his own comment upon such unaccountable proceedings.

When the affairs of a private man are in disorder, he sinks faster towards the latter end than in the beginning; the same thing holds in a government whose revenues are entangled, the further it goes the more the debt swells, unless such as are concerned in the administration resolve before it be too late, to enter upon wise and thrifty measures.

Where the King's person is beloved, where his virtues are revered, and where the government is of the people's own forming and election, the subjects

jects will seldom fail to exert themselves strongly, and are very willing to stretch their purses, in order to put the public revenues into such a posture that the administration may be easy, and that the kingdom may be protected; but they must be invited to this by seeing that what they give is frugally managed, and not profusely wasted, and by observing that their money goes to support the state, and not to enrich private persons.

Men, when they are worn out with diseases, aged, crazy, and when besides they have the *mala stamina vite*, may be patched up for a while, but they cannot hold out long; for life, though it is shortened by irregularities, is not to be extended by any care beyond such a period. But it is not so with the body politic, by wisdom and conduct that is to be made long-lived, if not immortal; its distempers are to be cured, nay its very youth is to be renewed, and a mixed government grows young and healthy again, whenever it returns to the principles upon which it was first founded.

The disorders we labour under are capable of a remedy, and our difficulties are not such but that they may be mastered: Those Payments to the Public, by good management, may be lessened, which inevitably must set the Balance of Trade against us.

While these immense debts remain, the necessities of the government will continue, interest must be high, and large premiums will be given. And what encouragement is there for men to think of Foreign Traffic (whose returns for those commodities that enrich England must bring no great profit to the private adventurers) when they can sit at home, and without any care or hazard get from the state by dealing with the exchequer, 15 and sometimes 20, 30, 40, and 50 per cent. ? Is there

there any commerce abroad so constantly advantageous? Will men who can safely, and without trouble, reap such gains, breed their children to be merchants? Will they venture great stocks to make discoveries, and employ their industry to enlarge and extend our dealings in distant parts? Will they think of building that multitude of trading vessels which alone can rear us up a sufficient breed of able seamen? And if that tide of wealth which was wont to flow in trade, be diverted to another channel, and if we mind no other traffic but that which just supplies our luxuries, must we not in a few years be losers in the general balance?

Where interest is high, the merchants care not to deal in any but rich commodities, whose freight is easy, and whose vent is certain in corrupted countries; and of these costly wares very many carry out money, and but few bring any back to the kingdom. It is the bulky goods, whose returns are not of so great profit, that breed most seamen, and that are most nationally gainful; but such goods cannot be very much dealt in where interest is high, nor can any laws in the world lower it where great sums are continually borrowed by the government. And by these instances it must sufficiently appear how much our Payments to the Public may affect the Balance of Trade.

And, treating upon this subject, we cannot but take notice, where the Prince is frequently absent from his own dominions, sojourning for a long space of time in a foreign country, in which he, his court, and his whole retinue are obliged to make great expences, that this is highly prejudicial to the Balance of Trade, and, without doubt,
must

must incline the scale to that nation's side where the money is spent.

Upon the whole matter, if the revenues already granted are well looked after, and improved; if the accounts of the fleet and army are carefully inspected; if the grants are strictly examined; if the state enters entirely upon frugal measures; and if we resolve to exert ourselves, so as not to let this dangerous burthen lie long upon us, this great debt may be cleared in some moderate time, and those large Payments to the Public will cease, which are like so many bloody issues that emaciate the body politic, and render it hectic and consumptive; and if this debt was paid, we should get rid of that variety of new excises and high customs which hurt Foreign Traffic, and interrupt us in our domestic business, and which are more especially a heavy weight upon the woollen manufacture.

Even in a commonwealth, it is dangerous for one part of the people to be very much indebted to the other; and in Rome it was the occasion of great seditions. When the state has borrowed large sums, and issued out securities by tallies upon different funds, it is commonly said the Public is so and so indebted; but in truth the case is otherwise, and more properly speaking, these sort of funds divide a country into two ranks of men, of which one are creditors and the other debtors; and this distinction does without doubt belong to all nations where the people pay taxes to one another, as it now happens to be our case in England. The creditors are the bank, such as deal with the public for stores, lenders of all kinds, besides a great many foreigners, whose money is lent to the state in English names. The debtors are the landed men, the 5th or 6th part
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of whose rents are pawned for the public service from year to year, by aids and land funds. All merchants likewise who pay customs, and all shopkeepers and retailers are, according to our distinction, to be accounted debtors. Thus almost all England may not be improperly divided into debtors and creditors, nor in a long and expensive war was this wholly to be avoided; but without doubt it cannot be wise nor safe to let this distinction long continue; for though such as receive may like their condition and think themselves at ease, yet such as are to pay cannot be so well contented. It is true, some modern politicians have run upon another notion; and several persons have thought that the more funds are erected, the more people are engaged to preserve the present government. This policy indeed of theirs would hold good, if they could make out that the lenders are stronger, and more in number than such as are concerned in Payments to the Public: But it rather seems to hold in sense and reason, that the throne of that Prince, in a free nation, must be the most firmly established, whose affairs permit him to ask the fewest taxes from his people.

France was once upon a right foot in relation to its liberties; and they who peruse their history with care will find, that arbitrary power did not so much bring in high taxes, as high taxes introduced arbitrary power; for when that golden idol of an immense revenue was once set up, all the nation bowed to it.

In the second and third sections we have shewn, that the probable methods to make a country gainers in the Balance of Trade, are to take care of encreasing and employing the people, and to improve land and its product. In this fourth section we have set forth how this Balance may be

be affected by our Payments to the Public: And in the last Discourse we shall endeavour to shew, that the wealth and prosperity of a state depend chiefly upon a wise, steady, and honest administration.

S E C T. V.

That a Country cannot encrease in Wealth and Power but by private Men doing their Duty to the Public, and but by a steady Course of Honesty and Wisdom, in such as are trusted with the Administration of Affairs.

*A*T *Romæ ruere in servitium consules, patres, equites, quanto quis illustrior, tanto magis falsi ac fessinantes.* “ But at Rome they all ran headlong “ into slavery, the consuls, the senate, the gentry; “ and the nobler the person was, the more false, “ and the greater haste he made.” This was the condition of Rome when Tiberius assumed the empire; but God forbid it should be ever the case of England, for our constitution will be entirely lost when such a corruption happens; we may indeed preserve the name of liberty, and some of its outward forms, but no more than what will help to keep our chains the faster on: Tyrannies have been often subverted, where the Princes govern merely by their own will, without giving to their subjects the least appearance of being free; but those absolute monarchies are hardly to be shaken, and that servitude is lasting, where the people are left to make their own fetters.

It is a matter of great wonder, that from the time of Augustus downwards, the Romans, who were seldom without brave and virtuous men, should never make one attempt to restore the commonwealth, and to shake off that power which some of the Emperors exercised with such exorbitance; but in all likelihood it proceeded from this, that the soldiers and common people, without whom no great revolution can be made, believed themselves still free, because, in show, the commonwealth had the same form as in elder times: There was a senate, consuls, tribunes, and an appearance of all the ancient magistracies, though nothing remained of the ancient liberty: But this the common people did not feel, for the cruelty and fraud of Tiberius, the madness of Caligula, the stupidity of Claudius, the riots and lust of Nero, the gluttony and sordid mind of Vitellius, the vanities of Otho, and the enormous vices of Domitian, did little hurt to the inferior rank of men, who all the while had *panem & circences*, which was all they desired; but the mischiefs these monstrous Princes brought upon the world, fell chiefly upon nobler heads; who yet could not rescue their country, so much were the common people lulled asleep, with the opinion they entertain, that the laws still governed, because they saw every year consuls and a senate; but this senate being corrupted, made the tyranny boundless and safe: For the people could never be induced to oppose that power which still bore some resemblance to their ancient form of government.

In the same manner, if in future ages our Parliaments should be debauched in principles, and become willing to be the instruments of a Prince's will, and to act as he directs them, arbitrary power would be here settled upon a lasting foot; for the
common

common people would never join with any who would attempt to redeem their country, because they will be deceived by names and forms, and think the laws governed, and that they are free, if the outward show of the constitution is still preserved.

When corruption has seized upon the representatives of a people, it is like a chronical disease, hardly to be rooted out. When servile compliance and flattery come to predominate, things proceed from bad to worse, till at last the government is quite dissolved. Absolute monarchies are in danger of great convulsions, when one man, their Prince, happens to be weak or wicked; but commonwealths, or mixed constitutions are safe, till the chief part of the leading men are debauched in principles. However, monarchy has this advantage, that the one man, their Prince, is mortal, and if bad, he may be succeeded by a better; but a people thoroughly corrupted never returns to right reason; and we see that the depravity of manners, which began in Rome presently after the second Punic war, among the nobility and gentry, became every year worse and worse, till at last Cæsar destroyed the commonwealth. And after his time, under the succeeding Emperors, every senate grew more abject and complying than the other, till in process of time the old Roman spirit was utterly extinguished, and then that empire by degrees became a prey to barbarous nations.

If all parts of the state do not with their utmost power promote the public good; if the Prince has other aims than the safety and welfare of his country; if such as represent the people do not preserve their courage and integrity; if the nation's treasure is wasted; if ministers are allowed

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to undermine the constitution with impunity; if judges are suffered to pervert justice and wrest the law, then is a mixed government the greatest tyranny in the world; it is tyranny established by a law, it is authorised by consent, and such a people are bound with fetters of their own making. A tyranny that governs by the sword, has few friends but men of the sword; but a legal tyranny (where the people are only called to confirm iniquity with their own voices) has of its side the rich, the fearful, the lazy, those that know the law, and get by it, ambitious churchmen, and all those whose livelihood depends upon the quiet posture of affairs; and the persons here described compose the influencing part of most nations; so that such a tyranny is hardly to be shaken off. Men may be said to be enslaved by law, or their own consent, under corrupt or degenerate republics, such as was the Roman commonwealth from the time of Cinna, till the attempts of Cæsar, and under degenerate mixed governments, such as Rome was, while the Emperors made a show of ruling by law, but with an awed and corrupted senate: To which form of government England was almost reduced, till the King came over to put our liberties upon a better foot.

But what has been may be, and though we are safe during his reign, yet in after ages, bad and designing ministers may think their conduct is no way to be maintained but by the sword, and that they cannot securely prey upon the commonwealth till they have made their Master absolute; upon which score, in these enquiries concerning the methods whereby England may be a gainer in the general Balance of Trade, we think it needful to lay down, that all that wealth and power which must defend this state upon any emergencies or
inva-

invasions from abroad, depends upon our preserving inviolate the ancient constitution of this kingdom.

Men do as industriously contrive fallacies to deceive themselves, (when they have a mind to be deceived) as they study frauds whereby to deceive others; and if it leads to their ends, and gratifies their present ambition, they care not what they do, thinking it time enough to serve the Public when they have served themselves; and in this view very many betray their trusts, comply, give up people's right, and let fundamentals be invaded, flattering themselves, that when they are grown as great as they desire to be, it will be then time enough to make a stand, and redeem the commonwealth. The same notion led Pompey to join with those who intended to subvert the Roman liberties; but he found them too strong, and himself too weak, when he desired to save his country.

In the same manner, if there be any in this nation who desire to build their fortunes upon the public ruin, they ought to consider that their great estates, high honours and preferments, will avail them little when the subversion of liberty has weakened and impoverished us so, as to make way for the bringing in of foreign power.

It imports all degrees of men in their several posts, to endeavour at the preserving that form of government, under which we have prospered for near seven hundred years. It happens seldom that any country is totally subdued by foreign force; and civil war is indeed a raging fever; but it goes away of itself, when the humours that feed it are spent, and is often no more than the sign of a health too florid, and the effects only of too much blood in the body politic: But ill
conduct

conduct in a state long continued, wastes it by slow and certain degrees, and at last brings an incurable consumption upon all its parts and members.

If the affairs of this kingdom should ever happen to be ill conducted, which we hope is a remote fear, the legislative power must then interpose with its authority, and the united wisdom of the nation must rescue us out of weak and polluted hands, for such a ministry is a surer engine to destroy a state, than any its enemies can bring against it.

It is true, such as would correct errors, and watch that no invasion may be made on liberty, have been heretofore called a faction by the persons in power; but it is not properly their name, and ought to be given to another sort of men.

It is wrong to call them the faction, who by all dutiful and modest ways promote the cause of liberty, as the true means to endear a Prince to his subjects, and to lay upon them a stronger tie and obligation to preserve his government. For a people will certainly best love and defend that Prince, by whom the greatest immunities and most good laws have been granted.

They cannot properly be termed the faction, who desire a war should be managed upon such a foot of expence as the nation is able to bear; who would have the public treasure not wasted, the Prince not deceived in his grants and bargains, who would have the ministry watchful and industrious, and who, when they complain, are angry with things and not with persons.

The name of faction does more truly belong to them, who, though the body politic has all the signs of death upon it, yet say all is well; that the riches of the nation are not to be exhausted; that
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there is no misgovernment in all its business; that it feels no decay; that its œconomy is perfect, and who, all the while, are as arrogant and assuming as if they had saved that very people, whom their folly and mad conduct has in a manner ruined.

They may be rather termed the faction, who were good patriots out of the court, but are better courtiers in it, and who pretended to fear excess of power while it was not communicated to them, but never think the monarchy can be high enough advanced, when they are in the administration.

In nations (where for a long time matters have not been placed upon a foot of honesty) their great assemblies consist commonly of two parties, in both of which sides there are many who have the same right intentions to the Public, and many who in all their councils consult only their private interest.

Of one side, some out of principle love their country, and are jealous of its liberties; and yet at the same time are careful of their Prince's honour and interest. In all their proceedings they have nothing in view but the public good, they study not so much how to blame the past, as which way the future is to be mended; they do not accuse the statesman, and yet let the fault continue, as well knowing, that impeachments of men, and not of crimes, produce new, but seldom better ministers.

They desire the necessities of the state should be well supplied, the person of the Prince revered, and his government maintained. When his ministers have made false steps, or when their councils have had unsuccessful events, they desire not to inflame the assembly where they sit, but
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are willing rather to assist with their superior knowledge, and to bring the minds of men to the temper and calmness that is proper in weighty deliberations.

Persons of this character are in most assemblies of a people, but they are often joined and followed by such as have quite another view and aim, and who, in all their actions, consult not the common welfare, but either wreak their own discontents, or pursue some ambitious hope, and upon such, or the like accounts, mix themselves with the wiser and better sort; however, the good and the bad being thus mingled and blended, compose altogether what in vicious times is called the country party.

On the other side, there are some very nice in what may intrench upon the regal authority, yet never forgetful of the people's rights. It is true, their post often compells them to excuse all faults, though guilty of none themselves: They are forced too frequently to move for money, but with there was less occasion for it: They hate not such as differ from them in opinion, and secretly approve of the right course, which sometimes they must not follow; but with such as have been here described, there will too often join an ignorant, mercenary, and servile crew, who like all things, and examine nothing; unanimous in evil, diligent in mischief, variable in principles; constant to flattery, talkers for liberty, but slaves to power. Such as these will too frequently, in vicious times, mingle with the sound part of a court, styling themselves the court party, and the Prince's only friends.

In former reigns, by the artifice of designing statesmen, the representatives of the people were divided into those two parties: Besides, in most

assemblies which meet by authority of a single person, there are still some who are taught to have the secret, and they stile themselves the managers: The eyes of every one are bent upon them, their words are observed, and in most things they give the first turn. At court indeed they pretend to sway and govern every motion; but in matters esteemed indifferent, they carry with them many of the best sort, and are certainly followed by all such as are willing to be guided. These are believed to have weighed beforehand, and to know what is wisest, most safe, most expedient, or at least most grateful: And when they appear, it is imagined there has been put into their heads the whole extracted quintessence of all the ministerial wisdom. In the House they undertake for the Court, and at Court for the House, receiving singly the thanks of what proceeds from the joint affection of all the rest, and are thought alone to give what the whole nation pays.

To tell what time-designing men began to erect for themselves this new office, and when and how this imposition took its rise, would be too long a digression from the present matter; but we may truly affirm, things have never gone well with our Princes, nor their people, since it was first invented.

Good Kings, at all times, without any danger, may repose their entire concerns upon a House of Commons; the national interest will go on there without driving, and when difficulties arise, the ministers only make them; for when the King and people have but one interest, it goes on of its own accord, and such as pretend to be busy for the Prince in that place, are working for themselves, and not for him.

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But if in after ages our disorders and corruptions should make this office necessary; if there must be managers; if some must lead and others follow, it is reasonable the guides should be well instructed.

Nothing therefore can more import the Prince, than that they who will assume such a province should be men of grave discretion and solid judgment; wise, and not subtle; cool, temperate, steady, discerning, and patient of contradiction: And indeed they cannot be proper for that post, unless they have in their heads an universal scheme of their own and the business of other countries.

When giddy young men, without experience, are relied upon and trusted in this station, they embroil the Prince's affairs; by their ignorance they give his enemies advantage, and by their insolence disoblige his friends.

A man can be no more born a statesman than a physician or a lawyer; and let the mind be never so happily disposed, time must ripen what is begot by nature.

Mr. Hobbes says*, "He that has most experience in any kind of business, has most signs to guess at the future time; and consequently is the most prudent; and so much more prudent than he that is new in that kind of business, as not to be equalled by any advantage of natural or extemporary wit."

The sanguine hopes conceived by young men are by no means proper in weighty and great deliberations; and they seldom make good statesmen: Elder years, where they produce not wis-

* Hobbes' *Leviathan*, p. 10.

dom, bring at least caution, which is something like it.

They who have seen much, are used to frequent disappointments, and therefore not inclined to venture; especially they rarely hazard the sum of affairs upon any single council.

Young men are good to execute the results of elder wisdom, but the same fire which makes them best for action, renders them unfit for council: Yet there is now and then a fortunate genius, in whom the prudence of age, and the warmth of youth meet together; but of such the examples are not common.

Pierce Gaveston, Hugh Spencer, and the Duke of Buckingham, are sufficient instances that the conduct of young ministers is seldom successful to themselves, nor to their masters: They do the less mischief if they meddle only in the pleasures of their Prince; but when warm heads, full of conceit, with slight wit, and no true wisdom, pretend to guide a whole state, and to have majority at their beck and rule, in a short time they occasion more disorders than can be remedied in many years.

When persons so described come to have a corrupt majority of their side, they diminish the nation's stock and its coin; they lose its trade; they anticipate all the Prince's revenues; they charge the subject for many years to come with a great number of new duties and impositions; they bring the state into an immense debt, and plunge it into such difficulties, that hardly any new revenues can be well erected; but it is hoped England will never fall into such destructive hands.

Our wealth and greatness depend absolutely upon keeping the legislative power to future ages untainted, vigilant for the public safety, jealous
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of the people's rights, watchful over the ministers, and to have the members not awed by armies, nor to be seduced by preferments, bribes or pensions: That we are safe at present is granted, and that we are not now under any dangers of the like kind, and that this important post is well secured, is allowed; but writing for posterity, to which these Papers may peradventure be transmitted, we think it needful to give these cautions.

While we preserve our constitution as we received it from our ancestors, bad men may have a short power to do mischief; however, their rage and folly will be at last corrected; but if we suffer our civil rights to be invaded, and if our ancient form of government should be lost, then ill ministers will proceed without controul; they will in a short time dissipate the nation's treasure, the people will have no stock for trade, they will lose their industry, they will grow inclinable to change, resty and indifferent in the cause of liberty, and perhaps willing to submit to any foreign force, like Spain, which has been both despotically and weakly governed.

Freedom and wealth proceed hand in hand together, and if one is lost, the other will not long continue: But this notion is not much regarded by those who can only be great, and have no ways of making their own fortunes but by the destruction of their country.

For such as propose to thrive by disorder and misgovernment, have a strong interest to beggar the people. The confusion which public wants and private necessities introduce, suits best with their designs: A wealthy nation may be jealous of its rights, and watch any invasions upon its freedom, and a rich gentry may be unmanageable;
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and such bad men may think that the best course to keep us humble is to make us poor.

If any should be so wicked to have thoughts of enslaving England, they will endeavour to mate and quell the stomachs of the common people, by reducing them to the misery and want which decay of trade, if it ever happens, must bring upon this nation; and they will try to distress the gentry in their estates to that degree, as to make them rely upon the court for a livelihood and subsistence; for which reasons they will wink at the loss of our foreign traffic, and perhaps contrive its destruction, knowing that upon the prosperity of trade, rents and land have for many years depended. Nor can ill ministers desire a better circumstance, than to have men of the best fortunes reduced by their necessities to come and cringe and sue to them for a small employment. Does not this bring all into their power? Must not such as shall have the distribution of these favours be courted and followed by the major part of the gentry? Would not so great a capacity of helping others add to their strength, make them rich and safe, and indeed set them in a manner above impeachments?

If bad men should ever get into power, they will not only contribute to ruin our foreign trade, but they will try to impoverish the kingdom by exorbitant taxes, thereby to bring the gentry and people yet more under their subjection; they will likewise plunge their Master into debts and necessities, to render their tricks and arts of more use, and to put a higher value upon the band they shall have in pay; for in former times we have seen that when a court wanted, they who procured money to be given, were thought to give it; by which means they obtained favour cheaply at the
expence

expenditure of others: And this single merit atoned for all their faults, it excused false steps and negligence, it sheltered their bribery, and covered their disability for the public service.

Besides, they will entangle their Master's affairs, because a Prince that does not need money, may come not to need them, whose talents, in all likelihood, will consist in procuring taxes, not in well laying out the sums granted: Therefore a wanting state, a troubled government, and an indebted exchequer, will be their region; large premiums, exorbitant interests, diverting appropriated funds, choice of funds on which to place their own money, preferring one debt and postponing another, will be always good matter for ill statesmen to work upon, but afford much a better harvest when the government stands in want of money; immense sums given every year will be a brave and ample field for their avarice to range in, which would be cramped and confined, if bound within the narrow limits of what a nation may be able to pay.

Of all things, they love a long and an expensive war, and fear peace; for peace produces order, and gives the Prince leisure to enquire into the abuses of the state; it lets him into a right knowledge of persons in the kingdom, and the dregs which float upwards when the liquor is stirred, must sink to the bottom in quiet times; peace restores liberty of speech, whereas in war all is silenced with the single word necessity; in peace there is no need to court factions, turbulent spirits are not so useful, thrift may be introduced, and such sudden fortunes cannot be raised out of the public. Grievances may be calmly debated, the management of the revenues inspected, the conduct of the ministers may be examined; and good laws may

may be proposed, without the perpetual objection of, "Are you for bringing in the French and "Popery?" But war will better answer their designs, who mean to thrive by the loose administration with which war is generally accompanied, and who propose to prosper by the calamities and misery of their country.

The business of Ireland, at the beginning of the Revolution, is a pregnant instance how much designing men love a long war. That kingdom might have been presently reduced, the nation was dispirited. He who held the government was ready to give up the marks and ensigns of his authority, with the strengths depending on it; they were struck with a panic fear, and had readily submitted, if in any reasonable time a small force had been sent thither. But one people does rarely yield so much to the fame of another, as to surrender without being asked or summoned. It was desired that a few troops might be carried over to confirm and countenance our friends, and to give our enemies a fair colour for pursuing that course to which they were enough persuaded by their true interest, though they could not modestly acquiesce, unless something had been done that might save appearances; for a great army could not with any decency disband, without so much as hearing of an opposite strength, to which (in the general fright that possessed their party) they might have yielded with some saving to their honour. But Ireland was for a long time slighted, and the natives were suffered to gather into a formidable power. That diversion gave our neighbour kingdom opportunity to take breath, and time to recover from the fright and amazement which so potent a league had brought upon them. The troops who perished so miserably at Dundalk and elsewhere,

elsewhere, would have been a great addition to the confederate force. The vigour that actuates the minds of men in their first proceedings should have been carried against France, and not have been let to consume itself, and slacken within our own dominions. If by good conduct the affairs of Ireland had been betimes appeased, the power of these three nations had been united, and we might have entered the lists with our strength entire, and a treasure unwasted, which probably would have wrought such effects, and begot such a terror as might have produced long ago as sound and honourable a peace as we enjoy at present, after the expence of so much blood and money.

This war stood England in 4,128,672*l.* 5*s.* 3¼*d.* and both nations in 4,515,693*l.* 8¾*d.* But if we come to reckon the burnings, waste, and depredation, and the irreparable loss of men, English and Irish, by sickness and in battle, and the Irish damage redounding to us at last, it may be safely affirmed, that we are the worse for that war by at least seven millions.

However, that fatal neglect did divert from the war against France above four millions, and did engage in civil broils those arms which were so needful in the beginning to make a strong impression upon our enemies abroad.

But a certain party of men were too busy themselves at home for to mind the nation's foreign concerns. They were dividing the spoil here; they were hunting after places, and sharing among one another the dignities and offices of the state, which took up all their time, and employed all their care. Besides, such an early coalition and union of the whole strength of the three kingdoms, might have terrified France too soon, and taken away their hopes of a succeeding war,
which

which is the crop and harvest of designing ministers, the field in which they fatten, and a spendthrift to whom they are stewards without account.

If not minding the affairs of Ireland did hinder the peace so long, then we owe to that fatal council the beginning of the debt, which now presses so hard upon us; for without the colour of such a war, those immense sums could not have been consumed, which for these last five years have been levied in this kingdom.

When King James went away, we were reduced to what Mr Hobbes calls the state of nature, the original contract being dissolved, and the ligaments broken, which held us before together: The nation was then a blank, apt to receive any impression: The old building was pulled down, and the faults in it before might have been corrected, if the architects had been skilful, and such lovers of their country as they pretended to be. Never men had such an opportunity of doing good, as they who had the chiefest hand in making the Revolution. They had a Prince willing to consent to whatever might set us upon a right foot, if they had met his design of landing here with equal virtues. The gentry and people were at that time newly awakened from their lethargy in which they had been for many years; they saw how narrowly religion and their liberties had escaped; their fears had made them wise and sober; their eyes were universally opened; and they were wrought up to a temper (which seldom happens in a whole nation) of being capable to receive good and honest councils. It was in their power for ever to have banished flattery and corruption from the court, and from another place where those vices are yet more hurtful; and
when

when they had changed persons, if they had taken care at the same instant to mend things, they had wrought a general reformation in our manners. It was in their hands to have given us a sound constitution; they had before them the errors of preceding reigns, by which they might have corrected their model: They should have entered upon a strict œconomy, neither plundering for themselves, nor suffering others to grow rich at the public cost. They should have been as careful in the state, as their master was active in the field; they should have begged less, and done more. They should have avoided bribery, than which nothing could be more unseemly in reformers of a state; and which was certain to keep out the best, and let the worst men into all their business. They ought to have known that a new settlement was to be maintained by severer rules and methods than perhaps are necessary in a court where the Prince is born in purple. And lastly, they should have made this reflection, that more than ordinary virtue of all kinds was needful to answer the people's expectations, and that more than common wisdom was requisite to maintain and justify so great a change.

The worst and most unhappy Kings that ever were would have ruled better, had it not been for the wrong suggestion and wicked incitements of the flatterers about them; but those pests and poisons of a court are yet more to blame, when things succeed not well with wise and virtuous Princes.

That declaration which the King sent to England before he came over, was the pole-star by which our state pilots were to steer their course. It was well known, that to keep the same Parliament sitting so many years, was what had chiefly debauched

debauched the gentry of this kingdom; it was therefore expected, that in the act for declaring the rights and liberties of the subject, some provision should have been made against that evil for the future. Several ministers, who betrayed their King and country, have gone on to the last with impunity, by keeping Parliaments quite off; but more have found a shelter for their crimes in houses, which they have held long together, and of which they have had the handling for many a sessions. Could men pretend to be patriots, and not take care of securing that post? Could our freedoms be any way certainly lost, but by laying aside the use of Parliaments, as was designed in the reign of King Charles I. or by keeping them so long sitting, till a majority of members should be under engagements with the court, as had almost happened in the reign of King Charles II.? Were we not both times upon the very brink of ruin, and in hazard of being no more a free people? Did it not therefore import that party which had heretofore made such high professions for liberty, to provide that England might be no more threatened with the same danger? Should not this have been a main article in our contract with their Majesties upon their accession to the throne, who readily consented to all things that might make us safe and happy, the King having promised in his declaration, "To do all things
 " which the two houses of Parliament should find
 " necessary for the peace, honour, and safety of
 " the nation, so that there may be no more dan-
 " ger of the nation's falling at any time hereafter
 " under arbitrary government."

It was certainly a great omission not to bring on in the very beginning of the Revolution, the act for triennial Parliaments, which our own corrup-
 tions

tions produced at last: If the state had entered early into that wholesome counsel, it had made the King's entire reign more easy to himself, and less costly to his people. It had given a rise to that virtue and public honesty he came over to plant, and had answered all the ends of his declaration. They who were not well principled, must have pretended so to be, for the paths and road to preferment had been thereby quite altered: The ingredients which before composed a statesman, were skill to govern the house; ability now and then to make an important turn; knowledge of the members, that is, who were to be taken off, and what was their price; diligence in keeping that band together who were right or wrong to be unanimous. They who were thus qualified themselves, or who would blindly follow the professors of these pernicious arts, engrossed the whole business and employments of the nation: But by neglecting to put matters under a good settlement in the beginning, one and the same House of Commons came to continue sitting with short intervals for six years, and this wrong measure being taken, renewed all the former errors of our constitution, and for a time restored to men the same dishonest interest they had before; and if any were so wicked, gave them fresh opportunity and room to endeavour once more the subversion and ruin of this kingdom; not by the very ways practised in former times, but by the same corrupt inclinations and councils dressed in other shapes; and though, without doubt, none of them are chosen into this Parliament, yet it is to be feared, that in those sessions of six years continuance, there was reared up a new brood of men of business, as high flatterers, more false, designing, and rapacious than
their

their predecessors; but without the same skill and dexterity to support their malice.

However, it is hoped the act of triennial Parliaments may have given a check to this ulcer, which was growing in the body politic, and that it may hinder the gangreen from proceeding further; yet though the old venom may be restrained a while by remedies, it is to be feared it lurks still within us, ready to break out upon the first occasion.

If that party which once seemed so jealous of our rights, had not abandoned all their old principles, they might have formed us a lasting establishment, such as could not have been shaken by domestic rage or foreign power; whereas now we depend alone upon the reputation, merit, and virtues of the King, that bind and hold us together; but when he must yield to nature (which misfortune we hope is very distant from us) in all human probability nothing can be expected but confusion and civil war.

When the breaches made upon our constitution in the late reigns, had induced many of the best sort to judge a revolution needful, the people had reason to expect that in a new-modelled government all things should have been set upon the foot of honesty and virtue, and to see all that male-administration reformed, which some persons had been reasonably complaining of for 30 years. We thought to see a virtuous court, a watchful state, an industrious and frugal ministry. If all these our expectations had been answered, what disasters from without or within could have hurt England? Must not the change have been tacitly consented to (if not applauded) even by those that suffered in it? Had we not at home a discontented party, which was to be silenced by shewing them an
honest,

honester, more steady, more disinterested, and a wiser conduct, than what they had known before, and still lingered after? Had we not abroad a potent enemy, against whom our strength was to be husbanded discreetly, that it might last the longer? And lastly, was not the best and most irreproachable management in the world necessary and hardly sufficient, to enable us to carry on that war, with which so great an alteration was certain to be followed?

But instead of building upon these foundations, and taking such measures as had rendered our proceedings safe in their consequences, and not obnoxious to any censure, some persons have given manifest proof that they were acted by no sort of principle, and that in their doings they were rather swayed by private interest, revenge, ambition, and their other appetites, than guided by any sense of the public good; for we no sooner had upon the throne a Prince feared and revered abroad, and idolized here, but some persons immediately forgot the cause for which they called him over.

If we had shewn any desire to assist and imitate his perfections, what a fair fame of ourselves had we transmitted to after ages?

If some men had considered wisely, they would have found that all things were not secure, because religion was out of danger, whose concerns are soon forgotten when we begin to be pressed with other fears: Besides, if matters are not so ordered, that Spain may not fall under the power of France, Popery, and universal monarchy are still to be apprehended.

Prosperity, a flowing trade, and great riches, may admit of prodigality, negligence in the state, and false steps in the ministry, but a people exhausted by long taxes, desire to see in those above
them

them thrift for the public, vigilance, and as much good conduct as can be expected in human business. Power is seldom invidious to the common people when placed in virtuous hands, nor are calamities intolerable, which could not have been avoided by any care or caution. When the ministers do well, those under them suffer quietly; but on the contrary, if they observe themselves ruled in the subordinate parts of government, by such as make a prey of the commonwealth, and to that end only take upon them its administration; if they plainly perceive their miseries and misfortunes to proceed chiefly from the corrupt or weak councils of such statesmen, they become disheartened and lose that mettle and spirit, without which the high designs of their powerful neighbours are not to be resisted.

But though some errors might be committed in the beginning of the Revolution, it is hoped all things are now well; that peace has put an end to those disorders in government which war does commonly beget, and that our present management is not liable to any censure. And what is said here, and what may be observed hereafter of the like kind in the series of this discourse, is not at all the present case of England; it is hoped we are not a corrupt people, but in process of time we may grow so, and lose that virtue which is presumed to shine in this age. This Section is therefore directed to posterity, which alone is concerned in the ethics here advanced.

In future ages perhaps ambitious and designing men may desire to embroil their master's affairs only, to make him more dependent upon their arts; hereafter men of arbitrary principles may designedly neglect the concerns and care of foreign traffic, with a purpose to impoverish, and so to enslave

enslave the people: In the next age likewise designing ministers may take advantage of the martial temper of a Prince, and instead of reigning in his high courage with grave councils, they may disguise from him the true state of his affairs, and push him on to a new war, without making right provisions, or without such previous leagues as may make it tolerable in the progress, or happy in the conclusion; and perhaps they may desire the semblance of a war, only to have a pretence for a standing army.

For the benefit therefore of future times, it may be proper to shew by what steps those vices and immoralities that affect the public first creep into a country, and what progress they come afterwards to make, and to shew what sort of men, and what kind of councils entangle a Prince's affairs.

But though this paper be directed to posterity, and though it is nothing but a caution to future times, yet probably it may offend some persons who are tender in these matters.

However we shall venture to affirm, that if this nation should ever be under any great disorder, the truest course to mend it, will be to plant in the minds of the better sort, morality, and the shame of doing ill to their country; and we shall presume to assert, that observing the rules and dictates of virtue, does not only lead to heaven and a blessed state hereafter, but is the best way of securing to a people in general prosperity, peace, safety, power, and happiness in this present world.

To trace those men who may design to change this constitution in all their dark and crooked ways, and to follow them in all their mazes will be difficult; however, we shall do our best to describe the persons, and to shew their councils, that

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they may be narrowly watched by all such as love their country.

But to do this we must take a short view of things past, and a little consider the posture of affairs at the restoration of King Charles II. and how they stood during his reign and the reign of his successor.

When that Prince was recalled from exile, by the voice of the whole people, (who had been tired with the many changes in government that happened from Cromwel's death to the year 1660) it was almost impossible, but that we should run from one to the other extreme; and it was reasonable to fear that men should readily embrace servitude, who knew not how to make a right use of liberty. Upon which account many have wondered why our ancient form of government was not at that time altered, and how it came to pass we did not then embrace absolute monarchy.

But we are to consider that King Charles was a young Prince, more inclined to taste the pleasures of power, than willing to feel its weight: He had undergone many troubles, which he intended to recompence with great ease and luxury; so that the rugged work of subverting the laws suited neither with his age nor temper. Had he lived longer, as time and opposition began to sower his blood, what he might have attempted is very doubtful.

Besides the unactive genius of the King, there happened then another circumstance very fortunate for England, which was, that the services and merit of the chancellor Clarendon, and the treasurer Southampton, did strongly induce him to put the administration of his affairs into their hands. They were both persons of age and experience; they had known the former reign; they had seen the
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the grounds and rise of the civil war ; they understood the nature of our constitution ; they saw what had deposed one King, and found that unlimited power was hard to compass, and difficult to keep ; and having their Master's ear, and at first a large share in his affection, they kept him within bounds. The skill in the laws of one, the eloquence of the other, the general abilities of both, made them esteemed by the people, and awful to their very Prince, and this gave a weight to all their councils. They had authority enough in their persons to be listened to, when they spoke bold and necessary truths : Having superior knowledge and desert too to be heard, they did not stand in need of saying always what was pleasing, which is the miserable and servile condition of upstart, weak, and obscure statesmen ; but less were they obliged to flatter every flatterer. Having a foundation of merit, they scorned the mean aid of parties, or to be the wretched journeymen of any dark cabal : Knowing what was their Master's and the nation's interest, and intending to promote both, they gave wholesome advice, without fear of offending either Prince or people. That kingly government was then kept within the limits of the law, that our constitution was not given up between the fears of one, and the hopes of the other party ; and that our civil rights were still preserved, was chiefly owing to the wisdom, courage, and integrity of those two able statesmen.

But even then, and all along afterwards, there were still some among us impatient to make their Master absolute ; they consisted principally of such as had large ambition, and slender merit, who are the best instruments for any tyranny. These were ever embroiling the King with his Parliament,
either

either to protect them, or to justify some of their illegal actions. Sometimes they got him to appear a violent churchman, and at other seasons to favour the dissenters, but at no time to take care of religion itself. They persuaded him to extend the regal power in every thing ; they got him to seize all the charters, in order to influence elections. By their councils he raised an army, under colour of declaring war with France ; by their instruments they made him absolute in Scotland, at the same time doing what they could to weaken the Protestant interest in Ireland : But their chief aim was to procure him so large a standing revenue, as might make Parliaments useless for the future. It is true, they proposed this revenue for his life only ; but if that first step had been made, it had not been difficult afterwards to entail it on the crown : Besides, what has been granted to one Prince, has been always continued to his successor without any struggle.

That these things were done with a design to change the constitution is visible enough : And it is as evident that these councils were either promoted by persons, who wanted the sublime part of wisdom, necessary for the conduct of great affairs, and therefore were to form a government that might subsist by tricks and arts, or they were forged by a set of men, whose avarice and ambition no regular establishment could satisfy, whose crimes a free state would look into, and whose arbitrary proceedings a Parliament would not suffer : They were therefore to build their fortunes, gratify their high desires, and find impunity, by setting up the regal power above the laws.

In the next reign, yet more open invasions were made upon our liberties, not by the same
men,

men, but by men acting upon the same principles. But they proceeded more cunningly before than afterwards: For in the former reign it was thought best to begin with altering the constitution, and that when this was done, religion might be changed of course: But the hot zeal of the Catholics would not permit them to go by slow and regular measures; they therefore made a strange and unpolitic attempt, never like to succeed, which was first to convert, and then to enslave the nation.

While these matters were transacting, there appeared all along persons, both in and out of the court, who did most virtuously oppose those designs, that, first secretly, and then openly, were forming against their country.

As some were contriving to subvert our civil rights, others did as carefully watch their preservation, which invading and defending, divided England into what was then called the court and country party.

Never was liberty more cunningly attacked, nor more nobly protected, than in that House of Commons which sat 18 years. It contained bold bad men, with hearts and heads fit to contrive the subversion of a state. But there were in it also persons of another character, very great indeed, with quite superior judgments, and with minds so rightly adapted for government, that the weight of the whole empire might be safely reposed upon their shoulders; in whom conversation with the dead wisdom of past ages, was joined with experience, and a perfect knowledge of this present world. These brave spirits from the beginning resisted that inundation of flattery and servile compliance, with which great revolutions in corrupt times are certain to be attended. They
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vigorously opposed that unanimous band, which diligently promoted arbitrary power. Sometimes they saved us when we were within three or four votes of utter ruin; they hindered that encrease of the King's revenue, which alone would have put an end to Parliaments. These were the prime leaders of such whom the people for some years were pleased to term the Country Party; and by good patriots, so called, our constitution was for a while preserved.

But after the year 1679, on both sides the minds of men grew so inflamed, and such animosities did arise between them, that they could no longer call one another by the civil appellation of Court and Country Party, so that the different sides began to be distinguished by other sorts of names.

It is indeed below the gravity of a sober writer to use the common cant words of the town, but it is sometimes unavoidable, especially when that which was only mirth and cant at first, became at last a serious matter.

The accidental words of Guelf and Ghibelin, in process of time grew to be the names of powerful parties, into which several countries were divided, and in which Emperors, Kings, Popes, and Princes engaged, and these names of distinction continued for some ages, producing wars and actions of great importance.

In the same manner the words of Whig and Tory, intended at first as reciprocal reproaches, in a short time grew to be the names by which two great parties were contented to be called, and into which in a manner the whole nation was divided.

They were termed Whigs, and indeed they called themselves so, who under another name, had heretofore opposed the corrupt and illegal proceeding.

ceedings of the court, who foresaw the dangers that would arise from a Catholic King, who were for correcting the exorbitances of Westminster-Hall, and for putting a stop to extravagant fines, and who made a resolute stand, and would give no more money, till the Habeas Corpus act was passed, and till the new raised army was disbanded; and who did their utmost against the surrender and regulating of charters.

In the next reign the same men, or men acting upon the same principle, declared themselves against taking of the test and penal laws. They shewed an open dislike in Parliament of Catholics being put into offices of trust. They abhorred the cruel executions in the west. They opposed the violent prosecution of the seven Bishops: And lastly, they were ready and active with their councils and assistance to bring over the redeemer of England.

A man is but young at 19, but a party may be thought old that is of so long a standing. The persons just now described were the Old Whigs, whose principles will be revered in future ages by all such as love their country. It is true, some persons did join with these, and call themselves Whigs, who had all along other views than the nation's service, whom disappointments had soured, who opposed to be taken off, and who did not like a court, because a court did not like them. But they who swim against the tide, must make use of all helps, and in corrupt times, even the best patriots have refused no sort of men that could any ways assist the public: The good and bad of these altogether were called the Whig Party.

To what had been formerly stiled the Court Side, the people afterwards gave the name of Tories. And we shall give an account of what sort
of

of persons this party was composed. The bulk of them consisted of such as were descended from the Cavaliers, whose families had suffered very much by the civil war, and who by education were seasoned with an early love to kingly government. They were jealous that all motions tending to preserve liberty, favoured of the commonwealth, with whose weight their fathers had been crushed. A most unwise generation of men, to have any fears that a commonwealth could be restored in a country so corrupted! Many of them were much of that principle of which Tacitus describes Marcellus Epius to have been, who said in the senate, "Se meminisse temporum quibus natus sit, quam civitatis formam patres avique instituerint: ulteriora mirari, præsentia sequi, bonos imperatores voto expetere, qualescunque tolerare." Many of them were debauched by pomp and splendor, and in the heat of their youth, they liked the pleasures of a court, but the riots of it compelled many of them, at last, to depend upon its favours. Others embraced the regal power more warmly, because they saw many of the opposite side bitter against the church, not so desirous to correct any of its errors, as willing to lay the ax to its very root. Others linked themselves with this band out of a cautious temper, and through a fear that contending with the court might produce another war. Some came into this side out of gratitude to King Charles, and many through mere affection to his person; for without doubt he was a most engaging Prince. Others went into it from a real conviction of their minds, that the King was not safe without more power, to which opinion they were chiefly led, by observing the rash councils, unquiet spirits, and insolent behaviour of some of their opponents. But with those

those who might act of this side upon a principle, there joined a great many who had no good intentions to the public, who were for enlarging the Prince's power, in order to augment their own, who were for robbing the people, that they might share in the plunder, who would have set the King above all the laws, that they might be never accountable to a Parliament for their proceedings; and, who pretending a great zeal for the church, were all the while making way for Popery; thus upon different motives, considerable numbers were lifted on this side, and the good and the bad mingled together, composed what was called the Tory Party.

But human affairs are subject to such odd turns, that in the next reign many of both these parties traversed their ground, and mutually passed into that camp which some of their enemies had deserted. Not a few of the Whigs entered into the worst of King James's measures and councils; and the eyes of those who had been reckoned Tories, were in a manner universally opened, and they began to see the errors they had been committing so many years, insomuch that they were as eager as any others to promote the Revolution: So that the soundest part of these clashing factions shook hands together, and joined in that rescue of our liberties which could never have been brought about but by the concurrent endeavour of both parties.

Both sides had their faults, and of both sides bad men were lifted, and of each side there were many who all along acted upon the principles of honesty and virtue, and who aimed at the common good, though as to the way to it, in their turns, each side might be now and then mistaken: It must indeed be granted, that the Whigs saw the diseases
that

that were growing upon the body politic, before the Tories; but when the distemper began to rage, the Tories were not behind hand in seeking out the proper remedy.

But though such as the common people then called Tories, joined in the Revolution, and had without doubt the greatest hand in it, having on their side men of fortunes, power, and figure, and the main body of the church, which will always be found the strongest interest in England, yet it must be confessed that the change was made upon the old Whig principles, of making Parliaments awful to the ministers, and of keeping the regal authority within the limits of the law; for what this nation then did, was directly opposite to the church or tory maxims; but when Princes quit the old rules of right government, their subjects will be apt to forget the old rules prescribed for their obedience.

It is hoped these names of distinction are now quite abolished and forgotten; but the faction of Guelfs and Ghibelins, after having slept for some time, revived again, and continued upwards of 200 years, even when the derivation of the words was no more remembered; and the parties lasted so long, because the same principles upon which they had first differed, remained still deeply imprinted in their minds, and afforded continual matter for new dissention.

In the same manner perhaps some time hence the names of Whig and Tory may be again renewed here, to disturb this nation's peace; and if this should happen, we must implore the Whigs not to forget their old principles and ancient maxims.

The Tories, by taking arms to defend their civil rights, and by joining to depose that Prince
by

by whom those rights were violated, have in the most public manner in the world renounced their doctrine of *Jus Divinum*, passive obedience, and non-resistance.

But if the Whigs should hereafter take their stations, if they should go upon that ground which the Tories have quitted, if they should enter upon just such measures, if they should pursue the same councils, if they should suffer themselves to be imbibed with Tory notions, our constitution must be entirely lost.

For they may undermine it without suspicion: Who will be jealous of those who have been preaching up liberty, and accusing arbitrary ministers for thirty years? Who will suspect such profest patriots? They may change the form of our government, and have the people of their side, who can have no jealousy of them, for the Whigs are the favourites of the people, as having so often preserved England. No person could be popular enough in Rome to think of subverting its constitution, in the purity of the commonwealth, but Manlius who had saved the capitol.

It will hardly be surmised, that they can mean to enslave us, who (by their speeches, actions, and writings) for many years seemed rather inclined to a republic than to despotic government. But if they should come to change their minds, if they should throw off their former principles, we shall be undone by the very men whom we thought our surest friends.

If old Whigs should hunt after places as much as ever the Tories did, and if like them, upon preferment, they should become quite new men, in voting, thinking, and speaking, in a moment making a sudden turn from the whole course of their former lives; if old Whigs, as the Tories did,

did, should ever take bribes and pensions to betray their trust ; if they should do any thing to break into the Habeas Corpus act, which is the chief guardian of our liberties ; if they should oppose any good act for the frequent sitting of Parliaments, which want in the constitution produced all our former miseries ; if they should openly oppose any reasonable provision for trials in treason, the want of which has lost many a noble life, and for which heretofore they had so loudly called ; if, as the Tories did, they should send their emissaries about to influence or corrupt elections ; if old Whigs, to whom *Meum* and *Tuum* was once so sacred, should come to ruin a society of trading men, and at one blow destroy many hundred families ; but God forbid Englishmen should ever have such a thought ! if old Whigs shall persuade any future Prince to closet members, as was done in the preceding reigns ; if by their power they should get men turned out of employment, for pursuing the dictates of their conscience, and understanding ; if like the ministers heretofore complained of, they should have a band of pensioners ready to give up any right, to grant any sum, and to excuse, nay even to vote their paymaster thanks for any male administration.

If the old Whigs should restore to men the same dishonest interest they had heretofore ; if they should consume us in their ministerial, and sell us in their legislative capacity ; if they should desire to have things governed rather by tricks and little arts, than according to the direction of the laws, or the bent of the people ; if they, who, upon the virtuous principles of keeping England a free country, in former times, opposed all excises, should be brought to create so many new
offices

offices and officers, as may influence elections round the kingdom; if they, who heretofore thought the best way to preserve their civil rights, was to keep the purse, and to have always something to give, should be for settling such an immense revenue on the crown, as may make Parliaments unnecessary; if they who were so careful in King Charles's reign, not to burthen the nation with taxes, should give away the people's wealth, as if England were a mine of treasure never to be exhausted; if they who have ever asserted, that all rents and payments to the crown were the kingdom's revenues, and not alienable, but by authority of Parliament, should in a short space of time come to alienate all the crown land, and to leave the King hardly a turf of ground either in England or Ireland; if they who formerly thought it sufficient matter of impeachment for a Lord Treasurer, or any other intrusted by the King, to pass large grants from the crown to themselves, should give to their creatures, and share among one another, in a few years, of crown lands, near to the value of two millions.

If the very men who have * “ asserted and
“ claimed it to be their true, ancient, and in-
“ dubitable right, and that it ought to be esteem-
“ ed, allowed, adjudged, and deemed, that the
“ raising or keeping a standing army within the
“ kingdom in time of peace, unless it be with
“ the consent of Parliament, is against law;” if
they who once believed this eagle in the air frightened
all motions towards liberty; if they who heretofore
thought armies in time of peace and our free-

* Act declaring the rights and liberties of the subject, p. 197.
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doms inconsistent; if the same men should throw off a Whig principle so fundamental; if they should become the open advocates for standing forces, and even submit to troops composed of foreigners.

If in this manner the old Whigs, whose foresight and courage has hitherto preserved England, should quite change their minds, and go thus retrograde from all their former speeches, actions, and councils; if they should thus come to clothe themselves with the foul, ridiculous, and detested garments of the Tories, and give into the worst of their measures; and if all that has been here discouraged should happen, then would the constitution of this country be utterly subverted.

For men finding themselves thus forsaken by the ancient friends to liberty, would believe they were bought and sold; they would imagine that there was no such thing as virtue and honesty remaining in the kingdom; they would think all pretensions to the public good, to be nothing but designs of ambitious persons, to lift themselves up to high honours, upon the shoulders of the people; and when nations have before their eyes an armed power to fear, and none in whom they can put any trust, they seldom fail of submitting to the yoke.

Free states yield to slavery when the men best esteemed, and most in vogue, are generally thought to be corrupted. This was the condition of Rome under Augustus, as Tacitus finely describes it*:
 “ Ubi militem donis, populum annona, cunctos
 “ dulcedine otii pellexit; insurgere paulatim, munia senatus magistratuum, legum in se trahere,
 “ nullo adversante: cum ferocissimi per acies aut

* Lib. i.

“proscriptione cecidissent. Cæteri nobilium,
“quanto quis servitio promptior, opibus ac ho-
“noribus extollerentur : ac novis ex rebus aucti,
“tuta & præsentia, quam vetera ac periculosa
“mallent, neque provinciæ illum statum rerum
“abnuebant, suspecto senatus populique imperio,
“ob certamina potentium, & avaritiam magistra-
“tuum : invalido legum auxilio quæ vi, ambitu,
“postremo pecunia turbabantur.” When the best
and noblest spirits were all extinct, and when it
was seen that the remainder were contented with
wealth, titles, and preferments, the price of their
submission, the Romans thought it their safest
course to commit all to the care and wisdom of a
single person.

In the same manner, if in times to come it
should happen that our nobility and gentry should
be more solicitous to get a small employment,
than to keep a great estate ; if the persons of note
and figure should be swayed by their private in-
terest, without any regard to the public good ; if
it should be visible to the counties and boroughs,
that men covet to be chosen, not for their coun-
try’s service, but in order to serve themselves ; if
it should grow apparent, that neither side is at
bottom better principled than the other ; that
Court and Country Party, Whigs and Church-
men, are nothing but the factions of those who
have, and those who desire preferment ; if in this
manner the whole mass of blood in the body po-
litic should be corrupted, the nation will throw off
that reverence to Parliaments, which has hitherto
preserved our liberties, and like the neighbouring
countries either terrified or allured, they will by
degrees submit to unlimited monarchy ; and so
we shall lose one of the best constitutions that was
ever set afoot for the well governing a people.

Handling

Handling as we do the methods whereby a nation may encrease in wealth and power, we thought it necessary to describe those parties and factions which probably hereafter may come to influence in its councils; and this has been done in order to incite good men to watch over their growth and progress, and such good men chiefly as design to engage on neither side, but to bend all their care that no side may be able to hurt the commonwealth.

And if it should be asked, Why the care of liberty and preserving our civil rights should be so much recommended in a paper relating to Trade? we answer, that herein we follow * Machiavel, who says, "That when a free state degenerates into a tyranny, the least mischief that it can expect, is to make no farther advancement in its empire; and no farther encrease either in riches or power, but for the most part it goes backward and declines."

This deep statesman has a saying in another place †, well worthy of eternal remembrance: "That the Prince who aims at glory and reputation in the world, should desire a government where the manners of his subjects are corrupted and depraved, not to subvert and destroy it like Cæsar, but to rectify and restore it like Romulus, than which the heavens cannot confer, nor man propose to himself a greater honour."

It may be objected, that in France, where all thoughts of liberty are extinguished, trade and riches have of late years very much encreased. But this admits of an easy answer. An absolute Prince, with great abilities and virtues, by care and wis-

* Machiavel's Discourses on Livy, lib. ii. c. 2.

† Lib. i. c. 10.

dom may make his country flourish for a time. However, if his successors are weak or wicked, all shall be soon unravelled and go backward, and poverty shall soon invade the same people which before began to thrive; for to make a nation very rich and powerful, there must be a long succession of good Princes, (which seldom happens) or a long succession of good laws and good government, which may be always had in countries that preserve their freedom: And without doubt it is on this account that Machiavel has asserted*, “That no cities have augmented their revenues or enlarged their territories, but whilst they were free and at liberty.”

And if in future times the nobility and gentry of England (which God forbid) should traffic the people's rights for titles, bribes, or places, *vilia servitii pretia*, and if they should be induced fearfully, or which is worse, corruptly to give up this constitution, poverty will creep insensibly upon us. We shall, as Machiavel says, “go backwards and decline;” land will yield a great deal less than now, rents will be ill paid, and we shall not have a Foreign Traffic large and extended enough to produce such a naval strength as may make us safe at home and terrible abroad.

It is therefore upon the authority of this great Man that we have laid down, “That a country cannot encrease in wealth and power but by private Men doing their Duty to the Public, and but by a steady course of honesty and wisdom, in such as are trusted with the Administration.”

However, if things should hereafter proceed amiss, it is hoped the strong constitution of this

* Lib. ii. c. 2.

government will in time throw off those diseases which may affect it for a season, and that the united wisdom of the nation can recover us from that decay of health to which we may be reduced by a few empirics of state: Their giddy management for a while may be supported and born out, by the great riches which peradventure may have been collected here by the industry and prudence of former ages; but if what has been gathering seven centuries, they should squander away in a few years, the cries of that people whom they so impoverish, will at last awaken the Parliament to enquire into, and animadvert upon their wild proceedings.

If the wealth and power of a country depend upon the good government and stability of its affairs; it must certainly import all the different ranks of men to contribute their utmost that things may be well administered: And in mixed constitutions almost every man is able in some degree to help towards this; for if the people are honest and careful in the choice of their representatives, and if those representatives perform their duty, arbitrary power can never be settled here, and no male-administration that may hereafter happen can long continue.

That we are in no danger at present, and that matters proceed well, now is allowed; but for the security of future times it may not be amiss frequently to repeat this caution, that our whole depends upon keeping one post well defended.

The public virtue which must preserve a state is "A constant and perpetual will to do our country good;" and where this principle governs, though in the minds of but a few, yet if they persevere with undaunted courage, the small number may prevail at last to defeat the malice of the
the

the corrupt part, especially when the endeavours of the few are assisted by a Prince disposed by interest and inclination to promote the common welfare.

If good men were but as active and vigilant as their opposites, it would not be so easy a matter to change the constitution of a country : When those who are concerned in honour and interest to have things well administered, do resolutely and firmly join together to oppose such as find their profit by a corrupt and loose administration, a stand may at least be made, and some stop put to the further progress of the evil.

But though Pompey, Cæsar, and Crassus, composed a fatal triumvirate, and united in a strict league to subvert the liberties of Rome, we do not read that there was the same union and good understanding between Lucullus, Cato, Cicero, and the rest, who endeavoured to save the commonwealth ; for the luxury and laziness of some, the forward temper, or secret ambition of others, made them either neglect or obstruct the business of the public, which might be the reason that Cæsar at last prevailed.

In the same manner, if hereafter a cabal of men, in order to their own greatness, should design to change this constitution, to introduce a government by the sword, and to give away all the nation's wealth ; and if to these ends they should form assemblies, and there propose what they intend to consent to in another place, they will succeed, and their attempts can never be withstood, unless such as mean England well, join in as firm a league for its preservation, as they shall enter into for its destruction.

If therefore, in future times, it shall be visible that some men, to build their own fortunes, are
pushing

pushing at their country's ruin, good patriots must then exert all their virtue, they must reassume the courage of their ancestors, they must lay aside their pleasures, but chiefly, they must sacrifice to the public all their ancient animosities; they must mutually forgive one another; it must be no more remembered of what party the man was, it being sufficient to enquire, whether or no he always acted upon the principles of honesty and honour. At such a time the best men of both sides, if the name of parties shall still remain, must shake hands together, with a resolution to withstand the unanimous, subtle, and diligent enemies of the King and kingdom.

In such a juncture both sides must contend, not which shall flatter highest, but which shall best contribute to the defence of their Prince's person, and to the maintenance of the established government.

If bad men shall have meetings to consult how they may destroy our civil rights, good patriots ought to meet calmly to communicate counsels which way those rights are to be preserved; for Machiavel says*, "There is not a better or more secure way to suppress the insolence, or cross-bite the designs of an ambitious citizen, than to take the same way to prevent, which he takes to advance them."

In such a juncture, not only the best of all parties must be taken in, but we must be angry with no sort of men that are willing to unite against the enemies of England; for in a nation which for a long time was, as all allow, upon a dishonest interest, it will be difficult to find persons whose characters shall be entirely without a blemish; nor

* Discourses on Livy, c. 52.

indeed was there ever any man perfect : At such a season therefore, men must place their hopes in such as have most abilities, and fewest faults, especially when they live in the dregs of Romulus, and not in the republic of Plato's institution.

If the nobility and gentry retain their wonted courage, and preserve their former wisdom, they will always rescue us out of weak and polluted hands, and will never endure that so noble a Prince as we have now upon the throne, esteemed by the whole world, and head of the Protestant interest, should at any time be distressed at home, or interrupted abroad, in the measures his high valour purposes for the good of Europe, by the ill conduct of any minister.

Particular men do often miscarry in the world ; notwithstanding that in their whole transactions they give continued proofs of a most perfect conduct : They shall not be the richer for their thrift, nor better esteemed for their integrity : Their industry shall avail them nothing : Their courage shall never bring them victory, and their wisest counsels shall have no success. Others in the mean time every way deficient, of no desert, and merely by the help of fortune, shall succeed in all they undertake. But though she may be said to govern thus in single events, and here and there to influence in the actions of private persons, great monarchies and commonwealths do not depend upon her. Politic institutions, prudently ordered in the beginning, and keeping on in a steady course of wisdom and virtue, are out of her power and rule, and can never fail to prosper ; and when disasters happen to a state, it is seldom the work of chance, but rather the effect of some misgovernment.

For

For in former reigns we have seen, that when the King's revenue was not well managed it proceeded from this, that the employments relating to it were not the rewards of skill, but the recompence of another merit, and that want of knowledge in the managers was winked at while they were giving money in another place. Heretofore if men betrayed their trust and sold the people, it was because they were largely invited to it. In former times, when the nation's trade impaired and went backward, the secret cause was that the ministers were servilely to promote the interest of some other country. And in the preceding reigns, if the King's treasure was wildly dissipated, and if exorbitant grants were made, it came from this, that the ministers could refuse no body, having a great deal to ask for themselves, and that they were not to put rubs in the way of others, that they might more smoothly carry on their own pretensions. These instances are only given, not but that by many others we could support this position, that when the public treasure is wasted, when a nation runs into immense debts, when the land of the crown is granted all away, when its revenues are ill managed, and when the people are corrupted, we are not altogether to blame fortune, the times or accidents of the war, but rather to attribute a great share of these evils to some error in the subordinate parts of the administration.

Tiberius, in a letter to the senate, has this expression * : “ Nescio an suafurus fuerim omittere
 “ potius prævalida & adulta vitia, quam hoc ad-
 “ sequi, ut palam fieret quibus flagitiis impares
 “ essemus.” The scope of his epistle is to shew

* Tacit. l. 3. Ann.

how difficult it was for him to correct vices, with which the principal men of Rome were tainted, and that by the attempt he might draw envy upon himself. But though a cautious Prince might have reason to entertain such a fear, the whole legislative power of a country need never lie under apprehensions of the like nature. This strength can deal with the ambition, avarice, corruption, and rapine of the great ones : The legislative authority can correct men of arbitrary principles, and pull down the topping pride of insolent and undertaking ministers, who are by no means equal to their business, and whose heads are giddy, and turn round in the eminence, on which fortune, flattery, and their other vices, not their merit, has placed them.

And if our affairs here should ever happen to light into such hands, we must put our chief hopes in the King at the head of a Parliament.

While that place contains men of courage and public spirit, matters cannot long proceed amiss. Whoever therefore undertakes that trust, should continually have before their eyes how much the common welfare depends upon their virtues. But above all things, they should have disinterested and self-denying minds.

It can hardly be conceived, but by those who have seen it, what reverence is paid, even by his enemies, to a man of steady principles, the tenor of whose words and actions are always the same ; who is neither to be bought nor frightened : He is admired and followed ; all he says has its due weight, his honest hoary head is dear to all mankind. Whereas the whifling prolers after places, and little busy intriguers, are contemptible to the very men, of whom they are the wretched instruments. And let the ambitious think what they

they please, that man has most real power in this country, who is believed to be of the most unshaken integrity towards the public, and he who has such a character, enjoys more true greatness than all the vain pomp and honours a court can give.

The employments of England are yet but few, and their profits but inconsiderable to what they are in several nations; however small as they seem to be, it is to be feared that some time or other they will be made engines wherewith bad men will endeavour to subvert this constitution.

It is true, at present we are out of such a danger, but if in future times we should chance to see all employments reserved for men in one certain station, if the road to preferment should lie but through one place and passage; when this happens, we shall have cause to be alarmed, and to look about us.

They who feel within themselves abilities to serve the public, are by no means blamable in desiring to be upon the stage of business. On the contrary, that four philosophy which makes some persons at all seasons retire and abandon the state, is by no means to be commended. They do indeed but *nomine magnifico, segne otium velare**: If the posture of affairs will possibly admit it, good men should rather strive to be in power, that the commonwealth may not be ingrossed by corrupt and unskilful hands. A wise man can easily discern whether the ministers are such, that he may with honour and safety mix in councils with them. If the administration be sound and right, or if it has but a face looking that way, it is a proper season for men of probity, skill, and virtue, to

* Tacit. lib. iv. Hist.

produce their talents, and to push themselves forward, in order more fully to mend things. And at such a time they should be ready to assist the state with their true sense and right understanding; nor should they lazily suffer the perfections of their minds to be useless and unactive. And if among those there be any very eminent, strong in friends, versed in affairs of state, of a deep reach and foresight, who have eloquence to sway assemblies, and courage to resist and overcome popular fury, such ought not to despair of the public, but assist with their wisdom to redeem a people from their weak hands, who shall get into power by mere chance, when the nation perhaps has been in a high ferment, as in boiling liquors the scum will get uppermost. And there is such reverence paid to those who have a very great genius, that when they offer themselves to serve the commonwealth, the weight of the people will bear down all the upstart pretenders, and force them to give way, and make room for merit so superior.

But if it should ever happen that the administration should be entirely bad and wrong, then ought good men to have no share nor hand in it; they should withdraw from any participation in the negligence or guilt; they should quit what they cannot honourably hold; they should concern themselves no more in business, leaving such ministers to govern by themselves, who will not govern well, and be contented to serve their country by defending liberty in one post against any encroachment; they should not make so ill a use of that affection the people may bear them, and of the interest they may have in the nation, as to be a shelter for the crimes or folly of others; nor should they as it were lend their countenance,

nance, and be the screen behind which bad men may safely attempt to undermine the constitution.

If the times are good, silent merit will be sought after; but if they are bad, ill men will be lifted up to the offices and dignities of the state by the applause of their adherents, and the faction of their friends; but at such a season it is no shame not to be employed. Tacitus speaking of *Ælius Lamia*, says, “*Et non permiffa provincia dignationem addiderat*.*”

Great men are often liable to one unfortunate vanity: They believe their parts, dexterity, and wisdom, to be such, that they can mend things, give them a new complexion, correct all errors, and at least that they shall preserve themselves sound, though every one else be tainted; and upon these presumptions, some of the men in best esteem have heretofore engaged with a foul and depraved ministry; but we could never see that they were able to make any converts: On the contrary, instead of changing the court, the court did alter them.

Courts are but slowly mended, and that not by the authority or example of any single person, except it be of the Prince himself, strongly bent to set matters upon a right foot. And yet we have more instances of courts which have spoiled their Prince, than of Princes that have reformed their courts.

And if it be asked, When is the most proper time for persons of probity and virtue to undertake the management of affairs? it may be answered, It is then seasonable when things call loudly to be mended, when unskilful pilots have run the ship

* Tacit. lib. vi. Ann.

aground, so that she sticks fast, ready to split at the next coming of the waves; when ignorant men are quite bewildered in their errors; when the whole people see and feel the effects of ill government; when the Prince grows ashamed of those whom his subjects hate and fear; when the commonwealth cannot emerge out of its debts and difficulties, without help from abler hands, then is the true time for the best men to offer themselves to the service of their country. At such a season honesty will not stand alone, weak, defenceless, and out of countenance at the sight of prosperous vice: Nor can courts be ever safe for honest men, till the circumstance and necessity of the times bring thither a party strong enough to maintain itself against those who are grown great by wicked arts.

If Englishmen will be continent in this single point, all must of course go well; if they who have noble commands in the country will scorn meanly to depend in town; if they who have brave seats of their own, will despise the crowded antichambers of the great ones here; if they who have plentiful estates, will slight a troublesome and precarious employment, they are more happy than a court can make them; if our nobility and gentry would consider how miserable the noblemen of France are with all their mighty places, they would at no time hereafter desire to wear the livery of bondage. And if they are truly seasoned with these notions, that their liberties are above all price, and (as Sir Benjamin Rudiard was wont to say) "That there is nothing worth being a knave," the head must be very skilful, and the heart very bold, that will undertake to invade our fundamental rights.

It

It is true, what has been here advanced, and what shall be said anon, may seem needless at present, when all things are presumed to go well, but these notions may be of use to after-ages.

“ The duty which private Persons owe to the Public,” lies in a very narrow compass, and when that is thoroughly performed, a country seldom fails to see “ a steady course of wisdom and honesty in such as are trusted with the Administration.” This duty may chiefly consist in the following particulars :

I. That such as represent the people be uncorrupt, unbiaſſed, and diſintereſted.

II. That they diligently attend the nation's ſervice.

III. That they carefully watch any innovation or encroachments upon the conſtitution.

IV. That they make proviſion againſt future evils.

V. That they look narrowly into the income and expence of the kingdom, and examine which way imenſe debts have been contracted, and how that money has been diſpoſed of which the nation has already granted.

VI. That they hold a ſtrong hand over the men of buſineſs, calling thoſe to an account, who, either through folly, or upon ſome wicked deſign, purſue deſtructive meaſures.

1. “ That ſuch as represent the people be uncorrupt, unbiaſſed, and diſintereſted.” This point we have handled ſufficiently in the ſeries of this diſcourſe. And to what has been already ſaid upon that ſubject, we ſhall now only add, that Rome was once free ; that France heretofore had the three eſtates, which were the guardians of its liberty ;

liberty; that Spain had formerly many rights and privileges, of which nothing now but the shadow remains; that Denmark and Sweden had once constitutions something like that of England; and that all these countries have been enslaved by their own corruptions.

2. "That they diligently attend the nation's service;" for otherwise they do not discharge their trust to which they are chosen. It has been formerly a matter of great wonder, that gentlemen should even waste their fortunes to be elected, and yet afterwards never mind that station which they seemed before so vehemently to covet. Cato had many virtues too big for practice, but he may be easily imitated in one good quality he had, of never failing to be present in the senate. Such should give way to others, and make room for men of more leisure, who cannot afford to employ all their time in the service of their country. But above all others, they are to blame who can be drawn from their duty by luxury, laziness, and pleasures. Liberty can be hardly wounded in a full house; the attempts made upon it in former reigns were made when such as had no dependence upon the court were absent about their country business. The ill ministers of those days took that opportunity to promote taxes, which would never pass in a full assembly; to pass dangerous laws; to set afoot new invented corporations which may be fatal in their consequences; and to form projects either destructive to the nation in general, or ruinous to particular men. All the ill things ever done have been compassed when the negligence of some had made one side strong and the other weak.

And if in after-ages any of the men of business should be so wicked as to proceed by the same council,

councils, and to go by the like measures, they will promote their dark designs in some such juncture, when the best patriots shall be gone away quite tired out by sessions artificially prolonged.

But it is the duty of all who love England, to defeat by unwearied patience such a conspiracy against the people, and to obviate such a mischief: If the ordinary rules cannot do it, extraordinary laws may be thought on to oblige the members to that attendance which they owe their country.

He who does not attend, injures the borough for which he serves; for it may so happen, that in his absence a thing may pass to their ruin who have sent him, and which his presence might have prevented; his electors therefore seem to have such a right to his service as in reason no others ought to dispense with, without their consent.

Deserting in this manner the Public, is a growing evil, upon which account it ought to have a timely remedy. Perhaps it might not be amiss, if a bill were brought in to make it highly penal for any member to be absent from the house above fourteen days, without express leave first had under the seal of the borough for which he serves.

A great many mischiefs both public and private would be prevented, if such as represent their country would be strict in this duty of attending.

3. "That they carefully watch any innovation
"or encroachments upon the constitution." There is nothing lulls a people more asleep than the reign of a good Prince, revered for his wisdom, feared for his high courage, beloved for his lenity, and admired for a number of other virtues; whereas under a bad reign, the subjects are jealous
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and vigilant, though often to little purpose. However, it is agreed on by all writers, that the mild rule of Augustus, contributed more to confirm the slavery of Rome, than all the severity and cunning of Tiberius.

The best times likewise produce the worst presidents; for in good times the people let many things slip, being then at their ease, not suspicious, and consequently not watchful over the government; but where this supine temper prevails, mixed governments decline immediately into absolute power. The frequent contests that were of old between the senate and people of Rome, without doubt preserved their freedom; for where all are of one mind, ill use may be made of that unanimity, by some eloquent, subtle, and ambitious man, who may turn and rule it as he pleases. Therefore, to preserve constitutions that have a mixture in them of popular government, it is necessary there should be always some small division, just enough to keep the minds of men awake, that they may observe what advantages one part of the state gets over the other.

Bad Kings provoke enough to look into their actions; but when the people have a good Prince, they give a favourable interpretation to all he does.

And the best man that ever reigned may be ill served. It is a maxim of our law, "That the King can do no wrong, but if any ill be committed in matters of state, the council; if in matters of justice, the judges must answer for it *." But though the laws exempt our Kings from blame, they are not freed from the bad effects of ill conduct in their ministers.

* Declaration and Remonstrance of Lords and Commons, May 19, 1642.

He therefore who represents his country, cannot do the nation nor his Prince better service, than to see that those who sit at the helm do not run the ship upon dangerous rocks. Absolute dominion is a bait with which the greatest minds may be tempted; for they whose goodness is unlimited, may desire that their power should be so too. But no one man ought to think of being omnipotent, unless he could be omniscient and omnipresent. Besides, though Princes may desire great power, that they may be able to do great good, such as serve them rarely proceed upon this principle. They often desire their masters should be arbitrary, in order to their own impunity, and to build a large fortune for themselves, for which reason they should be watched in all their windings, and followed in all their dark and subtle mazes.

It seldom happens that the liberties of a country are invaded all at once. The steps of power are leisurely and slow. Ministers who have it in their thoughts to change the nature of a government, go to work by degrees. At first they make use of the most popular hands they can possibly procure, ordering it so, that the people may not perceive who it is that puts their fetters on, but these popular men they shove out at the first convenient season, that all may be of a piece. Their next business is to corrupt such persons as have the clearest fame, whom they discard when sufficiently tainted, and this they do that the people may think all mankind alike, which naturally drives them to follow those only who are in power, and who can do them good. Afterwards they get from the nation all the money they can, the collecting of which erects new employments, and creates them a number of dependents, who, in one certain place, are their chief strength and best support:

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By the distribution of these sums, they likewise make more friends. But being never out of fear of accounting for all at last, their principal aim is to procure their Master such a standing revenue, as may make him subsist without the people's help. If they find this impossible or difficult, then by accusations, by exorbitant proceedings without any precedent, and by harassing private persons, either in their fame or fortune, they endeavour to make all the different ranks of the people out of love with their ancient constitution.

But when they have done all this, they will not yet think themselves quite out of danger. "Senatus & populus nunquam obscura nomina, et si aliquando obumbrentur*." They will still lie under apprehensions of being reached at last by the guardians of liberty. Therefore, to damp all thoughts of freedom, to influence the better sort, and to awe the vulgar, their last work is to procure a standing army.

By manifest original contract, an armed force cannot be raised nor kept within this kingdom, without consent of Parliament, so that if hereafter we should be ever enslaved that way, it is our own proper fault.

Where armies are powerful, there grows a necessity upon Princes, rather to please them than the people. And yet no mercenaries are sufficient to help a Prince against a powerful foreign force, if the subjects are disobliged at home. Machiavel says †, "That a Prince who founds the duration of his government upon mercenary troops, shall never be firm nor secure." But he counts foreign forces yet more dangerous,

* Tacit. lib. ii. Hist.

† Prince, ch. xii.

because "they are always unanimous, and at the command of other people*."

If hereafter any ministers should be so wicked to attempt the subversion of our fundamental rights, we have here shewn some of the steps which they will probably make to compass their designs. It therefore imports all good men to watch their first invasions and encroachments, and betimes to intercept them in their course.

4. "That they make provision against future evils." The virtues requisite for such as will handle matters of government, have their foundation in wisdom and courage. He whose endowments of the mind are not sufficient to foresee a long while before what may be the event of a council, cannot consult safely for his Prince; and he who at every turn is afraid of popular anger, shall never give any sound advice.

Virtue and wisdom, in some sense, are terms synonymous, and different words, signifying the same thing; for no man can be virtuous with any effect conducive to the public good, without a rich talent of the mind, and strong wisdom; nor can a man be truly wise, without such public virtue as warmly embraces the liberty, honour, and interest of his country. And when a genius of this kind appears in any nation, he has a natural right to the offices and dignities of the state: But if ever courts shall happen to be depraved, they will like quite another sort of men: Wanting true wisdom, they must set up something in the room of it; that is to say, momentary shifts, and short remedies; raw and unskilful meddlers in business are their darlings, that will venture at all, and yet know nothing; upon

which principle they make open war with desert of any kind, and reckon it a great conquest, when they can get rid of a wary and knowing statesman.

They count it supreme wisdom to answer any single necessity, never regarding whether the manner of doing it be safe, just, or honourable. They not only trust providence, (as all men should do) but are content to rest wholly upon it; believing foresight, and thoughts of the future, to bring more anxiety than profit. They are wise, as some men subsist from hand to mouth; they think it sufficient to live to-day, and to make provision for the present moment. All this perhaps may be good philosophy in private cases; but for the whole body of a state to go by such rules, must needs be very dangerous.

Machiavel says*, “The Romans could never relish the saying that is so frequent in the mouths of our politicians; to enjoy the present benefits of time.” They either provided against, or fronted a danger; and seldom let themselves be overtaken by it: He says likewise, “That things which are discovered at a distance (which is done only by prudent men) produce little mischief, but what is easily averted: But when, through ignorance or inadvertency, they come to that height that every one discerns them, there is no room for any remedy, and the disease is incurable.”

Cardinal Richlieu says†, “It is the duty of ministers of state to represent to their masters, that it is more necessary to consider the future, than the present; and that distempers are like

* Prince, cap. iii.

† Testament Politique du Cardinal Richlieu, p. ii. c. 4.

“ the enemies of a state, against whom prudence
 “ obliges to march, rather than tarry till they are
 “ come to drive them out again ; that those who
 “ do not follow this method, will fall into great
 “ confusions, which it will be very difficult to re-
 “ medy afterwards.” But he lays down, “ That
 “ it is a common thing among weak men to drive
 “ off time, and to chuse the preserving their ease
 “ for a month, rather than to deprive themselves
 “ of it for a while to avoid the trouble of many
 “ years ; which they do not consider, because
 “ they see only what is present, and do not anti-
 “ cipate time by a wise providence.” He farther
 adds, “ That ministers, who never consider to-
 “ morrow, live happily for themselves ; but
 “ others live unhappily under them.”

We have here cited the authorities of two very able men, both in the theory and practice of state affairs ; to shew how dangerous their measures are, who consult nothing but their present ease, who love palliating remedies, and who are for removing from them the evil day at as great a distance as they can.

If we should ever fall into such hands, they will not care with what debts and payments they load future times, so they may come at a little ready money. They will give large premiums and interest, never considering who must pay the reckoning at last. They will set afoot high duties, never weighing how the people's trade and manufactures are thereby affected. They will not mind how profusely they waste the nation's treasure ; negligence and prodigality being pleasant and easy for the present time, though afterwards the parents of infinite care and trouble.

Constancy in denying unreasonable suits ; thrift for the public ; promoting foreign traffic ; improving

proving the revenues granted; keeping the ships of war in good repair; laying up stores; making schemes for better government; retrenching all needless expences; providing against wars to come; making good leagues abroad; allaying heats and animosities at home; and putting impediments in the way of any power that grows too fast; are so many seeds which great and able statesmen are always sowing, without a prospect to reap in many years; but the harvest comes at last; and under the conduct of such ministers nations thrive and flourish: Whereas, such as proceed upon that narrow notion of "enjoying the present benefits of time," though they may thereby do their own work, and make their own fortunes, yet without doubt they will ruin whatever government they undertake to guide.

If, in after-ages, they who are trusted with the administration here, should be thus careless and unforeseeing, it will be the duty of such as represent the people, by frequent and serious enquiries into the state of the nation, and by plain speeches, to rouse up the men of business from a lethargy that may prove so fatal; for undoubtedly any part of the legislative authority may call upon the executive power to make provision against future evils.

5, "That they look narrowly into the income and expence of the kingdom, and examine which way immense debts have been contracted, and how that money has been disposed of which the nation has already granted."

The last Duke of Buckingham had many designs to put the affairs of his estate in order; and to this end he consulted several sorts of men: His wife and true friends laid before him, that no ways would be so effectual as to look into his accounts,
to

to employ honest stewards, and to live within compass. But there was another set of people in whom he more delighted, who made him believe they would put his business into such a posture, that no negligence or profusion should do him any hurt. In short, they told him directly, that they would procure for him the philosophers stone. He hearkened to them, minded none of his affairs, he let his servants do what they pleased, and would put no limits to his expences. But the consequence and conclusion of all was, that his Grace's evil counsellors became rich, and he grew poor.

In the same manner, if in some future reign we should fall into the hands of bad ministers, they will tell the Prince, that they can get for him the *magisterium*, (and indeed it would prove a kind of philosophers stone, if they can so concert matters, as to obtain all the supplies they shall insist on) they will persuade him they can maintain his crown and dignity out of a mine of new projects never to be exhausted, and upon this view they will advise him, first, to give them very large sums to buy limbecks, crucibles, and charcoal; for utensils must be had, and workmen must be paid; they will promote the making exorbitant grants, and giving away the crown lands upon this notion, that it is sowing a little to reap much. They will conceal pernicious pensions under the dark veil of Secret Service: An article that hides all. "But the estimates of the charge of the war" will be the best shelter they can possibly have for their profusions of any kind, where they may insert Items never to be disproved, and never to be understood. Finding how much it turns to their own account to have an ample revenue to range in, they will persuade their Prince to ask all things, and to spare nothing: And if such bad men as have
been

been here described should ever come to be trusted, they will make the body poliric faint and look pale with continual opening of its veins; they will leave the crown bare, the exchequer empty, and all the revenues anticipated; they will distress the gentry, and beggar the common people; and having thus enriched themselves, and impoverished all other degrees of men, they will reduce the nation to be naked and defenceless, hardly able to support itself at home, much less in a condition to undergo another foreign war.

If at any time herereafter, such men as have been here pointed out, should be suffered to entangle our matters, to dissipate our treasures, and to waste the commonwealth, where will be the money, the fleet, and arms, that may be necessary in case the French should ever break the peace, and attempt to possess themselves of Spain and the West-Indies?

If by the giddy, or rather frantic conduct of beardless politicians, lifted perhaps up from the meanest obscurity, and set in a manner to hold the reins, our affairs should hereafter be brought so low, (which God forbid) as that we must sit still, while those dominions fall into a power already but too dreadful, how can universal monarchy be avoided? And if Spain should happen to be thus lost, we are not only hurt in a point of empire, the most important of all, but the whole trade of England will be cut up by the very roots.

It may be laid down for a certain truth, that no man of a great fortune was ever undone in a few years, but he was cheated of much more than he was able to spend: And this is yet more true, if the man had parts, and a good understanding. Private men are ruined, when those about them
are

are unfaithful, and are to profit by their destruction; and if they have no trusty servant that will put them in mind of their condition.

The same holds in the affairs of a whole nation. When a Public, that was once clear and easy, is overwhelmed with debts; when this happens among a people that have been always willing to give, and in a ministry that has never been backward to ask, when all occasions have been supplied to their full demand; when the Prince is wise and without any expensive pleasures; when such a country does labour under difficulties almost insuperable, and when in some future reign all this shall be our case, mankind will entertain an opinion that the administration is not right, the world will be inclined to think, that such as shall then govern in the revenue, want either fidelity or skill; it will be thought that they have not at any time laid before their Master a true state of his affairs; it will be believed that they have never contrived his expences with care and wisdom, and that they have not endeavoured by grave and wholesome councils to moderate his bounties.

The liberality of a Prince, the most extended we can imagine, will yet oblige but a very few; and to give it a constant supply, vast numbers must be harassed. Besides, among the vulgar, frugality in a court does in some measure commute for high taxes. Liberality is noble in rich and quiet times, but it will hardly be thought just when what is given is to be in a manner the last drop of blood in the subjects veins. Not to value their treasure has been always the fault of great and heroic minds, of which many had been ruined every moment, but that they had grave and honest ministers ready to keep them within bounds by wholesome advices, rugged truths, and severe virtue.

virtue. And so the Duke of Sully proceeded with his Master Henry IV. When a Prince is in his nature too bountiful, it is a duty incumbent upon such as serve him, with all humility to beg, that in his high wisdom he would consider how hardly that is gathered, which they shall see so lightly given: They ought rather to quit their posts, than to sign or fix the seal to immoderate gifts. But those hands must be very clean themselves, which are held up to Kings with humble prayers, that they would have compassion on their people.

It is true, war is a devouring monster, and to feed it will very much disorder the revenues of a country; and yet we see France has been able for nine years to engage all the strongest part of Europe, to have all the while land armies, consisting of above. 300,000 men, and to maintain a fleet as numerous, and more expensive than that of England: And after all this, they have been in a condition to make larger expences of all kinds, (as is said) than in any two years during the war; and we see them now in a posture to meditate higher designs than ever. That they did bear up so long against the confederate strength; that they have been able annually to expend such an immense treasure for upwards now of ten years, and that they are not at present quite exhausted and impoverished, must without doubt proceed from the good conduct of those to whom the management of their affairs has been entrusted. No man is endured, under that monarchy, to perform the functions and offices of the state in an ignorant and careless manner. The ministers there are more frugal for their master than in their own concerns; they do not make too much haste to be rich; they are contented that a great fortune should be the recompence of many services, and
of

of long merit. They have not let the crown lands of France be as it were a derelict, *et primi occupantis*: We do not observe it has been so ordered in that kingdom, that both the body of the people and the public too are poor at one and the same instant there; ministers have not suffered the commonwealth to be consumed by usurious contracts with the common lenders; and by their care and wisdom they have obtained such credit, even under a despotic power, that they have not been forced all along to pay above seven per cent. interest for money lent the Kings, whereas forty per cent. has been paid for mighty sums in one free government; so that upon the whole matter it is evident enough, that “this devouring monster” war is to be fed” where the men of business are honest, foreseeing, and frugal for the state.

Mixed governments, among many other excellencies, have this advantage, that a good administration may be obtained by any one part of the constitution, that will set itself strongly to so good a work: Kings can all times set things right, if the business of their wars do not compel them to be often absent. Either of the houses, when they have set themselves to enquire into, and correct disorders, have been terrible to the most bold, subtle, and most powerful statesmen that ever went about to undo a people, or to mislead a Prince.

If in any future reign the treasure of this kingdom should be mismanaged, and profusely wasted; and if debts, hardly to be waded through, should be contracted, the representatives of the people may, by looking strictly into all these matters, perhaps immediately lessen the public engagements, at least they may put some stop to the farther progress of the mischief.

In such juncture, good men will think it their duty to see whether this debt is not to be lessened, by reviewing former accounts, they will examine whether the sums already granted were not sufficient to pay off all the forces we have had at land and sea: They will enquire from whence such a high article of arrears proceeds; they will see how so many funds come to be deficient, and whether such deficiencies have not been occasioned by some ill conduct in those who have managed the respective branches; they will inform themselves which way the many millions are gone which the people have paid; they will desire to know what necessities could compel men of business to give such large premiums and high interest; and whether the promoters of a council so pernicious did not lend their own money; and whether they have not been parties deeply concerned themselves in all usurious contracts: They will enquire upon what consideration, and for what services, immoderate grants of lands and money have been made, and they will do it the more strictly, if, when such grants were passed, it should happen that the nation was indebted, and paid heavy taxes.

The representatives of the people can look into all these things; and, no doubt, it is a duty which they owe their country, that has trusted them with so unlimited a disposal of their fortunes.

To prevent mismanagement in the revenue of this kingdom, it seems necessary that a law should be made to put the lords of the treasury under such an oath as the lord high treasurer of England takes; for it appears an absurdity in our government, that the meanest officer concerned in the King's revenue should be sworn to a true and faithful discharge of his trust; and that the treasury,

fury, who are trusted with the whole, whose authority is so boundless, and who have it so much in their power to hurt the nation, should be under no oath at all. Some objections there are against this; but he who considers them well, will find them of no weight, and that those necessities which have broken into, and overruled the ancient course of the exchequer, might have been avoided by care and conduct.

If in future times England should have any grounds to doubt that the treasure of the public has been embezzled; if prodigious fortunes, raised in ten years by obscure men, who have had no dealings but with the court, should minister occasion of suspicion; if resumptions should be thought fit, we mean in cases where persons of no merit have been enriched with the kingdom's spoils; if it should be thought reasonable to see whether any thing is to be saved in an immense debt, out of the unwarrantable gains which the lenders have made; if it should be judged expedient to enquire into any male-administration in those through whose hands the revenue passes; if it should be deemed necessary thrift to look into all pensions; if it should be thought reasonable fairly and impartially to state the account of so many millions given and expended, so great and difficult a work as a strict enquiry into all these matters will prove, cannot be entered upon, and brought to a good conclusion, but by the united wisdom of the nation.

No other power can face that strong league which will be made between fellow-criminals to save one another. Ordinary remedies prevail but little against stubborn and inveterate diseases: If therefore our affairs should be ever in disorder, the
legislative

legislative authority can bring the most effectual helps to set us right.

And in such a case, peradventure, it may be thought advisable to promote a bill, that such sort of abuses as have been here described, and all other male-administration of the like kind, may be enquired into by committees of both houses, to sit in the interval of Parliament, with all requisite powers, without salaries, and to be chosen by ballot. And supposing past errors to be too big for correction, yet so awful an authority, and the fear that will from time to time be renewed, may, for the future, be some check to the growing corruptions of the age.

All the premises considered, we submit it to better judgments, whether it is not the duty of such as represent their country, “to look narrowly into
“the income and expence of the kingdom, and
“to examine which way immense debts have been
“contracted, and how that money has been disposed of, which the nation has already granted.”

6. “That they should hold a strong hand over
“the men of business, calling those to an account,
“who either through folly, or upon some wicked
“design, pursue destructive measures.” Helvidius Priscus, after the example of his father-in-law Petus Thrasea, in the philosophy he made use of to fit himself for the service of his commonwealth, followed the opinion of the stoicks, who placed all good and evil in honesty or dishonesty, accounting the gift of fortune, such as high birth, power, and wealth, to be but things indifferent towards the constituting of happiness, which they define to be internal, only in the mind.

But though Aristides, Socrates, Phocion, Publicola, Cincinnatus, Attilius, Regulus, and many others, have been great men under a constant and
willing

willing poverty ; yet, without doubt, nobility and riches help good spirits on in their way, and set them forward : He that is high born, his perfections may be sooner taken notice of, as standing upon an eminence ; and he that has wealth need not be troubled with private and domestic cares, and may devote all his time and thoughts to the service of his country.

Machiavel says *, that a Prince who intends to invade the constitution of a free people, takes this course : “ To subvert all, to turn every thing “ topsie-turvie, and make all things new : To alter magistracy, create new titles, elect new persons, confer new authorities, advance the poor, “ and impoverish the rich. That what is said of “ David may be said of him ; he filled the hungry “ with good things, and the rich he has sent empty “ away. Besides, it is his interest to build new “ cities, to shift the inhabitants from one place to “ another ; in a word, so to toss and transpose “ every thing, that there be no honour, wealth, “ nor preferment in the whole province, but what “ is ownable to him.”

Some of these courses were taken by Henry III. in France ; but his chief aim was to introduce new persons into such offices and dignities of the state, as were filled before with the nobility and princes of the blood. He raised out of the dust obscure persons, who might owe to him only their wealth and honour, and who might look upon him as their second creator : These paid him a blind obedience ; they never considered what was for the public good, what was reasonable, safe, expedient, just, or honest, but in all things did as they were commanded ; with such a set of men

* Discourses on Livy, lib. i. c. 26.

this dark Prince gave the first mortal wound to the liberties of France; he placed them so high as to overlook the old gentry, who, being weakened and depressed, had neither the interest nor the courage to preserve their ancient form of government.

He has been followed in these steps by all the French Kings his successors; so that under that monarchy, in every reign since, we have hardly seen any but the creatures merely of the Prince's favour, and quite new men upon the stage of business; and such have in a manner engrossed all the employments of profit, trust, and honour.

We grant, that in a well constituted government, which is upon a right foot indeed, neither wealth nor titles, and nothing but virtue and abilities, should prefer a man to the honours and employments of his country. But when the times are too corrupt to admit of such measures, the question will be, Who with most safety are to be relied on, they whose fortunes are made, or they who are to make their fortunes? They who have a satiety of titles, or they whose ambition may prompt them to attempt any thing to advance themselves?

In all likelihood countries (whose depraved manners will not allow them to lift up virtue in distress, and which in truth cannot find such men to serve them as were Aristides, Socrates, and those other heroes whom we newly mentioned) should desire to see themselves ruled in the subordinate parts of government, by the best hands that can be possibly got: If it is to be come at, they should endeavour to have places of great honour and high trust, filled with persons whose birth, estates, and other circumstances, seem in human
proba-

probability to set them at least above the common temptations of the world.

He who has a good stake will be afraid to engage in desperate councils; he who has a large estate will not consent to have the laws subverted, which are his firmest security; for where the sword governs, lands at best are held but under a precarious title. They who are well born will desire to preserve that constitution of which they and their ancestors have always been a part: Instead of governing and making a figure in their country, in all appearance they will be loth to become the contemptible clients and dependents of some favourite or minister, whom chance or partiality shall set above his betters.

But they who come into a government with a design to build a family, and make a fortune; who are to get all, and can lose nothing; who are chiefly recommended by their boldness to undertake, and readiness to comply, whom no councils fright, and whom no measures shock; such men are indeed the proper instruments for introducing arbitrary power, but can hardly be thought fit ministers in any nation that is desirous to preserve its freedom.

Whoever looks over our histories will find, that all the attempts which were heretofore made upon the liberties of England, have been formed by such persons as have been here described.

Most of our former Princes having had designs of absolute dominion, and finding that the men of fortune and figure would rather obstruct than promote their intentions, thought it more conducing to their ends to be served by another sort of people, and did therefore bring into the management of their affairs all along a set of ministers, weak, ambitious, light, designing, rash, unskilful
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in the arts of wise administration, and versed in nothing but craft and tricks; but at the head of these they had always some one that was to be the forlorn hope, and who would venture to go greater lengths than any of his companions: And for this post they generally chose a pushing man of a bold spirit, a ready wit, a fluent tongue, obscure and low in the world, and such a one whom fortune could hardly leave in a worse condition than she found him. Nor was it difficult to find persons of this character, who would hazard their heads to compass power, wealth, and greatness. And though they could not arrive at unlimited monarchy, the philosophers stone, our former statesmen have so much hunted after, yet in the search of it they found several other good things; we mean good for themselves, that is to say, titles and great estates. It is true, many of them have been interrupted in their course, and the weight of the people has borne them down at last. But a man of a wretched beginning, never heard of before, when he sees himself lifted up high, seldom thinks of the laws, impeachments, and the ax. He hopes to elude justice; that the power which set him on will bring him off, and that he may be defended by his numbers, and a corrupted majority devoted to him; or as his predecessors have done, that he may at last retire full of wealth and crimes, and that his guilt will be covered in the fresher offences of those who are to succeed him: Or men of this stamp, when they have got all they can, may think to be forgiven by changing sides; and that it will be time enough to become good patriots when they are no longer suffered to hurt the commonwealth; for the arms of the public have

been but too open to embrace such a sort of penitents.

Upon these, or the like hopes, the Cethegi and Catilines of former times have presumed to attack the liberties of England. It must therefore be a duty incumbent upon such as represent their country, "to hold a strong hand over the men of "business."

It would be endless to enumerate all the dangers that may befall a free government, if it should have at the head of its affairs a minister of a bold and enterprising spirit, who, from a low degree, aspires to the highest greatness, and whose ambition is not restrained by any private or public considerations.

If in some future reigns it should be our case to have such a man in a station, and with the power of doing much hurt, all such as desire to preserve their civil rights, should with undaunted courage set themselves to stop him in his career, and to intercept him in his growth.

Machiavel says *, "There is one rule infallible "to Princes in the election of such as are to serve "them. When you observe your officer more "careful of himself than of you, and all his actions and designs pointing at his own interest "and advantage, that man will never be a good "minister."

We shall beg the reader's pardon for one short digression in this place, and it is to take notice of another fine remark of the same author†, who says, "The actions of a new Prince are liable to "a stricter observation than if he were hereditary; "and when they are known to be virtuous, gain "more upon people, and oblige them farther

* Prince, c. xxii.

† Ibid, c. xxii.

" than

“ than antiquity of blood, because men are more
“ affected with present than past things.” But to
return to our matter.

The Spaniards were in a flourishing condition in Richlieu’s time*: And in the beginning of his ministry the affairs of France were in great disorder: He wholly attributes the prosperity of Spain to this principle (running through all their councils at that time, and prevailing with all their ministers) of preferring the public good to private interest; and the contrary obtaining in France, he says, was the cause of all their disorders: So that we may justly think the present greatness of the French has taken its rise from this noble principle, having gotten there deeper footing now than it had heretofore.

Ministers, whose chief aim, in all they do, is their own greatness, can neither be good for prince nor people. And when they consult their private interest more than the public good, it is, in many instances, apparent to all the world; as for example:

1st, When they take no care of their Master’s revenue. For in all countries, and in all ages, bad statesmen have thriven best under Princes plunged in debts and difficulties.

2dly, When they have made a false step, and do not own it, and recede, but rather call in the Prince’s authority, and all his more immediate dependents, to help them out, and to countenance their errors, it is a sign they have more regard to themselves than to his honour.

3dly, When they enter upon new and desperate counsels, which if they succeed well, will redound to their proper glory; and if they should have a

* Testament Politique du Cardinal Richlieu, p. 2. c. iii.

bad event, may hazard his ruin; it is a plain mark that they are ready to sacrifice his safety to their own vanity or ambition.

4thly, When they conceal from him truths which he ought to know; when they do not acquaint him with the state of his affairs, nor with the true condition of the nation; when they do not endeavour to moderate his expences; and when they do not quit, when sound counsels cannot prevail, it is an evident proof that they prefer keeping up their interest, as they call it, and holding their post and employments, to all other considerations whatsoever.

5thly, When they are ready to do any thing, let it be never so hurtful to their Master, provided it square with the interest and measures of the party of which they are at the head, and by whom they are boyed up, it is a mark that they aim at being independent even of the Prince himself, and that they think to subsist more by the strength of their own faction than by his favour.

6thly, When man to man, and singly, they are willing to own any errors, but say at the same time that they were against this and that, accusing their brethren of the state for every miscarriage, it is a sign that provided they themselves are well thought on, they do not care what opinion the people entertain of the whole government.

7thly, When they are for proposing dishonourable and unjust shifts to raise money, rather than to take the pains of forming beforehand better schemes for ways and means, it is a sign that they prefer the momentary arts of recommending themselves to all thoughts whatsoever, and that they consult more their own ease than the public good. It is likewise an evidence that they are not of

Richlieu's

Richlieu's mind, who says *, " That public administration takes up the thoughts of judicious ministers, infomuch that the perpetual meditations they are obliged to make, to foresee and prevent the evils that may happen, deprives them of all manner of rest and contentment, excepting that which they receive in seeing many sleep quietly, relying on their watchings, and live happy by their misery."

8thly, When, contrary to the constitution of the land, they promote counsels which tend to the keeping up an armed force, it is a sign that not daring to trust the laws, they would have their proceedings maintained another way; that they desire such an impunity as the sword has seldom failed to give bad ministers in other countries. It is a mark that their own safety is their principal object, and that they had rather the nation should be burthened with taxes, and have the form of government altered, and that the Prince should lose his subjects hearts, than venture themselves before a free and angry people.

We have given some of the marks which selfish and designing statesmen may be known by hereafter. And if in future times it should be our case to see persons of this character upon the stage of business, we must rouse up the vigour of our ancient constitution, we must awaken all the laws, and direct them boldly to the heads of such a dangerous sort of men.

Machiavel says †, " That they who governed the state of Florence from anno 1434 to 1494, were wont to say, that it was necessary every five years to review the state, for otherwise it

* Testament Politique, p. 2. c. iv.

† Discourses on Livy, lib. ii. c. i.

“ would be very hard to maintain it: They called
 “ reviewing the state, reducing the people to the
 “ same terror and awe as they had upon them of
 “ old, when every man was punished according to
 “ his crime, let his quality be what it would.”

He lays down likewise, “ That kingdoms as
 “ well as commonwealths, have often occasion to
 “ be reduced to their first principles:” Which,
 he says, “ was done in France by the parliaments,
 “ who revived the ancient government as often as
 “ they opposed the King in his arrests, and as
 “ often as they called great delinquents to ac-
 “ count, whose crimes, if they are suffered to
 “ grow, cannot be reformed but with disorder, if
 “ not the dissolution of the whole government.”

For want of pursuing some such like courses, the French have lost their old constitution, and are now under the absolute sway of a single person; and that we in England continue still to be a free people, is without doubt chiefly owing to that power which our ancestors have from time to time exerted, of impeaching such of the great ones as they saw entering upon measures which plainly tended to introduce unlimited dominion.

We have been hitherto preserved by pulling down such men as were setting themselves and their Master above the laws; and we shall transmit to posterity our civil rights untouched and untainted, if we do not lose our wonted courage.

If therefore, in any future reign, it should be seen that the ministers waste the kingdom's treasure; that they misgovern or misapply it; that they break into appropriated funds; that they give advices which invade property, and which, in their consequences, tend to disaffect the people: And lastly, that to secure themselves they pro-
 mote

mote one counsel which must end in the subversion of all the laws ; if these things should come to appear, they who represent their country will not be afraid to attack these bold and high crimes with complaints, addresses, and impeachments ; for if this be omitted, the impunity such men have found, will engage so many new offenders, that at last, by their number, they grow safe, and above correction ; and when this happens, (as it has appeared in the instance of France) the liberties of a country are entirely lost.

When matters are become unquiet by ill conduct, discerning Princes, like wise men who have a law suit, desire to piece things up as soon as possible, and to remove the bone of dissention, as seeing full well, that troubles make the common people inquisitive ; that enquiry gives them knowledge ; and that when they have knowledge, they are very hard to govern.

But ill ministers often think that the best course to save themselves is yet farther to embroil their Master's business, not considering that the more things grow disturbed, the greater necessity there will be of sacrificing them to appease the people's anger.

Statesmen should take great care how they contract public hatred : For both good and bad Kings desert them at last, and with just reason ; for he who has not judgment, conduct, and wisdom enough to avoid being odious, deserves not to be protected by his Prince, to his own hurt and danger.

Is there any instance of a wise, just, and good King (reigning so long as to have virtues known) who had not the hearts and affection of his subjects ? When plots are formed against such Princes, are they not presently defeated ? And does not all
mankind

mankind detest the conspirators? And let some flatterers say what they will, the vulgar are not impatient of any rule that is tolerably fair and easy; at bottom they love the splendor of a court, and are fond of regal power; so that Kings, who will but stoop the least to be popular, are doated upon, and idolized in every country.

The same thing holds in relation to ministers, if they are honest, if they have a superior genius, if they do not make too much haste to be rich, if they are notoriously seen to prefer the common welfare before their own private interest, if they are affable and industrious in doing good offices, if by their actions it is known that they do not desire to hold their stations upon any ignoble terms, if they are not haughty, arrogant, and insolent, they may rule the state without clamours, they may grow grey in their dignities and offices; the best part of mankind will be constantly of their side. And if they are at any time attacked by private malice upon some disobligations or disappointment, their enemies will not be able to do them any hurt: Clouded they may be for a while, but they will soon shine out with fresher lustre: If by inadvertency, and through the frailty of human nature, they have made false steps, and committed small faults, the general voice will be ready to excuse them, and their perfections shall be put in the balance, and outweigh their errors.

But here it may be objected, that Richlieu, who was undoubtedly one of the greatest men that ever undertook the guidance of a state, and who had very near all the good qualities necessary for one to whom the reins of empire are committed, did, notwithstanding, lie under continual accusations, popular anger, and conspiracies against his person. To which we answer, that this cardinal was
a good

a good minister for the French King, but not for France. He had all along designs to make his Master absolute. It is true, he endeavoured, by his sagacity, care, and deep foresight, to make the French as great and happy as a country can possibly be under an unlimited dominion: However, his foundation was not sound at bottom, nor honest to human kind: He was therefore, from time to time, harassed, interrupted, and perplexed by the few good patriots that remained, who had still an eye towards their ancient constitution: Some indeed joined with these to oppose him, who did not act upon so right a principle.

But when the ministers in the measures they take to promote their Master's greatness, consider their country's freedom, when at one and the same time they are trusty and impartial servants to Prince and country both, when they duly contemplate how unwise and wrong it is ever to let them have a divided interest; such statesmen as do all this, stand like rocks, against whom the waves, stirred and moved forward by vulgar breath, beat in vain. They are safe, revered by the best sort, and the darlings of the people; such need not fear the scanning of their actions, popular anger, nor the secret machinations of discontented persons; their innocence is their sure guard, armed with which, they are not apprehensive of impeachments.

From what has been here said, peradventure it will appear, that mixed governments are not to be long preserved under their old form, unless such as represent their country "do hold a strong hand
"over the men of business, calling those to an
"account, who either through folly, or upon some
"wicked design, pursue destructive measures."

But this high cordial is not to be used upon every slight occasion; it was never intended by our
ancestors

ancestors to encounter distempers better cured another way, and to be then only administered when the body politic was sick at heart. Nothing can be admired and awful, that at every turn is exposed to common view : Impeachments are the laws of the supreme sword, which should be drawn only to cut off great offences ; it should hang high, with the scabbard on, over the heads, and in the view of such as meddle in matters of state ; and when it is unsheathed, be in a way and manner so very terrible, as to make all offenders tremble.

If in times to come, our affairs should happen to be under an ill administration, the calamities that must thereby fall upon all degrees of men, (those excepted who shall have enriched themselves by the public spoils) will stir up the legislative authority to interpose in looking after our future safety.

And at such a season perhaps it will be thought the sublimest wisdom of all, not to be angry with persons, but to mend things ; and that it will not import much though the criminal escape unpunished, so the fault can be corrected. The remorse and shame of having, it may be, in a few years ruined a rich and flourishing people (for so the case may happen) will be punishment enough to those who have left in them any seeds of honour.

Such therefore as mean their country well in an unhappy juncture of this nature, when they go to give affairs a better complexion, should in all likelihood begin their work by determining and pronouncing " What councils have been directly
" against the law, what advices have tended to
" impoverish the crown and kingdom, and what
" practices have wasted the nation's treasure."
And when in this solemn manner they have condemned

demned the offences, if they think fit, the offenders may be reached with ease.

If we should ever have a set of statesmen whose offences will compel the nation to accuse them, they will endeavour to cover their own faults by recriminating upon the proceedings of former times. If they are charged with wasting the public treasure, and giving away the crown lands, with aiming at arbitrary power, and to govern by the sword, they will be so audacious to think they stand justified by answering, "The same things" "were heretofore done." But they ought to make this reflection, that King Charles was in danger to lose his crown; and that King James actually lost it, because his ministers pursued measures destructive to the kingdom.

And now in a few words to recapitulate the whole matter of this long section; if such as represent the people are uncorrupt, unbiassed, and disinterested; if they diligently attend the nation's service; if they carefully watch encroachments upon the constitution; if they make provision against future evils; if they look narrowly into the debts and expences of the nation; if they hold a strong hand over the men of business; and if in this manner "private persons perform their Duty" "to the Public," we shall not fail in all succeeding times, to see "a steady course of honesty and" "wisdom in such as are trusted with the Administration of Affairs." For it may be laid down for a certain maxim, that statesmen will hardly be negligent, corrupt, or arbitrary, when they are overlooked with careful eyes by so considerable a part of the constitution.

And where things are well administered, "that" "country will always encrease in wealth and" "power." Have we not before our eyes the example

ample of Spain, labouring under public and private wants, occasioned by nothing but a long series of misgovernment? What has preserved the Venetians for thirteen centuries against such potent leagues as have been frequently formed against them, but that the goodness of their constitution has enabled them to do great things with a very little? Would people under a tyranny, or indeed under a better form of government ill managed, have defended themselves with such courage as Venice and Holland have done? Did ever countries fight so bravely for their oppressors, as nations that have contended in the defence of their own liberties? Where matters are in a tottering condition, do not the people grow sullen and loth to venture their stocks out of their sight? Is it not seen that at such a time men hoard their money up which should circulate in trade? When the subjects are under apprehensions that ill conduct at home will at last produce wars, dangers, and invasions from abroad, have they not in all ages at such a season intermitted their foreign traffic, manufactures, and other business? What begets general industry, but hopes to have property preserved? Is it not evident that though here and there a private man accumulates great riches under an absolute monarchy, yet that the whole body of the people is always poor and miserable in countries so governed? What encourages men with infinite care, labour, and hazard, to gather private wealth, which enriches the public at last, but the hopes that stability of affairs, prudent conduct, and just administration, may produce peace, security, and lasting empire? Where men have a prospect of all this, strangers resort thither with their wealth and stocks, whereas merchants and other cautious persons abandon countries,

tries, whose follies and corruptions subject them to continual changes and frequent revolutions, so that peradventure, upon solid reasons and very just grounds, we may lay down, that nothing more contributes to make a Nation Gainers in the General Balance of Trade, than good laws well observed, and a constant course of honest and steady government.

As trade and riches have their principal foundation in the liberty and laws of a country, so when those great springs go right, they set in motion the engine of a commonwealth, though some other wheels may happen to be out of order.

To have the course of law and courts of judicature proceed uncorruptly, is such a remainder of strength and health, as may in time help to recover the other sickly parts of a constitution.

So that a nation is not depraved beyond all hope of cure, which has in the chief seats of judgment men of deep learning, probity, moderation, and integrity.

We shall conclude this last section with some advices which Richlieu directs to Lewis XIII*.

“ Unless Princes use their utmost endeavours to
“ regulate the divers orders of their state ; if they
“ are negligent in the choice of a good council ;
“ if they despise their wholesome advice, unless
“ they take a particular care to become such that
“ their example may prove a speaking voice ; if
“ they are negligent in establishing the reign of
“ God, that of reason, and that of justice together ; if they fail to protect innocence, to recompence signal services to the public, and to
“ punish disobedience, and the crimes which
“ trouble the order, the discipline, and safety of

* Testament Politique, part ii. chap. x.

“ states ;

“ states ; unless they apply themselves to foresee
“ and prevent the evils that may happen, and to
“ divert by careful negotiations the storms which
“ clouds drive before them from a greater distance than is thought ; if favour hinders them
“ from making a good choice of those they honour with great employments, and with the
“ principal offices of the kingdom ; if on all occasions they do not prefer public interest to
“ private advantages, though otherwise never so good livers, they will be found more guilty than
“ those who actually transgress the commands and laws of God ; it being certain, that to omit
“ what we are obliged to do, and to commit what
“ we ought not to do, is the same thing.”

END OF VOLUME II.